Staff Publications

Staff Publications

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    'Staff publications' is the digital repository of Wageningen University & Research

    'Staff publications' contains references to publications authored by Wageningen University staff from 1976 onward.

    Publications authored by the staff of the Research Institutes are available from 1995 onwards.

    Full text documents are added when available. The database is updated daily and currently holds about 240,000 items, of which 72,000 in open access.

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Record number 428610
Title Can altruism stabilise international climate agreements?
Author(s) Pol, T.D. van der; Weikard, H.P.; Ierland, E.C. van
Source Ecological Economics 81 (2012). - ISSN 0921-8009 - p. 112 - 120.
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2012.06.011
Department(s) Environmental Economics and Natural Resources Group
WIMEK
Publication type Refereed Article in a scientific journal
Publication year 2012
Keyword(s) environmental agreements - contingent valuation - social identity - public-goods - cooperation - preferences - fairness - coalitions - consumer - schemes
Abstract We study the impact of altruism on the stability of international climate agreements. We consider the standard two-stage game for the analysis of international environmental agreements where countries announce their participation at the first stage and abatement levels are chosen at the second stage. We modify the game to consider altruism in the participation decision, i.e. countries consider, to a certain extent, the net benefits for other countries in their decisions. We study two types of altruism: impartial altruism, where countries show a concern for all other countries, and community altruism, where the concern extends only to coalition partners. We use the stability of coalitions model (STACO) to illustrate the impacts of both types of altruism on the stability of a climate agreement. We find that a limited degree of altruism is sufficient to stabilise the Grand Coalition such that a globally efficient climate policy can emerge while in the absence of altruism only a fraction of countries would join a climate agreement and the benefits of cooperation would largely remain unexploited. Our results indicate how moving beyond national interests can support the success of international climate agreements
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