Staff Publications

Staff Publications

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    'Staff publications' is the digital repository of Wageningen University & Research

    'Staff publications' contains references to publications authored by Wageningen University staff from 1976 onward.

    Publications authored by the staff of the Research Institutes are available from 1995 onwards.

    Full text documents are added when available. The database is updated daily and currently holds about 240,000 items, of which 72,000 in open access.

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Record number 505781
Title Interconnected Games and International Environmental Problems
Author(s) Mouche, P.H.M. van; Folmer, H.; Ragland, S.
Source In: Game theory and International Environmental Cooperation / Finus, M., Caparros, A., Cheltenham, U.K. : Edgar Elgar Publishing (The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series ) - ISBN 9781782545095 - p. 215 - 237.
Department(s) Economics of Consumers and Households Group
WASS
Publication type Chapter in book aimed at a professional audience
Publication year 2015
Abstract The purpose of this paper to introduce the concept of interconnected games and to show its relevance for modeling international environmental problems. It is argued that an interconnected game approach to international environmental problems may enhance cooperation and provide an alternative to the use of financial side payments to induce countries to cooperate. Two types of interconnected games are distinguished in this paper, i.e. direct sum games and tensor games. In the former all the constituting isolated games are games in a strategic form and in the latter they are repeated games. In both cases the interconnected game can be interpreted as a multiple objective game, but only the setting where a trade-off is made for the vector-payoffs is considered. In additin to the formal definition of these types of interconnected games, some elemenary results concerning Nash equilibria of such games are derived.
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