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ABBRVIATIONS

AO       Algemeen Overleg (parliamentary discussion meeting)
AXO      Abandoned Explosive Ordnance
CCM      Convention on Cluster Munitions
CCW      Convention on Conventional Weapons
CMC      Cluster Munition Coalition
ECOS     European Coalition on Oil in Sudan
EIF      Entry into Force
ERW      Explosive Remnant of War
EP       European Parliament
FTE      Full-Time Equivalent
GGE      Group of Governmental Experts
HRW      Human Rights Watch
ICBL     International Campaign to Ban Landmines
IHL      International Humanitarian Law
IKV      Interchurch Peace Council
IPCN     IKV Pax Christi Netherlands
MBT      Mine Ban Treaty
MP       Member of Parliament
NATO     Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation
NGO      Non-Governmental Organisation
NSAG     Non-State Armed Group
PCI      Pax Christi International
PCN      Pax Christi Netherlands
SC       Steering Committee (CMC)
ToR      Terms of Reference
UN       United Nations
US       United States (of America)
UXO      Unexploded Explosive Ordnance

NOTE

The Dutch Interchurch Peace Council (IKV) and Pax Christi Netherlands (PCN) have merged into one organisation IKV Pax Christi Netherlands (IPCN) with effect from January 2007. References in this report to work or events carried out before this date relate largely to Pax Christi Netherlands, while references to 2007 and later and recommendations for the future are directed to IKV Pax Christi Netherlands. The usage of the organisation’s name will therefore depend on the (overall or historical) context and thus vary throughout the report.
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As a sociologist and policy analyst he focuses on conflict and disaster-induced vulnerabilities and responses at the local level as well as on associated policies and interventions designed and implemented at international and national levels. Frerks further acts as an advisor to several governmental and non-governmental councils and organisations in the field of conflict and peace, including the Netherlands Defence Academy.

Frerks has carried out evaluation studies on conflict-related subjects for multilateral, governmental and non-governmental agencies. He completed with co-author Bart Klem an evaluation of the Dutch Stability Fund and also co-authored studies on Civil-military Action and Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration.


For IKV Pax Christi he completed three earlier Best Practice Studies; *Informing the public, transforming policy. Pax Christi’s advocacy and lobby activities on Colombia*. IKV Pax Christi Best Practice Study no. 1 (co-author: Hilde van Dijkhorst); *The European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, 2001-2007*. IKV Pax Christi Best Practice Study no. 2; *Local Peace Initiatives in Ituri, DRC, 2003-2007*. IKV Pax Christi Best Practice Study no. 3 (co-author: Pyt Douma).

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1. INTRODUCTION

In the context of its current strategic multi-annual plan subsidised under the Thematic Co-financing Programme of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, IKV Pax Christi Netherlands (IPCN) carries out a series of best practice studies. The present study is the fourth study in this series.

Goals of best practice studies
IKV Pax Christi hopes to achieve the following goals by carrying out these best practice studies:

- The documentation of its (successful) activities;
- Making available the experiences gained from the best practice studies to project managers and others within IPCN to improve its learning capacity;
- To share best practices and experiences gained with IPCN’s partner organisations and strategic allies (Cordaid, Interchurch Organisation for Development Cooperation (ICCO), Interchurch Peace Council (IKV)1, Pax Christi International etc.);
- To create a basis for policy dialogue with relevant stakeholders;
- To contribute to policy and strategy building within the own organisation;
- To contribute to the development of quality criteria within IPCN and to its overall evaluation practice.

The main objective of the best practice studies is to derive the positive lessons from existing experiences to enable constructive change and improvement in current and future programmes. Best practice studies have a more limited focus than full-fledged evaluations in that they focus on learning, dialogue and change rather than on upward or external accountability. Yet, they share with other evaluative approaches a number of problems such as the question of attribution and causality, the replicability of findings, and how to arrive at a sound judgement on the basis of often contradictory and multifaceted data (the valuation question).

The Disaster Studies Group of Wageningen University has been invited to carry out these best practice studies. There are two types of study: one is a more limited study (type I) on the basis of a file study and some interviews in the Netherlands, and the other one is a more elaborated study (type II), comprising fieldwork in the country of operation as well. The first best practice study Informing the Public, Transforming Policy, Pax Christi’s Advocacy and Lobby Activities on Colombia, written by Georg Frerks and Hilde van Dijkhorst, was a type I study. The second study The European Coalition on Oil in Sudan, 2001-2007, by Georg Frerks, was also a type I study. The third study Local Peace Initiatives in Ituri, DRC 2003-2007, written by Georg Frerks and Pyt Douma was a type II study, including field work in the Ituri District in the DRC.

Lobby and advocacy campaigns by IKV Pax Christi
This report concerns a type I study on IKV Pax Christi’s involvement in the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC). Lobby and advocacy campaigns by IKV Pax Christi generally aim to establish public and political awareness and encourage (policy) change. IPCN as well as, earlier, its predecessors separately, have been involved in lobby campaigns. IKV and PCN have become well-known due to the campaigns against nuclear weapons, especially against the so-called neutron bomb and against the placement of cruise missiles on Dutch soil, which mobilised in the 1980s ten thousands of people in protest marches and meetings. Another Pax Christi campaign was focused on increasing international awareness of the Colombian situation and to stimulate a sense of solidarity between the European Community, Colombian

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1 With effect from 1 January 2007 IKV and Pax Christi Netherlands have merged into one organisation IKV Pax Christi Netherlands.
churches, non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and local leaders (see best practice study no. 1; Frerks and van Dijkhorst 2005). Both IKV and Pax Christi took part in International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL), also known as the Ottawa Initiative. Pax Christi was further the coordinating member of the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS) aimed at reaching an end to oil exploitation in southern Sudan until there was a just and lasting peace. After the signing of the Comprehensive Peace Accord in 2005 ECOS shifted its focus towards the management of oil revenue and towards social corporate responsibility, including the involvement of local civil society (see best practice study no. 2; Frerks 2008).

The selection of CMC as the object of a best practice study and research questions

Like in the case of ECOS, the Cluster Munition Coalition exemplifies an approach where the activities IKV Pax Christi were conducted in the framework of an international coalition. As bans on particular categories of weapons need to be effected internationally in order to have a meaningful impact, this campaign to achieve a ban on cluster munitions had to be focused on national, international and multilateral actors at the same time. Hence, an internationally coordinated lobby and advocacy campaign seemed to be the most suitable approach. In addition, such a coordinated approach allowed for the pooling of scarce resources, specialist knowledge and expertise. On the other hand, it faced at the same large obstacles of a political and logistic nature. Issues related to weaponry and security, are generally highly charged political topics linked to considerable geo-strategic and commercial interests worldwide. In addition, armament issues are usually surrounded by high levels of secrecy and circumspection, and there is often a reluctance to share information by those involved, even in democratic polities. Moreover, coalitions of a diverse group of heterogeneous, mainly non-governmental actors are generally difficult to merge into effective campaigning machines. It may, therefore, not be easy to arrive at concerted NGO-action globally. Hence, the CMC formed an appropriate subject for a best practice study. The specific questions mentioned in the Terms of reference (ToR) are as follows:

- Which strategy was used during the (Dutch) cluster munition campaign?
- How successful was the campaign?
- What lessons can IKV Pax Christi learn for other campaigns?

The present study describes how the CMC-campaign evolved over time and what lessons can be drawn. The period covered is from 2003 till 2008 when the Convention on Cluster Munitions was signed, but it also mentions some follow-up activities that were carried out in 2009. It differs from the ECOS or Colombia campaigns studied earlier, in that the focus is not on a country or a particular conflict, but on a category of weapons that is spread world-wide.

Definitions of advocacy and lobby

For the purpose of this study, advocacy is defined as: ‘the act or process of convincing leaders and decision-makers to use their powers and influence to support an issue or cause by the making or changing of law, policy or programme and in the allocation of resources’ (Nukuro 2000: 2).

Lobby is “A group, organization or association seeking to influence the passage or defeat of legislation. … By some definitions, lobbying is limited to direct attempts to influence lawmakers through personal interviews and persuasion. Under other definitions, lobbying includes attempts at indirect, or ‘grassroots’ influence, such as persuading members of a group to write or visit their district’s representative and state’s senators or attempting to create a climate of opinion favourable to a desired legislative goal” (www.lectlaw.com, accessed 18-10-09).
Another definition describes lobby as “the act of attempting to influence business and government leaders to create legislation or conduct an activity that will help a particular organization” (www.businessdirectory.com, accessed 18-10-09).

Lobby and advocacy organisations try to translate public moral outrage into political action by turning media attention towards a certain issue or subject, or try and rally support directly from people that are able to make changes, i.e. politicians. According to the literature, advocacy campaigns have generally successfully mobilised moral outrage into political action when the targets are clear, the cause obviously just, and the abuses graphic. Yet, achieving political victories in practice and securing their implementation requires continued political pressure (Nelson 2000).

**Evaluating advocacy and lobby**

Literature on international campaigning by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) pinpoints to the difficulty in assessing what impact can be directly related to NGOs’ advocacy and lobby activities and what to other factors. As argued by Nelson (2000), “Evaluating impact is difficult, and the results are usually ambiguous and debatable, but the process is essential to NGOs’ effectiveness and credibility.” Chapman and Wameyo (2001) assert that: “The monitoring and evaluation of advocacy and influencing work is critically underdeveloped. … Current ‘project focused’ monitoring and evaluation systems and methods are inadequate for assessing the value of influencing and advocacy work where the emphasis is on the development of civil society and its ability to hold decision makers accountable” (2001: no page number). These authors argue that advocacy evaluation is compounded by the problem of causality and attribution of impact. Moreover, outright victories are rare and often compromises need to be reached that may include trade-offs, introducing an element of subjectivity when judging the gains. Advocacy may include a whole range of different tactics and instruments, and many changes only become manifest at the long term, as policy reform is slow and incremental. They also note there is little accumulation of knowledge in this field. Chapman and Wameyo recommend that not only outcomes but also processes need to be analysed as well as the different interrelated levels at which advocacy takes place and the alliances that are forged in the process. With regard to results it is not only policy change that matters, but also its implementation. Chapman and Wameyo identify a number of gaps in the prevailing knowledge on how to evaluate advocacy. These include *inter alia*: the working of networks and movements, the notion of people-centred advocacy, the conflictual and political aspects of advocacy work, the political or democratic space for advocacy, and the issue of gender (2001: no page numbers).

Similarly, Kelly remarks that “few organisations … have evaluated their [advocacy] work until recently and most have struggled with suitable methods and approaches that enable them to be clear about the usefulness of advocacy work” (2002: 4). She adds that the unique combination of strategies, targets and outcomes make simple comparisons between interventions over time difficult, while effective advocacy itself is seldom a straightforward process. Instead it is ‘a gradual accumulation of attention and focus with occasional precipitive events’, causing organisations to play multiple roles and relying on many different players in often unpredictable contexts (2002: 4). This requires that each campaign should be seen as a unique undertaking of which ‘a picture’ needs to be build, next to some more general issues usually addressed in conventional monitoring and evaluation studies. In this connection, Kelly argues that next to the outcomes or results *per se*, attention should be paid to the strategy and vision, the program logic, the specific objectives, the framing of the intervention, the legitimacy of the lobbying organisation, the coalitions and alliances forged, and the adaptation of the strategies and tactics to the evolving context and opportunities over time. Finally she notes the importance of a joined-up approach as part of a series of interventions in a wider programme. The joined-up nature of advocacy relates to attempts to embed the specific action in broader initiatives (Kelly 2002: 4-5).
Lessons learned from the ICBL

Williams and Goose, who were actively involved in the ICBL, outline the lessons learned which can be derived from the Ottawa process (2008). They especially highlight the campaigning model followed that has given rise to what has become known as citizen diplomacy. What was unique in the Ottawa experience was that an international movement of NGOs acted as a driving force of change on an issue with international security implications. This was made possible by common and coordinated action by NGOs, like-minded governments, UN agencies and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). The ICBL “showed that it is possible to work outside of traditional diplomatic forums, practices and methods and still achieve success multilaterally” (2008: 182).

Williams and Goose identify a set of key campaigning lessons that could be seen as ingredients for a successful citizen diplomacy campaigning model. In the context of this study they are only listed; further details can be found in the article by these authors (2008: 183-187).

Box 1: ICBL campaigning lessons

- Know how to organise
- Maintain a flexible structure
- Need for leadership and committed workers
- Always have an action plan and deadlines, with outcome-oriented meetings
- Communication, communication and more communication
- Follow-up and follow-through
- Provide expertise and documentation
- Articulate goals and messages clearly and simply
- Use as many forums as possible to promote the message
- Be inclusive, be diverse, yet speak with one voice
- Recognise that international context and timing do matter

Evaluative framework

In line with the remarks by Chapman, Wameyo and Kelly, this report first provides a fairly detailed descriptive, chronological account of the CMC campaign, after which it discusses the findings according to themes identified by them as crucial aspects of (successful) advocacy and lobby², as summarised in box 2:

Box 2: Themes for evaluating the success of advocacy and lobby campaigns

- Vision, strategy, objectives and framing of the intervention
- Results (products, effectiveness (policy change and implementation), impact; transparency and accountability)
- Instruments and actors (legitimacy, efficiency)
- Causation and attribution
- Process (networking, alliances and coalitions; local level activity)
- Dynamics and environment (democratic space)
- Compromise, trade-offs, politics and conflict
- People-centred advocacy and gender
- Joined-up nature of intervention

After that I shall briefly discuss to what degree the lessons learned from the ICBL as identified by Williams and Goose (see box 1) have been applicable to the CMC.

² The same evaluative framework has also been adopted for the best practice study on the European Coalition on Oil in Sudan (ECOS).
**Methodology**
This study was based on a desk study of all relevant files on CMC available with IPCN. In addition, some questions were asked from the IPCN staff responsible for CMC. They also provided additional information that could not be found in the files studied. Financial and personnel data were obtained from the respective units within IPCN. The final draft report of this study was shared with responsible IPCN staff and was subsequently adjusted on the basis of their comments. Normal procedures of probing and cross-checking were applied and verbal information compared with information available on file.

**Set up of the report**
The present report is organised as follows. Chapter 2 gives background information on cluster bombs and discusses the first steps leading to the establishment of the CMC. Chapter 3 relates the launch of the CMC and then presents CMC's international activities over the period 2003-2009. Chapter 4 focuses on the activities by IPCN and its partners in the framework of the Dutch Cluster Munition Coalition. Chapter 5 contains a thematic discussion of the main findings and chapter 6 draws the conclusions. Annexe 1 provides a chronology of the international movement to ban cluster bombs. Annexe 2 enumerates the sources consulted and used for this study, while Annexe 3 presents the completed 'Assessment list evaluation research' of the Policy Evaluation Department of the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
2. CLUSTER MUNITION

**Definition**

Though there have been a range of significant activities on the topic of cluster munitions in the period of 1999-2002 (see Annexe I for an overview), the year 2003 was specifically salient due to the negotiations of a new Protocol V in the framework of the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva and the establishment of the CMC at a Launch Conference in the Hague that united NGOs worldwide aiming at a prohibition of cluster munitions.

Cluster weapons or munitions are defined as containers designed to disperse or release multiple explosive sub-munitions. Sub-munition is any munition that, to perform its tasks, separates from a parent munition. It is designed to explode at some point in time following dispersal or release from this parent cluster weapon (Weidacher et al 2005: 7). Cluster munitions can scatter between 150 up to 600 sub-munitions (also called ‘bomblets’ or ‘grenades’) over areas the size of several football fields (‘carpet-bombing’). These sub-munitions are designed to kill people, start fires, and burn through armour, or perform all those tasks at the same time. Cluster munitions can be deployed from aircraft, through cruise missiles, or by artillery and rockets. Cluster munitions have reportedly been used in armed conflicts in 27 countries and territories since World War II by 15 states, including The Netherlands. They were also deployed by non-state armed groups (NSAG) in Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Lebanon and Tajikistan. There are at least 34 documented producers of cluster munitions and 58 countries that own cluster munitions of which 39 are party or signatory to the CCW.

Between 5 and 30% of the sub-munitions dispersed in operations fails to explode. When sub-munitions are dropped but do not explode for whatever reason, they pose a serious risk as they may still explode when moved or touched. These ‘duds’ (hence the notion of ‘dud rate’) - officially called ‘explosive remnants of war’ (ERWs) - function very much like landmines when scattered on the terrain, on roads and other physical infrastructure or in agricultural fields. There are two types of ERW, i.e. unexploded and abandoned explosive ordnance. Unexploded explosive ordnance (UXO) has been prepared for use and has been used, but failed to explode. Abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) has been deployed, but was not used and has been abandoned or dumped in the country concerned by a party to an armed conflict.

**Humanitarian impact**

Apart from the obvious fact that explosives per se form a huge risk for civilian populations when used during war, EWRs continue to do so even after the cessation of the conflict. Accidents by such ERWs result in multiple mutilations: amputation of limbs, severe burns, hearing damage, blindness and wounds caused by fragments of the bomb. People with disabilities as a consequence of ERW explosions often face severe forms of societal discrimination (UNIDIR 2006: 12-13). UNIDIR also documents the relatively larger impact on the poor, as they lack the means to leave contaminated areas and have no alternative livelihood options that would expose them less to the risks of ERWs. Generally, males fall more often victim to ERWs than females. This is due to the gender-specific division of labour especially in agriculture, or may happen due to reasons of ‘social display’, where they take unnecessary risks. They also may be the first to return home after conflict and clear contaminated lands for agriculture. However, in cases where women traditionally are involved in agriculture or have taken over men’s jobs during or after conflict, they account for high percentages, too.
A high proportion of the victims are children and youth. Brightly-coloured sub-munitions shaped like balls may attract children confusing the munitions with toys. In some countries children are the largest group of victims. In Lao and Kosovo the percentage of children among the casualties was a high 51% and 67% respectively (UNIDIR 2008: 21). Cluster munitions further leave a serious psychological impact by creating fear, trauma and stress. Symptoms in child survivors of ERW in Lao included nightmares, insomnia, emotional detachment, anxiety, depression, headaches and other physical pains not related to physical injury (UNIDIR 2008: 12). The UNIDIR report also stated that most child survivors had little chance of overcoming the challenges and leading a normal life.

In summary, cluster munitions represent a double danger: as deadly wide-area weapons that pose grave immediate dangers when used in or close to civilian areas, and as a long-term UXO risk to lives and livelihoods due to their high failure rate. Contamination by cluster munitions also complicates the return of refugees, and obstructs post-conflict peace and reconstruction efforts in terms of rehabilitation of infrastructure and land use. UNIDIR has documented the longer-term negative impact of ERW contamination on infrastructure, livelihoods and income generation (2008: 16-19).

Due to their lack of discrimination between civilians and combatants and the excessive loss of life in relation to the military objectives, many observers and NGOs have questioned the legality of cluster munitions under the principles enshrined in the Geneva Conventions. Despite the fact that this type of UXO functions effectively as a land-mine, it was not taken care of in the Ottawa Agreement on the abandonment of anti-personnel mines nor under any other provision of international law so far. It was from the perspective of unjustifiable humanitarian suffering that cluster munitions and ERWs represent, that they became a topic for intensive international and NGO action and lobby.

Negotiations on Protocol V of the CCW and NGO response
In the years 2002 and 2003 international preparations were ongoing by the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) to formulate and adopt Protocol V to the Convention on Conventional Weapons (CCW) on explosive remnants of war. The purpose was “to take all possible and appropriate steps to protect civilians and humanitarian missions and other missions on the auspices of the United Nations from the risks and effects of explosive remnants of war”. The protocol envisaged a series of measures in the field of clearance, removal and destruction, recording and use of information, protection of civilian populations and missions, cooperation and assistance and prevention.

International non-governmental organisations were already critically following these preparations from the start onwards, but decided in the course of the year 2003 to step up their efforts, especially when it became clear that the preparations in the GGE/CCW were less far-reaching than had been hoped for and was deemed desirable. NGOs had serious concerns on the non-binding nature of the provisions, and the fact that no steps were envisaged to achieve a ban or moratorium on cluster munitions, but rather to formulate forms of ‘acceptable use’.

In view of this, many NGOs argued for a more drastic approach in the GGE/CCW meetings and hoped to move the State Parties to the CCW towards a comprehensive ban on cluster munitions. At the same time they realised this was an uphill battle in view of the military, political and commercial interests that a number of possessor and producer states had in the continued and unhampered production and use of those controversial weapons.

Preparatory steps towards the CMC
At a meeting on ERWs organised by Pax Christi Ireland at Dublin in April 2003, the NGOs present expressed their concerns with regard to the lack of substantial progress on the GGE/CCW talks and opined that a joint NGO-effort was needed to address the humanitarian
problems caused by cluster munitions and ERWs. It was decided that a coalition would be formed to formulate a common view and to organise a campaign. An interim Steering Committee (SC), including Pax Christi Netherlands, was mandated to take the necessary preparatory steps for the launching of this coalition. It was decided to launch the coalition before the meeting of States Parties to the CCW scheduled for November 2003. PCN was appointed to organise the launch conference-cum-photo exhibition in the Netherlands. It was also envisaged to resolve during the launching conference several practical and managerial matters relating to the future functioning of the coalition. Pax Christi had requested funding from the Dutch government in support of the planned activities which was granted through a subsidy of € 95,000. In the preparatory work leading to the launching conference the interim steering committee met seven times, often back-to-back to other conferences or meetings where the members were present.

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Footnote 3: There is no clarity on the exact amount. Parliamentary sources state that Pax Christi received € 64,256 from the Dutch government for the EWR Cluster Munition campaign (Tweede Kamer, 2006-2007, 30 800 V, p. 30).
3. LAUNCH AND ACTIVITIES OF CLUSTER MUNITION COALITION

International Launch Conference
On 13 November 2003 the official launch of the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) took place at the International Launch Conference in the ‘Grote Kerk’ in The Hague, the Netherlands by 85 member organisations from 42 countries. The CMC had the following official call:

- No use, production or trade of cluster munitions until the humanitarian problems associated with the weapons have been resolved;
- Increased resources for assistance to communities and individuals affected by unexploded cluster munitions and all other explosive remnants of war; and
- Users of cluster munitions and other munitions that have become ERW accept special responsibility for clearance, warnings and markings, risk education, provision of information and victim assistance.

The CMC was founded to provide a coordinated, global response to the growing problems created by cluster munitions and other ERWs. The Coalition was open to all non-governmental organisations that supported the aims, policy objectives and action programme of the coalition. It was governed by a ten-member Steering Committee (SC), including Pax Christi Netherlands.

Apart from the official launch of the CMC per se, the participants at the International Launch Conference discussed campaigning and lobbying issues, including media, communication, technical and legal aspects of the cluster munition problem. The launch of the campaign was successful. As said, it attracted 85 participants from 42 countries and was opened by the Dutch Foreign Minister. The launch of the CMC was not only reported in the Dutch press, but also in a number of influential foreign newspapers.

In the aftermath of the launch CMC prepared a funding proposal for 2004, in which it outlined its objectives, strategy and priorities, very much in line with the original mandate. It was argued that there was a need to appoint a full-time coordinator, this being the most immediate requirement for the further development of the CMC. Landmine Action UK offered to host the coordinator. Further it was decided to produce and distribute campaign materials, launch a website, and provide ‘humanitarian input’ to the CCW and other relevant international forums.

2004: CMC action beyond Protocol V
On 28 November 2003 more than 90 countries, including the United States (US), agreed to adopt Protocol V of the CCW. Though it was welcomed by NGO spokes-persons as a step forward compared to the lack of any instrument earlier, its text and many of its provisions were deemed weak. CMC argued that there was no clear user responsibility, a lack of retroactivity, and an absence of deadlines. Also no ban or moratorium on the use of cluster munitions was reached and its use was still permitted. However, at the same time talks of the GGE/CCW were scheduled to continue in 2004, and the GGE was tasked to "continue to consider the implementation of existing principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) and to further study ... possible preventive measures aimed at improving the design of certain specific type of munitions, including sub-munitions, with a view to minimize the humanitarian risk of these munitions becoming explosive remnants of war. Exchange of information, assistance and cooperation would be part of this work.” CMC announced that it would continue to raise the issue of cluster munitions both within and outside the CCW.

At the seventh session of the GGE held in Geneva from 8 till 12 March 2004, CMC delivered a statement and emphasised that the adoption of protocol V could only be considered a first
step of a much-needed, wider approach. CMC urged that a new protocol on sub-munitions be negotiated and that till that time State Parties take national steps. It demanded that stocks with high failure rates be destroyed, not only in view of humanitarian considerations but also due to military concerns. In the eighth session of the GGE/CCW held from 5-16 July 2004, CMC submitted a working paper ‘The Concerns about Sub-munitions from a Military Perspective’, including critical statements of military experts collected from military sources and recent reports on sub-munitions. CMC called for an immediate and permanent ban on those cluster munitions causing unjustifiable civilian suffering; a prohibition on the use of cluster munitions in or near populated areas; a clarification of international humanitarian law, as it applies to cluster munition; increased reliability and accuracy of cluster munitions; increased scrutiny of other factors associated with the use of cluster munitions, such as terrain, weather and drop altitude. Also Pax Christi delivered a statement, urging the GGE to support a separate legally binding protocol on cluster munitions.

At the ninth GGE/CCW session, CMC submitted a paper ‘Dealing with the impact of cluster munitions’ that outlined the risks and problems of the use of cluster munitions and presented a number of recommendations to the State Parties as a minimum first step towards eliminating the humanitarian suffering caused by cluster munitions. PCN also delivered a statement to the GGE, asking attention to the resolution of the European Parliament (EP) (see below). CMC, Human Rights Watch (HRW) and several other NGOs expressed their disappointment about the lack of concrete results in the CCW framework. In an internal paper the CMC coordinator analysed the factors that thwarted progress, including the reluctance of the US to engage in deliberations that might affect its present use of weapons and the fact that China, Russia and others were not prepared to accept limits on the use or production of weapons that they were using or might wish to use in the future. For these countries any discussion on targeting and use of cluster munitions was problematic. They, at most, wanted to engage in a debate on the technical aspects of ERW (the ‘dud problem’), unlike the countries of the so-called like-minded group that were also prepared to discuss the targeting and use aspects as such. It was also observed in this paper that the disappointment of the like-minded group to achieve any tangible result might lead to a growing willingness to move outside the CCW. CMC decided to focus for 2005 more on national campaign meetings, and especially targeted Europe and like-minded countries. CMC also decided to adopt the tagline ‘Stop killing civilians’, next to ‘Stop using cluster munitions’ in order to capture all aspects of the problem adequately. In a briefing paper HRW highlighted a number of intermediate, but yet positive technical steps that could be taken at the national level to mitigate the negative humanitarian impact of cluster munitions. These included a shift to cluster munitions with a minimum sub-munition reliability rate, and the withdrawal and destruction of particularly damaging types of bombs. In some cases bombs could be retrofitted with self-destruct sub-munitions and thus made safer.

European Parliament
In cooperation with the Development Committee of the European Parliament, Pax Christi organised a hearing on cluster munitions and ERWs in the European Parliament on 6 October 2004. This had been achieved in close cooperation with Dutch Euro-parliamentarian Max van den Berg who had called upon his colleagues and the Development Committee to facilitate such a hearing. This was subsequent to an earlier resolution by the EP and questions asked by several Euro-parliamentarians of different national and political backgrounds.

As a follow-up of this hearing the EP adopted a resolution on cluster munitions and explosive remnants of war on 28 October 2004, calling for “an immediate moratorium on the use, stockpiling, production, transfer and export of cluster munitions, including air-dropped cluster munitions and sub-munitions delivered by missiles, rockets, and artillery projectiles, until an international agreement has been negotiated on the regulation, restriction or banning of these weapons”. The resolution also called for a mandate to negotiate a new protocol within
the framework of the CCW. It also asked for adequate clearance and recording procedures and insisted that EU-troops should under no condition use cluster munitions till an international agreement has been negotiated.

In the CMC SC-meeting on 12 November 2004 it was decided to continue to work for a new Protocol on cluster munitions at the CCW, but to focus increasingly on action outside the CCW, as the CCW was seen as ‘failing’ and ‘not seriously dealing with the problem’. In that same meeting Thomas Nash from Mines Action Canada was appointed as CMC coordinator on a voluntary basis till funding would have been secured for covering the costs involved. CMC SC members were asked to commit one day work per week to the CMC. A long list of tasks was defined and distributed, including establishing field contacts, gathering evidence, the development of campaign materials, the drafting of an institutional code, a website, and an update of the CMC leaflet. The total budget needed for the year 2005 was GBP 75,000. Land Mine Action had carried out a Global Impact Survey project in the period 2004-2005 for which it had received a subsidy of € 100,000 from the Dutch government.

**CMC strategy and activities in 2005**

CMC developed a strategy for 2005. One new element in the CMC strategy was research in order to collate existing evidence and to further document the cluster munitions problem and its use in affected countries. This also included surveys on government and military policy on cluster munitions. A second element was public education. It was argued that too few people understood the cluster munitions problem. CMC endeavoured to develop and disseminate key arguments and to support members with national meetings, debates, exhibitions and similar public events. CMC also wanted to organise side-events at the CCW and other UN and international meetings. A third component was a credible and evidence-based advocacy campaign focused on governments, ministers, CCW delegates and countries that were prepared to work outside the CCW. Finally, it was deemed essential to have an effective website. CMC also drafted a CMC Institutional Code of Conduct outlining the structure, responsibilities and procedures of the CMC.

In the tenth session of the GGE/CCW in March 2005 preparatory steps were discussed for the Third Review Conference of the State Parties to the CCW, which was scheduled for 2006. Pax Christi Netherlands asked attention in this session for a survey it was carrying out on the military utility of cluster weapons and asked the cooperation of the State Parties to the CCW to submit the answers of their governments to complete the draft working paper that was in progress. The United Kingdom submitted a paper on the ‘Military Utility of Cluster Munitions’ in the tenth session of the GGE/CCW meeting in which it reaffirmed its view that cluster munitions represent an essential capacity against area targets such as groups of vehicles. It committed itself at improving the technical aspects of sub-munitions. All sub-munitions would contain a self-destruct mechanism by 2015 reducing their failure rate to less than 1%. Also Germany submitted a paper on the ‘Reliability and Use of Cluster Munitions’. Germany expressed its intention to use only cluster munitions with a limited operational time after deployment by including self-destruction or self-neutralizing mechanisms. The maximum ‘dud rate’ should be less than 1%. Cluster munitions that could not be adapted to that standard would not be used and phased out.

In the eleventh session of the GGE/CCW, PCN presented its research study entitled ‘Cluster Weapons: Necessity or Convenience’. It contained an inventory of state policies and views with regard to the utility of cluster munitions. It further discussed related issues of non-discrimination between combatants and civilians, the disproportionate harm caused relative to the military gains, and the reliability and accuracy of cluster munitions. The report distinguished different positions among the countries studied, corresponding to different possibilities and opportunities for lobby and reform.
CMC activities in 2006

During the 14th session of the GGE/CCW held in Geneva in June 2006, HRW submitted a ‘Survey of Cluster Munition Policy and Practice’ that provided an overview of states’ practice regarding cluster munitions, a timeline of the use of cluster munitions since 1943, and country profiles of states owning stockpiles of cluster munitions. The survey also revealed that at least twelve countries had transferred over fifty types of cluster munitions to at least fifty-eight other countries. On the other hand, it also mentioned countries that had taken positive steps to address humanitarian concerns by national legislation and/or removing munitions with high failure rates. With regard to principles of IHL, the report asserted that current national implementation was inadequate and that additional measures were required. HRW argued for a new cluster munition-specific mandate for the GGE/CCW with a view to negotiate a new protocol addressing cluster munitions following the 2006 CCW Review Conference. It argued in addition, that the vast majority of existing stockpiles should never be used, as these posed unacceptable risks to civilians, either during strikes, post-conflict or both, due to their inaccuracy and unreliability.

A positive development in the meantime was the adoption of a law by Belgium on 6 February 2006 prohibiting the production, stockpiling, transfer, trade, export or use of cluster munitions. It ordered the destruction of available stocks in Belgium before 9 June 2009. Norway announced a moratorium in June 2006.

The use of cluster munitions in the Israel-Hezbollah war

According to HRW both Israel and Hezbollah used cluster munitions in the war in South Lebanon that raged between 12 July and 14 August 2006 (Volkskrant 2006). The use of cluster munitions in this war raised intense international attention and outrage. HRW and UN mine-experts declared that Israel had used cluster munitions on populated civilian areas in South Lebanon. The UN confirmed 366 individual cluster strike sites. On 3 August 2006 Pax Christi International (PCI) submitted a written statement to the UN Sub-commission for the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights in which it expressed serious concern about the violence used in Gaza and South Lebanon. It asked the committee to denounce all attacks from all sides on civilians and civilian infrastructure and to call for a stop to the use of cluster munitions and phosphor bombs, being ‘inacceptable, inaccurate and unreliable weapons’.

A detailed study presented by four UN experts to the UN Human Rights Council concluded that there had been major violations of human rights and international humanitarian law on both sides of the conflict. The report concluded that civilian targets had been hit and that 1191 people had been killed in Lebanon and 4,405 wounded of which one-third children. In Israel Hezbollah rockets killed 75 people with hundreds of persons wounded. Hundreds of thousands of people were displaced at both sides of the border. The experts specifically mentioned the impact of cluster bomblets, of which Israel reportedly dropped about one million. According to UN figures, 12 persons were killed, among which three children, and 44 injured by unexploded cluster munitions after the ceasefire.

Disillusionment at the 2006 CCW Review Conference

In the run-up to the CCW Review Conference, held in November 2006, several international NGOs stepped up their campaigns by organising meetings, producing studies and screening films that showed the impact of cluster munitions. At the start of the conference about thirty-five CMC campaigners distributed flyers.

At the opening of the 2006 Review Conference United Nations, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan called for an immediate freeze on the use of cluster mention in armed conflicts, while UN Under-Secretary-General Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator Jan Egeland also called on the State Parties to do so during a press conference in New York. Though during the Review Conference, on 13 November 2006, Protocol V entered into force,
it became clear that a growing amount of states were in favour of a new instrument on cluster munitions, due to the perceived inadequacy of Protocol V. There was a sizeable presence of NGOs at the conference. The CMC members gave mutually coordinated presentations on different problematic aspects of cluster munitions. Moreover, representatives from Afghanistan and Lebanon presented the experiences from countries affected by cluster munitions. All this led to considerable media attention, both in major European newspapers and on TV in Italy and the UK.

However, despite all efforts, yet expectably, it was not possible to come at the Review Conference to a conclusion desired by the CMC and some progressive like-minded countries. It was, nevertheless, a notable fact that over thirty State Parties were in favour of a new negotiating mandate for the CCW and that this group, led by Norway, undertook the initiative to start the so-called Oslo Process, aimed at an internationally binding convention against cluster munitions causing unacceptable suffering among civilians. The Oslo Process was conspicuous in the sense that the states involved had decided to continue their efforts outside the CCW framework, which was deemed completely ineffectual.

The Oslo Process
In February 2007 a first meeting was organised in Oslo and 46 states subscribed to the aim of a prohibition of cluster munitions. Whereas initially 38 states had been invited, others came on their own, including The Netherlands. The states present committed themselves to conclude by 2008 a legally binding international instrument that would prohibit the use, production, transfer and stockpiling of cluster munitions causing unacceptable harm to civilians, and that would establish a framework for cooperation and assistance to survivors. They also would consider national steps and continue to address the humanitarian challenges of cluster munitions within the framework of international humanitarian law and all relevant forums. Follow-up conferences were announced in Lima, Wellington, Vienna and Dublin with regional conferences planned in between. The follow-up conference in Lima from 23-25 May 2007 was attended by 68 countries. Several aspects of the problem were discussed with the host Peru following the format of the Ottawa anti-personnel mine ban treaty. No official declarations were made or texts negotiated at this conference.

On 23 October 2007 the European Parliament adopted a resolution supporting the Oslo Process and calling for a comprehensive ban on cluster munitions.

The next meeting in the framework of the Oslo Process was held in Vienna from 5-7 December 2007. It was attended by delegates from 138 countries. On 5 December UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon called for a prohibition on cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. CMC had come to Vienna with 140 civil society delegates from fifty different countries in support of the process who actively lobbied and distributed relevant information. A significant contribution was the report ‘M85 – An analysis of reliability’ that refuted the often used argument by possessor states that cluster munitions with self-destruct mechanisms or lower failure rates would not harm civilians and hence should not be banned. ICRC as the guardian of international humanitarian law stated that the vast majority of cluster munitions and, in fact, all cluster munitions used to date, had been inaccurate and unreliable.

NGOs at the meeting in Vienna stressed the value of a partnership between civil society, international organisations, parliamentarians and governments. Detailed preparatory work had been carried out on victim assistance provisions, clearance and stockpile destruction and the issue of the definition. It was asserted that a strongest possible ban treaty was desirable that would imply far reaching obligations on the basis of the clearest and most precise provisions possible. The burden of proof for any exemptions would completely rest on user governments. CMC had prepared itself thoroughly by formulating a detailed, nine-page, lobby guide and a questions-and-answers sheet for media work.
In Wellington 103 states met again from 18-22 February 2008 and decided to forward a draft text for the Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM) to the Diplomatic Conference to be held in Dublin from 19 till 30 May 2008. They reaffirmed the wish to conclude a legally binding instrument prohibiting cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians. They also agreed, as a compromise, to forward alternative text proposals contained in a compendium attached to the Wellington Declaration, but these were not deemed to have the same status as the draft text.

In the run-up to the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions from 19-30 May, CMC prepared a detailed action plan for civil society outreach, publicity, events and lobby. CMC also produced a lobbying guide and a participant handbook and a set of policy papers on thirteen major subjects of interest to the Conference.

In the Dublin Conference 107 states, including the Netherlands, adopted the Convention on Cluster Munitions. Though some major owner and producer states, including Russia, China, the US and Israel, did not take part, the number of states attending was much higher than expected and also included states that earlier were not in favour of the Convention or supported a much weaker text. During the conference, many detailed and often technical discussions took place on definitions and texts of specific articles and provisions. NGOs like HRW and International Human Rights Clinic, Austcare and Handicap International provided technical inputs on such issues as the legal process of joining and implementing the CCM, sensor-fuzing and smart sub-munitions, and interoperability and the prohibition on assistance. There was a close relationship and working contacts between the CMC partners and delegations of like-minded countries. In the meetings of the Dublin conference CMC partners were offered to opportunity to raise issues and submit proposals. Though CMC was disappointed about article 21 (interoperability), it was enthusiastic about the CCM as a whole. The CCM had become a comprehensive treaty with a strong definition and a groundbreaking article on victim assistance.

In the meantime the continued relevance of a comprehensive prohibition was shown by the use of cluster munitions in the 2008 conflict between Russia and Georgia. Both sides were accused of having used cluster munitions, leading to at least seventeen casualties and dozens of wounded, according to HRW. Tragically, also the Dutch journalist Stan Storimans was killed in one of those cluster bomb attacks, as was confirmed by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs after a forensic investigation.

As a preparation to the signing conference in Oslo to be held on 2 and 3 December 2008, regional conferences were held in Bulgaria, Uganda, Ecuador, Lao and Vietnam in the autumn of 2008. CMC provided guidance to the Oslo Process by submitting a definition of cluster munition for the convention and by formulating 19 treaty principles. Before the Dublin conference, CMC had already formulated an internal action plan to promote the Rapid Entry into Force (EIF) of the CCM. This included targeting countries to sign and after that rapidly ratify the CCM. It was intended that at least 123 states would sign the convention in Oslo, surpassing the 122 states that had signed Mine Ban Treaty (MBT) in Ottowa in 1997. A variety of tools, activities and resources was used, mainly drawing on the human resources of the global coalition of CMC members. Special attention was devoted to affected countries, the use of the ‘Ban Advocates’ team of cluster munition survivors, and a ‘ban bus’. Campaigning materials (including eye-catching stickers, bumper stickers and badges) and lobby tools were developed, including the use of new media such as blogs, facebook, film clips and other visual resources. On the CMC website there was a slide show, a ready-to-use powerpoint presentation and YouTube videos, and downloadable survivor stories. In addition, disinvestment campaigns were highlighted as a tool to draw attention to the issue and pressurise governments. In October 2008 a Global Week of Action was planned emphasising the need for all countries to sign. Together with the Dublin conference this
would be used as the main media moment and run till the opening of the signing conference in Oslo. Religious leaders were approached to encourage their respective governments to sign. CMC further identified a multitude of international, multilateral and other agencies that were to be mobilised in favour of signing and ratification. The action extended toward the global public as well by introducing the notion of the People’s Treaty that could be signed on internet (see box 3).

Box 3: **Sign the People’s Treaty**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Cluster bombs cause predictable and unacceptable harm to civilians, both at the time of use and for many years after. It is my strong belief that these weapons are morally unacceptable.</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I fully support the new international treaty on the prohibition of the use, stockpiling, transfer, and production of cluster bombs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through their signature and ratification of this treaty, governments will legally commit themselves not only to ban cluster bombs, but also to clear contaminated land and provide assistance to victims and affected communities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Through my signature on the People's Treaty, I commit to work to ensure that governments live up to their obligations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During a CMC SC retreat in New York in September 2008 further operational details were discussed and tasks divided. It was also discussed that after the EIF of the CCM there would be a need to monitor its implementation. Several institutional modalities were discussed as how to do this, especially in view of the commonalities and differences between the CCM and MBT, and the potential relationship between CMC and the ICBL.

On 2-4 December 2008 Norway hosted the Oslo Signing Conference for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, attended by 122 states. A total of 94 states signed the Convention in Oslo in front of a CMC delegation of 250 campaigners, including The Netherlands. The ministers of Foreign Affairs of St. Vincent and the Grenadines and of Cyprus signed the CCM on 23 September 2009 in New York, being the 99th and 100th signatory respectively. France and Burundi ratified the CCM on 25 September 2009, bringing the total number of ratifications at 21. At the moment of writing this report the number of ratifications had increased to 23.

**Rear-guard actions in the GGE/CCW**

In the meantime during meetings of the GGE/CCW in 2007 and 2008, work started on a mandate to formulate a new protocol and on the drafting of the protocol itself. However, from the beginning there were wide-spread doubts and scepticism whether the CCW would be able to arrive at any meaningful result. NGO representatives characterised the mandate for negotiations as not serious and credible. It was evident that there was serious dissent between the State Parties on the text in terms of definitions, provisions and articles. The compromise text therefore contained all types of exemptions and had an open transition period. It in effect did not ban cluster munitions, but only regulated them, permitting continued use. CMC characterised the result as weak, inadequate and unacceptable. Compared to the CCM, the protocol did not add anything significant and, in fact, provided a lower standard, even though it could still be useful for (limited) national initiatives, especially of those countries that were not part of the CCM. It became clear that the CCM and the Oslo Process had gradually completely overshadowed the work of the GGE/CCW that had increasingly manoeuvred itself into a position of irrelevance in the wider global context.
A life after the CCM

Having reached its major goal of a comprehensive ban on cluster munitions, CMC refocused its efforts on universal adherence of the CCM, on its rapid EIF and the monitoring of compliance. It rephrased its goals and strategic objectives as follows:

“The CMC’s goal is to protect civilians from the effects of cluster munitions. The CMC has a number of strategic objectives to achieve this goal:

1. To promote universal adherence to the Convention on Cluster Munitions and the emerging global norm against the use, production, stockpiling and transfer of cluster munitions
2. To promote the maximum number of signatures to and ratifications of the Convention in the shortest possible time to ensure its rapid entry into force
3. To promote effective implementation of and full compliance with the Convention by States Parties, and compatible steps by non-States Parties, and to ensure effective monitoring of all such efforts by civil society
4. To raise public awareness of the harm to civilians caused by cluster munitions and efforts made by civil society and concerned states to eliminate this harm”.

Till the moment of writing this report national and international activities to reach those strategic objectives continue. CMC’s work got international recognition by being given the Tipperary International Peace Award on 1 May 2009. On 29 May 2009 Human Rights Watch, Landmine Action, Landmine Monitor, the ICBL and CMC published the report ‘Banning Cluster Munitions’ that not only described the successes of the past, but also outlined future challenges. The 288-page report contained a government policy and practice analysis with entries on 150 countries. It called upon the countries that so far did not sign the CCM, to do so. It also marked the kick-off of the ‘Global Week of Action against Cluster Bombs’. In August 2009 the CMC commemorated the victims that fell due to the use cluster munitions in South Lebanon and Georgia.
4. **PCN ACTIVITIES IN THE NETHERLANDS**

Most of the time and energy devoted by IPCN went into active participation in the SC, attending several meetings a year, attending all Oslo-related conferences and, moreover, through many emails with the SC members deciding on the strategy and policy of the CMC.

Apart from its participation in the CMC SC, Pax Christi was also active in the Netherlands. Here, in 2003 the Dutch Cluster Munition Coalition was formed comprising IPCN, Oxfam Novib, Stichting Vluchteling, UNICEF, Campagne tegen Wapenhandel and Amnesty. (I)PCN acted as coordinator and spokes-person of the Dutch CMC. The Dutch partners collaborated and, individually or together, approached Dutch politicians and the press. The creation of broad societal support and advocacy was deemed essential. PCN for example approached the Dutch Bishops’ Conference and the Representative of the Holy See in Geneva. PCN also continued to promote the use of the photo-exhibition developed for the CMC Launch Conference elsewhere. It was used by several NGOs as well as in Denmark, Ireland and Germany respectively. In 2005 PCN developed a specific proposal to carry out a ‘Stop Cluster Munition Campaign’ to be carried out in 2005-2006. The proposal comprised many ideas for public awareness raising and lobby activities as well as an educational campaign focused at schools, universities and specific target groups like members of parliament (MP), press and volunteer groups. Expectably, a major target group for policy influence was the Dutch government. The proposal also included a research into financial links between Dutch banks and producers of cluster munitions.

**Political lobby**

On 29 August 2006 PCN wrote a letter to spoke-persons of the major political parties in Dutch parliament, pleading for an immediate moratorium on the production, trade and use of cluster weapons. It urged The Netherlands to call for a new negotiating mandate in the GGE/CCW, while The Netherlands should destroy its stocks of old cluster munitions. With regard to the situation in South Lebanon PCN called for assistance to the authorities in clearing and destroying the ERWs. This would also require full cooperation and transparency from Israel. Finally, PCN asked for an independent investigation into the use of cluster munitions by Israel. On 11 October 2006 PCN together with six other NGOs organised a hearing at The Hague and presented a joint declaration to Dutch politicians in the run-up to the CCW Review Conference. The declaration stressed the need for a new international instrument to stop cluster munitions and reiterated the demands made earlier by the CMC. The meeting was well attended, with the main interest from MPs from the opposition parties. The ruling Christian-democratic party –CDA – was conspicuously absent.

In the parliamentary budget discussions in October 2006, several parliamentarians asked questions to the Dutch government on the issue of cluster munitions. An overview of parliamentary questions and motions between 1999 and 2006 showed that questions on cluster munitions were posed on nine occasions in Parliament and that three motions had been submitted. They originated from respectively the Socialist Party, the Social Democrats and the Greens. However, none of the motions received a majority in Parliament. The Dutch government replied that it considered cluster bombs legitimate and therefore was not prepared considering a moratorium. It stressed that if such weapons were used by The Netherlands, they would comply with international humanitarian law principles. The government added that The Netherlands would undertake efforts in international forums to sharpen the technical criteria for cluster munitions, e.g. to reduce the ‘dud rate’ and thus decrease the humanitarian risk of those weapons.
IPCN urged the Dutch authorities to participate in the first Oslo meeting and was afterwards in frequent contact with the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to a lesser extent with the Ministry of Defense.

The Netherlands joined indeed the Oslo Process in February 2007. But although The Netherlands participated in the Oslo Process from the outset, it made clear its preference for the CCW, and frequently expressed reservations about the Oslo process and the draft convention text, particularly the notion of a comprehensive ban. On 18 March 2007, considerable public outcry was generated when Dutch television aired a documentary titled "The Clusterbomb Feeling," which exposed major Dutch pension funds’ investments in companies involved in the production of landmines and cluster munitions. Many pension funds subsequently announced their intention to end investments in cluster munitions manufacturers. IPCN supported this documentary and sent around letters to the pension fund PGGM and requested its members to approach their pension fund as well. A report with recommendations was written on PGGM and clusterbombs. This was discussed with the Labour Union FNV and PGGM itself.

In April 2007, Krista van Velzen of the Socialist Party submitted a private member’s bill to the Council of State forbidding the use, stockpiling, transfer and production of cluster munitions. However, the bill was not discussed in Parliament before the Dublin negotiations in May 2008. IPCN supported MP Van Velzen in this and commented several times on it.

During the Lima conference in May 2007, the Netherlands stated that it was not in favor of a comprehensive ban on cluster munitions. When the Norwegian chair introduced the Oslo Declaration on 23 February, The Dutch Ambassador stated that: "Our aim is to ban a certain part of the universe of cluster munitions ….. The objective of Oslo is not to ban an entire category of weapons." The Netherlands continued to emphasize the CCW as the preferred environment for work on this issue.

Due to the ambiguous position of the Netherlands and the need for a strong definition of cluster munitions that should be banned, IPCN decided in Lima to strengthen its campaign in The Netherlands. With support of the SP and the Social Democrats IPCN organised on 27 June 2007 a parliamentary discussion meeting (‘algemeen overleg’; AO) for which IPCN invited military expert Collin King, HRW expert Marc Hiznay, CMC coordinator Thomas Nash, survivor Bralslav Kapetanovic and also IPCN spoke. MoD invited military specialist Goense and Major Van Kappen. On 26 June 2007, one day before that meeting took place, the Ministry of Defense announced a temporary suspension of the use of cluster munitions, stating that the military would not use cluster munitions until further notice. Henceforth, the Parliament would be notified in a timely manner in the event cluster munitions were to be used. IPCN reacted quickly by a press release (that was picked up widely) stating that the Ministry’s position was still ambiguous, as it did not take a clear and firm stance on any of the contested issues and kept, in fact, all possibilities open. It maintained in the Oslo Process its original position, very much similar to the one taken in the GGE/CCW and CCW Review Conference. IPCN was able to explain this in detail at a prime TV news programme ‘Eén Vandaag’ that same day.

In September 2007 during the Global Week of Action, IPCN (together with the other Dutch members of the CMC) put an advertisement in three major Dutch newspapers through which it asked the public to take a stance against cluster munitions.

IPCN with four other NGOs urged Dutch Parliament to devote a special debate to the issue of Dutch cluster munitions which took place on 7 October 2007. In a letter to the Dutch MPs they asserted that the Netherlands lacked a clear position and did not play a significant role in the Oslo Process. The NGOs urged that the Netherlands play a more protagonist role in
the process towards the prohibition of cluster munitions and also take (unilateral) national steps.

In the years 2007 and 2008 Dutch MPs posed a large number of questions to the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence with regard to their position in the GGE/CCW and the Oslo Process, and on the technical interpretation of the reliability and accuracy of cluster munitions. In the parliamentary committees on Foreign Affairs and on Defense a total of 76 questions were asked by the MPs to the government. It was clear that the viewpoints, inputs and lobby of CMC had contributed significantly to the wording and framing of those questions, next to the role of conspicuous events such as the war in South Lebanon and Georgia. With regard to political lobby, it seems that IPCN had more traction with opposition parties than with parties from the government. A very active key role in the debates was played by SP MP Ms. van Velzen and also by social-democratic MP Ms. Eijsink. After a change of government in 2007, IPCN got some better access to the major confessional party, the Christian-democrats, who (together with the government) moved slowly in the direction of the Oslo Process.

At the same time IPCN also maintained good relations with the civil servants of both the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Defense. Those contacts had improved due to IPCN’s presence at the GGE/CCW as well as the conferences in the Oslo Process, with regular briefings and exchanges with the head of the Dutch delegations. It also helped that IPCN involved reputed Dutch military experts in its campaigns that were able to raise confidence and a certain level of receptivity within especially the Ministry of Defense.

At the Vienna conference in December 2007, the Netherlands stated, “Since that ‘founding meeting’ of the Oslo Group the discussion papers tabled at the follow-on meetings in Lima and Vienna have drifted away from [the] original aim” of the Oslo Process: to ban those cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm. The Netherlands argued that the proposed draft convention text implied “a ban on all future types of cluster munitions, whose characteristics are as yet unknown but may include types that do not cause unacceptable harm to civilians and hence do not have to be banned.” The Netherlands argued for exceptions for cluster munitions with low failure rates and self-destruct mechanisms, and for cluster munitions containing fewer than 10 sub-munitions. The Netherlands also proposed the inclusion of a specific article on the relationship of a future treaty with existing international instruments, mentioning CCW Protocol V.

As Dutch MP’s and media were under the impression that the Dutch government was lobbying for a strong treaty and IPCN noticed a more negative stance of The Netherlands at the several Oslo conferences, it decided to write a report. This report ‘The Devil is in the Detail’, gives a detailed description of the Dutch position and was widely distributed.

During the Wellington conference in February 2008, the Netherlands aligned itself with the so-called like-minded group that put forward numerous proposals that the CMC sharply criticized as weakening the draft text. In addition to continuing to oppose a broad prohibition, the Netherlands supported the deletion of special obligations for past users of cluster munitions. It endorsed a discussion paper calling for provisions aimed at facilitating ‘interoperability’ (joint military operations with states that were not party to the Convention). It supported a new provision allowing retention of cluster munitions for training and research purposes. At the conclusion of the conference, the Netherlands associated itself with a statement made on behalf of the like-minded group declaring dissatisfaction with the conference as it felt different opinions and views had not been taken into account in a balanced way. The Netherlands itself criticized ‘an unnecessary polarization’. However, it announced it would subscribe to the Wellington Declaration, indicating its intention to participate fully in the Dublin negotiations on the basis of the Wellington draft text.
In April 2008, the Ministry of Defense in collaboration with national research bodies reported on an inquiry into precision and reliability as criteria by which to distinguish “acceptable” from “unacceptable” cluster munitions. They concluded that reliability rates of weapons depend on the context and are therefore difficult to ascertain. On this basis, the government decided it was preferable to use technical properties, such as the presence of self-destruction and self-neutralization mechanisms and the number of sub-munitions.

In April 2008 IPCN intensified its campaign again through the media and by launching a signature action asking the Dutch government to go for a comprehensive ban (and thus destroy both the M261 and the CBU 87 types that it owned). Pressure was put on MoD as former military commander Patrick Cammaert and former minister and former UNSG Special Representative to Sudan Jan Pronk who was now chairman of ICPN, signed the petition publicly at the Africa Day organised by the Labour Party. Furthermore, signatures were collected at universities, at Liberation Day festivals, and a day organised by the Socialist Party etc. Nevertheless, defense minister Van Middelkoop kept stating that the Dutch government would consider giving up only the CBU 87, but not the M261. IPCN approached Adessium for extra funds and started a campaign two weeks before Dublin started with many radio commercials that featured a military expert and Bishop Van Luyn calling upon the Dutch government to go for a total ban, news articles, radio interviews etc. IPCN made a DVD on the need for a comprehensive ban and this DVD was send to all MP’s with the specific request to ask their colleagues not to accept a weak position of the Netherlands. Bishop Van Luyn sent a letter to Prime Minister Balkenende and though IPCN’s network many MPs were approached. IPCN called upon these MPs to ask Minister Van Middelkoop and Verhagen for strong instructions for Dublin, but without success. IPCN asked for another parliamentary discussion meeting (AO) on cluster munitions and this request in the end was respected on May 15th (two days before Dublin started).

On that day IPCN organised a publicity and awareness event with Dutch parliamentarians and spokespersons at the Plein in The Hague, where mock cluster sub-munitions were exploded with real audio-effects. MPs from the Christian-Democrats, the Social-Democrats, the Greens and the Socialist Party helped cleaning up the square of unexploded duds and were interviewed afterwards. Despite the media attention the outcome of the AO was negative and Minister Van Middelkoop kept to his position that cluster munitions were essential for the Dutch military and that a total ban was not desired by the Dutch government.

During the Dublin Diplomatic Conference in May 2008, the Netherlands increased its emphasis on interoperability, arguing that a solution to this would be vital to achieving consensus. It said that the Netherlands would not be able to join a convention which would affect its choice of military partners. The Netherlands proposed that the convention should employ a three tier approach to prohibition, including exemptions for munitions with a limited number of sub-munitions; a middle range of cluster munitions which would be subject to cumulative requirements; and a bottom tier of a “massive number” of cluster munitions which would be subjected to prohibition outright. On 22 May, however, the Lower House of the Netherlands’ Parliament accepted a parliamentary motion for a comprehensive ban on cluster munitions, submitted by social-democrat MP Eijsink. This motion was also supported by the Christian-Democrats, something which had become a key target for IPCN in the first half of 2008. The motion called on the Netherlands to pursue the strongest treaty possible in Dublin, and played an important role in a shift of Dutch policy in Dublin toward a more constructive approach and greater willingness to accept key elements of the draft text.

During the run-up to the Dublin conference IPCN attracted a lot of media attention, on radio as well as in prime time television programmes such as NOVA and Den Haag Vandaag. The same happened again during the signing conference in Oslo.
During the year 2009 the attention shifted to the rapid signing and ratification of the CCM. In the Global Week Of Action Against Cluster Bombs from 29 May till 4 June 2009, IKV Pax Christi, Oxfam Novib, UNICEF, Stichting Vluchteling, Amnesty International and the Campagne tegen Wapenhandel presented letters to the embassies of Cyprus, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Latvia, Poland, Romania, Slowakia, Turkey and the US and called upon those states to sign the CCM. All these countries were European Union members or Northern Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) allies that had not yet signed the CCM.

Disinvestment campaign
IPCN had built up a certain niche with regard to this issue of disinvestment in cluster munitions production and trade. In a letter to the Dutch Minister of Finance IPCN raised the role of Dutch banks in the funding of companies involved in arms trade to countries with an arms embargo or of companies that produced cluster munitions. A documentary ‘Het Clusterbomgevoel’ by the programme Zembla on Dutch television on 18 March 2007 showed that several major Dutch pension funds invested in companies involved in the production of cluster munitions. The programme led to public commotion and resulted in a multitude of articles in the written press. IPCN had provided inputs in the documentary and, more importantly, used the momentum by co-publishing and promoting a report ‘Pensioengeld voor wapengeweld’, while actively engaging in discussion with Dutch pension funds and labour unions. This led to a further focus on social corporate responsibility and increased transparency. It also induced a sharpened policy by several pension funds that started to exclude tainted companies from their portfolios, though some others refused to take any action. In May 2008 the Campaign against Arms Trade published an interim report providing an overview of the policies and investments of the pension funds with regard to the production and trade in arms, including cluster munitions.

With regard to The Netherlands the CMC demanded a strong Dutch legislation, including a prohibition on investments in cluster munitions ex art. 1C CCM. In a ‘Guide toward fair banking’ and on the basis of research by IPCN, it was proven that several major Dutch banks and insurance companies still continued to invest in firms producing or facilitating cluster munitions producers, including Aegon, ING, Rabobank en SNS Reaal. CMC also wanted that the Dutch take a critical and non-supportive position vis-à-vis allies that still use cluster munitions. In October 2009 IPCN and Netwerk Vlaanderen published a major research document into the role of banks, insurance and investment agencies in the funding or assistance of cluster munitions producers or traders. It presents a state-of-the-art report on financial institutions’ investment in companies that develop or produce cluster munitions (Hall of Shame), on financial institutions disinvesting from producers of cluster munitions (Hall of Fame and Runners-Up) and on legislative measures to prohibit investment in cluster munitions. Although the Convention on Cluster Munitions does not explicitly prohibit investments in cluster munitions, the prohibition on assistance that is included in art 1c of the convention should prevent states from investments in cluster munitions producers. Financing and investing are active choices, based on a clear assessment of a company and its plans. Investing in a cluster munitions producer therefore is a choice to support the production of these weapons that cause unacceptable harm. The report highlights both the good practices of financial institutions and states, as well as points out the financial institutions that are still investing in cluster munitions. The report contains clear recommendations for states and financial institutions that all come down to one message: stop explosive investments now (Vandenbroucke and Boer 2009).

Funding and human resources
The total cost for activities in relation to the cluster munition campaign has been calculated at € 345,367 for the period 2003-2009, or on average € 49,338 per year. In addition IPCN had to spend monies for the salaries of the staff involved in the campaign. The total investment has been for 6.4 full-time equivalents (FTEs) or about 0.9 FTE per year on average. Due to changes in personnel over the years it was not possible to estimate the exact expenditure
spent, but it is safe that this average would not exceed €50,000 per year against current
costs, incl. employers’ fees. In 2003 PCN received a subsidy of €95,000 from the Dutch
government for organising the International Launch Conference in The Hague. In October
2007 IPCN submitted a funding request to Adessium for an amount €45,000 to sponsor their
lobby efforts for an international treaty. In 2008 Adessium sponsored IPCN again with an
additional €67,700 for a media and public campaign towards the Dublin conference. Later on
additional funding was acquired from Adassium bringing their sponsoring for this purpose at
a total of €160,000. It was noted that without this support IPCN would not have been able to
launch its campaign with the external professional inputs and with the size and scale it was
able to do thanks to this sponsoring. Considering the results, it can be said that the campaign
has been carried out with minimal financial resources and a limited input of personnel from
the Dutch side. Though the results at the international level cannot, of course, be attributed
exclusively to IPCN and also included the efforts of other international partners, IPCN was
nevertheless an important partner and contributor to the overall CMC campaign, next to its
own achievement at the national level in The Netherlands.

Table 1 Resources used for cluster munition campaign 2003-2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Activities (€)</th>
<th>Personnel in FTEs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>40,598</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td>35,078</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>15,445</td>
<td>1.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>17,486</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>40,015</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>116,745</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>89,000</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>345,367</td>
<td>6.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The human resources available were participating in CMC international as well as in lobby
and publicity work nationally. The dossier of the cluster munitions is fairly specialist and
required up to date knowledge both in terms of technical know-how as with regard to the
diplomatic and political developments. Within this demanding domain they were again
specialising on the issue of disinvestment which had become a niche that IPCN was
developing both within the CMC framework as more generally. All this can be seen as a
considerable achievement in view of the limited human resources available.

Understandably staff seemed sometimes overwhelmed by the pressure to act on immediate
events. This was partly due to the unpredictability of the larger developments, such as in the
Oslo process, and the inherent difficulty to arrive at a proper long-term planning. Such
planning could have guaranteed that extra personnel could have been mobilised when
needed or that those could be hired from outside, as was done in 2008 for designing a
professional publicity campaign. There is some scope for improvement here, as well as with
regard to the communication and division of tasks between different IPCN departments,
including the department of Communications and Campaigns. The exigencies and pressures
involved in this type of work require regular communication and a clear articulation of
expectations, possibilities and limitations.
5. DISCUSSION

Below I shall discuss the findings under a number of headings as derived from the literature on advocacy evaluation by Chapman and Wameyo (2001) and Kelly (2002) in the Introduction.

Vision, objectives, strategy, and framing of the intervention

The CMC was set up on the basis of the experiences of its members in the ongoing difficult, slow and frustrating discussion in the GGE/CWW, as well as on the basis of a series of studies and reports that were published in the late 1990s and early 2000s on the issue of cluster bombs. Several of those reports discussed the use of those munitions in NATO’s actions in Yugoslavia and Kosovo. There was a strong feeling among the NGOs convening at a meeting in Dublin in 2003 that it was of the essence to join efforts to gain momentum and break through the impasse that seemed to prevail in the official talks. The example of the MBT and a resolution in Norwegian Parliament urging the government to achieve an international ban on cluster munitions provided a much needed stimulus and encouragement.

Though there was no strategy paper prepared in advance (such as was the case in ECOS), the envisaged coalition harnessed skilfully the experiences from its members and formed an interim steering committee mandated to prepare the establishment of the CMC. The SC was able to move things quickly and organise an International Launch Conference the same year. It was decided to have a light formal or, perhaps in fact, an informal structure without legal identity, based on a coordinator and a SC of ten members. This structure continued to function throughout the period studied, though support staff increased over the years as the campaign intensified and reached seven full-time staff in the CMC office in London by 2008, in addition to staff attached to individual CMC members. Leadership evolved gradually from one coordinator to a structure with three co-chairs that provided leadership: Human Rights Watch (Mr. Steve Goose); Landmine Action (Mr. Richard Moyes); and Norwegian People’s Aid (Ms. Grethe Østern).

The vision, strategy, and program logic evolved in response to the situation encountered in reality and in policy practice. Whereas in the beginning the focus was still largely on the negotiations in the framework of the GGE/CWW, it began to shift away from this official setting towards a broader societal involvement and alternative avenues outside this framework in later years. This was in response to own experiences gained within the coalition with respect to its participation as an observer in the GGE/CCW, but was also propelled by external events, such as the use of cluster munitions in ongoing conflicts offering an opening for political lobby and societal awareness-raising. In addition, there were shifts in the position of progressive, ‘like-minded’ states that increasingly became open to the viewpoints of the coalition and ultimately were even prepared to operate outside the CCW framework. This was a dialectic process, as this development was partly the result of CMC’s own work and the evidence-based inputs it provided to the ongoing debate.

The shift from a CCW-focused to a broader approach also implied a different discourse. As in the CCW framework the discourse was mainly framed by the history of the convention and by established positions of influential possessor and producer states, most emphasis was put on issues of a technical nature as compared to the more principled humanitarian issues raised by the CMC and its members. Debates on cluster munitions in the GGE/CCW were hardly possible on, for example, the principle of use and targeting, but mostly narrowed down to technicalities regarding ‘failure or dud-rates’, ‘self-destructing mechanisms’, ‘sensor-fuzing’, or reliability and accuracy of the bombs.
The CMC and individual CMC-partners have admirably been able to deconstruct many of these self-serving technical arguments by detailed, professional evidence-based studies, many of which were able to refute the arguments of the State Parties convincingly that basically aimed at the continued use of what were called ‘acceptable’ cluster munitions. At the same time, the coalition did not get bogged down in such technical arguments and recognised the need to (re-)politicise the debate. While continuing the debate in the GGE/CCW in an increasingly conscious and assertive manner, CMC opened a new line of operation on a different field with other actors and another, more political agenda outside the CCW. This simultaneous play of chess on different fields must have been a difficult and fine balancing act, but was done with considerable skill. It helped to frame the necessity of a ‘humanitarian’ and political alternative to the stagnating and frustrating CCW talks that were exposed not in the last place by the serious and continuing inputs of CMC itself that characteristically remained without any effect in that particular setting. This in itself stimulated the counter movement that gradually emerged and the political disengagement from the CCW setting that it implied.

With the benefit of hindsight it can certainly be judged a sharp and smart move to refocus the CMC efforts away from the narrow possibilities of the GGE/CCW, and to create an alternative. It would perhaps be too much to contend that CMC fabricated this move completely on its own and that it was only a result of conscious effort. It was as much due to the inflexibility and self-inflicted damage by the GGE/CCW that was blinded by their own interests and seemed to have lost touch with the world around it, and the trends prevailing in the wider context. It was interesting to note between brackets that this also, somewhat surprisingly, happened to The Netherlands, that despite a generally fairly progressive reputation in international and humanitarian affairs, not only had the dubious reputation to have dropped cluster bombs itself as one of the fifteen recorded users of this contested weapon world-wide, but also persevered in its defence of those weapons as legitimate and needed far into 2007.

Over the years CMC demonstrated a conscious effort to think and rethink through its operations. There is a plethora of internal discussion and guidance documents that bear witness to this. Actions were often discussed in a timely manner and there was a high level of professionalism in its activities. This is undoubtedly due to the quality and experience of the CMC partners and especially of its SC members, as CMC itself had hardly a meaningful infrastructure or budget. The planning documents of all major events bear witness of a professional and simultaneously innovative machinery that combines long standing insights from peace activists with newer approaches and ideas, for example in the realm of visual and computer-based communication technologies. Yet, there is no evidence of a strong and centralised managerial approach and this begs some questions of how the CMC really managed to work so well. From the evidence available, we must conclude that it was the result of the experiences gained of the partners in long standing advocacy and lobby activities and the quality of the human resources available. The allocation of decentralised responsibilities to partners also seemed to have worked well. It induced a largely effective and fairly autonomous process of goal attainment.

There must, in a large effort as that of the CMC, have been some setbacks and differences of opinion, but the available documentation does not give any major information on this. It seems that the CMC has been able to work overall in an efficient, down-to-earth and matter-of-fact manner. There is hardly any lofty, idealistic language in the cluster munitions campaign and its documentation, though there is a consistent focus on the terrible humanitarian impact of the cluster bombs. It is, as if being appalled by the vague language and the manipulation thereof in the CWW and the imprecise, inaccurate and unreliable nature of cluster bombs, the CMC campaigners themselves became sharp, focused and no-nonsense in their approach. That is not to say that they were not driven by deeply
humanitarian motives and a serious indignation of what cluster munitions bring about, but only that they have become fairly result-oriented and professional at that.

It is not possible to give a detailed discursive analysis of the framing of the CMC campaign in the context of a best practice study, as that would require a research on its own. Nevertheless, there are noticeable discursive shifts in the language and framing of the issues by CMC over time. As observed above, some of these discursive shifts brought back both politics and humanity in what were earlier largely technico-military debates. They also put on the table goals and objectives that every time became somewhat more comprehensive and radical. It is interesting to observe that ‘conservative’ State Parties had no answer to these discursive shifts and started losing the discursive initiative, and in the end the whole debate. The discursive shifts in effect represented a radicalisation of the view points and were pushing the final result to a higher level outcome in terms of goals (to be) achieved. State parties had no choice than to follow in this trend and, interestingly, the final outcome of the Oslo process was very much unimaginable just five years earlier. Part of the discourse was also the conscious use of modern technology, reaching new global audiences in what used to be earlier a highly specialised and fairly insulated domain of international diplomacy. The move from the corridors in Geneva to what has been dubbed as a ‘People’s Treaty’ is in many ways a spectacular and formidable achievement both in its political, practical and discursive aspect.

Apart from the international strategy, CMC partners have consistently carried on their national campaigns. The relationship between the international CMC efforts and the national campaigns has been multi-faceted. One the one hand, they reinforced and mutually supported each other. The international CMC office developed lobby material and tools, provided guidance, and coordinated work focused at the larger international initiatives. This provided a unity of purpose and presentational consistency to a wide variety of local initiatives. It also forged a sense of unity among the activists and was a source of encouragement. CMC was at the same time fed by the inputs and evidence-based studies carried out by its partners. It also needed national infrastructures to ‘reach the people’. A focus on particular key governments could also only be effectuated with the help of national movements. Similarly, the involvement of NGOs, survivors and champions from affected countries was an indispensable element in the campaign’s success. It gave a human face to the suffering caused by cluster munitions. However, the ‘ban advocates’ as they were called went far beyond making visible what cluster munitions entailed. They were guided and trained in lobby and advocacy and mostly part of active, local NGOs in affected countries. Despite all those synergies, there was bound to be tension as well between the international CMC campaigners and their national counterparts. This was due to the challenge of balancing levels of diplomacy with activism. The SC was sometimes perceived to be behaving as diplomats and lobbyists rather than activists. Here it proved to be of the essence to continuously brief and involve the wider constituency of activists and explain to them the relevance of diplomatic efforts in the larger political framework. As analysed above, this not only involved a gradual process of discursive repositioning upward, but also needed a good communication strategy and transparency downwards. There was an additional issue of joint versus own organisational interests. The participating organisations, including SC members, were quite diverse and had different foci and interests. Some were highly specialised on particular aspects (e.g. Landmine Action), while others operated from a wider perspective, like IPCN. It seems, however, that this has been handled generally well and SC members were able to operate for the larger common interest, despite some unavoidable tensions in this regard.

In The Netherlands IPCN focused mainly on the spoke-persons of the political parties through lobby, support and advice and on the public at large through media campaigns and publicity. It hoped that through Parliamentary debate, questions and motions the Dutch government policy could be influenced. As observed earlier, the Dutch government was a...
reluctant partner in the Oslo process and stuck to its original positions till very late in the process before shifting towards a more supportive position of the CCM. It was noted that it was with mainly opposition parties that the IPCN lobby was successful. IPCN also knew to raise considerable if not prominent media and public interest. Like CMC in the international arena, IPCN published two influential reports that had a high impact, i.e. the report on the military utility of cluster bombs and its work on the disinvestment initiative.

Results
The signing of the CCM means that the original campaigning goals of the CMC issued at the Launch Conference on 13 November 2003 were realised. Above, it has been explained what efforts went into achieving these results and to what degree these results could also be seen as quite extraordinary. There is no need to repeat that all in this section again. Of course, the EIF of the CCM depends on further ratification, while also compliance to the CCM still needs to become subject of future monitoring. It is therefore appropriate that the CMC has formulated a new set of strategic objectives for the post EIF period.

There are, a number of salient outcomes of the CMC campaign that merit further highlighting:

First, the CMC campaign at both international and national level, has been able to include a variety of actors, constituencies and publics ranging from State Parties, affected countries, the GGE, the own government, politicians, parliamentarians, NGOs, survivors, media and the public at large. Though some of those actors were more difficult to reach or influence, this has been in and of itself a remarkable achievement.

Second, CMC has been able to work as 'a light structure' in an efficient, professional and down-to-earth manner and has evolved as a respectable and recognised partner at all levels. While doing so, it has balanced the exigencies of diplomacy and more assertive activism well, achieving over the years a political and discursive shift that was substantive, strategic and tactic at the same time. It moved from the technico-military level of debate to a more overtly political and humanitarian inspired approach.

Third, CMC knew to derive professional strength and respect from its grounded, evidence-based approach using thorough studies and involving respected experts, including from the military itself. The many studies, reports and papers emanating from the work of CMC and its partners are impressive as a result on their own, and have been guiding and dominating the debate to a large degree. Based on this evidence-based work, the CMC gained the upper hand in the debate and was able to argue with the more conservative State Parties.

Fourth, instead of being forced to compromise and water-down its demands in the negotiation process, it has radicalised and strengthened them.

Fifth, CMC sensed well if and when there were new opportunities and when and how to shift gears. The transition of a GGE/CCW-focused approach towards the Oslo process is the key example of this, but there are many others, such as the disinvestment campaign started by IPCN. It is notable that the CMC with the like-minded countries took the initiative in international diplomacy and did not lose it again to more conservative and powerful State Parties, achieving results that earlier would have been deemed unimaginable.

Sixth, CMC related very well to a group of 'like-minded' governments and forged a strong and effective partnership. Yet, it is not totally clear whether such an approach is replicable in other circumstances or that it was contingent on a particular context and history, especially the lack of progress and irrelevance of the CCW.
Seventh, CMC harnessed all opportunities from conventional as well as new media. It has successfully used innovative methods of campaigning reaching large publics and new constituencies.

**Instruments and actors**
As indicated above already CMC has made proper use of its resources and contacts with different actors. This was due to the high level of knowledge and experience in the SC and the possibility to effectively pool resources from the large network without the need to coordinate or steer that network in a laborious way. In its management CMC had to achieve a delicate balance between diplomacy and activism and between advocacy and professional expertise. Those different roles were not always easy to combine and this resulted in incidental tensions. CMC had also to contend with differences between the shared, common interests of the coalition as a whole, and the individual interests of the participant organisations. This was generally managed well.

IPCN faced certain human resource and internal communication constraints that were partly the result of unpredictability of events in the broader context and a lack of long-term planning and clear articulation of expectations both internally and to other Dutch partners.

**Causing and attribution**
There are obviously many factors impinging or contingent on the success of the CMC campaign. These include global interests related to the geo-politics of possessor and user countries such as the US, Russia and China. They also included the processes, procedures and decision-making rules in the GGE/CCW mitigating against substantial progress. There was also on the positive side, the success of the 1997 MBT in Ottawa and an increasing societal abhorrence of the humanitarian consequences of the use of cluster munitions, graphically and tragically depicted by its continued use in recent wars in the Middle East and Georgia. In this overarching context, the vision, strategy and activities of the CMC itself clearly stand out as one of the determining factors in achieving the goal of the CCM. Though in most lobby and advocacy processes the issue of causation and attribution is difficult, in this case both internationally and in The Netherlands, there is no doubt about the definite influence and major impact of CMC work, as can easily be derived from the descriptive part of the study and all underlying extensive documentation thereof.

**Dynamics and environment**
CMC has been able to discursively and strategically relate very well to the changing conditions and contexts in the international arena. It had a fine nose to smell emerging trends and opportunities and capitalise on them. It was not afraid to change its course when needed and take new initiatives, if required. This has made that CMC was not only floating on the wave of trends and events, but also to a degree created, channelled and directed that wave.

**Compromise, trade-offs and politics**
Advocacy and lobby often face the need to compromise or accept trade-offs. In the case of CMC there have been continuous attempts by many states, including The Netherlands, to weaken and watering down the envisaged convention. It has been remarkable that those attempts have largely been warded off and that the CCM in the end became as robust and strong as it happened to be. This was no doubt due to skills of the Chairs and Presidents of the different meetings and conferences leading up to the signing of the Convention in Oslo, but also to the perseverence and campaigning skills of the CMC. The shifting political climate, the ongoing campaigns and provision of information, and public pressure moved states towards an increasingly radical text. Nevertheless, it is notable that CMC has maintained good working relationships with its government partners. Based on expert knowledge and professionalism on the one hand, and a mixture of assertiveness and skilful diplomacy on the other, it became recognised as an unavoidable, but also respectable partner. To a certain degree this was also the case in the relations with private companies. In
relation to the disinvestment campaign of IPCN, the evidence base provided and negative publicity of dubious investments has already led to considerable progress, but also here a skilful combination of assertion and diplomacy seemed to be most effective. IPCN has developed the disinvestment initiative as a niche which continues to be followed-up up to present.

People-centred advocacy and citizen diplomacy
In several publications on advocacy there is the notion that advocacy should also be people-centred and not only focus on higher-level authorities. This does relate to the development of the advocacy message itself and it being based on the views and needs of the population, as well as with regard to its destination. Here the widest possible audience should be addressed to give the message an impact beyond elitist circles. The CMC has definitely been able to make the CCM into a ‘People’s Treaty’. It has not only changed the course of traditional diplomacy, but overtook it and made it appear irrelevant. It formulated and implemented with like-minded state parties a strong and vibrant alternative to what increasingly was recognised to be a fossilised and impotent structure that was detached from wider societal trends. In this connection, the CCM has been hailed as a major example of citizen diplomacy, a form of diplomacy going beyond the earlier forms of Track II or III negotiations. Citizen diplomacy is characterised by the active involvement of civilian groups in international diplomacy beyond mere lobby or advocacy roles or the supplementary or alternative roles envisaged in alternative dispute resolution or community-based peace initiatives. Both in the GGE/CCW and the Oslo process, the CMC actively provided inputs and advice. In the Oslo process there was virtually direct involvement in the drafting of text, as CMC played a role in the main preparatory meetings and maintained close contact with host countries’ governments such as New Zealand, Ireland and Norway and other ‘like-minded’ countries. In the framework of this best practice study it not possible to gauge the impact of this further development - and perhaps consolidation since the Ottawa process - of citizen diplomacy in its entirety, but CMC certainly provides an interesting case for further analysis in this direction.

Vulnerable groups and gender
The CMC campaign focused on the special vulnerability of children with regard to ERWs, and naturally included assistance to victims who faced a series of physical and other handicaps. While in many other debates on contemporary conflict gender-specific approaches are promoted, there seems to be no such emphasis in the CMC campaign. Though there is a sense that women could be particularly vulnerable, e.g. in terms of agricultural labour, there has been no evidence of a specific gender-sensitive approach. This could, however, be of relevance in terms of awareness and victim assistance, such as in areas where patriarchal systems or religious norms suppress women’s participation in such activities or in the public realm in general.

Joined-up nature of intervention
The joined-up nature of advocacy relates to attempts to embed the specific action in broader initiatives. It could be said that CMC has been able to expand towards a broader approach from the start onwards. It transformed the initial narrow focus on ERWs to a more principled perspective on use and target. It embarked on discussions of military utility. It ended with pleading for a comprehensive ban. At the same time it demanded user responsibility and proper programmes for victims’ assistance in affected countries. It included disinvestment campaigns from a perspective of social corporate responsibility and transparency. In the choice of its partners it has been able to join up with like-minded states as well as global grass roots audiences, as explained above.

Lessons learned from the ICBL
Williams and Goose identified a set of key campaigning lessons that could be seen as ingredients for a successful citizen diplomacy campaigning model, as mentioned in chapter 1. The CMC complied nearly completely to this list of key lessons.
6. CONCLUSION

From the above discussion sixteen major conclusions can be drawn.

1) CMC was established on the basis of its members’ experiences in the GGE/CCW negotiations and due to the increasing debate on cluster munitions caused by its actual use by NATO and the publication of critical reports on its humanitarian consequences.

2) The CMC had a light structure that was able to operate efficiently, professionally and in a down-to-earth manner.

3) By the adoption and signing of the CCM, the initial goals of the CMC were reached. It adopted as an appropriate follow-up on this achievement, a subsequent set of goals targeted at the rapid EIF of the CCM and the monitoring of compliance.

4) The strategy, vision and activities of the CMC evolved in close interaction with the situation encountered in reality and the developments in policy practice.

5) Starting from a largely technico-military approach that dominated the GGE/CCW discussion, CMC broadened the debate to include humanitarian and political perspectives to finally develop an alternative track next to the increasingly infertile GGE/CCW discussions. CMC was able to adopt a discursive transition that enabled it to gradually and timely radicalize and politicize its demands and approach.

6) CMC has succeeded in carrying out this balancing act between diplomatic and activist approaches requiring different sets of skills and actors in a credible, self-conscious and assertive manner. Incidentally this juggling of roles and positions led to tensions with the activist constituencies of the participating NGOs.

7) The CMC had a capacity to identify opportunities and to anticipate the need for substantive, strategic and tactical change, if required.

8) The CMC international and national campaigns to ban the cluster munitions were based on clever contextual analysis, evidence-based, detailed expert information and studies that could deconstruct the arguments put forward by conservative State Parties opposing a ban, and a professional campaigning strategy and implementation based on both conventional lobby and advocacy methods and innovative visual and computer-based communication strategies.

9) In its campaign CMC build a strong interrelationship and synergy between the international and national campaigns, tasks and activities.

10) CMC has forged close and effective linkages with like-minded governments.

11) It was able to involve in its campaign larger segments of the grassroots and survivors in affected countries and to work in the direction of a ‘people’s treaty’.

12) Drawing largely on the resources of its members the CMC was carried out with limited personnel and financial resources, attaining an overall high level of efficiency, something which is quite remarkable considering the nature of NGO-movements and the technical and diplomatic complexity of its mandate and tasks and the multitude of actors it had to deal with.

13) CMC’s overall approach toward the CCM has been called citizen diplomacy, a new form of diplomacy involving civil society in an active and co-responsible way beyond advocacy, lobby and traditional track I and II approaches.

14) IPCN focused its lobby and advocacy approach on parliament, media and the public at large. It proved difficult to influence the political sector beyond the opposition and to influence the Dutch government that was unwilling to revise its original stance and only started moving towards the Oslo process in a late stage.

15) IPCN has generally been in achieving its goals and strategic objectives, but could improve on long-term planning the mobilization and timely usage of human resources and on internal communication and the explicit articulation of expectations vis-à-vis specialist internal departments as well as external partners. Its campaigns have been cheap and efficient.

16) CMC both at the international level and in The Netherlands have been recognized as respectable and professional actors in their field.
REFERENCES


**ANNEXE 1  CHRONOLOGY OF THE INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT TO BAN CLUSTER BOMBS**

Chronology of the international movement to ban cluster bombs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jun.</td>
<td>Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) issues report, <em>Drop Today, Kill Tomorrow: Cluster Munitions as Inhumane and Indiscriminate Weapons</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 16</td>
<td>In a memorandum for CCW delegates, HRW calls for a moratorium on the use of cluster munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aug.</td>
<td>Landmine Action (LAUK) issues report, <em>Cluster Bombs: The military effectiveness and impact on civilians of cluster munitions</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sept.</td>
<td>The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) holds a meeting in Nyon on ERW</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>Mennonite Central Committee (MCC) issues report, <em>Clusters of Death</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>Jun. 14</td>
<td>Norwegian Parliament adopts a resolution urging the government to work to achieve an international ban on cluster munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>CCW mandate on ERW agreed at the Second Review Conference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dec. 18</td>
<td>HRW issues report, <em>Fatally Flawed: Cluster Bombs and Their Use by the United States in Afghanistan</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>Apr. 23-25</td>
<td>Ireland convenes a meeting on explosive remnants of war in Dublin that is hosted by Pax Christi Ireland. NGOs decide to establish an international coalition to tackle cluster bombs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 13</td>
<td>The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) is launched in The Hague, Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 27</td>
<td>United Nations (UN) Inter Agency Standing Committee calls for a freeze on the use of cluster munitions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nov. 28</td>
<td>CCW states parties adopt Protocol V on Explosive Remnants of War, but fail to take any meaningful action to address cluster bombs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 11</td>
<td>HRW launches report, <em>Off Target: The Conduct of the War and Civilian Casualties in Iraq</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2004</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>82 NGO participants from 21 countries gather at a CMC campaign workshop hosted by DanChurchAid on the margins of a conference on cluster munitions in the Danish Parliament</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 28</td>
<td>European Parliament calls on EU member states to enact moratoria on the use, stockpiling, production, transfer and export of cluster munitions, and negotiate an international legally binding instrument on the use of cluster munitions.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2005</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar.</td>
<td>HI Belgium mobilizes in Belgium to support the parliamentary process to ban cluster munitions. CMC campaigners support efforts through a global letter writing campaign to Belgian parliamentarians.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jun.</td>
<td>Norwegian Government Pension Fund excludes eight foreign companies involved in the production of cluster munitions from the fund’s investments; more companies are excluded in 2006 and 2008</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2006</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 16</td>
<td>Belgian parliament passes first national law in the world banning cluster munitions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jun.</td>
<td>Norway announces moratorium on cluster munition use, pending review of stockpile</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul.</td>
<td>Austrian parliament passes a resolution urging the government to support ‘the preparation of a CCW Protocol on cluster munitions and bombs or another appropriate international law instrument.’</td>
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<tr>
<td>Jul 16-Aug 14</td>
<td>Widespread cluster munition use in southern Lebanon during the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel</td>
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<tr>
<td>Aug. 30</td>
<td>CMC hosts a CCW briefing on the impact of cluster munitions in Lebanon</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Oct. 1</td>
<td>LAUK issues report, <em>Foreseeable harm: The Use and Impact of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 25</td>
<td>Austria, Holy See, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden propose a CCW mandate to negotiate a legally-binding instrument to address the humanitarian concerns posed by cluster munitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 1</td>
<td>HI issues report, <em>Fatal Footprint: The Global Human Impact of Cluster Munitions</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 7</td>
<td>UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan calls for a “freeze” on the use of cluster munitions in populated areas and the destruction of “inaccurate and unreliable” cluster munitions</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov. 8-9</td>
<td>CMC hosts an international meeting for campaigners in Geneva</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 17</td>
<td>At the CCW, 25 countries issue a joint declaration calling for an agreement that would prohibit the use of unreliable and/or inaccurate cluster munitions in civilian areas. Norwegian Foreign Minister J. Gahr Støre announces that Norway will hold a meeting to discuss cluster bombs outside the CCW</td>
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<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>----------</td>
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<tr>
<td>Feb. 22</td>
<td>Landmine Action launches report, <em>Cluster Munitions in Kosovo: Analysis of use, contamination and casualties</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 22-23</td>
<td>Norway hosts the Oslo Conference on Cluster Munitions, where 46 states agree an “Oslo Declaration” committing them to conclude an international treaty on cluster munitions in 2008.</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. 2</td>
<td>Belgium passes first law in the world to specifically prohibit financing of cluster munitions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. 15</td>
<td>South-East Asia Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions is held in Phnom Penh, Cambodia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mar. 22</td>
<td>New Zealand NGOs meet to establish the Aotearoa New Zealand Cluster Munition Coalition</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apr. 18-20</td>
<td>ICRC hosts an experts meeting on cluster munitions in Montreux, Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>NPA launches report, <em>Yellow Killers: The impact of cluster munitions in Serbia and Montenegro</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Handicap International (HI) launches report, <em>Circle of Impact: The Fatal Footprint of Cluster Munitions on People and Communities</em></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 23-25</td>
<td>Peru hosts the Lima Conference on Cluster Munitions, attended by 67 countries, where a draft treaty text is introduced for discussion</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sep. 4-5</td>
<td>Costa Rica hosts the San José Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions attended by 18 states from the region</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 3-4</td>
<td>Serbia hosts the Belgrade Conference of States Affected by Cluster Munitions, where HI launches its Ban Advocates initiative to enable cluster munition survivors to participate in the Oslo Process</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oct. 30</td>
<td>Belgium hosts the European Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions in Brussels</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov. 5</td>
<td>The CMC calls its first Global Day of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs, in which campaigners in 40 countries take action</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Nov.</td>
<td>CCW states parties fail to agree on a mandate to negotiate a legally-binding instrument on cluster munitions and instead agree to “negotiate a proposal”</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 5</td>
<td>UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon calls for a prohibition on cluster munitions that cause unacceptable harm to civilians.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 5-7</td>
<td>Austria hosts the Vienna Conference on Cluster Munitions, where 138 countries discuss the proposed international treaty</td>
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<tr>
<td>Dec. 6</td>
<td>The Austrian parliament adopts a national law comprehensively banning cluster munitions</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**2008**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Feb. 18-22</td>
<td>New Zealand hosts the Wellington Conference on Cluster Munitions, attended by 106 states, of which 82 endorse the Wellington Declaration committing to negotiate a cluster bomb treaty in Dublin in May 2008 on</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the basis of the draft discussion text

Mar. 31-Apr. 1 Zambia hosts the Livingstone Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions
Apr. 4 The New Zealand Superannuation Fund announces it will divest from companies that manufacture cluster munitions
Apr. 16-17 Mexico hosts the Regional Conference for Latin America and the Caribbean on Cluster Munitions in Mexico City
Apr. 19 The second Global Day of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs is held, with actions taken by campaigners in 53 countries
Apr. 24-25 Thailand hosts the Southeast Asia Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions in Bangkok
May 19-30 Ireland hosts the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, attended by 127 states
May 30 A total of 107 states adopt the 2008 Convention on Cluster Munitions on the final day of the Dublin negotiations. The CMC and Mines Action Canada launch the “People’s Treaty” petition
Aug. 13 CMC members hold candlelight vigils and other actions to mark the second year since the cluster bombing of South Lebanon
Aug-Sep. CMC members protest Georgia and Russia’s use of cluster bombs in South Ossetia
Sep. 18-19 Bulgaria hosts the Sofia Regional Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions
Sep. 29-30 Uganda hosts the Kampala Regional Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions
Oct. 1 The ‘Ban Bus’ begins its eight-week-long awareness-raising journey from Belgrade to Oslo
Oct. 20-22 Lao PDR hosts the South East Asia Regional Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Xiengkhouang
Oct. 27 The CMC calls its first Global Week of Action to Ban Cluster Bombs, in which campaigners in 74 countries take action
Oct. 29-30 A European Faith Leaders Conference on Cluster Munitions is held in Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina
Nov. 6-7 Ecuador hosts the Quito Regional Conference on the Convention on Cluster Munitions
Nov. 11-12 Lebanon hosts the Beirut Regional Conference on Cluster Munitions
Dec. 3-4 Norway hosts the Oslo Signing Conference for the Convention on Cluster Munitions, attended by 122 states. A total of 94 states sign the Convention in Oslo in front of a CMC delegation of 250 campaigners

2009

Mar. 10 NPA launches report, The Impact of unexploded cluster munitions in Serbia
Mar. 11 President Obama signs into law a permanent ban on nearly all U.S. cluster bomb exports
Mar. 18 DR Congo signs and Lao PDR ratifies the Convention on Cluster
Munitions during a special event held at UN headquarters in New York

Apr. 14  HRW launches report, *A Dying Practice: Use of Cluster Munitions by Russia and Georgia in August 2008*

May 1  Cluster bomb survivor Branislav Kapetanovic accepts the Tipperary International Peace Award in Ireland on behalf of the CMC


May 29  The CMC calls its second Global Week of Action Against Cluster Bombs, with campaigners in 58 countries taking action

Jun. 25-26  Germany hosts the Berlin Conference on the Destruction of Cluster Munitions, attended by 87 treaty signatories
ANNEXE 2  CMC FILES STUDIED

Minutes CMC Meetings

Minutes ERW Meeting, 6 February 2003 (ERW111/30/2003)
Minutes ERW Meeting, 6 February 2003 (ERW111/31/2003)
Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Core Group Meeting, 25 April 2003 (ERW111/29/2003)
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Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Core Group Meeting, 19 June 2003 (ERW111/136/2003)
Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Steering Committee Meeting, Geneva, 12 November 2004
Cluster Munition Coalition, Minutes Steering Committee Meeting, Vienna, 8 December 2007
Cluster Munition Coalition, Steering Committee Meeting Agenda, Dublin, 16 May 2008
Cluster Munition Coalition, Steering Committee Meeting Agenda, New York, 13 September 2008

Studies, reports, papers, proceedings, memoranda etc.


C. King Associates Ltd., Norwegian Defence Research Establishment and Norwegian People’s Aid, M85, An analysis of reliability, 2007


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Germany, ‘Reliability and Use of Cluster Munitions’, presented to the Working Group on Explosive Remnants of War, Tenth Session of the GGE/CCW meeting, Geneva, 10 March 2005

Human Rights Watch, Intervention by Stephen Goose, Closing Session of the Meeting of States parties to the CCW, Geneva, Switzerland, 19 November 2004

Human Rights Watch, Worldwide Production and Export of Cluster Munitions, HRW briefing paper, April 2005

Human Rights Watch, Survey of Cluster Munition Policy and Practice, Memorandum for Delegates to the Fourteenth Session of the CCW Group of Governmental Experts, June 2006


Human Rights Watch and International Human Rights Clinic, Interoperability and the prohibition on Assistance, Memorandum to delegates of the Dublin Diplomatic Conference on Cluster Munitions, May 2008

IKV Pax Christi, Notitie ‘Het Nederlandse beleid inzake clustermunitie’, 2008

IKV Pax Christi and 4 other NGOs, Letter to members of Dutch parliament re cluster munition, 11 October 2007

Mines Action Canada, Overview of States Parties’ national policy on CCW, 2003

Minister van Buitenlandse Zaken and Minister of Defensie, brief aan de Voorzitter van de Tweede Kamer van de Staten-generaal, inz. wapenbeheersing: start van de onderhandelingen te Genève over ontplofbare oorlogsresten, 15 mei 2003 (ERW111/37/2003)

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Beschikking ERW Clustermunitiecampagne, 29 september 2003 (ERW111/46/2003)

Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken, Kamerbrief inzake schriftelijke antwoorden naar aanleiding van de eerste termijn van de Tweede Kamer tijdens de begrotingsbehandeling van Buitenlandse Zaken, 19 oktober 2006

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Pax Christi Netherlands, Intervention Pax Christi Netherlands, 10th session GGE CCW, 10 March 2005


Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2003-2004, Goedkeuring van het op 28 november 2003 te Genève totstandgekomen Aanvullend Protocol inzake ontplofbare oorlogsresten, 29 848 (R 1775), nr. 1 (Koninklijke Boodschap), nr. 2 (Voorstel van Wet), nr. 3 (Memorie van Toelichting), nr. 4 (Nota van Verbetering), nr. 5 (Verslag)


Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2005-2006, aanhangsel van de Handelingen, 237-239

Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2006-2007, aanhangsel van de Handelingen, 2565

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Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal, vergaderjaar 2007-2008, aanhangsel van de Handelingen, 2299-2301


Volkskrant, ‘Hezbollah gebruikt clusterbommen’, 20 oktober 2006, 4


**INVENTARISATIE VAN KENMERKEN**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Evaluatieobject</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Titel</strong></td>
<td>The Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC), 2003-2009</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Type object</strong></td>
<td>International and national advocacy and lobby campaign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land(en), regio('s)</strong></td>
<td>World-wide, The Netherlands</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Financieel belang</strong></td>
<td>€ 345,367 direct costs, and salary costs for 6.4 FTE amounting to a maximum of approximately € 350,00 (period 2003-2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluatieperiode</strong></td>
<td>2003-2009</td>
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<tr>
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<td><strong>Gebruiksdoelstelling</strong></td>
<td>(i) policy development / organisational learning (ii) management decisions (iii) accountability</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Type onderzoek</strong></td>
<td>Best practice study; review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Onderzoekskosten</strong></td>
<td>Salaries € 11,573 (1.46 %)</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Financieringsbron</strong></td>
<td>IKV Pax Christi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Doorlooptijd</strong></td>
<td>The study was started in the month of October 2009, week 41. A first draft based on the desk study was ready in week 43. The final key informant interviews were held in week 45, comments on the first draft incorporated, and the report was completed on 18 November 2009.</td>
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<tr>
<th>Actoren</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Opdrachtgever</strong></td>
<td>IKV Pax Christi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sturing of begeleiding</strong></td>
<td>Miriam Struyk and Roos Boer (responsible for CMC at IPCN)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Evaluatoren</strong></td>
<td>Prof. dr ir Georg Frerks (Disaster Studies Group, Wageningen University)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kwalificaties</strong></td>
<td>Yes (see ‘about the author’ op p. 6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Selectiecriteria</strong></td>
<td>The assignment took place in the context of a 4-year during framework agreement between Wageningen University and IPCN. This framework agreement was tendered and Disaster Studies selected. For the individual studies under this framework agreement there is no new tender procedure, though for each study a contract is signed.</td>
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4 Deze omvatten zowel *"interne"* PE's van individuele MFS-organisaties als gezamenlijke PE's ondernomen in het kader van een tijdelijk of permanent samenwerkingsverband.
datum 18 November 2009
auteur(s) Georg Frerks
onderzoeks vraagstelling Yes (p. 8)
ToR Yes, ‘Best Practice Study Camagne Cluster Munitie’ (in addition, there are the general questions for best practice study agreed between IPCN and Wageningen University). Reference to the research questions in the ToR is made on p. 9.
omvang 57 pagina’s, including annexes

TOELICHTING OP INVULLING INVENTARISATIE VAN KENMERKEN

titel de naam van het onderzoek volgens de definitieve versie van het eindrapport
type object (bijv.) programma / project / sector / thema / instrument / strategie / organisatie
land(en), regio(s) gebied(en) waar het onderzoek betrekking op heeft
financieel belang het bedrag aan MFS-fondsen dat tijdens de onderzochte periode aan het evaluatieobject is besteed
evaluatieperiode de periode die het onderzoek bestrijkt
gebruiksdoelstelling (i) verantwoording en/of (ii) beleidsontwikkeling (leren) en/of (iii) managementbeslissing
type onderzoek (bijv.) ex post / interim / evaluatie / review / evaluatie & formulering
onderzoekskosten in € (en in % van de financiële belang van het evaluatieobject)
financieringsbron het budget(onderdeel) waaruit het onderzoek wordt gefinancierd
doorlooptijd de periode die met de uitvoering van het onderzoek is gemoeid
opdrachtgever functionaris of instantie die de ToR vaststelt en beslist over de aanvaarding van de eindrapportage
sturing/begeleiding samenstelling van (eventueel ingesteld) gezelschap dat begeleiding of sturing gaf aan de evaluatie
evaluatoren namen (+ eventuele werkkringen) van zowel teamleider als teamleden
kwalificaties vermelding van de voornaamste opleidings- en ervaringsgegevens van de onderzoekers; ja / nee
selectecriteria zijn de criteria aan de hand waarvan de onderzoekers zijn geselecteerd expliciet vermeld (bijvoorbeeld in de ToR); ja / nee
datum van de definitieve versie van het eindrapport
auteur(s) namen (+ werkkringen) indien anderen dan de evaluatoren zelf
onderzoeks vraagstelling vermelding of herhaling (uit de ToR) in de hoofdstuk van de onderzoeks-vragen, met locatie: ja (p. …) / nee
ToR zijn deze – volledig of verkort – als bijlage in het rapport opgenomen? ja (volledig/verkort), p. … / nee
omvang van het rapport in pagina’s (inclusief bijlagen)

¹ review: ‘lichte’ vorm van evaluatieonderzoek, voornamelijk gebaseerd op reeds bestaand materiaal.
² evaluatie & formulering: van deze combinatie is sprake als de onderzoeksoptdracht zodanig expliciete aanwijzingen voor de opstelling van aanbevelingen ten behoeve van de voortzetting van de te evalueren activiteiten bevat, dat het risico bestaat dat de aanbevelingen de evaluatieve bevindingen gaan sturen in plaats van omgekeerd.

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## BEoordelingSCriteria, indicAtoren en componenten

### 1. Validity (meet het onderzoek daadwerkelijk wat het beoogt te meten?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Problemstelling</td>
<td>Helderheid van probleemstelling en uitwerking in onderzoeksfragen. Zie p. 8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.2 Evaluatieobject</td>
<td>Definitie, werking en afbakening van het onderzoekobject. It concerns the strategy, activities and results of the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC), as documented in chapter 2, 3 and 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.3 BeleidsTheorie</td>
<td>Definitie, werking en afbakening van het onderzoekobject. It concerns the strategy, activities and results of the Cluster Munitions Coalition (CMC), as documented in chapter 2, 3 and 4.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.4 Analyse</td>
<td>Weergave van reconstructie van interventielogica en resultaatniveaus. The strategies are mainly discussed in the chapter 3 and analysed in chapter 5.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 2. Betrouwbaarheid (hoe stabiel zijn de onderzoeksresultaten?)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Subsection</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Onderzoeksmethoden</td>
<td>Specificatie en verantwoording van gehanteerde onderzoeksmethoden. See for some methodological aspects of the best practice study the pages 8-11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Rekewijdte</td>
<td>Verificatie van gegevens / Triangulatie. The direct responsible CMC officers at IPCN gave feedback on the complete draft version of the report. Triangulation took place by comparing the different sources and checking the interview data with those on file.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Onafhankelijkheid</td>
<td>Representativiteit van de steekproeftrekking c.q. case study-selectie. There was no sample procedure followed. It concerned a unique case-study, in which all available relevant material was studied.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Onderzoeksverloop en kwaliteitsbewaking</td>
<td>Vermelding van beperkingen van het onderzoek. The research took place in retrospect. This means that the researcher was not present at the events and conferences described. The study was fully based on files and some retrospective interviews, without the possibility of direct and/or participatory observation and (cross-)checking.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th><strong>BRUIKBARHEID</strong> (hoe goed zijn de onderzeksuitkomsten toepasbaar?)</th>
<th>score</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>Presentatie</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.1</td>
<td>Helderheid van de onderzoeksdoelstelling. The rationale of the study is formulated on p. 8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1.2</td>
<td>Toegankelijkheid van de onderzoeksresultaten. The report is public.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>Aansluiting</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.1</td>
<td>Beantwoording van de onderzoeksvragen door de conclusies. The discussion in chapter 5 and the conclusions in chapter 6 systematically deal with the research questions and the themes identified for the evaluation of advocacy and lobby on p. 10.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2.2</td>
<td>Uitvoerbaarheid van lessen of aanbevelingen. The lessons learned are formulated in chapter 5 and 6. They basically contain ingredients for success, but also some issues that could be further strengthened.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TOELICHTING OP INVULLING BEOORDELINGSCRITERIA, -INDICATOREN EN COMPONENTEN**

**VALIDITEIT**

1.1.1 De probleemstelling formuleert kernachtig waarop (aan de hand van welke, met name genoemde, criteria) het evaluatieobject wordt beoordeeld. De onderzoeksfragen vormen samen de operationalisering van de probleemstelling.

1.1.2 Eenduidige omschrijving van de maatstaven – zoals doeltreffendheid – die worden aangelegd om het evaluatieobject te beoordelen.

1.2.1 Opomming, omschrijving en begrenzing van de verzameling (operationele populatie) van onderzoekseenheden (naar type, doelgroep, locatie, periode, instelling, financiële omvang, enz.) waarop de onderzoeksresultaten betrekking hebben.

1.2.2 Weergave van relevante beleidsmatige achtergronden en uitgangspunten, alsmede van het institutionele krachtsveld waarin het evaluatieobject opereert.

1.3.1 Uitvoerbaarheid van lessen of aanbevelingen. The lessons learned are formulated in chapter 5 and 6. They basically contain ingredients for success, but also some issues that could be further strengthened.

1.3.2 Uiteenzetting van de beleidstheorie met de veronderstellingen over causale en finale relaties die aan onderzochte interventies ten grondslag heeft gelegen, en over de gehanteerde doel–middelenhiërarchie met de onderscheiden resultaatniveaus.

1.4.1 Zorgvuldigheid waarmee de gebruikte gegevensbronnen zijn geselecteerd, als specifiek, meetbaar en tijdgebonden kunnen worden beschouwd.

1.4.2 Mate waarin de conclusies daadwerkelijk worden gedekt door de onderzoeksbevindingen.

**BETROUWBAARHEID**

2.1.1 Nauwkeurige identificatie en rechtvaardiging van de gehanteerde onderzoeksmethoden en – technieken.

2.1.2 Mate waarin gegevens zijn gecontroleerd, en verschillende bronnen/methoden zijn gebruikt om informatie over dezelfde kenmerken en verschijnselen te verzamelen.

2.2.1 Mate waarin de conclusies uit de onderzochte steekproef c.q. van de uitgevoerde case studies gelden voor de hele onderzoeksopvolging.

2.2.2 Vermelding van en uitleg over (eventuele) tekortkomingen van het onderzoek en restricties aan de generaliseerbaarheid van de bevindingen en conclusies.

2.3.1 Mate waarin selectie en inhoud van geraadpleegde gegevensbronnen, met name documentatie en respondenten, onafhankelijk waren van belanghebbenden bij de evaluatie zoals opdrachtgevers, uitvoerders en beneficiënten.

2.3.2 Mate waarin de evaluatoren onafhankelijk opereerden en rapporteerden van belanghebbenden bij het onderzoek zoals opdrachtgevers, uitvoerders en beneficiënten.

2.4.1 Beschrijving en verklaring van het verloop van de evaluatie, inclusief eventuele aanpassingen die ten opzichte van de oorspronkelijke opzet zijn aangebracht.

2.4.2 Controle op het ontwerp en/of de uitvoering van het onderzoek door een begeleidings- of stuurgroep binnen of buiten de MPV-organisatie(s).

**BRUIKBARHEID**

3.1.1 Helderheid van de specificatie van het (buiten het onderzoek zelf gelegen – externe) doel van de evaluatie, waarvoor de onderzeksuitkomsten zullen worden of zijn gebruikt.
| 3.1.2 | Duidelijkheid en volledigheid waarmee in het evaluatierapport en de samenvatting ervan de essentie van het onderzoek, en met name de hoofdbevindingen, zijn weergeven. |
| 3.2.1 | Volledigheid waarmee alle onderzoeksvragen door de conclusies worden beantwoord. |
| 3.2.2 | Praktische uitvoerbaarheid van gepresenteerde aanbevelingen en de mate waarin deze binnen het bereik liggen van betrokken verantwoordelijken, met name van de evaluatie-opdrachtgevers. |