Governance of Tourism Conservation Partnerships

Lessons from Kenya

Rita Wairimu Nthiga
Thesis committee

Promoter

Prof. Dr V.R. van der Duim
Professor of Tourism and Sustainable Development
Wageningen University

Co-promoters

Dr I.J. Visseren-Hamakers
Assistant professor, Forest and Nature Conservation Policy Group
Wageningen University

Prof. Dr B.E.L. Wishitemi
Professor of Tourism and Natural Resources Management
Moi University, Eldoret, Kenya

Other Members

Prof. Dr A.P.J. Mol, Wageningen University
Prof. Dr D. Vanneste, University of Leuven, Belgium
Dr P.G.M. Hebinck, Wageningen University
Dr W.M. Ahebwa, Makerere University, Kampala, Uganda

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Governance of Tourism Conservation Partnerships

Lessons from Kenya

Rita Wairimu Nthiga

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List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCG</td>
<td>African Biodiversity Collaborative Group</td>
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<td>ACC</td>
<td>African Conservation Centre</td>
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<td>ADMADE</td>
<td>Administrative and Management Design for Game Management Areas</td>
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<td>ALDEV</td>
<td>African Land Development Organization</td>
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<td>AWF</td>
<td>Africa Wildlife Foundation</td>
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<td>AWLF</td>
<td>African Wildlife Leadership Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAMPFIRE</td>
<td>Communal Areas Management for Indigenous Resources</td>
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<td>CBD</td>
<td>Convention on Biological Diversity</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBNRM</td>
<td>Community Based Natural Resource Management</td>
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<td>CBO</td>
<td>Community Based Organization</td>
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<td>CBT</td>
<td>Community Based Tourism</td>
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<td>CC</td>
<td>Community Conservation</td>
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<td>CI</td>
<td>Conservation International</td>
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<td>CE</td>
<td>Conservation Enterprises</td>
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<td>CIP</td>
<td>Community Investment Plan</td>
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<td>CHWs</td>
<td>Community Health Workers</td>
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<tr>
<td>CITES</td>
<td>Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLO</td>
<td>Crown Lands Ordinance</td>
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<tr>
<td>COBRA</td>
<td>Conservation of Biodiverse Resource Areas</td>
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<td>CORE</td>
<td>Conservation of Resources through Enterprise</td>
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<tr>
<td>DANIDA</td>
<td>Danish International Development Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>DGIS</td>
<td>Directoraat-Generaal for Internationale Samenwerking (Directorate General for International Cooperation)</td>
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<tr>
<td>DfID</td>
<td>Department for International Development</td>
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<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
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<td>EFT</td>
<td>Electronic Funds Transfer</td>
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<td>EMCA</td>
<td>Environmental Management and Co-ordination Act</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<td>FAO</td>
<td>Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations</td>
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<td>FECTO</td>
<td>Federation of Community-Based Tourism Organizations</td>
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<td>FSO</td>
<td>Financial Service Organisation</td>
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<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross Domestic Product</td>
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<td>GoK</td>
<td>Government of Kenya</td>
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IBEC : Imperial British East Africa Company
ICDPs : Integrated Conservation and Development Projects
IMF : International Monetary Fund
IUCN : International Union for the Conservation of Nature
KCT-KS : Koija Conservation Trust - Koija Starbeds
KCT-SOL : Kijabe Conservation Trust – Sanctuary at Ol Lentille
KNFSO : Kijabe-Nkiloriti women Financial Service Organisation
KTB : Kenya Tourist Board
KWCA : Kenya Wildlife Conservancies Association
KWS : Kenya Wildlife Service
LCCT : Loisaba Community Conservation Trust
LWF : Laikipia Wildlife Forum
MCA : Member of County Assembly
MDGs : Millennium Development Goals
MEA : Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
MoU : Memorandum of Understanding
NCT : Naibunga Conservation Trust
NEMA : National Environmental Management Authority
NGOs : Non-Governmental Organizations
NRM : Natural Resource Management
NRT : Northern Rangelands Trust
OL : Oryx Limited
RL : Regenesis Limited
RNE : Royal Netherlands Embassy
SACCO : Savings and Credit Cooperative Organization
SLF : Sustainable Livelihoods Framework
TCEs : Tourism Conservation Enterprises
TNC : The Nature Conservancy
TRA : Threat Reduction Assessment
TTF : Tourism Trust Fund
UNDP : United Nations Development Programme
UNEP : United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCAP : United Nations Special Commission for Asia-Pacific
UNESCO : United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank</td>
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<td>WCED</td>
<td>World Commission on Environment and Development</td>
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<td>WCMA</td>
<td>Wildlife Conservation and Management Act</td>
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<td>WCMD</td>
<td>Wildlife Conservation and Management Department</td>
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<td>WCS</td>
<td>World Conservation Society</td>
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<tr>
<td>WMCA</td>
<td>Wildlife Management and Conservation Act</td>
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<tr>
<td>WRI</td>
<td>World Resources Institute</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WSSD</td>
<td>World Summit on Sustainable Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WWF</td>
<td>World Wildlife Fund for Nature</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................... vi

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms .................................................................................. vii

List of Figures, Tables and Boxes ....................................................................................... xiv

Chapter 1: Introduction ........................................................................................................ 1
  1.1 Background: Conservation, Development and Tourism ............................................. 1
  1.2 The concept of governance ......................................................................................... 10
  1.3 Partnerships as modes of governance ......................................................................... 13
  1.4 Problem statement and research aim .......................................................................... 14
  1.5 Methodology ............................................................................................................. 18
    1.5.1 Selection of the cases ......................................................................................... 18
    1.5.2 Access to and collection of data ......................................................................... 19
    1.5.3 Data sources ..................................................................................................... 20
    1.5.4 Data Analysis and Interpretation ....................................................................... 23
    1.5.5 Research constraints ......................................................................................... 23
    1.5.6 Ethical considerations ....................................................................................... 24
  1.6 Outline of the thesis .................................................................................................... 25

Chapter 2: Governance of Partnerships ............................................................................. 27
  2.1 Introduction .............................................................................................................. 27
  2.2 The concept of governance ....................................................................................... 27
  2.3 The concept of good governance .............................................................................. 31
  2.4 Principles of good governance .................................................................................. 33
  2.5 Conceptualizing governance of partnerships ............................................................ 35
    2.5.1 Participation .................................................................................................... 35
Chapter 3: Contextualizing the Partnerships ............................................................55
  3.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................55
  3.2 International level context ...........................................................................55
    3.2.1 Sustainable development discourse .....................................................56
    3.2.2 Governance, good governance and partnerships discourses ...............57
    3.2.3 Neoliberal conservation discourses.....................................................59
  3.3 National level context ..................................................................................60
    3.3.1 History of wildlife conservation in Kenya .............................................60
    3.3.2 Policy, legal, and Institutional framework for wildlife conservation in
          Kenya ......................................................................................................64
  3.4 AWF Conservation Enterprise Strategy .......................................................69
  3.5 Local context ................................................................................................74
    3.5.1 The Laikipia ecosystem ........................................................................74
    3.5.2 The community-level context ..............................................................76
  3.6 Conclusion ....................................................................................................79

Chapter 4: The Sanctuary at Ol Lentille ..............................................................80
  4.1 Introduction ...................................................................................................80
  4.2 The partnership ............................................................................................80
    4.2.1 History of the partnership ......................................................................80
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.2.2</td>
<td>Actors in the partnership</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.3</td>
<td>The partnership initiatives and activities</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.2.4</td>
<td>Decision-making platforms</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>Governance of the partnership</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.1</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.2</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.3</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>101</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.3.4</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 5: The Koija Starbeds
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>The partnership</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.1</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>109</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.2</td>
<td>The actors</td>
<td>111</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.3</td>
<td>Partnership initiatives and activities</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.2.4</td>
<td>Decision-making platforms</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>Governance of the partnership</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.1</td>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.2</td>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>125</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.3</td>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.3.4</td>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>133</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chapter 6: Contribution to livelihoods and conservation
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>6.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>Contributions to livelihoods</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.1</td>
<td>Physical capital</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.2</td>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td>139</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.3</td>
<td>Human capital</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Title</td>
<td>Page</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------</td>
<td>------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.2.4</td>
<td>Financial capital</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>Contributions to natural capital and biodiversity conservation</td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter 7: Conclusions and discussion</td>
<td></td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>151</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.2</td>
<td>Overview of main concepts</td>
<td>152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>Summary of the main findings</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>Discussion and ways forward</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.1</td>
<td>Theoretical and methodological reflection and suggestions for future research</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.2</td>
<td>Role of partnerships in the conservation-development nexus</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.3</td>
<td>Role of tourism in the conservation-development nexus</td>
<td>182</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7.4.4</td>
<td>Role of the government in the regulation of partnerships</td>
<td>184</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary</td>
<td></td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Samenvatting</td>
<td></td>
<td>197</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>References</td>
<td></td>
<td>205</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
List of Figures, Tables and Boxes

List of Figures

Figure 2.1: Sustainable Livelihoods Framework ................................................................. 46
Figure 2.2: Framework for analyzing governance of partnerships ....................................... 53
Figure 3.1: Location and land-use of Laikipia ecosystem ..................................................... 75
Figure 3.2: Map of the study area ...................................................................................... 77
Figure 4.1: Actors at the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille Partnership ............................................. 84
Figure 4.2: The Sanctuary at Ol Lentille Chief’s house and swimming pool ........................... 89
Figure 4.3: Decision-making platforms of the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille Partnership ............... 92
Figure 5.1: Actors at the Koija Starbeds Partnership ......................................................... 112
Figure 5.2: Koija Starbeds platform and Starbed ............................................................... 116
Figure 5.3: Decision-making platforms of the Koija Starbeds Partnership ........................... 118

List of Tables

Table 1.1: Conducted Semi structured interviews .............................................................. 21
Table 1.2: Focus Group Discussions .................................................................................. 23
Table 1.3: Interviews and focus group discussions coding .................................................. 24
Table 2.1: Principles of good governance ......................................................................... 34
Table 2.2: Overview of governance concepts ...................................................................... 54
Table 3.1: AWF interventions in relation to international conservation discourses .............. 71
Table 5.1: Bed night and conservation fees to KCT-KS ..................................................... 130
Table 7.1: Utilization of bed night fee at KCT-KS .............................................................. 164
Table 7.2: Overview of participation, transparency, accountability and equity in the partnerships .................................................................................................................... 167
Table 7.3: Contributions to livelihoods .............................................................................. 173
Table 7.4: Employment Opportunities .............................................................................. 174

List of Boxes

Box 2.1: Selected definitions of the concept of governance .................................................. 28
Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Background: Conservation, Development and Tourism

*Historical overview of conservation and development approaches*

Nature conservation in Eastern Africa can be traced way back to the 19th century when the first ideas emerged about the importance of actively managing and governing the use of wildlife and natural resources (Büscher & Dietz 2005). Concerned about the decline and potential extinction of species for sport-hunting, the colonial administrations formulated hunting regulations and licenses (Adams 2004) such as the 1884 British East Africa Company’s sport-hunting licenses and regulations (Lado 1992). More structured conservation efforts began after the Second World War and entailed the setting aside of nature parks and reserves aimed at preserving land occupied by wildlife (Mburu & Birner 2007). This conservation approach propagated the separation of people and nature, aimed at protecting the mythical status of wildlife and its aesthetic value to people (Adams 2004; Adams & Hulme 2001; Büscher & Dietz 2005).

This ‘preservationist’ conservation paradigm, mainly drawing from the United States National Parks model (Hutton et al. 2005), dominated conservation efforts of both the colonial and post-colonial governments from the 1950s until the late 1970s. At that time, areas for conservation were identified by national or local government agencies based on the abundance of wildlife and involved displacing local people, outlawing human settlement, and designating them as protected areas (Akama et al. 2011; Wishitemi & Okello 2003). In this preservationist model, nature was seen as wilderness and local people as a threat (Fisher et al. 2005), and the established protected areas excluded and limited the rights of local communities for consumptive use.
The related adoption of ‘militaristic’ tactics and infrastructure has been described by critics as ‘coercive’ and ‘fortress’ conservation along with its ‘fences and fines’ or ‘top-down’ approach (Adams & Hulme 2001; Brown 2002; Fisher et al. 2005; Peluso 1993), in which the state or the government was the main actor in decision making and implementation of conservation. In Kenya, for example, the government department charged with park management took all decisions regarding conservation. Other actors, mainly conservation Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), were engaged in activities meant to complement the park authorities, such as capacity building, species research and anti-poaching initiatives (Van Wijk et al. 2014).

In the 1950s and 1960s, also referred to as the ‘modernization era’ (Van der Duim 2011), mainstream development initiatives focused on poverty alleviation, high productivity agriculture, physical infrastructure and industrialization, with scant attention to environmental and social issues (Adams et al. 2004). In the established protected areas, which were meant for conservation, tourism was identified as a strategy for increasing the countries’ Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employment, and attracting foreign capital (Kangwana 2001; Van der Duim 2010; 2011). Local resource use was considered destructive to wildlife and incompatible with wildlife safari tourism (Okello et al. 2009). Tourism in this case played the role of economic justification for the establishment of protected areas, since nature and wildlife were a tourist attraction (Nyaupane & Poudel 2011).
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, the ‘top-down’, ‘state-centric’ approach to conservation began to be viewed as ineffective, unsustainable, unattainable and counter-productive in realizing conservation objectives (Brown 2002; Gibson & Marks 1995). The main arguments were that the approach alienated local resource users, leading to local resistance, drained scarce national resources, and had severe social and economic consequences for local communities (Agrawal & Redford 2006; Akama et al. 2011; Barrett & Arcese 1995; Brown 2002; Gibson & Marks 1995; Honey 1999; Kiss 1990; Nyaupane & Poudel 2011; Winkler 2011). The failures of the ‘top-down’ conservation efforts were manifested in increased poaching, decline of wildlife populations, and local people’s hostility towards protected areas, among other challenges (Barrett & Arcese 1995).

To address these challenges of the ‘top-down’ approach, attempts were made to integrate the objectives of biodiversity conservation with objectives of socio-economic development (Brown 2002; Büscher & Dietz 2005; Hackel 1999; Wainwright & Wehrmeyer 1998; Western & Wright 1994), since socio-economic factors were seen as critical to conservation success (Berkes 2004). The ‘community conservation’ paradigm was thus borne out of a desire to rectify the human costs associated with ‘coercive’ conservation (Dressler et al. 2010). The engagement of the ‘community’ is believed to have set the scene for the convergence of the conservation and development agenda (Van der Duim 2011), through ‘communal approaches’ or programmes variously labeled as Community-Based Conservation (CBC), Community Conservation (CC), Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs), Co-Management and Adaptive Management (Barrett & Arcese 1995; Campbell & Vainio-Mattila 2003; Chapin, 2004; Murphree 2004).
Subsequent interventions were therefore based on the idea that conservation should contribute to local needs and development (Adams 2004; Berkes 2004; Brown 2002; Hackel 1999; Igoe 2006; Mahanty 2006; Sumba et al. 2007; Wainwright & Wehrmeyer 1998; Western & Wright 1994). Organizations including governments, NGOs and donor organizations began to support programmes, including tourism-based ones, aimed at achieving conservation goals while at the same time addressing development issues such as poverty (Chapin 2004; Van der Duim 2010). Though critiqued, the hypothesis behind the programmes was that local people and their livelihood activities were a threat to biodiversity and that they would act to conserve resources if they had a stake in decision-making on their use and management (Hughes & Flintan 2001), resulting in a win-win outcome for biodiversity and rural development (Getz et al. 1999).

The adoption of the ‘community’ conservation paradigm coincided with the international development discourse of the late 1980s and 1990s, which critiqued ‘top-down’ approaches and advocated participatory development approaches, devolution of authority and decentralization (Adams & Hulme 2001; Adams 2004). In governance terms, the community involvement in conservation was a manifestation of the shifts in societal steering from ‘government to governance’ (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992). At the same time, the aspirations of ‘community’ inclusion were in line with the notions of sustainable development, which advocated simultaneous achievement of economic, social and environmental goals (WCED 1987).

Despite the potentials, the ‘community’ conservation paradigm has over time been subject to debate (Sebele 2010; Waylen et al. 2009). Some scholars have called for a return to ‘protectionism’ or ‘back to the barriers’ (Brandon et al. 1998; Sanderson & Redford 2003; Terborgh 1999), while others suggest improving the community conservation approaches (Adams & Hulme 2001; McShane & Wells 2004). The critics
point out failures of people-oriented approaches to conservation (Brechin et al. 2002), incompatibility of people and nature, and the ‘myth’ of environmentally friendly communities (Hutton et al. 2005; Wilshusen et al. 2002). Others have questioned whether ‘community’ conservation is a real paradigm shift in conservation or just ‘window dressing’ by major conservation interests and players (Brown 2003).

According to Berkes (2007), the ‘community’ conservation paradigm interventions were pioneered by the Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDPs). ICDPs were projects that were mainly meant to create economic benefit flows to communities as incentives for conservation (Wells & Brandon 1993). Preceded by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)’s Man and Biosphere programme of 1979, the ICDPs of the early 1980s were mainly based on the protected-area concept, and their goal was to increase benefits from alternative livelihood activities as a way of reducing the threats to conservation in protected areas from local people (Berkes 2007).

These ICDPs involved three main strategies: (i) strengthening of park management and creation of buffer zones; (ii) compensation to local people for, and substitution of lost access to resources; and (iii) local socio-economic development, aimed at breaking the destructive patterns of resource use and agricultural development (Brandon 2001; Wells & Brandon 1993). The ICDPs of the early 1980s have however been widely critiqued for, among others, failure to adequately involve local populations in planning and benefit sharing (Wells & Brandon 1993). Others have argued that they were paternalistic, lacked expertise, and were driven by NGOs with little indigenous input (Chapin 2004).
From the mid-1980s through the 1990s, and as a reaction to these critiques, local communities began to be engaged and considered as critical and major actors in conservation (Barrow & Murphree 2001). As a result, the Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) approach was popularized, out of a desire to return the stewardship of biodiversity and natural resources to local communities through participation, empowerment and decentralization (Dressler et al. 2010). Among the well-known CBNRM programmes in Africa are the Communal Areas Management for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) in Zimbabwe, and the Administrative and Management Design for Game Management Areas (ADMADE) in Zambia (Lewis & Alpert 1997; Lyons 2000; Murombedzi 1999).

The CBNRM approach aimed to establish a direct link between conservation and local benefits, which were to act as incentives for local people to protect biodiversity in the long term (Salafsky & Wollenberg 2000). CBNRM has been adopted widely, especially in Africa, due to its potential for delivering both financial and non-financial benefits to reinforce community conservation incentives (Elliott & Sumba 2010). In Kenya, the CBNRM model was mainly embraced after the realization that landscape-level conservation was critical to the survival of protected areas, since more than 65% of wildlife in Kenya live outside protected areas (Western et al. 2009; Williams et al. 2014; Zeppel 2006).

**Tourism, conservation, and development**

Following the realization that majority of wildlife lived outside protected areas, various interventions such as revenue sharing arrangements and natural resource-based businesses were initiated for communities (Van der Duim 2011). The businesses included tourism-based, such as eco-lodges, campsites, cultural villages, and fishing
villages and non-tourism based ones, such as harvesting and processing of natural resource products (Sumba et al. 2007). As a result, Community-Based Tourism (CBT) enterprises, such as eco-lodges and cultural-villages, are common in wildlife-rich community-owned land outside protected areas and are aimed at generating revenues as incentives for conservation (Butcher 2011; Kieti et al. 2013; Kiss 2004; Saarinen 2010).

CBT is believed to have the potential for creating an avenue for communities to have a stake in the management and use of natural resources (Butcher 2007; Flintan 2001; Van der Duim 2011). Moreover, CBT is considered a non-extractive strategy, which provides a win-win outcome for conservation and development and has been considered as the ‘holy grail’ of conservation biology (Agrawal & Redford 2006; Chan et al. 2007; Johnston & Dannenmaier 1998; Massyn 2007; Southgate 2006; Wunder 2000).

Tourism is also believed to have a high potential for establishing a ‘symbiosis’ between conservation and development through the generation of revenue as incentives for conservation (Butcher 2011; Sumba et al. 2007). According to Kiss (2004), by the mid-1990s USAID had 105 projects, totaling over US$ 2 billion, with eco-tourism components, and 32 of the 55 World Bank-financed projects that supported protected areas in Africa between 1988 and 2003 included a CBT component.

The prospect of linking conservation and local livelihoods simultaneously, as part of a strategy of integrated conservation and development, has however, been critiqued over time for being based on ‘illogical’ assumptions, such as linking two competing policy objectives (Butcher 2011). Others point to the over-simplification and misconception of concepts such as communities, participation, sustainability, and empowerment, leading to failures of the projects (Adams et al. 2004). Newmark & Hough (2000) note ‘erroneous assumptions’, such as the notion that raising the living standards of local communities
will inevitably result in conservation. There are also concerns raised about the limited attention to specific contextual aspects (Agrawal & Redford 2006).

CBT projects are also particularly prone to challenges such as reinforcing dependency (Manyara & Jones 2007); poor market access and governance; (Kiss 2004; Van der Duim & Caalders 2008); power struggles (Southgate 2006); low occupancy of the lodges (Goodwin & Santilli 2009; Spenceley 2008), lack of consensus on fundamental objectives, and unrealistic expectations (Kiss 2004) among others.

From the late 1990s and early 2000s, in line with the popularization of the neoliberal development discourse, the private sector became involved in conservation and development initiatives (Adams & Hulme 2001; Büscher & Dietz 2005; Scheyvens 2007). The neoliberal discourses encouraged market-oriented policies such as deregulation and liberalization, with priorities aimed at, among others, attracting foreign investment (Chang 2002; Haque 1999). Moreover, after the launch of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) in 2000 and the Johannesburg World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 2002, partnerships between diverse actors from different spheres of society were encouraged as the most viable institutional arrangements for governing conservation and sustainable development (Brockington et al. 2008; Forsyth 2010; Glasbergen 2007; Igoe & Brockington 2007; Van Huijstee et al. 2007).

From the 1990s onwards, the partnership model has also been advanced in CBT enterprises in areas inhabited by wildlife outside protected areas, where communities have established joint ventures with private operators. In the late 1990s, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) conservation NGO pioneered a ‘new’ partnership model in implementing their tourism-based conservation enterprise strategy (Van Wijk et al. 2014). These conservation enterprises, such as the ones studied in this thesis, have been
established by AWF in wildlife-rich areas outside protected areas to generate revenues as incentives for conservation (Butcher 2011; Saarinen 2010; Sumba et al. 2007).

Conservation enterprises are defined as ‘commercial activities that generate economic benefits in a way that supports the attainment of a conservation objective’ (Elliott & Sumba 2010: 4). In these conservation enterprises, communities create a partnership with a private investor, but in this model, AWF operates as a third and ‘neutral’ partner to moderate the institutional arrangement, promote a ‘fair deal’ between communities and private sector organisations, and secure ‘good’ or ‘sound’ governance (Ahebwa et al. 2012; Lamers et al. 2013; Muruthi 2004; Nthiga et al. 2011; Sumba et al. 2007; Van der Duim 2011). In this thesis, I focus on two of these AWF supported partnerships.

Theoretically, partnerships are positioned as having great potential for enhancing governance, as they – almost per definition, by engaging multiple types of partners - improve inclusiveness, transparency, and equity, and re-distribute power, (Bramwell 2004; Brinkerhoff 2007; Bovaird 2004; Edgar et al. 2006). This thesis therefore seeks to study the governance of two particular partnerships between a community and a private investor, facilitated by AWF, namely the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and Koija Starbeds partnerships in Kenya.

The two enterprise partnerships are located in the AWF’s Samburu Heartland, Laikipia County Kenya. As strategies for conservation and development, both involve three partners: AWF, communities and private investors. The respective communities have set aside a part of their land exclusively for conservation, where the eco-lodges have been constructed. In return, the communities receive economic benefits from the eco-lodges, which are operated by the private investors. Both cases were considered since both partnership enterprises were started through the African Wildlife Foundation
(AWF), considered an ‘institutional entrepreneur’ (Van Wijk et al. 2014) in applying tourism through a tripartite partnership model. They therefore provide valuable lessons in terms of governance of tourism-conservation-development partnerships.

1.2 The concept of governance

This thesis examines the nature of governance of two partnerships facilitated by AWF. Since the early 1990s, the concept of governance has received increased attention from both scholars and policy makers (Arnouts 2010; Behagel 2012). Governance has a wide range of meanings and applications, and there is no universally agreed upon definition of the term (Jordan et al. 2005; Symes 2006) or a common idea as to how it could be applied more concretely (Doornbos 2001).

However, in contemporary literature, it has been used to describe the changes in societal steering through the ‘shift from government to governance’ (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992), resulting, according to some, a ‘hollowed out state’ (Rhodes 1997). This meaning encompasses societal steering through arrangements of diverse actors beyond the state, such as market and civil society actors (Arts & Van Tatenhove 2004; Rhodes 1997; Offe 2009; Rosenau & Czempiel 1992) including partnerships. The concept of governance has also been used to describe changes in the forms, mechanisms, location, governing capabilities and styles of governance following emergence of new arrangements of governance at different levels and in various societal spheres (Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden 2004).

Critical governance scholars, however, argue that governance is complex, multi-dimensional and has different meanings (Doornbos 2001; Kaufmann et al. 2002; Symes 2006; Marinetto 2003; Walters 2004). Despite the critiques, governance allows scholars and practitioners to discuss the role of non-state actors, complexity of and changes in
society, and the new norms and techniques of societal steering (Offe 2009), including partnerships.

A key debate in governance literature centres on ‘good governance’ which is the normative qualification of governance processes (Symes 2006) and a yardstick for governance (Rometsteiner 2009). The popularity of good governance has its roots in the World Bank where it was promoted as an instrument for economic development (Anders 2009; Santiso 2001). Good governance has also been pursued for its potential for strengthened democratic and inclusive decision-making (Behagel 2012).

Consequently, good governance principles have been advanced to monitor and assess governance in governments and other modes of governance for sustainable development (Graham, et al. 2003; Edgar et al. 2006; FAO 2011; Lockwood 2010; UNDP 1997). In governments, or states, governance is mainly assessed using the good governance principles of voice and accountability, effectiveness, lack of regulatory burden, rule of law, independence of the judiciary, and control of corruption as proposed by World Bank researchers (Kauffman et al. 1999). For other modes of governance, including partnerships, the principles of accountability, efficiency, effectiveness, equity, participation, and transparency have been widely adopted (Graham et al. 2003; Edgar et al. 2006; EC 2001; FAO 2011; Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; UNDP 1997).

The concept of good governance has however been critiqued for, among others, simplifying complex issues, lacking universality, representing an ideal, being normative, prescriptive, and providing little guidance on the way forward (Doornbos 2001; Graham et al. 2003; Grindle 2004; Moore 1993). This critical perspective of good governance specifically scrutinizes its normative claims by comparing the claims to actual practices, and deconstructing the normative assumptions of the proponents of good governance (Arts et al. 2009; Behagel 2012; Turnhout & Van der Zouwen 2010).
This thesis studies governance of the two partnerships, making use of the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness. Although these concepts are also known as normative and prescriptive 'good governance' principles, as discussed above (Anders 2009; Rametsteiner 2009; Symes 2006), this thesis applies these concepts in an analytical way to study and understand governance of the partnerships. The analysis therefore deviates from the normative view and approaches the concepts in a theoretical manner (Jordan 2008), also incorporating inter-relationships between the concepts, looking at power relations in the partnership (Barnett & Duvall 2005; Edgar et al. 2006; Lister 2000), and analyzing governance in light of the local, national, and international contexts in which the partnerships operate (Graham et al. 2003).
1.3 **Partnerships as modes of governance**

Partnerships entail a range of relationships, agreements or collaborative ventures of two or more parties, which are expected to benefit the parties or achieve shared objectives (Edgar et al. 2006; Vermeulen et al. 2003). As modes of governance for sustainable development, partnerships have been widely advocated as part of good governance (Bramwell 2004; Brinkerhoff 2007; Bovaird 2004; Edgar et al. 2006), as they are believed to encapsulate the positive rhetoric of inclusiveness, transparency, redistribution of power, and equity that prevails in the ideals of sustainable development (Bramwell 2004; Brinkerhoff 2002; Brinkerhoff 2007; Davies 2002; Glasbergen 2007; Van Huijstee et al. 2007).

Critical partnership scholars however, argue that partnerships have been used mainly for rhetorical purposes and as strategic frames (Ashman 2001; Bebbington 2005; Brinkerhoff 2002; Büscher 2010; Lister 2000; Mosse 2004; Stewart & Gray 2006; Plummer et al. 2006; Roberts 2000; Ros-Tonen et al. 2006; 2008; Van Huijstee et al. 2007).

Generally, partnerships have been subject to extensive study, especially partnerships for sustainable development (Visseren-Hamakers 2009), and partnership research has been conducted from either actor and/or institutional perspectives (Visseren-Hamakers 2009). From an actor perspective, researchers look into partnerships, where the internal dynamics of the partnerships are analyzed (Van Huijstee et al. 2007). From the institutional perspective, researchers view partnerships as new institutional arrangements contributing to and shaping the governance of sustainable development (Ibid). The potential of the partnership instrument (e.g. for creative and innovative solutions and pooling of actors’ strengths and resources), and their governance functions (including agenda-setting, implementation, improving
effectiveness, learning, and broadening participation) have been evaluated (Bäckstrand 2006; Van Huijstee et al. 2007; Visseren-Hamakers 2009).

Governance scholars studying partnerships have also attempted to unveil the reasons behind the adoption of the partnership model in the governance for sustainable development. According to Mol (2007), partnerships have been necessitated by, among others, the complexity of sustainability problems. Bäckstrand (2006) and Van Huijstee et al. (2007) argue that it is because of their perceived capability of addressing governance implementation and participation deficits.

1.4 Problem statement and research aim

Problem statement

This thesis is positioned and engages with three main debates in the conservation-development nexus. The first is with the partnerships, governance and good governance literature. In these bodies of literature, there is regular reference to the ‘importance of governance, power and politics in the process of implementing ‘community’ conservation’ (Büscher & Dietz 2005: 2; Graham et al. 2003). The importance of governance in partnerships is further reinforced by Zadek & Radovich (2006), who argue that the performance of partnerships depends on how well they are governed. Although much research has been conducted on the functioning and governance of partnerships for sustainable development (Abrahamsen 2004; Brinkerhoff 2002; Greer 2001; 2002; Lister 2000; Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; Morsello 2006; Ros-Tonen et al. 2008), there is inconclusive literature and limited empirical research on tourism-based conservation partnerships.
The second debate is on the adoption of tourism-based partnerships as strategies for conservation and development, or the use of market-based initiatives for sustainable development. There are a number of studies that have evaluated tourism-based conservation partnerships in Africa (Ahebwa et al. 2012; Kiss 2004; Lapeyre 2011; Pellis 2011; Spenceley 2003; Stronza 2007; Southgate 2006) in terms of conservation and development. However, within this literature, there is limited evaluation of the partnerships from a governance perspective in terms of the specific governance challenges and the link between the governance of the partnerships, the contexts and the partnerships' contribution to livelihoods and conservation.

The third debate is on the position of the partnerships in the governance of conservation and development. The partnerships studied in this thesis are part of a neoliberal trend of projects and interventions in the tourism-conservation-development nexus in Eastern and Southern Africa. The diverse partnership arrangements are driven by different organizations, different models, and different configurations of actors, resources and regulatory arrangements. As Van Wijk et al. (2014) point out, the entry of community, private and NGO actors in conservation in Eastern Africa and specifically Kenya was as a result of a policy void that did not recognize conservation interventions outside protected areas.

The policy void on one hand created room for experimentation especially with the tourism conservation enterprises (TCEs) partnerships (AWF 2011; Elliott & Sumba 2010; Lamers et al. 2014; Van Wijk et al. 2014). On the other hand, the engagement of diverse actors each with their own products and institutional arrangements has created a policy void due to lack of coordination and congruence (Van Wijk et al. 2014). In governance literature, such challenges could be addressed through meta-governance (Jessop 2003; 2004; Sørensen 2006; Sørensen & Torving 2009; Visseren-Hamakers 2013). This thesis
therefore engages in this debate in search of viable solutions for coordinating the diverse partnership arrangements in the conservation-development nexus.

To better understand the governance of tourism conservation enterprises (TCEs) and their contribution to conservation and development, in this thesis I examine the governance of the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and Koija Starbeds partnerships making use of the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness. This thesis is therefore both significant and timely since a large number of conservation and development initiatives are organized as conservation-development partnerships. The results of this thesis will thus provide insight for the extent to which this currently popular instrument is actually working and why (not).

**Research aim**

This study aims to contribute to a better understanding of governance of the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and Koija Starbeds partnerships using the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness. The research aim is achieved by answering the following research question:

*What is the nature of governance of the partnerships in terms of participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness, and how can this be explained?*

To answer this question, the governance of the partnerships is analyzed, utilizing the concepts, as described in chapter 2. The following aspects are taken into account in explaining the nature of governance. According to Graham et al. (2003), the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness overlap and sometimes reinforce and contradict one another. Therefore, they are not analyzed in
isolation from each other, and areas of reinforcement, trade-offs and contradiction are identified (see Agrawal 2001; Cleaver 1999; Cornwall 2004; Johnson et al. 2004; Kim et al. 2005; Park & Blenkinsopp 2011; Schacter 2000).

The thesis further analyzes the influence of local, national, and international contextual factors on the governance of the partnerships. This is because the context influences how governance plays out in practice (Graham et al. 2003). At the local level, aspects such as culture, socio-economic status, and local institutional arrangements are incorporated, while at the national level, relevant policies are identified. At the international level, relevant global discourses are studied. Chapter 3 presents a more detailed description of the contextual factors incorporated in the analysis.

Moreover, the influence of power-relations on the governance of the partnerships is incorporated. According to (Lister 2000), any study of partnerships must incorporate the analysis of power dynamics. Edgar et al. (2006) further argue that governance both results from power and determines how power is exercised. Studies on power, however, reveal that power is ‘Janus-faced’, with a constraining as well as an enabling role (Parfitt 2004), in addition to being complex, multi-dimensional, and difficult to identify (Hardy & Leiba-O'Sullivan 1998; Parfitt 2004). As a consequence, there are diverse conceptualizations of power (see Bachrach & Baratz 1962; Barnett & Duvall 2005; Clegg 1989; Dahl 1957; Digeser 1992).

This thesis adopts Barnett & Duvall’s (2005) conceptualization of the four faces of power, which has been widely applied in governance research (see Barnett & Duvall 2005; Hardy & Leiban-O'Sullivan 1998; Kuindersma et al. 2012) since it is considered to be systematic, precise, general and acknowledges that multiple forms of power can be simultaneously present (Kuindersma et al. 2012). However, this conceptualization overlooks the individual and organization’s freedom to act or agency, and also ignores
persuasion and processes of collective action (Kuindersma et al. 2012). Chapter 2 provides a more detailed conceptualization of power.

1.5 Methodology

This section describes the research approach chosen for this thesis and includes the research strategy, selection of cases, access to and collection of data, data sources, data analysis and interpretation, research constraints, and ethical considerations. The study was conducted as part of the Young Leaders programme in the framework of the ACP-EDULINK project which involved co-operation between European universities and African universities in capacity building of 12 young African scholars on research in tourism-conservation and development (see Nthiga et al. 2011). The research was also part of the research project ‘Exploring the Void; institutional entrepreneurship in nature-based tourism in East Africa’ (see also Van Wijk et al. 2014). As part of this project I co-authored two scientific articles (Lamers et al. 2013; 2014).

In this thesis, I employ a ‘two-case’ holistic case study design (Yin 2003; 2009). This choice was informed by its suitability to address ‘what’, ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions as well as an opportunity to include context and critical components of the phenomenon (Beeton 2005; Flyvbjerg 2006; Meyer 2001; Myers 1998; Stake 1995; Yin 1994; 2009).

1.5.1 Selection of the cases

For this thesis, the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and Koija Starbeds enterprise partnerships were selected as case studies. According to Thomas (2011) every case study must comprise a practical element, which is the subject of the study, and an analytical or theoretical frame, which is the object of study. Cases selected are also
expected to result in exemplary knowledge (Flyvbjerg 2006), and provide a strong empirical opportunity (Stake 1995).

The two enterprise partnerships selected fulfill the above requirements in several ways. First, they were among the first enterprise partnerships to be implemented by AWF and therefore provide an opportunity for exemplary knowledge and learning. The case studies are also based in Laikipia County, a very important wildlife conservation area without state protection. Laikipia thus provides an opportunity to learn lessons about the implementation of conservation-development initiatives and market-based tourism-conservation enterprise partnerships outside protected areas. Chapter 3 provides more information about the Laikipia region. The selection of two cases as opposed to a single case was to enable cross-case comparison and contrast (Meyer 2001; Yin 1994; 2003).

1.5.2 Access to and collection of data

Prior to undertaking the study for this thesis, permission was sought from the Kenyan Ministry of Science and Technology, and a research permit was acquired. Moreover, a three months internship was undertaken in the year 2011 at AWF’s conservation enterprises programme. AWF was selected for an internship since this conservation organization is an ‘institutional entrepreneur’ (Van Wijk et al. 2014) in tri-partite partnerships for conservation and development, and thus provided a highly relevant learning opportunity. The internship also enabled extensive document review and an introduction to the cases.

Data collection was an on-going process from October 2010 to March 2013 and field visits were carried out on several occasions to the study area and the AWF offices in Nairobi and Nanyuki.
1.5.3 Data sources

In-depth interviews

Semi-structured face-to-face interviews were used as the primary data collection method. In total 58 interviews were conducted. Each interview lasted between 30 minutes and 2 hours (a summary of the conducted interviews is shown in Table 1.1 below). The criterion for sampling the interviewees was as follows: first, interviewees were divided into categories representing the multiple actors in the partnerships and other conservation stakeholders. The categories included: community members, private investors, AWF, and other national and local conservation stakeholders such as the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF), Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT), Naibunga Conservation Trust (NCT), and donors such as the Royal Netherlands Embassy (RNE) in Nairobi, among others.

Second, interviewees were selected from these categories based on the nature of the knowledge they possessed regarding the partnerships, the role they played in the partnerships as well as through snowball sampling. Interviewees therefore included AWF personnel in the Nairobi and Nanyuki offices, the private investors, community leaders, representatives of the spin-off enterprises and projects related to the partnerships such as schools, and representatives of the conservation organizations mentioned above.

With some respondents, more than one interview was conducted on different occasions. Different insights on the partnerships emerged from each interview and these have therefore been treated as separate interviews. Contact with the respondents was made prior to the interviews and informed consent was sought by informing the respondents that the information was for academic purposes. For those informants who agreed to the interviews to be recorded on tape, the interviews were recorded and notes were taken; for those who declined, only notes were taken during the interviews.
Interviews were conducted until no new information emerged - that is until ‘saturation’ was reached. All the interviews were later transcribed for analysis.

**Table 1.1: Conducted semi-structured interviews**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of respondents</th>
<th>Sanctuary at Ol Lentille</th>
<th>Koija Starbeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of Interviews</td>
<td>Number of people interviewed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private investor</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO- African Wildlife Foundation (for both cases)</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others (KWS, LWF, NRT, NCT, ACC, RNE and Il Ngwesi group ranch (for both cases))</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td><strong>43</strong></td>
<td><strong>38</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Document analysis and literature review**

Documents such as minutes of partnership meetings and other partnership reports, performance reports (e.g. Sumba et al. 2007), AWF annual reports, and partnership agreements, among others, were reviewed and included in the analysis and discussion of the results. The choice of the documents was guided by literature and document review during proposal development and the internship at the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF). The documents played a major role in the research. First they acted as input in formulating the interview questions. The documents also served as sources of empirical material for the study. The documents additionally assisted in tracing the history of the partnerships and in the identification of key people who participated in the partnerships, which assisted in identifying potential interview respondents.

**Observation and informal discussions**

In several instances, an observer-as-participant manner of observation was employed (Meyer 2001). As an observer-as-participant, I attended two Kojia Conservation Trust (KCT-KS) board meetings, where the proceedings were followed. Informal meetings among community members were also observed, as well as other
activities on-going within the community. Moreover, several informal discussions were conducted, mainly with women in the communities, since their presence in leadership roles was minimal and women were therefore not well represented in the interviews. In addition, women mostly played an ‘observer’ role in the focus group discussions (see below), and thus their views were not captured there either. The local Maasai culture does not permit women participation in public debates, and therefore an informal and exclusive avenue was needed to include their views.

**Focus group discussions**

A total of 7 focus group discussions were undertaken for the study for both cases. The group discussions were employed to add richness to the data collected through interviews (Jennings 2010). Focus group discussions also acted as a means of validating the information already collected through other empirical sources. Moreover, focus group discussions matched the local communities’ set-up well, since most of their decisions are discussed in the open and taken through consensus.

Among the focus group discussions was a special validation workshop in Nairobi, which was attended by 25 participants representing various organizations in conservation in Kenya. During the workshop, key findings of the research were presented and discussed. Table 1.2 below summarizes the breakdown and composition of the focus group discussions conducted. The proceedings of the focus group discussions were also transcribed for analysis.
Table 1.2: Focus group discussions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Focus Group Discussion</th>
<th>Sanctuary at Ol Lentille</th>
<th>Koja Starbeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Number of persons present</td>
<td>Composition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Community leaders and members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>Community leaders and members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Community leaders and members</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 (for both cases)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>AWF staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 (for both cases)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>AWF staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 (Validation workshop) (for both cases)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>Conservation and tourism stakeholders including some members interviewed</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.5.4 Data Analysis and Interpretation

Data analysis included the following stages: transcribing, organizing data, familiarization, incorporation of pre-existing knowledge, and ultimately report writing (Yin 2003). In this case, the transcribed data from interviews, focus group discussions, observations and documents were organized, analyzed and compiled based on the conceptualizations presented in Chapter 2.

1.5.5 Research constraints

The research constraints encountered included language barriers with some community respondents who only spoke the Maasai dialect as opposed to the official Kiswahili and English languages. This challenge was countered through the use of interpreters. The extreme remoteness of the study area also posed both transport and logistical challenges. The fact that the communities are mainly pastoralists, and thereby rather dispersed, posed a major challenge for the study, since it required a lot of movement in search of the respondents, as well as caused some respondents to not be able to keep appointments. The community culture, in which women are not allowed to
speak in public made it difficult to attain insights into the women’s views, as discussed above.

1.5.6 Ethical considerations

At the planning stage, a research permit was acquired from the Ministry of Science and Technology, Kenya. At the implementation stage, informed consent was sought from the identified respondents. Prior to the interviews, the respondents were made aware that the research was for academic purposes and their participation was meant to help shed light on governance in tourism-based conservation enterprise partnerships. The respondents’ right to confidentiality, especially for community interviewees, was guaranteed by ensuring anonymity and the use of codes in numbering and quoting interviewees as summarized on Table 1.3. Finally, at the reporting stage, the potential impacts of the results on all people involved in the partnerships were taken into account.

Table 1.3: Interviews and focus group discussions coding

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Sanctuary at Ol Lentille</th>
<th>Koija Starbeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Interviews</td>
<td>C-SOL-1 to C-SOL</td>
<td>C-KS-1 to C-KS-13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private investor interviews</td>
<td>P-SOL-1 to P-SOL-5</td>
<td>P-KS-1 and P-KS-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Community focus group discussions</td>
<td>SOL-FGD-1 to SOL-FGD-3</td>
<td>KS-FGD-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWF interviews (for both cases)</td>
<td>A-1 to A-12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWF Focus group discussions</td>
<td>A-FGD-1 and A-FGD-2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other interviews (for both cases)</td>
<td>O-1 to O-12</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Validation workshop (for both cases)</td>
<td>O-FGD-1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1.6 Outline of the thesis

The thesis is organized in 7 chapters. After this introduction, the thesis proceeds as follows. Chapter 2 presents the theoretical framework of the research. It discusses in detail the concepts of governance and good governance, and presents the concepts used to study the governance of the partnerships. The chapter also includes a discussion of the inter-relationships among the applied concepts, and introduces the concept of power relations. At the end of the chapter, a conceptual framework for the analysis of governance of tourism-based conservation enterprise partnerships is presented.

The context within which the partnerships operate is described in chapter 3. The AWF conservation enterprise strategy is presented, in addition to the international, national, and local contexts (both the Laikipia ecosystem and the local community). This context ‘sets the scene’ for the analysis of the governance of the partnerships, since contextual factors influence the governance in practice.

Chapters 4 and 5 present the results for each of the two case studies based on the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, and equity. Chapter 4 presents results for the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership, while chapter 5 presents results for the Koija Starbeds partnership. In the two chapters, the results are further analyzed in terms of the relationships among the different concepts, power relations, and contextual factors. Chapter 6 presents the results for both partnerships in terms of their contribution to community livelihoods and biodiversity conservation, in other words the effectiveness concept. The results are further analyzed in relation to the inter-relations with the other concepts, power relations, and the partnerships’ context.
Finally, chapter 7 brings together the findings from the empirical chapters, discusses cross-cutting issues and the overall theoretical and policy implications, and suggests ways forward. The chapter begins with an overview of the main concepts applied in the thesis, followed by a summary of the main findings. The chapter ends with a discussion and suggestions for ways forward.
Chapter 2: Governance of Partnerships

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the theoretical foundations of this thesis. It starts with a discussion on the concepts of governance and good governance, followed by an overview of the concepts used to study the governance of the two partnerships. The inter-relationships among the governance concepts and power relations are also discussed. At the end of the chapter, I present a conceptual framework for the analysis of the governance of tourism-based conservation enterprise partnerships.

2.2 The concept of governance

Since its popularization in the early 1990s, governance has become a widely applied concept in both scholarly and policy approaches to societal steering (Arnouts 2010; Behagel 2012). Governance has also become one of the contemporary buzzwords shared by many fields of social scientific research, and, as a result, has numerous definitions (see Box 2.1 for some widely used definitions) and applications (Brechin et al. 2002; Edgar et al. 2006; Graham et al. 2003; Jordan et al. 2005). Early scholars viewed governance as being synonymous to government (Stoker 1998), ‘state-centric’ (Pierre 2000), or ‘hierarchical’ governance (Kooiman 2003). In the state-centric form of governance, the state or government is the main actor and incorporates ‘command and control’ and use of laws and regulations for societal steering.

Other scholars point to the changes in the meaning and practice of governance to ‘a new process of governing, a changed condition of ordered rule or a new method by which society is governed’ (Rhodes 1996: 652-653). This contemporary meaning involves societal steering through constellations of diverse actors beyond the state, such
as market and civil society actors (Arts & Van Tatenhove 2004; Rhodes 1997; Rosenau & Czempiel 1992; Offe 2009) including partnerships such as the ones studied in this thesis.

**Box 2.1: Selected definitions of the concept of governance**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Definition</th>
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<tr>
<td>Governance describes the changes in the nature and role of the state following the public sector reforms of the 1980s and 1990s (Bevir 2009)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Arrangements for decision making and power sharing (Brechin et al. 2002)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance is the process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented (or not implemented) (DANIDA 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance is both a destination and a journey encompassing the process whereby societies or organizations make their important decisions, determine who has voice, who is engaged in the process and how account is rendered (Edgar et al. 2006)</td>
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<tr>
<td>The interactions among structures, processes and traditions that determine how power and responsibilities are exercised, how decisions are taken and how citizens or other stakeholders have their say (Graham et al. 2003)</td>
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<tr>
<td>A system of rules that shape the actions of social actors (Rosenau &amp; Czempiel 1992)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Governance is about who decides and how and encompasses policies, institutions, processes and power (Swiderska et al. 2009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The exercise of economic, political and administrative authority to manage a country’s affairs at all levels. It comprises mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and mediate their differences (UNDP 1997)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A process of decision-making and the process by which decisions are implemented [or not implemented] (UNESCAP 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall system of steering mechanisms in society (Van Huijstee et al. 2007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The process by which authority is exercised in the management of a country’s economic and social resources for development and the capacity to design, formulate and implement policies and discharge functions (World Bank 1992; 1994)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Governance concerns the structures, procedures, rules and traditions through which decision-making power that determines action is exercised and so accountabilities are manifested and actualized (Zadek &amp; Radovich 2006)</td>
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</table>
The concept of governance has also been subjected to diverse conceptualizations (Arts & Visseren-Hamakers 2012; Bevir 2009; Rhodes 1996; Stoker 1998; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden 2004). Arts & Visseren-Hamakers (2012) for example, identify four broad conceptualizations of the concept. The first is ‘old’ governance, which involves state steering (‘top-down’, ‘command and control’). The second is ‘new’ governance, which includes new modes of governance from partnerships to self-regulation. This conceptualization of ‘old’ and ‘new’ governance suggests a shift from state-centric towards a society-centric approach, usually referred to as the ‘shift from government to governance’ (Rosenau & Czempiel 1992). The extent to which this shift has actually taken place has however been debated among governance scholars (Kooiman 1993; Pierre 2000; Treib et al. 2007; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden 2004).

The third conceptualization includes all mechanisms to govern public issues, encompassing both the old and new governance, and the fourth is ‘good governance’, which stands for the reform programs for improving governance.

However, the governance concept has been critiqued for being complex and multi-dimensional, and facing conceptual and definitional challenges (Doornbos 2001; Kauffmann et al. 2002; Symes 2006). In addition, Marinetto (2003) doubts whether the broad term can be fashioned into a coherent analytical concept. Another challenge is that the different disciplines studying it tend to give the concept different meanings (Jordan 2008; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden 2004). There is also the opinion that the term has become popular but remains imprecise (Rhodes 1996), with the many definitions and uses having little or nothing in common (Rhodes 2007). Additional criticisms are on the application of the term for rhetorical rather than substantive reasons and (Stoker 1998) gives examples of when the term is used to refer to a better-managed government and as a justification for reducing government spending in a fiscal crisis.
For Jordan (2008) the combination of the conceptual vagueness and loose application of governance has both boosted its popularity and raised questions about its utility. Graham et al. (2003) further argue the term can be applied to study all forms of collective action at the global, national, community and organizational spaces. The concept has also assumed particular significance by providing a framework for understanding changing processes of governing (Stoker 1998). Moreover, the concept has enabled an understanding of aspects related to power, multi-stakeholder engagement and interdependencies among actors in society (Lockwood et al. 2010). Governance has also been applied in analyzing the problem-solving capacity of new forms of governance (Arnouts 2010; Ostrom 1990; Visseren-Hamakers 2009).

Scholarly debates on governance have also unraveled three interconnected applications or interpretations of governance: theoretical/analytical, empirical, and normative (Jordan 2008). As an empirical phenomenon, governance is viewed as capable of capturing the changes in contemporary processes of governing, especially when analyzing the ‘new’ modes of governance (Treib et al. 2007). Interpreting governance theoretically or analytically enables one to understand issues of control, coordination, accountability, and political power (Jordan 2008). Governance from a theoretical perspective is also seen as a set of puzzling empirical observations looking for a theoretical explanation (Ibid). On the other hand, scholars viewing governance as a normative or prescriptive concept, view governance as something which could be adopted to achieve a preferred end point, with the most-well known formulation being that of ‘good governance’ (Jordan 2008).
2.3 The concept of good governance

Similar to the term governance, good governance has diverse definitions and is still unsettled in its meaning (Nanda 2006). However, good governance is generally viewed as a ‘normative’ or ‘prescriptive’ conception of the values according to which the act of governance ought to be realized (Symes 2006) and a yardstick towards which institutional arrangements should develop (Rametsteiner 2009). Historically, the concept of good governance was popularized in the late 1980s in the World Bank’s report on Sub-Saharan Africa, which characterized the crisis in the region as a ‘crisis of governance’ (Santiso 2001; Woods 2000; World Bank 1989).

The reason behind the introduction of the concept of good governance by the World Bank was the continuous lack of aid effectiveness, corruption, unaccountable governments and lack of respect for human rights (Santiso 2001; Weiss 2000). In its application, the World Bank equated good governance to sound development management, and called for ‘quality governance’ as a key determinant of the states’ ability to pursue sustainable economic and social development (World Bank 1992).

According to Doornbos (2001) the introduction of good governance by the World Bank was a response to the non-existence of specific guidelines for governments in structuring their administration and policy-making process. Good governance thus provided a set of criteria that could enable political and administrative reforms (Ibid). Anders (2009) further argues that the Bretton Woods institutions (World Bank and the IMF) promoted good governance as an instrument for removing obstacles to economic growth and the concept has since the early 1990s become popular in the development discourse.

General criticisms of the good governance concept include arguments that the concept simplifies complex issues, presents a challenge for democracy since the
concepts introduce disciplinary power, lacks universality, represents an ideal, and is normative and prescriptive, and provides little guidance on ways forward (Behagel 2012; Doornbos 2001; Graham et al. 2003; Grindle 2004; Moore 1993).

Despite the critiques, other organizations such as the United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO), United Nations Special Commission for Asia-Pacific (UNESCAP) and the European Commission (EC), and scholars (Graham et al. 2003; Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010) have adopted, defined and regularly used the term. Consequently, good governance principles have been advanced to monitor and assess governance in governments and other modes of governance for sustainable development (Graham et al. 2003; EC 2001; Edgar et al. 2006; FAO 2011; Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; UNDP 1997).

In addition to the advancement of the principles, there is also a growing consensus among the various development organizations on the significance of good governance for development. Graham et al. (2003: 6) for example argue that good governance involves “pathways to desired conditions or outcomes and a mode or model of governance that leads to social, environmental and economic results sought by citizens”. According to the FAO (2011: 10) governance is generally considered good “if it is characterized by stakeholder participation, transparency in decision-making, accountability of actors and decision makers, rule of law and predictability. Good governance is also associated with effective and efficient management of resources and fair allocation of resources and benefits” which are important for development.

Although the concept of good governance is primarily ‘normative’ and ‘prescriptive’ or something that can be adopted to achieve a preferred end point, there is a critical perspective (Behagel 2012). This critical view of good governance mainly
dissects the normative claims by comparing these claims to actual practices and dismantling the normative hypothesis of proponents (Arts et al. 2009; Behagel 2012; Graham et al. 2003; Edgar et al. 2006; Turnout & Van der Zouwen 2010).

2.4 **Principles of good governance**

In a bid to conceptualize good governance, principles or characteristics have been advanced and used as guidelines (see Table 2.1 for a summary). Good governance principles were first advanced by World Bank researchers who distinguished six main dimensions of good governance: voice and accountability, government effectiveness, lack of regulatory burden, the rule of law, the independence of the judiciary, and the control of corruption (Kauffman et al. 1999). Over time, diverse organizations such as the UNDP, EC, FAO, and scholars (e.g. Lockwood 2010) have modified and adopted the World Bank’s good governance principles in their operations and debates.

The principles have however been critiqued for, among others, being misleading and unhelpful in the face of real world political problems (Moore 1993). Other critics argue that the principles lack theoretical testing and simplify complex issues making the world appear clearer than it is in reality (Moore 1993). The principles further lack universality since they can be conceived differently within different socio-cultural and political contexts (Doornbos 2001).

In addition to the criticisms, a major challenge of good governance is that defining the principles is difficult and often controversial (Graham et al. 2003). This is because the principles represent an ideal that no society has fully attained or realized, and, just as democracy and human development, good governance is a journey and not a destination and the issue is how to stage that journey (Ibid).
Table 2.1: Principles of Good Governance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Description</th>
<th>References</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Actors having a voice in decision-making, implementation and enforcement either directly or indirectly through legitimate intermediate institutions that represent their intention.</td>
<td>EC (2001); FAO (2011); Graham et al. (2003); Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; ODI (2011); Swiderska et al. (2009); UNDP (1997); UNESCAP (2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Decision makers being answerable to the other actors.</td>
<td>EC (2001); FAO (2011); Graham et al. (2003); Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; ODI (2011); Swiderska et al. (2009); UNESCAP (2007); UNDP (1997).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Based on free flow of information. Availability and accessibility of information by actors in media and form, which they can understand.</td>
<td>EC (2001); FAO (2011); Graham et al. (2003); Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; Swiderska et al. (2009); UNESCAP (2007); UNDP (1997).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity/Fairness</td>
<td>Equal access, in decision making and in outcomes.</td>
<td>EC (2001); FAO (2011); Graham et al. (2003); Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; ODI (2011); Swiderska et al. (2009); UNDP (1997); UNESCAP (2007).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness/Performance</td>
<td>Processes and institutions produce intended results.</td>
<td>EC (2001); FAO (2011); Graham et al. (2003); Lockwood 2010; Lockwood et al. 2010; ODI (2011); Swiderska et al. (2009); UNESCAP (2007); UNDP (1997).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of Law</td>
<td>Legal frameworks that are fair and enforced impartially, particularly human rights.</td>
<td>UNESCAP (2007); UNDP (1997).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Direction and Timeliness/strategic vision</td>
<td>All actors having broad and long term perspectives.</td>
<td>UNDP (1997); Swiderska et al. (2009).</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Though the good governance principles are mainly linked to the wider discussions on aid effectiveness, they have been used beyond the donor-related applications from which they emerged (Maidell et al. 2012). Good governance has been widely advanced in the development discourse and hence its application is relevant for understanding the partnerships studied in this thesis, as some of these principles also underlie strategies or institutional arrangements in the conservation-development nexus.

This thesis, however, deviates from the ‘normative’ description or ‘checklist’ analysis of governance and applies the concepts in an analytical way to study and understand governance of the partnerships, also by incorporating inter-relationships between the concepts, power-relations and contextual aspects under which the partnerships operate.
2.5 Conceptualizing governance of partnerships

This thesis adopts the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness to study the governance of the partnerships. The choice of the concepts was due to their relevance for partnerships and their universal adoption by the various development organizations and scholars. Moreover, the five identified concepts are also implicitly used by AWF and other proponents of tourism-based conservation enterprise partnerships, which aim to among others ‘enable sound governance’ (AWF 2001; Enterprise Works/VITA 2009; Muruthi 2004; KWS 2011; USAID 2002).

In the following sub-sections, the thesis explores the different theoretical understandings of the concepts, and how they have been studied. At the end of each section, I summarize the way the concept is applied in the thesis.

2.5.1 Participation

“There is a critical difference between going through the empty ritual of participation and having the real power needed to affect the outcome of the process” (Arnstein 1969: 216).

Stakeholder participation has been described as a key cornerstone of governance, which underlies many other aspects (UNESCAP 2007; Swiderska et al. 2009; Zadek & Radovich 2006). This is because the dynamic and complex nature of governance requires the participation of the various actors involved, and the contemporary meaning of governance implies participation of diverse actors in societal steering (Reed 2008). Participation generally means a process where individuals, groups and organizations choose to take an active role in making decisions that affect them (Ibid).
Participation as a concept however, is not straightforward both in its normative as well as in its use in practice, and means different things to different people (Reed 2008). During the history of its development and in different contexts where it has been applied, participation has become loaded with ideological, social, political and methodological meanings, giving rise to a wide range of interpretations (Lawrence 2006; Reed 2008).

Two schools of thought and practice have evolved on the importance of participation, i.e. the normative and the philosophical schools (Pretty 1995). The normative school views participation as a means to increase efficiency whereby if people are involved, they will agree with and support the new development or service (Tosun 2000). The philosophical school views participation as a fundamental right whose aim is to initiate mobilization for collective action, equity, efficiency, environmental sustainability, empowerment, the building of institutions, and improvement of transparency and accountability (Agrawal 2001; Cornwall 2004; Johnson et al. 2004; Swiderska et al. 2009). For Cleaver (1999) these benefits are ‘heroic claims’ made for participatory approaches to development since they are believed to ensure efficiency and effectiveness and contribute to democratization and empowerment.

Despite the possible positive outcomes of actor participation, Cleaver (2004) and Reed (2008) acknowledge that there is a growing concern that participation is not living up to its potential. This has led to scholars approaching participation more critically. Examples include Cooke & Kothari (2001), who view participation as ‘the new tyranny’, and advise that if care is not taken, issues of power, representation and voice can be overshadowed in what other authors have called a ‘master frame’ (Ros-Tonen et al. 2006), ‘mobilizing metaphor’ (Hummel & Van der Duim 2012), or ‘development orthodox and buzzword’ (Cornwall & Brock 2005).
The majority of the critiques of participation, however, does not dispute the importance of participation, but rather questions participation in practice, and provides advice on the manner in which participation could be undertaken for it to be beneficial. Parfitt (2004) for example advises that participation should be viewed as both the means and end to a process. Reed (2008) and White (1996) further advise that any study or argument about participation should examine the power relations amongst the actors as well as the context, an advice taken on board in this thesis. Another dimension that has been neglected in participation is politics, as advanced by White (1996), who cautions that participation’s status as a ‘hurray’ word should not block its detailed examination, since it is a political issue.

Scholars have also attempted to conceptualize participation. Typologies have thus been developed to be used a priori—for selecting a suitable participatory method, or post-hoc—for categorizing the existing types of participation (Reed 2008). The different conceptualizations include Arnstein’s ‘ladder of participation’ (Arnstein 1969), which describes a continuum of stakeholder involvement from passive dissemination of information to active engagement and Pretty (1995) who offers a similar continuum of participation, ranging from ‘manipulation’ to ‘self-mobilization’.

Others include Biggs (1989) who differentiates between ‘contractual’, ‘consultative’, ‘collaborative’ and ‘collegiate’ levels of engagement. Farrington (1998) and Lawrence (2006) also categorize participation as ‘consultative’, ‘functional’, ‘empowering’, and ‘transformative’. These categorizations implicitly and explicitly suggest that higher rungs of participation in the continuum should be preferred to lower ones. The challenge of categorizing participation as a continuum, however, is that different levels of participation are applicable depending on the circumstances and the environment. There have been attempts to address the challenge through the application of non-linear models such as
Davidson’s (1998) wheel of participation with four quadrants of information, consultation, participation and empowerment.

In the different definitions (see Box 2.1), governance is generally about authority, power in decision-making, and the process by which decisions are implemented and enforced (Brechin et al. 2002; DANIDA 2007; Edgar et al. 2006; UNESCAP 2007; Swiderska et al. 2009). Borrowing from the definitions of governance and the above conceptualizations of participation, in this thesis I conceptualize participation in terms of actors’ involvement in making, implementing, and enforcing decisions in the partnerships. Moreover, I consider participation in the partnerships as ranging from ‘consultative’ if all decision-making, implementation, and enforcement roles are held by a central actor, to ‘transformative’ if all actors control these processes leading to changes in meaning, power-relations and social organization. The intermediate categories are ‘functional’, if the knowledge and labour are shared, while decision-making remains with the central actor, and ‘collaborative’ if the central and other actors share in decision-making (Lawrence 2006).

2.5.2 Transparency

“That more knowledge could cause problems, that light might prove another tyranny, that knowledge might bring suffering, were not thoughts the philosophers of Enlightenment were prepared to entertain” (Tsoukas 1997: 839).

There are diverse definitions of transparency, such as ‘lifting the veil of secrecy’ (Davis 1998), ‘making the invisible visible’ (Strathern 2000), and an open flow of information (Park & Blenkinsopp 2011). Transparency is also considered a moral and political necessity closely associated with goals of accountable, inclusive, legitimate, and
democratic governance (Gupta 2008). According to Kim et al. (2005), transparency means that enough information is freely available and directly accessible in easily understandable forms and media to those who will be affected by decisions. In addition to the diverse definitions, there are equally diverse interpretations of transparency whereby “one man’s transparency may be another’s surveillance”, since “where one stands on the issue depends on where one sits” (Fox 2007: 663).

Transparency is generally believed to be a good aspect and a panacea for, among others, low trust, corruption, bad performance, accountability, and abuse of power (Grimmerlikhijsen 2012; Park & Blenkinsopp 2011; Vishwanath & Kauffman 2001). Moreover, transparency has potential as a regulatory instrument, due to its assumed capacity to reveal the hidden issues when used as a mechanism for accountability (Roberts 2009). There are however limits to transparency, such as the violation of privacy, the direct cost of information disclosure, revelation of sensitive information, information overload, and misinformation or propaganda (Grimmerlikhijsen 2012; Park & Blenkinsopp 2011). In addition, more information may lead to less understanding, undermine trust, and make society or organizations less governable (Tsoukas 1997).

Another limit is that if transparency focuses on accountability, where it is focused on mistakes of those in power and blind on their accomplishments, it can result in a ‘gotcha game’, or what could be referred to as witch hunt, which can ultimately result to defensive and conformist decision-making (Grimmerlikhijsen 2012). Additionally, there are limits to people’s abilities to process information which constitute a limit to transparency (Etzioni 2010; Grimmerlikhijsen 2012).

From the above discussion, it is clear that transparency is a ‘double-edged sword’ with both potentials and drawbacks. Transparency should therefore be advanced, since
information facilitates informed decision-making (Loewenstein et al. 2011), but with caution, conscious of the fact that the outcome will depend on the information disclosed, how the information is delivered, and how it is utilized by the receivers (Ibid). Vishwanath & Kauffman (2001) further advise that an understanding of transparency should encompass attributes such as access to, and comprehensiveness, relevance, quality and reliability of information.

In light of the above discussion, I conceptualize and analyze transparency in the partnerships as the availability and content of information, and its accessibility to different actors (Grimmerlikhijsen 2012; Joss 2010; Park & Blenkinsopp 2011).

2.5.3 Accountability

“One person’s accountability is another’s persecution” (Fox 2007: 663).

Accountability means, among other things, the obligation to respect the legitimate interests of others affected by decisions, programs, and interactions (Considine 2002). Accountability is important since it ensures that the needs of society are served and that participation in decision-making is meaningful (Swiderska et al. 2009). According to Zadek & Radovich (2006), accountability occurs in three phases, which include: (a) being held to account or compliance; (b) giving account or transparency; and (c) taking account or responsiveness. Therefore, accountability entails being answerable or responsible for actions and the possibility of sanctions for decisions, actions, and conduct (Fox 2007; Lockwood 2010; Roberts & Scapens 1985; Sinclair 1995).

For the governance of partnerships, accountability may be said to serve both a political and an operational purpose (Schacter 2000). The political purpose checks the might of the executive, where it serves as a mechanism for minimizing the abuse of
power, while the operational purpose helps ensure that partnerships operate efficiently and effectively.

Despite its importance, there are challenges for accountability. Considine (2002) for example argues that making powerful people more accountable can clog the works, divert resources, and subject organizations to negative pressures. Joss (2010) further notes that most definitions tend to emphasize accountability ‘to the people’ and devalue other accountability mechanisms such as accountability ‘of the people’. Moreover, accountability is complex, subjective, and multidimensional, changes, exists in many forms, and is given extra dimensions by its context, leading to difficulties in evaluation (Roberts 2009; Sinclair 1995).

Graham et al. (2003) and Lockwood (2010) advise that in assessing the quality of accountability three questions should be answered. The first question asks whether actors have a clear assignment of responsibilities for decision-making and outcomes. The second asks whether the responsibilities are appropriately based on the actor’s strengths and resources, and the third whether the institutional arrangements contain sufficient checks and balances with regard to the exercise of power by the actors. Accountability thus goes beyond answerability to consequences of non-compliance (Fox 2007; Graham et al. 2003; Lockwood 2010; Moore 1993). Schacter (2000) further suggests that in assessing accountability, one needs to ask whether the actors have access to timely, accurate, and comprehensive information, which they are able to analyze and allows them to develop timely, action-oriented conclusions.

From the above arguments, I conceptualize accountability in terms of actors’ obligations for and ability to take on responsibilities, the availability of checks and balances for responsibilities, and the presence of sanctions for non-compliance (Considine 2002; Schacter 2000; Zadek & Radovich 2006).
2.5.4 Equity

There are diverse definitions and meanings of equity. According to Young (1994), for example, equity is concerned with the proper distribution of resources, rights, duties, opportunities and obligations in society. Swiderska et al. (2009), further state that equity implies the recognition of rights holders as the primary decision-makers. In addition, Donaldson & Gerard (1993), Eaves (1998) and Mahanty et al. (2006) argue that the concept of equity, with its connotations of justice and fairness, has an intrinsic appeal to all, despite the inherent lack of agreement of equity as a unitary concept, since what is fair and just varies across spatial and temporal dimensions of culture and societal value system (Luintel 2006; Mahanty et al. 2006).

Jacobs (1986) identifies two dimensions of equity. The first dimension is ‘economic’ (Poteete 2004), ‘allocative’ (Jacobs 1986) or ‘distributional’ equity (Anand & Sen 2000), and entails the allocation of costs and benefits among stakeholders (Mahanty et al. 2006). The second dimension is ‘procedural’ (Jacobs 1986) or ‘political’ equity (Luintel 2006; Poteete 2004), which translates to who gains influence over decisions.

In line with these two dimensions of equity, Brown & Corbera (2003) argue that equity is both instrumental and a right, and is concerned with both distributional and procedural justice. Brown & Corbera (2003) thus propose a distinction between three elements of equity: equity in access, decision-making, and outcome. Equity in access concerns the way individuals are able to participate, which depends on access to information, knowledge and networks. Equity in decision-making concerns the recognition and inclusion of actors in strategic decisions, and finally, equity in outcomes refers to the distribution of outcome, economic benefits and perceived fairness (Ibid).

Based on the above discussion on equity, in this thesis I categorize and analyze equity in terms of both the economic and political equity in the partnerships. Economic
equity is conceptualized in terms of the distribution of benefits and costs among the actors in the partnerships, as well as the perceived fairness of the distribution by the different actors. Political equity is conceptualized in terms of participation of actors in, and their influence on, the decision-making process. Since political equity is related to the concept of participation, it is considered to be covered under this concept, thus focusing the analysis of equity solely on economic equity.

2.5.5 Effectiveness

The concept of effectiveness is an elusive concept, which can mean a number of different things (Young & Levy 1999). For the operationalization of the concept of effectiveness, I have been inspired by the approaches used in the environmental regime literature. According to several regime scholars, the effectiveness of a regime or an institutional arrangement is the extent to which it solves the problem(s) that motivated its establishment (Andresen & Hey 2005; Helm & Sprinz 2000; Miles 2002; Underdal 2002; Visseren-Hamakers 2009; Young 1989; Young 1999).

In the thesis, I thus conceptualize the effectiveness of the partnership arrangements in terms of their contribution to community livelihoods and to biodiversity conservation, because the conservation enterprise partnerships were established to address these issues (Kiss 2004; Muruthi 2004; Sumba et al. 2007).

The following sub-sections present how each aspect of effectiveness of the partnerships is conceptualized. The evaluation and conceptualization is however conscious of the challenge of attribution, since the partnership arrangements are embedded in a complex societal and institutional system (Miles et al. 2002; Young & Levy 1999).
Contributions to community livelihoods

To analyze the contribution to livelihoods, I adopted the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (SLF) (Ashley et al. 1999; Ashley & Hussein 2000; Carney 1998; De Haan & Zoomers 2005; DfID 1999; Ellis 2000; Sayer et al. 2007; Scoones 1998). The livelihoods concept has been widely used in the analysis of development interventions and was popularized by Chambers & Conway (1992), who defined a livelihood as the means of gaining a living.

Since its popularization, development organizations have applied the livelihoods concept to unravel interventions for poverty and development as well as for evaluating the outcomes of these interventions (Allison & Ellis 2001; Farrington et al. 1999; Scoones 2009). Although the livelihoods concept has been critiqued as being normative and providing checklists and frameworks (Scoones 2009), it has been widely applied, because it is regarded as being people centered, holistic, recognizing multiple influences, outcomes, strategies and actors, and bridging micro and macro-level development (DfID 1999; Scoones 2009; Simpson 2007; Solesbury 2003). The Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (see Figure 2.1) consists of the following five main aspects (Ahebwa & Van der Duim 2013):

- Livelihood assets

Assets are important in securing livelihoods and are the building blocks on which people develop their livelihood activities and strategies. Five types of capital assets are distinguished:

(i) Physical capital assets entail physical infrastructural developments and other forms of built assets;
(ii) Social capital assets refer to the social resources upon which people draw in pursuit of their livelihoods, and include relationships of trust, social norms, networks, and memberships of groups;

(iii) Financial capital assets include income from employment, savings, credit associations and other remittances;

(iv) Human capital assets entail aspects related to people’s education, health and skills;

(v) Natural capital assets refer to the capital assets linked to natural resources such as land, water and vegetation.

- Livelihood strategies

These are usually seen as additional activities or livelihood options. In its analysis, questions are answered on how the introduced activities compliment or conflict with existing activities and strategies.

- Livelihood outcomes

This includes aspects such as well-being, income, empowerment, health and reduced vulnerability.

- Institutional arrangements

These are external influences to people’s livelihoods. In this thesis I particularly look at the influence of the two tourism conservation enterprises (TCEs) on community livelihoods.

- The vulnerability context

The context includes external shocks, seasonality and trends that affect livelihoods.
The tourism conservation enterprise partnerships studied in this thesis were established to diversify community livelihood strategies, by expanding the way the community now makes a living (mainly through pastoralism), thereby improving community well-being and reducing poverty (outcomes), and decreasing vulnerability to external factors (e.g. climate change, and drought), through the reinforcement of physical, social, human, financial, and natural, livelihood assets. The analysis aims to assess how and to what extent the partnerships support these assets and as a consequence, the other aspects of the SLF discussed above. Therefore, this thesis analyzes the implications of the two conservation enterprise partnerships on the five capital assets as follows:

- Physical capital assets: how the partnerships have contributed to physical capital aspects such as buildings, urbanization, water, health and education infrastructure;
- Social capital assets: contributions to aspects such as relationships of trust, social norms, networks and memberships of groups, and negative social impacts such as conflicts.
- Human capital assets: contributions to education, health and skills of community members.
- Financial capital assets: contribution to employment and other income or benefits.
- Natural capital assets: contribution to water, soil and other natural resources. This capital asset is operationalized by the analysis of the partnerships’ contributions to biodiversity conservation (see below).

**Contributions to biodiversity conservation**

As Community Based Natural resource Management (CBNRM) initiatives, the enterprise partnerships have been set up in line with a commonly held assumption that if people can benefit financially from enterprises that depend on natural resources, they will take action to conserve and to sustainably use them (Salafsky et al. 2001). There is also the assumption that diversified local livelihood options will reduce human pressure and threats on biodiversity leading to its improved conservation (Hughes & Flintan 2001). For the enterprise partnerships, the underlying assumption is that the benefits from the enterprises will improve livelihoods and thus incentivize biodiversity conservation among the local communities (AWF 2011; Sumba et al. 2007).

The term biodiversity became widely applied in conservation and the environmental debate in the 1980s (Wilson 1988; Van der Duim & Caalders 2002). Before then, terms such as nature and environment were used to refer to what we now call biodiversity. Biodiversity is defined as the variability among living organisms, and includes the genetic diversity within and between species, and the diversity of
ecosystems (CBD 1992; MEA 2005; Wilson 1988). This definition makes biodiversity a fundamentally multi-dimensional concept, which is difficult to reduce to a single measure (Purvis & Hector 2000), a major challenge for measuring biodiversity.

As a result of the difficulties in defining biodiversity, the concept of biodiversity conservation has equally faced both definition and measurement challenges (Salafsky et al. 2001). Attempts have however been made to define the concept. According to Roe & Elliott (2010), biodiversity conservation is a set of management objectives or interventions designed to maintain biodiversity and to prevent its degradation or loss. For Kangwana (2001), the many definitions of biodiversity conservation all imply maintaining, enhancing and or using sustainably the biological component of an ecosystem.

Measures have also been developed for evaluating biodiversity conservation efforts. Conservation theory for example has advanced biological indicators which can be used for measuring conservation outcomes in terms of species, habitats and genetic diversity (Agrawal & Redford 2006; Kangwana 2001; Salafsky & Margoluis 1999). Biological indicators however require monitoring indicators of composition, structure and function at genetic, population, community, ecosystem, and regional landscape scales which are costly and require long monitoring durations of time to change (Salafsky & Margoluis 1999). In addition, there are methodological difficulties in determining the link between ecological indicators and project interventions (Kangwana 2001). Measuring biodiversity is also confronted with a lack of knowledge of the functioning and dynamics of natural systems, which necessitates value judgments (Van der Duim & Caalders 2002).

As a consequence of the challenges encountered in the assessment of the impacts of conservation interventions to biodiversity, alternative indicators have been advanced. The most common is evaluation of the contribution of development strategies
to biodiversity conservation through an assessment of the pressures or threats to biodiversity, with the assumption that reductions in the pressures affect biodiversity positively (Kangwana 2001). This type of assessment was developed by Salafsky & Margoluis (1999), and is referred to as the Threat Reduction Assessment (TRA). The indicators take into account both short-term threats (such as illegal off-take, poaching, and intensive use) and long-term threats (such as changing land use and isolation of regions from the ecosystem).

To conceptualize the contribution of the partnerships to biodiversity conservation, this thesis borrows from the TRA model. Aspects from the TRA model enable an assessment of the reduction or exacerbation of threats such as poaching, land degradation, land-use changes, and human-wildlife conflicts e.g. livestock predation and destruction of property. The threats investigated are part of the challenges to biodiversity that the enterprise partnerships aim to address (Sumba et al. 2007). In addition this analysis of the biodiversity threats, the amount of land set aside for conservation is also included in the assessment of the contribution to biodiversity conservation of the partnerships.

2.6 Inter-relationships of the governance concepts

According to Graham et al. (2003), analyzing governance should embrace the fact that the various aspects overlap and sometimes reinforce and contradict one another. In light of this, the governance concepts adopted in this thesis have not been analyzed and discussed in isolation, and reference has been made on how the issues reinforce each other or not.

To start with, participation may reinforce accountability, transparency and equity (Cornwall 2004; Kim et al. 2005). Participation holds the promise of inclusion, access to
information and decision-making power, creation of space for the less vocal and powerful to exercise their voice and gain more choices, and bringing equitable development (Cornwall 2003). Moreover, according to Agrawal (2001); Johnson et al. (2004); Cleaver (1999); and Parfitt (2004), participation might enhance, among others, equity and effectiveness. On the other hand, accountability might ensure that the needs of society are served and that participation in decision-making is meaningful (Swiderska et al. 2009). However, Brinkerhoff & Brinkerhoff (2011) argue that the complexities of partnerships may lead to trade-offs among the advantages of partnerships. For example, benefits such as inclusivity or participation benefits may add costs and also complicate accountability.

Transparency, accountability and equity are also intertwined. According to Kim et al. (2005) transparency implies openness, clear processes and procedures, and open information, all of which stimulate ethical awareness, and ultimately might stimulate accountability for the performance of individuals and organizations handling resources or public office. Thus, lack of transparency may lead to inefficiency or even corruption, leading to poor outcomes. The principle of transparency also may strengthen accountability (Schacter 2000) since the relevance, accuracy and timeliness of information can curtail corruption and has a positive effect on trust and accountability (Park & Blenkinsopp 2011).

2.7 Understanding power-relations in partnerships

Any study of partnerships must analyze power dynamics (Lister 2000). Moreover, Edgar et al. (2006) and Graham et al. (2003) argue that governance both results from power and determines how power is exercised. In the many definitions of governance (see Box 2.1.), the exercise of power is implicitly or explicitly seen as a key component of
governance. Scholarly discussions on power have been on-going for quite some time. Systematic academic study and debates on power can be traced back to the late 1950s and 1960s, though there were earlier discussions by philosophers such as Hobbes and Machiavelli (Barnett & Duvall 2005). Power is a contested concept with no universal definition, and its meanings and conceptualizations have changed over time.

Dahl (1957) conceptualized power as the production of causal effects and as a relation between people whereby ‘A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’ (pp. 202-203). This definition and conceptualization was criticized by Bachrach & Baratz (1962) in their article ‘Two faces of power’ for being one-dimensional. Bachrach & Baratz argued that power can be exercised through both decision-making and through non-decision-making, which involves exclusion of issues from the political agenda. Other scholars include Clegg (1989) and Digeser (1992) who conceptualize power in terms of mechanisms & outcomes, discourses & rules of the game, and societal systems.

Building on the earlier conceptualizations of power, Barnett & Duvall (2005) distinguish four faces of power. The first face is the compulsory power, which entails direct control of one actor over conditions of existence and or actions of another (either intentionally or unintentionally through deployment of resources), and is manifested through dominance and resources. The second face of power is institutional power and encompasses an actor’s control over distant others through ‘biased’ institutions such as rules and laws. The third face of power is structural power, which involves direct and mutual constitution of actors’ subject positions in a structural relationship. The fourth face of power is productive power, which entails the production of subjects and identities through scientific and social discourses.
In this thesis I adopt Barnett & Duvall’s (2005) conceptualization of the four faces of power. This conceptualization has been widely applied in research on governance (see Barnett & Duvall 2005; Hardy 1996; Hardy & Leiban-O’Sullivan 1998; Kuindersma et al. 2012), and is believed to be systematic, precise, and general, and acknowledges that multiple forms of power can be present simultaneously (Kuindersma et al. 2012). Power is therefore conceptualized in terms of actor relations arising as a result of actors’ access to resources, the rules, policies and agenda that influence governance, the subject positions manifested, and the discourses and actor identities created, and their influence on governance.

2.8 A framework for analyzing governance of partnerships

This chapter has discussed the concepts of governance and good governance and introduced and defined participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness as main concepts used in this thesis. These latter concepts are applied as summarized in Figure 2.2. Inter-relations between the concepts (areas of overlaps, reinforcements and contradictions) are also identified. In addition, the analysis takes into account power-relations and the ways in which these relations affect governance. Contextual factors at the local, national and international levels are also included, as discussed at length in chapter 3. In this thesis, I use this framework to study the nature of governance of the partnerships.
Participation is conceptualized in terms of actors’ involvement in making, implementing, and enforcing decisions in the partnerships, and transparency as the availability and content of information, and its accessibility for the different actors. Accountability is conceptualized in terms of actors’ obligations for and ability to take on responsibilities, availability of checks and balances for responsibilities, and presence of sanctions for non-compliance. Equity is analyzed in terms of economic equity, including the allocation of costs and benefits amongst the actors. Effectiveness is operationalized as the extent to which the partnerships have achieved what they set out to accomplish, namely their contributions to community livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. Table 2.2 summarizes these definitions.
### Table 2.2: Overview of governance concepts

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Concept</th>
<th>Conceptualization</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Actors involved making, implementing and enforcing decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Availability of information to the actors; content and nature of the information, and accessibility of the information to the actors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Actors obligations and ability to take responsibilities; availability of checks and balances for controlling actor responsibilities, and presence of sanctions for non-compliance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Economic equity: Distribution of resources/benefits and costs in the partnerships.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
<td>Contribution to community livelihoods: contributions to capital assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contribution to biodiversity conservation: contribution to reduction of threats such as poaching, degradation and human-wildlife conflicts; amount of land under conservation.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter 3: Contextualizing the Partnerships

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I analyze the context within which the partnerships operate, as it influences how governance plays out in practice (Graham et al. 2003) by playing either an enabling or constraining role. The chapter therefore ‘sets the scene’ for explanation and analysis of the nature of governance of the partnerships. In this chapter, the context in which the partnerships operate is discussed in terms of the international, national and local contexts. In addition, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF)’s conservation enterprise strategy is discussed. The chapter begins with a discussion of the international context, followed by the national. Next is a description of the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF)’s conservation enterprise strategy, a discussion of the local level (including both the Laikipia region and the community level) context, and ends with a conclusion.

3.2 International level context

In the current highly globalized world, the partnership enterprises operate in an environment in which global discourses influence their operations and present both challenges as well as opportunities. In chapter 1, I argued that the partnership paradigm emerged from the global level ideas and have been advanced as modes of governance in conservation and development. Global discourses are usually articulated in international agreements, conventions and treaties as well as by major global organizations such as the World Bank and the United Nations. The incorporation of the
ideas at the local levels is manifested through projects and legislations by NGOs and governments who are key carriers of discourses or ‘meta-trends’ (Huitema & Bouma 2011).

Discourses as dominant ideas, narratives or concepts (Arts 2006) are believed to play a major role in shaping society by influencing meaning, interpretations, interactions and practices as well as enabling and limiting action (Arts et al. 2006; Arts 2006; Huitema & Bouma 2011; Humphreys 2009; Litfin 1994). Below, I briefly discuss three global discourses related to conservation and development, which I believe have influenced and continue to influence the development of the conservation enterprise partnerships.

3.2.1 Sustainable development discourse

Sustainable development, though contested in terms of meaning and practice, emerged in the 1980s as a solution to two main global challenges (Kemp et al. 2005), the increased ecological degradation and increased poverty (Adams 2004; Grimble & Laidlaw 2002; Kemp et al. 2005; Mcgregor & Ahen 2007). These two challenges are believed to be intricately linked (Adams 2004; Grimble & Laidlaw 2002). As a result, the United Nations General Assembly in 1983 appointed the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED), to find ways of addressing the two challenges simultaneously. The commission’s report our ‘Common Future’, suggested a common response to the two challenges through sustainable development which is ‘development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the needs of future generations to meet their own needs’ (WCED 1987: 43).
The sustainable development discourse articulates three critical aims: ‘the improvement of human wellbeing, more equitable distribution of resource use benefits across and within societies; and development that ensures ecological integrity over intergenerational timescales’ (Sneddon et al. 2006: 255-256). The sustainable development discourse further articulates issues of actor participation and equity in development and decision-making (WCED 1987). This quest is reflected in the set-up of conservation enterprise partnerships, as well as decision-making platforms that are meant to allow a wide range of actor participation (see Chapters 4 and 5).

As a global discourse that advocates for the linking of conservation and development discourse, sustainable development influenced the adoption of the idea of conservation enterprises, since they are believed to improve the community livelihoods and thus incentivize conservation. Sustainable development further calls for development interventions to operate as a ‘three-legged stool’ of ‘people, planet and profit’, which according to some actors in the partnerships is the main objective of the partnerships (P-SOL-2). Kenya is also a signatory to international conventions such as the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), whose objectives are to conserve biological diversity, pursue sustainable use and promote equitable sharing of the benefits arising from the utilization of genetic resources (UNEP 1999) in line with sustainable development.

3.2.2 Governance, good governance and partnerships discourses

The concept of governance became popular from the 1980s and shares a ‘history and parentage’ with sustainable development (Kemp et al. 2005). Governance has been framed among others as pathways to desired outcomes (Plumptre & Graham 1999) making it significant as a key determinant for growth, development and poverty
alleviation (Kauffmann et al. 2002). The rise of the governance discourse enabled the entry of different types of actors, such as AWF, communities and private investors into biodiversity conservation, which was before the prime responsibility of governments.

The quest for ‘good’ or ‘sound’ governance also influenced the framing of among others, AWF’s activities and interventions. For example the partnership model ‘secures community rights and resources; does not alienate resources and has empowerment value’ (Elliott & Sumba 2010: 8). AWF’s partnership model is also aimed at addressing voids relating to lack of participation of communities in the wildlife-based tourism industry, lack of livelihood opportunities, empowerment and addresses the existing deals between private investors and communities, which were lopsided and brought conflicts (Van Wijk et al. 2014).

A central theme in the sustainability debates has focused on the search for the most promising institutional arrangement for progressive change between the state-centric and the pluralistic approaches (Glasbergen 2007). Increasingly, partnerships have been perceived as arrangements that can further the drive for sustainable development (Ibid). The incorporation of partnerships in societal governance paved way for a shift towards de-regulation, a privatized way of governing and exclusion of governments (Mert 2009).

AWF responded to this shift by adopting a ‘single enterprise’ model which emphasizes community-private sector partnerships (Elliot & Sumba 2010). Potential benefits of partnerships were the main reasons behind the choice (Muruthi 2004). The influence of the partnerships discourse is also visible in the regional bodies such as Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF), the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT), and the Naibunga Conservation Trust (NCT), where actors collaborate to gain collaborative advantage.
3.2.3 Neoliberal conservation discourses

This discourse can be considered to be related to the governance and partnership discourses and encompasses three principles: (a) Marketization; which involves the increased role of markets; (b) The enhanced role of the private sector and; (c) De-regulation and scaling back the state, and voluntarism encompassing voluntary legally non-binding regulation and de-regulation of markets (Arts et al. 2010; Humphreys 2009). The neoliberal discourse also advocates reliance on market valuations to conserve natural resources which – according to critics - reduces them to commodities that are conserved only when the price is paid (Humphreys 2009). According to Igoe & Brockington (2007) the neoliberal conservation discourse entails ‘hybrid’ environmental governance where states, business, NGOs and communities share conservation responsibilities and partnerships are increasingly common if not the norm.

The neoliberal discourse is also implicitly manifested in the development of the conservation enterprise partnerships. For example, according to AWF ‘the evolution of conservation enterprise as a conservation strategy is tied to the growing understanding of the need to valorize biodiversity resources if they are to be adequately protected’ (Elliott & Sumba 2010: 6). Moreover, AWF advocates for the entry of private-sector operators in the enterprises in order to ensure their commercial success. AWF thus argues that ‘local ownership and private sector management’ is the most effective partnering option in delivering substantial benefits for communities and conservation (Elliott & Sumba 2010: 7). The neoliberal conservation discourse also consists of ideas such as participation, sustainability, ‘win-win solutions’ among others, which are clearly used in the conservation enterprise partnerships studied.
It can also be argued that this neoliberal agenda is further advocated by donor organizations of the partnerships. For example, the USAID, one of the donors of AWF, supports natural resource management projects, which pursue an integrated approach to natural resource management, by fostering partnerships, grass-root support, local ownership, sustainability, and accountability” (USAID 2002). According to Van Wijk et al. (2014) USAID’s Conservation of Biodiverse Resource Areas (COBRA) and Conservation of Resources through Enterprise (CORE) projects stimulated the realization of the market-based approach to conservation in Kenya, with AWF acting as a key organization.

3.3 National level context

This section describes ways in which developments at the national level influence governance of the conservation enterprise partnerships. For the national level context, I focus on two contextual aspects: the history of wildlife conservation in Kenya and the policy and institutional framework for wildlife conservation in Kenya.

3.3.1 History of wildlife conservation in Kenya

The evolution and nature of wildlife conservation in Kenya is linked to its political history as a country (Matheka 2008) as well as to the regional evolution of the conservation-development discourse described in chapter 1. An understanding of the country’s political history is vital since it impacts the current land-tenure system, land policies and management decisions (Fitzgerald 2010). To begin with, Kenya became a country after the 1885 Berlin conference when European countries partitioned Africa and the present day Kenya was part of the British East Africa Protectorate (Waithaka 2012). Before this occurrence, Kenyan communities lived in their respective regions with no
common rules except for the specific individual community traditional governance systems.

Kenya was administered through the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEAC) until 1984-1985 when the British government took over the region (Matheka 2008). From 1895 until independence in 1963, Kenya was under the British colonial rule. The over 70 year’s colonial rule and British governance system played a crucial role in shaping the current scenario on wildlife conservation (Waithaka 2012). In addition to changing the native communities’ governance system, the colonial government and white settlers also engaged in ‘development’ initiatives aimed at modernizing the country which had far reaching consequences for wildlife conservation.

The first initiative by the colonial administrators was to open up the interior of the protectorate. This was through the construction of the Kenya-Uganda railway which began in 1896 (Matheka 2008). The effects of the railway were increased white settler occupation, the birth of safari hunting, forced labour and reduction of African traditional rights over land and resources (Waithaka 2012).

The colonial government also set up laws with regard to land acquisition, ownership, use, and management which have influenced wildlife conservation to date. For example, the promulgation of the Crown Lands Ordinance (CLO) in 1902 facilitated land alienation for white settlers and became the basis for land allocation (Matheka 2008). Under this ordinance all land that was not occupied by settlers was state land and the Africans became tenants of the state in designated reserves. These reserves were later to be demarcated as wildlife reserves where locals were required to co-exist with wildlife (Matheka 2005). This negative treatment of locals on their own land and the denial to wildlife use rights for locals also led to negative attitudes towards parks and wildlife and limited commitments to conservation.
The colonial government also set up laws and strict measures for the protection of wildlife. Initial laws and regulations were however meant to regulate hunting by white settlers as well as limit local utilization of wildlife. An example is the 1884 British East Africa Company’s porting licenses regulation which proposed a hunting regulation for the number of kills that could be made for each license (Lado 1992). Africans were also prohibited from hunting, except during severe famines, while the settlers killed freely any wildlife on their land and hunted elsewhere (Matheka 2008). The outcome was that Africans came to regard wildlife as state property and did not feel obliged to observe game laws.

Despite all these earlier initiatives aimed at wildlife conservation, more organized wildlife conservation efforts in Kenya emerged after the Second World War (Lado 1992). Efforts had begun earlier in 1939 when the Game Policy Committee recommended the establishment of Parks and Sanctuaries (Ibid). The efforts were disrupted by the Second World War and in 1945 the Royal National Parks of Kenya Ordinance was promulgated to provide for the establishment of National Parks and Reserves and Nairobi, Tsavo, Mount Kenya and Aberdares National Parks were created in the period 1946-1950 (Matheka 2008). The land targeted by the colonial administrators for the creation of protected areas was the land available for the Africans and this led to an increase in human-wildlife conflicts which still persist today.

The limited capacity of government agency KWS to engage in conservation efforts outside conservation areas created an avenue for conservation organizations such as AWF to engage communities in conservation. The incentives created through community-based conservation projects and later conservation enterprises were to make up for the costs of living with wildlife, since KWS was also not well equipped to handle
compensation for damages incurred through human-wildlife conflicts (Van Wijk et al. 2014).

The total ban on wildlife hunting in Kenya in 1977 (Elliott & Mwangi 1998) also had an influence on the development of conservation enterprise strategy. As a result of the ban, communities did not have a way of benefiting from wildlife occupying their land (Van Wijk et al. 2014) and conservation stakeholders sought ways to remedy this. Non-consumptive wildlife uses, mainly tourism, were adopted to create benefits from wildlife. According to Watson et al. (2010), Kenya’s wildlife is the basis of the tourism industry; an industry that is second to agriculture as a national source of revenue.

The promulgation of laws and regulations as well as the creation of protected areas by both the colonial and post-colonial governments was also accompanied by the creation of government agencies for implementation. The first one, created in 1907, was the game department to enforce game laws and protect the established reserves (Matheka 2008). Subsequent government agencies created by both the colonial and post-colonial governments include the Kenya National Parks Trustees (1945), the Game Policy Committee (1956), the Wildlife Conservation and Management Department (1977) and in 1989, the present Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) (Lado 1992; Kameri-Mbote 2005; Matheka 2005; Matheka 2008).

The wildlife management agencies have however over time faced numerous challenges including under-funding of operations, land-use changes and poaching among others (Anyonge-Bashir & Udoto 2012). The challenges have made it impossible for KWS to handle its core mandate of wildlife conservation. Community areas have experienced these challenges even more, since communities have limited capacity to engage in conservation.
3.3.2 Policy, legal, and Institutional framework for wildlife conservation in Kenya

Public policies are government choices concerning the rule systems, resource allocations and delegation of authority (Brinkerhoff & Gage 1992). Such policy involves how governments address (or do not address) issues that affect the public and are usually visible and implemented through regulations, legislation, funding priorities and other government actions. Policies also guide decision-making and action at regional or local levels and therefore have a direct influence on governance in the partnerships. For the enterprise partnerships in this study, the policy and legislative framework for wildlife conservation in Kenya has had two main effects.

First, the earlier conservation-related policies covered conservation in state protected areas leave out non-protected areas. This therefore created a policy void (Van Wijk et al. 2014) which enabled the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) to engage in conservation enterprises. In terms of wildlife conservation policy and legislation, all wildlife belonged and still belongs to the government whether inside or outside protected areas. This meant that communities were required to protect and bear the costs of wildlife without benefits or property rights.

The second aspect is that the engagement of NGOs such as the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), the African Conservation Centre (ACC) and the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT) in conservation in community areas, has increasingly led to calls for policies that can regulate them. This is because each organization has applied different institutional arrangements for conservation and tourism, leading to haphazard and unregulated development and impacts on community groups and conservation.
**Wildlife conservation-related policies**

Kenya’s wildlife conservation policy is found in Sessional papers, Acts of Parliament, Ministerial statements and development plans (Kameri-Mbote 2005) and is summarized in the National Wildlife Conservation and Management Policy, 2012 (GoK 2012). The first comprehensive wildlife policy in Kenya was the Sessional Paper No.3, 1975 entitled ‘A statement on future wildlife management policy in Kenya’ (GoK 2012; Kameri-Mbote 2005). The policy emphasized conservation and management of wildlife while optimizing benefits to land owners (GoK 1975). The policy further provided a radical departure from preservationist policies (involved policing, enforcement and prohibitions) since it recognized value of wildlife outside protected areas and wildlife authorities were to be facilitators, advisors and assessors working with landowners (GoK 1975; Kameri-Mbote 2005).

The law was however not able to create an enabling environment for communities and private land owners to own and benefit from wildlife. Subsequently, the Wildlife (Conservation and Management) Act cap 376 of 1976, which was amended in 1989, established the legal framework for the policy and further recognized the need to increase wildlife earnings and benefits for communities living with wildlife outside of protected areas. The Act also amalgamated the then Game Department and the Kenya National Parks Trustees to form a single agency, the Wildlife Conservation and Management Department (WCMD), to manage wildlife.

In 1989, through an amendment of the Act, the current wildlife management agency KWS was established to replace WCMD (GoK 2012). The Policy framework and Development Programme 1991-1996 known as the Zebra Book, produced in 1990, aligned the goals of KWS with sustainable development. This policy, through its recognition of multiple stakeholders, made it possible for NGOs, including AWF, to be
actively engaged in conservation outside protected areas, including setting up enterprise partnerships.

Despite the existence of the policy framework, there is recognition that the wildlife management policy and Act have not been able to address some issues adequately, which has contributed to the threats and challenges facing wildlife conservation. These issues include ‘human-wildlife conflicts, mainstreaming the needs and aspirations of landowners and communities into wildlife conservation planning and decision-making processes, putting in place a regulatory framework for wildlife utilization and putting in place mechanisms for monitoring and implementing the policy and law’ (GoK 2012: 3-4). Existing penalties for wildlife poachers and illegal trade are also low, and are unable to deter the behaviour which is further fueled by the exponential growth of the international trade in ivory.

All the above mentioned issues pose challenges for the conservation enterprise partnerships in the realization of conservation objectives. The low penalties have however been revised in the Wildlife Act with effect from January 2014 of which results are yet to be witnessed (Wildlife Management and Conservation Act 2013). The new Act however lacks an overall biodiversity plan for the country and is not clear on various aspects that will impact conservation enterprise partnerships, such as guidelines for community support and involvement.

In Kenya, the legal system vests all ownership and property rights for wildlife to the state (The Constitution of Kenya 2010). The law also gives the KWS absolute control of the wildlife in Kenya regardless of the location (both in and outside protected areas). KWS is however not funded adequately to be able to manage wildlife outside protected areas which affects the realization of conservation objectives.
The limited funding of the state agency KWS has consequently created an avenue for conservation organizations such as AWF to become involved. The wildlife conservation law is also unclear on who and how to manage wildlife conservation threats and challenges such as human-wildlife conflicts which are prevalent. Moreover, KWS which has been charged with this responsibility faces lack of resources and capacity. Communities are therefore left to bear the costs of living with wildlife, which is further complicated by their limited capacity and lack of authority to manage wildlife and the accompanying threats.

**Land Tenure related policies**

Land ownership and land tenure laws and policies also influence wildlife management in Kenya. Land is owned by four different kinds of entities: national government, county councils (current county governments), individuals and groups and different legal instruments govern the different categories of land and owners thereof (Kameri-Mbote 2005). The land ownership in the case study areas for this thesis is group ownership registered as ‘group ranches’. A group ranch is land that has been demarcated and legally allocated to a group such as a tribe, clan, section, family or other group of persons under the Land Adjudication Act cap 284 Laws of Kenya. Therefore, more emphasis is made here on the policies and laws that regulate group ranches.

The group ranch concept has its roots to the colonial government’s attempts to conserve and develop range areas (Coldham 1982; Kibugi 2009; Seno & Shaw 2002). Early experimentation of the group ranch concept was in 1945 when the colonial government established the African Land Development Organization (ALDEV) which created large ranches for extended Maasai families but later failed due to
mismanagement and the failure of the Maasai to cope with the sedentary life (Seno & Shaw 2002).


The Land Adjudication Act Cap 284 was meant to enable the ascertainment and recording of rights and interests in trust land, which is the land held in trust for the local people by the local government, to ensure that the right individuals and groups were registered as land owners. On the other hand, the Land (Group Representatives) Act cap 287 was meant to allow few people to act on behalf of the group (Coldham 1982; Kibugi 2009). These two Acts of Parliament, which form the bulk of the legal framework for the group ranches, exhibit diverse gaps which influence the conservation enterprise partnerships. The leadership structure of the group ranch as stipulated in the Land (Group representatives) Act cap 287 creates three centres of power (group ranch representatives, group ranch officials, council of elders) at the group ranch level with no clear accountability mechanisms among the three. There is also lack of clear co-ordination mechanisms among the three levels of group ranch leadership.

Group ranch membership is also not clearly articulated in the Act and women are excluded from membership. Moreover, the procedures for the elections of officials as
stipulated in the Act are also wanting. Another issue not addressed by the Act includes environmental conservation in the group ranch, which is critical to the realization of the conservation objectives. Group ranch monitoring by the government is also inadequate.

There is also the lack of a comprehensive land use policy in the group ranches (Van Wijk et al. 2014). The lack of a comprehensive land-use policy is manifested in the lack of land-use planning and zoning laws for group ranch or pastoral land which has made the lands prone to erosion and land degradation (Kameri-Mbote 2005). The challenges associated with management, land use and governance in the group ranches have led to plans being initiated at national level to regulate community conservation areas as well as to revise the wildlife management laws to incorporate community conservancies and associated interventions as wildlife conservation areas in Kenya.

### 3.4 AWF Conservation Enterprise Strategy

The African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) is a conservation NGO founded in 1961 as the African Wildlife Leadership Foundation (AWLF) by a group of US citizens, in the wake of Africa’s independence (AWF 2011). Its aim then was to ‘help the newly created African nations and people to conserve their own wildlife’ (Van Wijk et al. 2014: 5). As part of the international biodiversity conservation community, AWF’s interventions to conservation have changed over time since its inception in line with the changes in the conservation discourses (Nthiga et al. 2011) as summarized in Table 3.1.

Currently, AWF works in nine large conservation landscapes, so-called African Heartlands, across parts of fourteen countries in sub-Saharan Africa (AWF 2011). The main conservation strategies employed by AWF in the heartlands include: conservation enterprises, land and habitat conservation, species and applied conservation research, capacity building and leadership development and contribution to policy formulation
(Muruthi 2004). The conservation enterprise partnerships studied in this thesis are located in the Samburu Heartland, Kenya and are part of AWF’s conservation enterprise strategy.

In line with the background presented in chapter 1, AWF’s adoption of the enterprise strategy for conservation occurred with the discursive shift from ‘fortress’ to ‘community’ conservation (Nthiga et al. 2011) and has all along changed in response to discursive changes (See Table 3.1). In addition to the alignment with the global discourses, Van Wijk et al. (2014) argue that the adoption of the conservation enterprise strategy to conservation was a reaction to the policy and legislative voids described in detail in section 3.3 of this thesis. AWF is also part of major conservation alliances such as the African Biodiversity Collaborative group (ABCG)\(^1\) and IUCN, arenas which inform local practices and interventions to conservation (Van Wijk et al. 2014).

\(^1\)ABCG Consists of AWF, The Nature Conservancy (TNC), World Resources Institute (WRI), Conservation International (CI), Jane Goodall Institute, Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) and World Wildlife Fund for Nature (WWF).
Table 3.1: AWF interventions in relation to international conservation discourses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Frame</th>
<th>General conservation discourses</th>
<th>AWF main intervention strategies</th>
<th>AWF’s organizational and strategic milestones</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endangered/flagship species conservation</td>
<td></td>
<td>1962 Establishment of the college of African Wildlife Management in Mweka, Tanzania (AWF’s first project)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s - 1980s</td>
<td>Community development and involvement around protected areas, e.g. in form of ‘Integrated Conservation and Development Projects’ (ICDPs)</td>
<td>Park Outreach Program</td>
<td>1983 Name changed to African Wildlife Foundation</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1987 AWF starts working in Amboseli National Park to enlist support of the Maasai (local people) towards the park</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late 1980’s - 1990s</td>
<td>Sustainability debates and actual community ownership, e.g. Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) projects, also in non-protected areas</td>
<td>‘Neighbours as Partners’ Program</td>
<td>1988 AWF works in Group ranches between Amboseli National Park and Tsavo West National Park Kenya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>End 1990s, 2000s</td>
<td>Conservation at landscape level</td>
<td>Conservation of Resources through Enterprises (CORE) program</td>
<td>1998 African Heartlands programme launched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neo-liberalization of nature, ‘Nature to pay for itself’, resulting in private sector involvement in conservation Partnerships among different actors in society</td>
<td>Conservation Enterprise strategy</td>
<td>1998 Conservation Enterprise (CE) strategy adopted as a key strategic intervention to conservation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1998 Klein’s Camp in Tanzania opened (First CE by AWF)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>2001 KoijaStarbeds Eco-lodge opened in the Samburu heartland, Kenya</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Nthiga et al. (2011: 110)

The conservation enterprise strategy is a ‘subset’ of CBNRM (Elliott & Sumba 2010) and coincided with the global discourse on participatory approaches which shifted responsibilities to communities (Chambers & Cornway 1992). Prior to the inclusion of conservation enterprises as a strategic intervention, AWF had engaged in other activities in line with merging of the conservation and development discourses. In the early 1990s, AWF participated in the implementation of the USAID funded Conservation of Biodiverse Resource Areas (COBRA) project together with the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) during 1992-1998 (Nthiga et al. 2011).
COBRA’s core purpose was “to increase socio-economic benefits to communities living adjacent to Kenya’s parks and reserves from conservation and sustainable management of wildlife and natural resources” (Hall et al. 1996: 2) and several enterprises including lodges, campsites, cultural villages and souvenir shops were constructed (Zeppel 2006). COBRA piloted community involvement in conservation and targeted benefit sharing and tourism enterprise development (Hall et al. 1996).

The tourism-based projects were aimed at providing financial incentives for communities (Elliott & Sumba 2010). The established tourism-based projects did not however generate sufficient commercial returns for the communities due to poor market linkages among other factors (AWF 1998). As a consequence, AWF and other NGOs with the support of donor organizations such as USAID started funding partnership enterprises between communities and private investors (Van Wijk et al. 2014). This support for partnerships was in line with the neoliberal discourse and the increased role of the market in conservation. AWF has also had to adhere to donor conditionalities and interests such as those by the USAID and other donors which affect their activities.

The adoption of the Heartland program in 1998, which exemplified the landscape-level conservation approach (Nthiga et al. 2011; Van Wijk et al. 2014), was accompanied by the adoption of the conservation enterprise programme as one of the strategic interventions for conservation (Muruthi 2004; Elliott & Sumba 2010). AWF thus set up a qualified enterprise team in conservation enterprise development who implemented the USAID funded the CORE project (1999-2005). CORE fully funded the construction of the Koija Starbeds and partly the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership enterprises.
Previous experiences with community-private investor partnerships however revealed that most of the deals were ‘lop-sided’ and favored private investors. There were also challenges of corruption and governance (Van der Duim 2011). AWF thus pioneered the engagement of NGOs as a third party to the community-private investor partnerships. This experimentation with new institutional arrangements for tourism-conservation-development is referred by Van Wijk et al. (2014) as ‘institutional entrepreneurship’ since AWF’s view was that for tourism-based conservation enterprises to succeed, ‘local ownership combined with private sector management is the most effective’ (Elliott & Sumba 2010:7).

According to Elliott & Sumba (2010), by the end of 2009, AWF had enabled the investment of US$11 million throughout Africa from funding sources including grants, debt and private sector equity. The money was spent on supporting 31 enterprises: 12 large tourism enterprises, 15 small spin-off enterprises (honey, crafts, and resins), 2 agricultural and 2 livestock-based enterprises. These generate a net community income of about US$1.9 million annually; employ about 255 community members full time and benefit approximately 76,000 local people through associated capacity building, revenue sharing and community-designed social development projects.


3.5 **Local context**

3.5.1 **The Laikipia ecosystem**

The partnership enterprises in this thesis are located in the Laikipia ecosystem (see figure 3.1), which is part of the African Wildlife Foundation's Samburu Heartland. The ecosystem is home to a large diversity of large mammals, only comparable to Serengeti and Kruger National Parks (Sundaresan & Riginos 2010). It is also home to the second highest abundance of wildlife in East Africa after Maasai Mara (LWF 2012; Sumba et al. 2007; Sundaresan & Riginos 2010). According to Laikipia Wildlife Forum (2012) the ecosystem is an important biodiversity area with over 98 mammal species, over 540 bird species, over 700 plant species and over 1000 invertebrates.

The ecosystem is home to a half of Kenya’s black rhinos, the second largest elephant population, lions, wild dogs, Grevy’s zebra and reticulated giraffes all which are threatened species. The ecosystem exhibits a diversity of land use and land ownership; 37% large scale ranching, 32% pastoralism, and 29% small-holder farming (LWF 2013). Only 2% of the ecosystem is protected and the large wildlife population occupies land owned by private land owners, either as individuals or in groups.

The main economic activities of the ecosystem are farming, livestock and increasingly tourism (LWF 2013). On aggregate levels, less than 20% of Laikipia residents have attended secondary school and fewer than 4% have tertiary education (GoK unpublished data 2009). Additionally, there is a high population increase in the area from 30,000 in 1960’s to 399,227 in 2009 census (Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, unpublished data 2009). This translates to a 92.4% population increase in 40 years which has led to an increase in human-wildlife conflicts as well as pressure on natural resources.
Laikipia as an ecosystem also faces the challenge of high poverty levels, and limited livelihood options in Laikipia present the greatest threats to conservation (LWF 2012). A study conducted by the government indicated that 35-40% of Laikipia’s inhabitants lived below the poverty line, with the majority of the population depending on food assistance (GoK 2005). In addition, 90% of Laikipia is dry, experiencing rainfall of between 400-1200 mm per annum (LWF 2013) hence limited livelihood options.

Figure 3.1: Location and land use of the Laikipia ecosystem. Source: Sundaresan & Riginos (2010)
3.5.2 The community-level context

Both enterprise partnerships are located in the Mukogodo division of the Laikipia North district, Laikipia County, which is the drier part of the area and land ownership is in form of a group ranch. The Sanctuary at Ol Lentille is located at the Kijabe group ranch, and is referred to as Kijabe lodge. On the other hand, the Koija Starbeds is located at the Koija group ranch (see their location in Figure 3.2). The private investor at the Sanctuary has leased a house to live within the Kijabe group ranch while the private investor at Koija Starbeds has leased the neighbouring Loisaba Wilderness ranch.

Culture and traditions

The people in the two group ranches comprise of Laikipiak Maasai (Sumba et al. 2007). This Maa speaking community is believed to have a long history dating back many years and are believed to be descendants of the Ndorobo who were hunter-gatherers. The communities have a rich culture, which also serves as a tourist attraction in terms of their dressing, housing, and food among others (Tarayia 2004). The communities still retain their traditional leadership system of the council of elders and have a strong patrimonial culture (Galaty 1982; Tarayia 2004) in which women are not allowed to be involved in decision-making.

The community also has strong kinship, family and clanship ties and therefore it is common to invite relatives to come and live with them and enjoy all the benefits of a member. The community deals with crime and punishment for wrong doers in society through the council of elders who usually impose among others, fines in form of goats or cattle. The communities also experience high school dropout rates as a result of cultural practices such as children being involved in the grazing of livestock, early marriages and joining Moran (young warriors) group.
The communities’ socio-economic status

The communities in the study area have high poverty levels coupled with low education levels, with government statistics showing that 46% of the population has never been to school (Kenya National Census 2009). Other statistics indicate that less than half of the school-going children attend school (Flintan & Puyo 2012). The community also borders Isiolo and Samburu districts in northern Kenya where there is a lot of cattle theft and intercommunity fighting. All these have led to community members having limited livelihood options, which also reduce their ability to take advantage of available opportunities.

The area is situated in the arid and semi-arid lands of Kenya (LWF 2013). In these areas there are limited government interventions, As a consequence basic social amenities such as roads, schools, water, and hospitals are lacking (LWF 2013; Policy
Brief 2009). According to Hughes (2005), the forced moving of the Maasai by the colonial government had repercussions on their socio-economic status, as they have resulted in distrust and alienation and made the communities fall behind in education and development.

A report by the GoK (1983) indicates that the post-independence government was unable to develop the area due to the nomadic lifestyle of the people whereby majority of the community members engage in pastoralism as the main economic activity (Tarayia 2004). This economic activity can be compatible with wildlife conservation. It however, leads to frequent movement of people in search for pasture, water and salt licks, which has implications for governance; especially participation which is influenced by the non-sedentary nature of their lifestyle. For example, in some instances group ranch elections do not take place annually according to stipulations due to lack of quorum. For pastoralists, livestock ownership has a high economic and social values and is considered an indicator of wealth and prestige (GoK 1983)

Traditionally, the work of herding animals is left almost entirely to young boys aged 6-14 years, which is the school going age (GoK 1983), hence limiting the number of children attending school. The communities also have strong family, clans and age-set tie which call for reciprocity, leading to the use and access to group ranch resources by non-members.
**The areas’ ecological status**

The group ranches are located at the drier section of the Laikipia ecosystem, within the rain shadow of Mt. Kenya. The climate of the area is arid and semi-arid with low average rainfall usually between 450-750mm which occurs in a bi-modal pattern (Gichuki et al. 1998). This climatic type and rainfall are not fit for other land uses apart from pastoralism. The area is also prone to drought, which is rated among the highest causes of poverty in the region (LWF 2012). The drought also causes limited pastures for their livestock.

### 3.6 Conclusion

This chapter has described the international, national and local context in which the partnerships and AWF’s conservation enterprise strategy operate. International discourses on sustainable development, governance, partnerships and emerging neo-liberal discourses have clearly influenced the development of tourism conservation enterprises, which were also partly an answer to shortcomings in wildlife conservation in Kenya and related policies, legislations and institutional frameworks.

AWF’s tourism conservation enterprises operate in a dynamic context involving changes which have implications for the governance of the partnerships. They are also embedded in a local context, in which local institutions, culture and traditions, and socio-economic and ecological status of the area, all influence the nature of governance of the partnership. The next three empirical chapters will illustrate how this works out in practice.
Chapter 4: The Sanctuary at Ol Lentille

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I examine governance of the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership making use of the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, and equity. The chapter begins with a description of the partnership in terms of history, actors, activities and decision-making platforms. This is followed by an analysis of the nature of governance in the partnership, and the chapter ends with a conclusion.

4.2 The partnership

4.2.1 History of the partnership

The Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership was initiated by the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) as part of the Samburu heartland’s Natural Resource Management (NRM) programme in the late 1990s and early 2000s. The region was an important habitat for elephants, wild dogs and Grevy’s zebra in the vast Laikipia ecosystem. AWF had identified critical wildlife threats in the area, including habitat destruction and fragmentation, competition from livestock, and water abstraction (Sumba et al. 2007). In the year 2000, AWF started working with three group ranches in the area (Koija, Tiamamut and Kijabe), and the first activity was to help the communities zone their land for conservation, settlement, and grazing areas (A-10).

AWF’s engagement in conservation on community land was in line with the Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) conservation approach in

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Africa (A-1; 4). As argued in chapter 1, CBNRM recognized communities to be critical for conservation success and therefore sought ways of encouraging them to participate in conservation. The involvement of AWF was also a response to the policy deficit in Kenya (see chapter 3) as wildlife laws and policies only covered conservation within state managed protected areas. Wildlife statistics also indicated that most of Kenya’s wildlife was not living in state protected areas, but on communal and private land (Western et al. 2009; Zeppel 2006). As a consequence, conservation organizations began implementing programs that could provide incentives to land owners to secure land for conservation (O-7).

AWF therefore sought to contribute to conservation in areas where the state could not reach: “government legislation for the management of wildlife was at the time limited to National Parks and Reserves and there was nobody for the wildlife on community and private land” (A-1). As a consequence “there are no frameworks in place to guide and regulate activities” (O-1).

The existing wildlife legislation and policy further restricted consumptive use of wildlife since the total ban on hunting in 1977 and wildlife had thus became “a cost with limited uses” (A-1) for communities living in areas with abundant wildlife. For example, the communities had to bear the costs of predation of livestock by wildlife, death and injuries due to attacks, and habitat destruction caused by wildlife without compensation.

In the land zonation programme, the Kijabe group ranch set aside a third of its land, 2,000 hectares, as conservation area in which a tourist lodge was to be constructed (A-10; C-SOL-1; 6). Initially, the community was apprehensive and thought that land was being taken from them (C-SOL-1). However, after several community meetings, workshops and familiarization tours to other regions, that had similar
experiences with conservation and tourism, the community was convinced and agreed to engage in conservation and tourism due to the anticipated benefits (C-SOL-2).

The initial lodge construction was started in 2003 by AWF through funding from the United States and Dutch governments’ development agencies (USAID and DGIS through the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Nairobi) amounting to US$ 100,000 (P-SOL-1;2). The funding by the two development agencies was motivated by the need to contribute to conservation of biodiversity and development, through enhancing livelihoods (A-1; 4; O-8). The challenges of biodiversity loss and poverty had become critical world concerns and therefore initiatives were being implemented to address the challenges. The two organizations thus funded the project since it proposed to fulfill their poverty reduction and biodiversity conservation agendas simultaneously (A-1) which were part of their development cooperation efforts (O-8).

The lodge construction was contracted to Anjuan Limited, which owns and manages the Ol Malo private ranch in Laikipia, in the hope that after the completion of the lodge, they would enter into a partnership with the community (A-10; C-SOL-1; 2; 6; 10). The construction continued for one year but stalled for some time due to disagreement between AWF and the community on the one side and the contractor on the other side, who had not used the funds as agreed and had a poor relationship with the community (A-10; C-SOL-1; 2).

The current private investors, Regenesis Limited (RL) became involved in 2005. RL is owned by a couple of British origin who had moved to Kenya and was searching for a community-based tourism project to invest in (P-SOL-2). RL was informed by the then director of Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF) of an enterprise they could invest in and upon visiting the area they liked it (P-SOL-2). RL held subsequent meetings with AWF officials, especially the then director of conservation enterprises, to discuss the lodge
concept. To differentiate from and appeal for a higher market than the other facilities in Laikipia, it was decided to build individual houses. RL thus settled for a ‘high end’ tourism facility, which was lacking in Kenya (P-SOL-2). The high-end concept is however now facing competition from other private ranches in Laikipia who have opened private houses to cater for exclusive high-end clients (P-SOL-4).

Together with AWF and the community, RL applied for a grant from the European Union and Government of Kenya’s Tourism Trust Fund (TTF) and they were given US$ 400,000 to construct the lodge buildings as a donation to the community (A-10; P-SOL-1; 2). RL spent a further US$ 1.5 million on furnishings, interior design and other movable assets which they thus own (P-SOL-1; 2), while the group ranch members contributed the value of US$14,000 in raw materials and labour towards the project (C-SOL-1; 6; 10).

In 2005, the Kijabe group ranch signed a 25-year management agreement with RL to manage the business and conservation area at a fixed fee of US$ 20,000 per year as well as a bed night and conservation fee of US$ 80 for every guest at the lodge. The fixed fee paid is referred to as ‘rights fee’ and rent is paid by the private investor to the Kijabe group ranch to conduct business in their lodge (C-SOL-1; P-SOL-2).

The year 2006 was spent on building, and preparations and the eco-lodge opened for business in January 2007 (P-SOL-2). After RL had signed the contract with the Kijabe group ranch, the neighbouring Nkiloriti group ranch claimed that part of the conservation area belonged to them. This led to a lengthy mediation by AWF, the private investor, and the government which included the verification of the actual boundary. As the actual boundary could not be verified, an internal, basic and local
Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the two group ranches (A-10; P-SOL-1; 5).

### 4.2.2 Actors in the partnership

The main actors in the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership are the Kijabe group ranch, the Nkiloriti group ranch, Regenesis Limited (RL) and the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) (see figure 4.1) and are described in detail below.

![Figure 4.1: Actors at the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership](image)

**The Kijabe group ranch**

The Kijabe group ranch has a total area of approximately 6,070 hectares and was established and registered with the Ministry of Lands in the 1970s (C-SOL-1). The group ranch currently has 250 registered members, with an estimated population of around 3,000 individuals of whom two-thirds do not reside on the group ranch land, but on other group ranches and in urban areas (C-SOL-1; 2). The majority of the inhabitants are Laikipiak Maasai (C-SOL-1).

Membership to the group ranch (listing in the group ranch register) is a continuous process and is open to all males above eighteen years of age (Kijabe
Group Ranch Constitution 2006). Registration takes place by forwarding one’s name to the group ranch secretary (C-SOL-1; 2). Women are not allowed to be listed in the group ranch register except for widows (C-SOL-4; 5; Kijabe Group Ranch Constitution 2006). The listing to the group ranch register does not give any voting rights, since all males above 18 years are eligible to voting.

However, the list has not been updated since the early 2000s and the leaders have had challenges in identifying bonafide members (C-SOL-9). For administrative purposes, the group ranch is divided into villages. Currently there are five villages: Lotetoi, Kijabe, Tura, Nabolo and Makandura (the latter is composed of those members who live elsewhere outside the group ranch). For representation to the group ranch committee, each village elects 2 members. Elections of group ranch officials’ takes place annually at a date set by the chairman in consultation with the Ministry of Lands officials [Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287].

During the Election Day, which in most cases is combined with the group ranch Annual General Meeting (AGM), members from each village (only males) assemble at a corner of the group ranch office compound and agree on two representatives per village which together create the group ranch committee, who then elect from among themselves the chairman, secretary and treasurer (C-SOL-5).

Prior to the 2012 elections, elections have taken place in the above described process. However, the members living outside the group ranch-the Makandura unit (two thirds of the registered members) - felt under-represented and opted for the queuing system of elections for the positions of chairman, secretary and treasurer and won since they were the majority.

During the elections however, only the males who attended queued behind their preferred candidate and the person with most followers declared the winner. This mode
of election is in accordance with the third schedule of the Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287 which states that ‘all members of the committee shall be elected by open ballot at the group’s annual general meeting, or at any subsequent annual general meeting convened for that matter and shall hold office until the next annual general meeting’. The challenge is that it created political differences between those living outside and those living within the group ranch.

The 10-member group ranch committee is required to oversee all the activities of the group ranch and make decisions on behalf of the group ranch members (Kijabe Group Ranch Constitution 2006; Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287 Laws of Kenya). In addition to the group ranch committee, each village has an elder who represents them to the community council of elders. The elders assist the group ranch committee in conflict resolution at both the group ranch and family levels in addition to ensuring that the community code of ethics and traditions are maintained (C-SOL-3).

The group ranch also forms one location, Kimanjo, as a unit of administration for the national government and therefore has a chief and assistant chief who undertake government-related administrative duties for the group ranch members. At the local government or county government level (The Constitution of Kenya 2010), the group ranch forms a geographical representation unit referred to as a ward, which is represented by a Member of the County Assembly (MCA) known as a councilor in the old constitution. The chief and the MCA as leaders are often chosen to represent the community in the partnership.

The Nkiloriti group ranch

The Nkiloriti group ranch has a total land of approximately 2,800 hectares (SOL-FGD-3) with the majority of the inhabitants being from the Samburu community (SOL-
The group ranch was established and registered with the Ministry of Lands in the 1970s and currently has around 185 registered members (SOL-FGD-3). After the construction of the Sanctuary, a boundary dispute arose, with the Nkiloriti group ranch claiming that part of the land the Kijabe group ranch had set aside for conservation and lodge construction belonged to them (C-SOL-1).

As a result, dispute resolution meetings and verifications took place. The outcome was that there was no conclusive evidence of where the boundary between Kijabe group ranch and Nkiloriti group ranch was, since there were two conflicting maps (C-SOL-1). As a result of the negotiation, the group ranch in 2006 entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) and added around 600 hectares of its land to the conservation area (SOL-FGD-3) in order to get 20% of the bed night and conservation fee. Administratively, the Nkiloriti group ranch falls under the same unit as the Kijabe group ranch.
Regenesis Limited (RL)

Regenesis Limited (RL) is a Kenyan registered private limited company owned by a British couple and was registered in 2004 to invest in community-based conservation and tourism (P-SOL-2). The company has invested in and manages the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille lodge and conservation area under the 25-year management agreement signed in 2005 with the Kijabe group ranch. Other stipulations in the management agreement are that RL has the right to be given the first chance to renew the agreement before the community can call upon other investors to partner with. RL is also allowed to sell the agreement to another investor (Sanctuary at Ol Lentille Management Agreement 2005; P-SOL-1). RL also owns all the movable assets of the business (P-SOL-1).

The two directors of RL, together with a Kenyan who works as the operations manager of the lodge, formed the Ol Lentille Trust, Kenya; a Kenyan registered charitable Non-Governmental Organization (NGO), which is formally not part of the partnership. The NGO funds the majority of the projects in the area and is the principle beneficiary of the Ol Lentille Foundation (USA) and a British registered Ol-Lentille Trust (http://www.ol-lentilletrust.org). The trust manages the Ol Lentille conservancy, attracts donor, and social and conservation funds for community and conservation benefits.

The African Wildlife Foundation (AWF)

The AWF is a conservation NGO (see more details of its history and work in section 3.4). With funding from donors, AWF initiated the partnership and is engaged in the partnership as a partner as well as undertaking conservation-related activities in the region.
4.2.3 The partnership initiatives and activities

The main objective of the partnership is to link conservation and development through livelihoods improvement. This objective is achieved through the initiatives and activities presented below:

a) Livelihoods initiatives and activities

The initiatives aimed at the improvement of livelihoods include the eco-lodge, the cultural manyatta\(^3\), and the Financial Service Organization (FSO) among others.

(i) Sanctuary at Ol Lentille eco-lodge

The lodge was the initial and major livelihood improvement initiative of the partnership. It is a 16-bed eco-lodge with four private, full-service houses situated in the Kijabe group ranch. The lodge’s four private houses (Sultan’s House, Chief’s House, Colonel’s House and the Eyrie) are architecturally designed to exhibit different themes with each having a private butler, valet, guide and chef. Other lodge facilities and activities include: a swimming pool, spa, library, wildlife viewing deck (see figure 4.2), game drives, horse riding, mountain biking, quad-bikes and community visits among others.

\(^3\)A manyatta is a Maasai settlement (kraal); a cultural manyatta is a purposely built Maasai-style visitor centre located near tourist resorts or attractions.
The lodge is operated and managed by the private investor, Regenesis Limited. RL pays annual lease fee to Kijabe group ranch for using their lodge facility. This money is given to the group ranch management to spend on school bursaries and healthcare, among other livelihood improvement initiatives as discussed in chapter 6. In addition, each lodge guest pays a daily conservation and bed-night fee. A portion of the amount is shared among the group ranches for livelihood improvement, while the rest is used to fund conservation initiatives.

(ii) **Cultural Manyatta**

The cultural manyatta was constructed in 2004 by 4 women groups with the assistance of RL and AWF (C-SOL-4). The activities at the ‘manyatta’ include showcasing the Maasai housing and way of life, sale of beads and other artifacts, as well as cultural dances by women and the Morans\(^4\) or warrior dancers (C-SOL-4). New members pay a registration fee of US$ 70; members also pay US$ 1.2 monthly for the group account. This money is used as savings and for the purchase of group beads and other group activities. Together with the money paid as guest entry fees to the manyatta, the members either share the income at the end of each year, buy cows, goats, beehives or iron sheets for house construction (C-SOL-4).

(iii) **Financial Services Organization (FSO)**

The FSO, a micro-credit and savings organization, was established in 2008 as a women’s group project for the Kijabe and Nkiloriti group ranches (C-SOL-5). The initial idea was introduced through training by consultants hired by AWF as well as familiarization tours to areas with micro-finance organizations in Kenya such as Kitui (C-

\(^4\)Morans are groups of young male Maasai warriors.
SOL-5). The project began as the Kijabe and Nkiloriti Women Financial Service Organization (KNFSO) but was renamed the Nasaruni Financial Services Organization (FSO) in 2009.

The project was initially intended to instill money management skills and a savings culture amongst the women and Morans in Kijabe and Nkiloriti, but currently serves even men as well as people from other group ranches. There are over a thousand members who are able to get saving services, annual dividends and loans (C-SOL-5). Although there is a board that makes decisions for the FSO, RL and AWF offer guidance and are consulted often and sometimes offer financial and capacity building assistance.

(iv) **Other projects**

RL directors also engage in various livelihood improvement projects catering for education, health and water through their registered NGO, the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya. The work of the trust is described at length in section 4.2.4.

b) **Conservation initiatives and activities**

The partnership engages in conservation both at the group ranch and the conservation area through conservation scouts. These are para-military, security employees whose main function is to ensure wildlife safety and adherence of conservation area rules by the community. The conservation scouts work in collaboration with government security agents as well as with the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), a state agency charged with the responsibility of wildlife conservation, to ensure both livestock and wildlife security. This is because the region is prone to poaching and bandit attacks from communities from Northern Kenya.
4.2.4 Decision-making platforms

Decision-making on issues related to and those impacting the partnership occurs mainly in three main places for decision-making or ‘governing platforms’, namely; the Kijabe Conservation Trust (KCT-SOL) or the ‘trust’, the group ranch, and the Ol Lentille Trust, Kenya or the ‘projects’ (see figure 4.3). A discussion of the ‘governing platforms’ is presented below.

**The Kijabe group ranch**

The Kijabe group ranch is the main beneficiary of the partnership as well as the owner of the land where the lodge is located. Decisions regarding all the activities of the group ranch are made by the 10-member elected committee on behalf of the group ranch members. The elected committee members are assisted by village elders in dispute resolutions and disciplining of ‘wrong-doers’ in the community.
The Nkiloriti group ranch

Similar to the Kijabe group ranch, the Nkiloriti group ranch has a group ranch committee that oversees the management of the group ranch and the sharing of the 20% bed-night and conservation fee from the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille guests. The group ranch also has village elders who assist the group ranch committee in decision-making and dispute resolution in the community.

The Kijabe Conservation Trust or the ‘trust’

At the core of the partnership is the Kijabe Conservation Trust or the trust, abbreviated as KCT-SOL, a charitable entity designed as a decision-making body for the operations of the conservation area, the lodge and the benefit sharing. The trust is also mandated with the role of attracting donor and investment funding for the Kijabe community, a role it has not managed to execute due to lack of trust staff and logistical support for fundraising and management of the funds (P-SOL-2; C-SOL-1; 2). The trust has however not held meetings since May 2010 as a result of disagreements among some trustees, mainly the chairman and the private investor (P-SOL-2; C-SOL-1; 2).

In essence, the trust was formed as a corporate institutional structure which could enable the incorporation and legal participation of AWF as a NGO in profitable business and philanthropic activities (A-10). The trust is governed by an 8-member board of trustees: 3 from the Kijabe group ranch, 3 from the private investor, 1 from AWF and a chairman who comes from the community (P-SOL-1; The Kijabe Conservation Trust Deed 2005).

Initial community representation to the trust included a prominent government official and politician as the chairman (former Speaker of the National Assembly), the area chief, area councilor and the group ranch chairman (C-SOL-2). This community
representation arose because the community was “given a chance to select three prominent people or leaders to represent them” (C-SOL-2). In the 8-member board of trustees, the community holds the position of the chairperson; the private partner holds the position of the executive or management trustee (C-SOL-2; P-SOL-2). There were claims that the chairman, had begun to use the eco-lodge and related activities for political gains (P-SOL-2). This did not go well with the private investors who wanted to keep their work ‘off’ politics resulting to disagreements (P-SOL-2).

The trust deed governs decisions and stipulates the responsibilities of the actors as well as the benefits the community is entitled to (Kijabe Conservation Trust Deed 2005). The trust’s functions, mainly salary payments for conservation scouts and management of the conservation area, have thus been executed by the private investor, who is also the executive trustee, or management trustee as stipulated in the trust deed (P-SOL-2). The trust deed stipulations therefore make it possible for the functions to be executed without the participation of other actors.

The Nkiloriti group ranch is not represented in the trust. AWF is represented by a high level official, who was decided upon when it became clear that the community had selected a powerful politician to represent them as the chairman of the trust (A-10; A-FGD-1). The other community representatives to the trust were selected based on their leadership positions in the community (one is a chief, the other one a former group ranch chairman).

This community representation to the trust, especially the chairman, has not been appreciated by some community respondents. One respondent argued that “the community felt that if they choose a prominent person from among them, their needs and aspirations will be better articulated and therefore more benefits from the venture…this however has not been the case and the community sees him on television like other
Kenyans….we are not free to tell him what we want…he is very far above the normal group ranch member” (C-SOL-10).

The Ol Lentille Trust Kenya

The Ol Lentille Trust Kenya (OLTK) is a Kenyan registered charity of the private investor, which manages the Ol Lentille Conservancy and attracts donor funds and philanthropy for projects providing community livelihoods and conservation benefits.

4.3 Governance of the partnership

In the next section, I analyze governance in the identified three platforms of decision making in terms of participation, transparency, accountability and equity.

4.3.1 Participation

In terms of participation, at the trust, decisions include, but are not limited to, distribution of conservation and bed-night fee, the management of the conservation area and the scouts. The trust board should meet quarterly, but at the time of the field visits (last one in March 2013) had not met since May 2010 (C-SOL-2).

In the absence of a functioning board, participation was mainly consultative since the private investor partner was the main actor in making, implementing, and enforcing decisions. This was made possible by the stipulations of the trust deed that gave the executive trustee power to implement it. The representation of ‘high’ level trust board members resulted in politicization of the trust and subsequent disagreements between the community and private investor trustees which led to the community demands for a review of the agreements. The busy schedules of the trustees also made it difficult for meetings to take place. Consequently, the trustees have not been able to represent the
interests of the community well (A-FGD-2): ‘we would like a body that will give the community bargaining power in decision-making’ (SOL-FGD-1).

AWF has been involved as a mediator in order to reconcile the differences. AWF was able to engage in the reconciliation due to its role at a ‘neutral broker’ and having particular resources. The position of AWF as a NGO enables them to have resources at their disposal to engage in activities that a profit-oriented company may not engage in; such as community mobilization and capacity building.

At the group ranch, mainly the chairman, secretary and treasurer take decisions on benefit-sharing on behalf of the community (C-SOL-1). Women are not represented as registered members or in decision-making. The paternalistic nature of the community subjects women to a different identity from men. The women’s education levels (P-SOL-2) were also low thus putting them in a disadvantaged position to negotiate inclusion: ‘women just attend meetings and sit at a corner and are never involved, they just attend to listen’ (C-SOL-5); “women do not speak...their education is low” (P-SOL-5). There was also limited involvement of the community in annual general meetings and elections of new officials (C-SOL-3), which are stipulated in the Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287 Laws of Kenya. Participation at the group ranch was therefore consultative.

The main actors involved in decision-making on fundraising for, and implementation of, various projects were the private investors, who are the trustees of the Ol Lentille Trust. The majority of the community leaders interviewed are however not aware of the trust’s existence and have all along thought it was the lodge guests together with RL funding development projects. Community involvement in project planning occurs through meetings and consultations of the trustees with leaders, teachers and health workers.
One respondent noted that money from the charity is “…spent as discussed with the community, the relevant people in the community. So if you are doing something on education you talk to the head teachers…that is how the secondary school came into existence” (P-SOL-2). There is however dissatisfaction amongst some community respondents with the limited community involvement and consultation in these projects. The main areas of dissatisfaction are the exclusion of community leaders in fundraising activities and minimal consultation in aspects such as the choice of food items of the school feeding programme (C-SOL-6; 8; 10).

4.3.2 Transparency

The private investor (as executive trustee) provided quarterly reports to the group ranch on behalf of KCT-SOL regarding the number of guests and the use of funds (P-SOL-2). This is in accordance with the stipulations of the both the trust deed and 25-year management agreement signed at the initial stages of the partnership. This aspect is confirmed by RL, “we produce accounts for the Kijabe Trust…every time we pay the fees; there is a statement with the names of the guests, agent name and number of bed nights which is absolutely transparent” (P-SOL-3). The majority of the community leaders however do not differentiate between the two agreements which has contributed to their sentiments regarding transparency (C-SOL-1; 2; 3; 8; 10). The trust deed is an agreement of three parties; the Kijabe group ranch, RL and AWF for the management of the trust and the conservation area. On the other hand, there is the management agreement between RL and the Kijabe group ranch for management of the lodge.

Similar sentiments emerged from the focus group discussions:- “we do not know the costs… we have been complaining about the benefits we get…we have been
fighting for the investor to increase our share….if we have information about the operations of the lodge and the costs…perhaps we would not have pushed so hard…he leaves us to speculation…we also have no information about how many visitors come to the lodge and how many beds were used…little information is brought to our light” (SOL-FGD-2).

The community leaders also have diverse interpretations and understanding of the contents and implications of the 25-year management agreement between the Kijabe group ranch and RL (C-SOL-1; 2; 6). Under this agreement, the investor pays rights fee to Kijabe group ranch to operate the lodge as a private business and is not obliged to communicate to the community the operations of the lodge. This perceived lack of information has made the community to have an opinion that there is absence of transparency at the trust. The community thus feels it has the right to know as partner and owner of the lodge and conservation area what goes on in the lodge: “the committee is just given money by the investor, who knows the number of guests who stay in the lodge...we do not know whether he reports the actual number of guests…The community also does not know how much the guests are charged…the agreement created a loophole such that the community does not know what goes on in the lodge” (C-SOL-2).

There have also been diverse interpretations of the content of the management agreement among the community. One leader for example argued: “we understand that the agreement says that the investor was to be here for 15 years…the other day we were told that the investor will decide whether to stay or not after 25 years….we are confused...we did not know this....The agreement also says that all the immovable assets belong to the investor....why and they were all bought with donor money....the loan is being paid with our money....why this unfairness?...the agreement also says
what will happen when the community breaks the agreement but doesn’t say what the investor will be done when he breaks the agreement” (C-SOL-6).

The many positions occupied and roles played by the private investor in the partnership (e.g. as a director of RL; as the executive trustee of the Kijabe Conservation Trust and as a trustee of the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya) with differentiated rules of engagement also influence the views of different actors on the nature of transparency. At the trust, as the executive trustee; the rules are that the private investor communicates every three months the occupancy of the lodge and the money received from bed-night and conservation fee. However, despite the private investor following the rule, the community still mistrusts the information given.

As a director of RL, the investor is not required to make public the lodge performance since there is a management agreement and payment of rights fees to the group ranch, a fact that is not clear to the community. Questions also arise as to the significance of information disclosure on the lodge performance as argued by one respondent: “would the business perform better if we gave a copy either verbally or in writing of the company accounts to the community? The answer is no. What would they do with that information? It would just create curiosity…some people will get hold of information they do not understand and then make up stories” (P-SOL-3).

At the group ranch, communication and information exchange between group ranch leaders and the community mainly occurs once a year (C-SOL-2). This is as stipulated in the Land (Group Representatives) Act cap 287 Third Schedule: p.19 ‘the group shall each year hold a general meeting as its annual general meeting in addition to any other meetings in that year’. These annual general meetings double as the avenue where information on finances and operations are availed to the community.
During the occasion, new officials are also elected and politics take centre stage at the expense of information transfer thus influencing transparency at the group ranch.

The Group Ranch Constitution (2006) also provides inadequate rules regarding communication and feedback mechanisms between the group ranch leaders and the community (contents provided for in the first schedule of the Act). In addition, due to low literacy levels the majority of the group ranch members are also not in a position to understand and interpret the figures and information usually posted on the office notice board (P-SOL-2; A-10).

At the projects platform, consultation occurs between the representatives of the OLTK, community leaders and project staff (P-SOL-3; C-SOL-1; 2; 8; 10). Some community respondents however felt that they have limited information regarding projects, especially at the fundraising and budgeting stages and argue that: “There is a lot of secrecy when it comes to donations and fundraising matters…the community is considered by the investor to lack knowledge and don’t have to be informed of the amounts which goes to these projects and this doesn’t go well with us…however whoever pays the piper chooses the tune” (C-SOL-8).

The community views regarding unavailability of information are disputable, since for example the Ol Lentille Trust posts their annual reports on the internet, making the results of their operations public (for example OLTK Report 2011). The views of the community regarding transparency can be attributed to the nature and media used to avail information to the community and the general public during fundraising, initiation, implementation and review stages of the projects. The community thus lacks power of knowledge and resources to access the information.
4.3.3 Accountability

At the trust, the trust deed provides guidelines for responsibilities of the actors and authority to act (P-SOL-2; Kijabe Conservation Trust Deed 2006). Thus, it gives the executive trustee, who is the private investor, authority to execute the stipulations of the trust deed, and further allows him to make executive decisions. The functions of KCT-SOL have therefore been executed even if no board of trustees meeting has taken place since May 2010 (C-SOL-2; P-SOL-2).

The trust deed further dictates that the private investor should avail quarterly reports to the group ranch, as well as the bed-night and rights fee for that period. This ensures accountability of the investor to the other partners (Kijabe Conservation Trust Deed 2006). The different community interpretations and understandings of the partnership arrangement have however resulted in the community leaders’ opinions that the private investor has not been accountable to the community, especially by not availing records on the lodge operations and performance (C-SOL-1; 2; 6).

The opinions by the community of limited accountability by the private investor at the trust can be attributed to several aspects. First, the responsibility of the community is limited. The community’s main role at the trust is to ensure that no livestock grazes in the conservation area, while AWF is charged with the tasks of oversight and moderation of the partnership (Kijabe Conservation Trust Deed 2006). In terms of power relations, this means that the community, with fewer responsibilities, also has less influence on decisions. Second, there is a lack of checks and balances and sanctions for the responsibilities of the executive trustee.

Though there are stipulations that the trust can withhold money from the group ranch if the community lets its livestock graze in the conservation area, there are unclear guidelines on avenues in place for the community and AWF in case of
dissatisfaction with the reports availed by the executive trustee, creating power imbalances. Third, there is misunderstanding about the management agreement, which has resulted in the community’s opinion of the unaccountability of the investor. The agreement gives the investor rights and authority to operate the lodge as a private business and pay annual rights fees to the community (Sanctuary at Ol Lentille Management Agreement 2005).

Thereby, the management agreement exempts the investor from being accountable to the community on lodge operations, a fact that is not clear to the community leaders. This aspect is clarified by the investor: “but this is a private business..., there should be a personal way of doing it...the business belongs to the investor not the community...the investor pays a rights fee to use the community land and lodge whether guests come or not” (P-SOL-3). “The rights fee is a commitment and part of the management agreement...it does give us freedom to act, which is very necessary for our product” (P-SOL-2).

At the group ranch platform, I identified several aspects related to accountability. The group ranch Community Investment Plan (CIP 2006) gives a general direction that 40% of the income should be used for bursaries and 60% for other group ranch activities (C-SOL-1; 2). In the CIP, the group ranch leaders have the responsibility to decide how to allocate the 60% for aspects such as payment of hospital bills for sick members, group ranch staff salaries and operational expenses for the group ranch office. In addition to the responsibilities given by the CIP, accountability mechanisms, such as the annual audits agreed upon during the initial stages of the partnership, have not been conducted consistently as argued by one respondent: “AWF paid for the last audit four years ago and it has not happened again” (P-SOL-4). The current community situation in terms of literacy further makes auditing as an accountability mechanism
prone to challenges as indicated by one cultural manyatta leader who argues: “we have not been able to carry out any auditing of accounts…even if we did…only two or three members are educated and can understand what is going on” (C-SOL-4).

The third schedule of the Land (Group Representatives) Act cap 287 stipulates that the committee is responsible for presenting within three months of the end of the financial year a full and accurate account of the income and expenditure of the group to the registrar for approval. However, the enforcement of the Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287 is wanting, making it an unrealistic option for accountability. Another challenge for accountability at the group ranch are the diminutive consequences for not complying with keeping of the books of account, as stipulated in section 18 ‘…each of the officers guilty of an offence and liable to a fine not exceeding one thousand shillings (US$ 12)’.

Another avenue for the leaders to be accountable to the members as stipulated in the Act is once a year during annual general meetings and elections which, as described earlier, are highly politicized with candidates’ campaigns for support taking centre stage and the accountability of the outgoing leaders taking a back stage. The limited accountability of group ranch leaders can also be attributed to societal set-up, culture and literacy levels. In terms of the societal set-up, one respondent argues that “there is too much respect…people won’t challenge those above them…this leads to accountability problems…people will not ask their leaders questions…there are no institutions in place in the structure of society” (P-SOL-4). Another respondent is of the opinion that “the group ranch leaders are thriving on the illiteracy of the community” (A-FGD-2).

The culture and way of life have also led to limited accountability at the group ranch platform: “when you want to take action against someone...the community will
say…he is ours…it’s the culture….you are supposed to be forgiving…one thing about
the Maasai and the pastoralists is that the fact that you have been brought to the open
that you have stolen is enough punishment…so if you go further and want to take them
to court, they will tell you no…The problem with us NGOs is that when we come with a
model from outside, we want to impose it on the community without understanding their
set-up” (A-FGD-2). Benefit-sharing issues at the initial stages of the partnership may
also have been overlooked as argued by some respondents: “it all boils to benefit
sharing…it’s a big headache in development circles…when benefits start coming,
problems begin” (A-FGD-2).

As indicated earlier, at the projects platform, the trustees of Ol Lentille Trust
Kenya consult the leaders and projects staff, such as school head teachers and the
person in charge of the health centre among others. Moreover, reports on the use of
funds and other trust activities are posted on their website as an avenue for
accountability. However, the majority of the community leaders do not differentiate the
position of the private investor as a trustee of the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya from the
investor as the director of RL (C-SOL-6; 8; 10).

This lack of differentiation of the different roles and positions of the investor
makes some community leaders, especially those in indirect contact with the investor
harbor mistrust with some arguing: “I think the investor is misusing the community by
acting as an intermediate between the community and the donors…..they are out to
make money from the community” (C-SOL-11) and “the community is not given a
chance to talk to the donors directly….we are not sure what information the donors are
given regarding the community” (C-SOL-8).

The private investor, as a trustee of Ol Lentille Trust Kenya, wields more
responsibilities, authority and access to information compared to the community. There
are also no documented agreement between the community and the NGO as well as checks and balances for the operations of the projects. As an NGO, their means of reporting their operations is also not accessible to the community. This raises the question to whether donors and philanthropists should be accountable to those they help, using the media they can understand.

4.3.4 Equity

The money shared at the trust platform is the conservation and bed-night fee. However, it is not clear to all actors how the amount is computed. The bed night and conservation fee paid by the guests amount to US$ 80, of which US$ 20 remain with Regenesis Ltd, US$ 30 go to the trust, US$ 24 to Kijabe group ranch and US$ 6 to Nkiloriti group ranch (P-SOL-1). There are also community leaders with no idea of how much goes to whom, which influences their opinion on economic equity: “I do not know how much each gets, but I know there was an agreement between the investor and the group ranch committee which am not sure of the amount…I also do not know how much the investor gets, so I cannot say if it is fair or not” (C-SOL-4).

However, the Nkiloriti group ranch does not share the rights fees paid by RL to the Kijabe group ranch, which has become a major source of contention and disagreement among the two group ranches: “the amount we get is unfair, we don’t see equity…Kijabe started the conservation area through grabbing our land …we brought a map and everyone saw that they had conserved Nkiroriti land…they only agreed to give us a portion of bed night money…we want to share the benefits equally or we sign our deal with the investor” (SOL-FGD-2; 3).

At the group ranch platform, the CIP stipulates that 40% of the group ranch income should be spent on education as fees bursaries. It however does not provide
specific criteria for the utilization of 60% of the income, which some respondents view as a recipe for misappropriation and corruption by the leaders raising concerns for equity: “the biggest challenge is how the money is given to needy people and for office operations out of the 60% is used” (C-SOL-1).

Regarding the 40% for bursaries, there is also no clear criterion on who should get bursaries and therefore everyone with a child in secondary school, college or university gets some money (C-SOL-1; 2; 6). However, those without school going children view it as unfair, since they do not get anything from the partnership (C-SOL-5). The complexity in determining the beneficiaries further arises as a result of lack of an updated list of registered members in addition to some members claiming to have adopted children (C-SOL-6).

Two thirds of the members have bought land or live elsewhere (in the Makandura unit). There are mixed feelings regarding the benefit distribution between those living in the group ranch and those living outside the group ranch. Some members are of the opinion that those living in the group ranch should benefit more since they experience human wildlife-conflicts and thus bear more costs. For others, all the members should benefit equally since those living outside have reduced the pressure on land by reduction of population pressure, which is also a contribution to conservation and thus the success of the partnership (C-SOL-1).

At the projects, the majority of the projects initiated are public projects intended for general community benefits such as those focusing on health, education, water and conservation. Every member of the community has equal access to these benefits. There is however a feeling among the community that the investor benefits more from the projects since to their opinion, the investor does not share the details of funds and expenditure.
4.4 Conclusion

This chapter analyzed governance of the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership based on the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability and equity. The analysis highlighted the very different views among the partners on the nature of governance in terms of participation, transparency, accountability, and equity of the partnership. The research revealed several challenges in this relatively young partnership, which include several fundamental concerns for governance. Identified issues include: the non-functioning Kijabe Conservation Trust and the perceived lack of transparency in the arrangement, due to the different roles of the private investor in the various decision-making platforms of the partnership, and the misinterpretation of the management agreement and trust deed by the community. The dominant responsibilities of the private investor trustee present a source of power to the private investor trustee over the other actors with implications for governance. In terms of transparency at the trust, there is adherence to the set rules by the private investor trustee but the community mistrusts the information provided.

Moreover, clear guidelines for the distribution of benefits, especially the group ranch benefits, are lacking. The Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287 and the Community Investment Plan (CIP 2006) also give more responsibilities to the leaders compared to the members, thus putting the leaders in a position of power. The women’s subject identity created by the Maasai culture also has implications on their participation in decision-making and other aspects of governance. Others aspects that have influenced the nature of governance at the group ranch include low literacy levels and the lenient sanctions in case of non-conformance. Internal and external political struggles have also influenced the nature of governance at the group ranch.
At the projects platform, the position of the community as ‘recipients’ of aid from the OLTK subjects them to a position which has implications on their views on participation, transparency, accountability and equity. The communication mechanism of the trust, which is incompatible with the community knowledge and resources also, had implications for the nature of governance.
Chapter 5: The Koija Starbeds

5.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the nature of governance at the Koija Starbeds partnership. Similar to the previous chapter, this chapter begins with a description of the partnership in terms of history, actors, activities and decision-making platforms. This is followed by an analysis of the nature of governance in the partnership and ends with a conclusion.

5.2 The partnership

5.2.1 History

The idea of the partnership and of constructing the lodge was conceived in the late 1990s by the directors of a private investor company, the Wilderness Guardian Company, which had leased the neighbouring Loisaba Wilderness ranch (see Figure 3.2). As a result of the severe drought of the late 1990s, the Koija community trespassed into Loisaba Wilderness ranch to let their livestock graze which affected the viability of the Loisaba Wilderness ranch’s tourism business, which accounted for over 70% of the income (Sumba et al. 2007).

The private investors, Kenyans of white settler origin, felt the need to initiate a beneficial relationship with the adjacent community and initiated the Loisaba Community Conservation Trust (LCCT) as a vehicle to spearhead community development projects

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5 A revised version of this chapter has been published as:

which included education, water provision, a mobile clinic and employment. These incentives did not reduce the community’s invasion of the private ranch and the investors thought of creating more incentives for the community to appreciate conservation.

In order to create avenues for the community to participate and reap benefits from conservation, they approached AWF and proposed to replicate the Starbeds® concept in partnership with the community in a bid to demonstrate to the community that conservation pays (Sumba et al. 2007; P-KS-2). The ‘Starbed’ consists of raised wooden platforms partially covered by a thatched roof with a bed that can be wheeled out onto the open deck for a night under the stars.

Coincidentally, AWF was undertaking a conservation programme in the region and was at the time implementing USAID’s Conservation of Resources through Enterprises (CORE) programme (see chapter 3), which had a strong focus on enterprise development (A-3; 4). The CORE programme was intended to improve conservation of natural resources through increased benefits to communities and landowners in areas critical to parks and reserves (USAID 2004).

The private investors and AWF thus agreed to set up a tourism-based enterprise in partnership with the community. In this partnership arrangement, AWF was to be a ‘neutral broker’ or ‘facilitator’ in the community-private investor partnership (A-2; 3). The main reason for AWF’s involvement in the partnership was necessitated by policy and institutional deficits observed (see chapter 3) as well as challenges that were being witnessed in the existing community-private investor partnerships in the region; “we noticed that the partnerships that existed were very lop-sided...they were really in favor of the private investors, the community groups had no proper representation in the negotiations”....“there were no existing institutions to provide technical services to community land owners” (A-2).
AWF organized meetings, workshops, seminars and familiarization tours until the community was convinced that they could ‘milk the elephant’ through tourism (A-3; C-KS-4), meaning they would receive benefits from wildlife-based tourism. AWF further assisted in zoning the group ranch for conservation, settlement and grazing zones and the community set aside 200 hectares conservation area where the eco-lodge is constructed (A-3). The Koija Starbeds eco-lodge opened up in 2001 as a partnership between the Koija group ranch, Oryx Limited, representing the private investor, and the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF).

The initial investment of US$ 48,000 for the lodge construction was a grant from the USAID’s CORE programme which enabled the securing of community ownership of the lodge (P-KS-2; Sumba et al. 2007). AWF’s facilitation for community mobilization, capacity building and securing of property rights were estimated at US$ 30,000 (Sumba et al. 2007). The private investors through Oryx Limited provided the working capital (such as food and other supplies) in return for management rights (A-4). The community provided land for constructing the lodge and labour, dry wood and stones as well as goats which were sold for US$ 2,000, which was used to process the land title deed (C-KS-4).

5.2.2 The actors

The main actors in the Koija Starbeds partnership are the Koija group ranch, Oryx Limited (OL) and the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) (see figure 5.1) and are described in detail below.
The Koija Starbeds Partnership

Koija group ranch (community partner)

Oryx Limited (private investor partner)

Africa Wildlife Foundation (NGO partner)

Figure 5.1: Actors at the Koija Starbeds partnership

**Koija group ranch**

The group ranch covers an area of 7,554 hectares (Sumba et al. 2007). The majority of the inhabitants are Laikipiak Maasai, descendants of the Maa speaking Ewaso clan (C-KS-4). The group ranch was established and registered with the Ministry of Lands in 1976 with an initial membership of 148 members (Sumba et al. 2007) and currently has 511 registered members (C-KS-1). The Koija group ranch community consists of over 1,500 individuals (C-KS-1; Sumba et al. 2007). It borders with the Samburu and Isiolo districts to the North, Loisaba Wilderness (the private investor’s ranch) and Mpala private ranches to the west and Tiamamut and Il Motiok group ranches to the east (see figure 3.2)

Membership to the group ranch (listing in the group ranch register) is open to all males who are above 18 years of age. Registration takes place by forwarding one’s name to the group ranch secretary (C-KS-4). As in Kijabe, women are not allowed to be listed in the group ranch register, except for widows (C-KS-4; Koija Group Ranch Constitution 2000). For administrative purposes, the group ranch is divided into neighborhoods or clusters called ‘Nkutot’. Currently there are four (4) clusters: Munishoi,
Mutaro, Koija and Nosirai, which are made up of households with close family ties (C-KS-1).

For representation to the group ranch committee, just like at the Kijabe group ranch, each cluster nominates 2 members. On an election date, which is combined with the Annual General Meeting (AGM), members from each cluster (only males) assemble at a corner of the group ranch office compound and agree on 2 representatives to the group ranch committee. The women are also required to nominate one woman to represent them at the group ranch committee level. The selected women however, do not occupy the three key positions of chairperson, treasurer and secretary. This form of women representation can be said to be a positive step towards the inclusion of women in decision-making platforms. The elected cluster representatives then elect from among themselves the chairman, secretary and treasurer for the group ranch (C-KS-4).

The roles main of the 9-member group ranch committee are to oversee all the activities of the group ranch and make decisions on behalf of the group ranch members (Koija Group Ranch Constitution 2000; Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287 Laws of Kenya). In addition, each cluster has an elder who represents the members to the community council of elders. The responsibilities of the elders are to assist the elected group ranch committee in conflict resolution at both the group ranch and family levels. The elders also help in ensuring that the community’s code of ethics and traditions are maintained and adhered to (C-KS-1).

Administratively, the Koija group ranch is similar to the Kijabe group ranch and therefore forms the Loiborsoit location. The group ranch also forms a Ward represented by a MCA. Similar to the Sanctuary at the Ol Lentille case, the chief and the MCA as leaders are often chosen to represent the community in the partnership.
**Oryx Limited**

Oryx Limited (OL) is a private limited company owned by the private investors to act as the management and operations vehicle for the partnership. The company manages the Koija Starbeds together with the other Loisaba Wilderness tourism facilities which include: Kiboko Starbeds, Loisaba lodge, Loisaba house and Loisaba cottage. Oryx Limited also provides transport, human resources, marketing and accounting services as well as game-drives and other activities to Koija Starbeds guests (P-KS-2).

Oryx Limited also provides the operating capital (P-KS-1; 2). The Wilderness Guardian Company, which shares the same directors as Oryx limited, leased the Loisaba Wilderness ranch and engages in wildlife tourism, cattle ranching, crafts and woodwork among other activities (Sumba et al. 2007). In addition, the private investors operate the Loisaba Community Conservation Trust (LCCT), a charitable trust engaged in education, health and conservation issues in adjacent communities.

**African Wildlife Foundation (AWF)**

A more detailed description of AWF is presented in chapter 3. At the initial stages of the Koija Starbeds partnership, AWF provided legal and technical support services such as business planning, community mobilization and capacity building (A-1). AWF is represented by one trustee at the Koija Conservation Trust, the main decision-making platform of the partnership.
5.2.3 Partnership initiatives and activities

Similar to the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership, the main aim of the Koija Starbeds partnership is to link conservation and development through livelihoods improvement.

a) Livelihoods initiatives and activities

The initiatives aimed at the improvement of livelihoods include the eco-lodge and the cultural manyatta and are discussed at length below.

(i) The Koija Starbeds Lodge

The Koija Starbeds Eco-lodge is an 8-bed eco-lodge on 3 platforms, located at the Koija group ranch. The platforms are raised wooden ‘bandas’ partially covered by a thatched roof, which each containing a ‘Starbed’. This design is a replication of the Starbeds® concept from Loisaba Wilderness ranch’s Kiboko Starbeds® (P-KS-2; Sumba et al. 2007). Additional lodge facilities are a small lounge area for coffee, tea, lunches, dinner and relaxation (see figure 5.2). The bed-night and conservation fee paid by the lodge guests is meant to act as a financial incentive for the community to engage in conservation.
(ii) The cultural manyatta

In addition to the eco-lodge, there is the cultural manyatta which is a spin-off enterprise of the partnership. The village is managed by four women and one Morans group from the Koija group ranch. At the cultural manyatta, the women have organized themselves into 4 groups, according to the settlement clusters or neighborhoods (C-KS-1). The women members from each cluster elect their leader, who then elects the overall leadership for the cultural manyatta. Visitors to the cultural manyatta pay an entrance fee that goes to the cultural manyatta account and the women share equally (C-KS-4). The women also sell individually-made beads at the cultural manyatta and the income goes to the specific individuals. The Morans group is paid per dance for the tourists who visit the cultural manyatta and share the money amongst themselves (C-KS-1).
(iii) **Other projects**

The Oryx Limited directors, through the Loisaba Community Conservation Trust (LCCT), though not officially part of the partnership, also engage in various livelihood improvement projects mainly focused on education and health. LCCT is described at length in the section on decision-making platforms below.

**b) Conservation initiatives and activities**

Like in the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership, the Koija Starbeds partnership engages in conservation through conservation scouts. These are para-military, security employees whose main function is to ensure wildlife safety and adherence of conservation area rules by the community. The conservation scouts also work in collaboration with government security agents as well as with the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) to ensure both livestock and wildlife security.

**5.2.4 Decision-making platforms**

Decision-making on issues related to and those impacting the partnership occurs mainly in three main platforms, namely in the Koija Conservation Trust or the ‘trust’ abbreviated as KCT-KS, the group ranch, and Loisaba Community Conservation Trust (LCCT) (see figure 5.3).
The Koija Conservation Trust or the ‘trust’

The Koija Conservation Trust (KCT-KS) or the ‘trust’ was formed as the main decision-making body for the partnership (C-KS-6; A-4). KCT-KS was formed as a corporate institutional structure which could legalize and enable the partnership to undertake both profitable business and philanthropic activities (Sumba et al. 2007). The trust is governed by a five-member board of trustees: two from the community, two from the private investor and one from AWF. The board also incorporates two executive government officials; the Land Adjudication Officer and District development officer (Deed of Discharge and Appointment 2000).

The initial community representation to the trust included the chairman of the group ranch committee and the councilor of the area (C-KS-6). They are still the community trustees, although they no longer hold the previously held leadership
positions. In addition to the two community trustees, other group ranch and community leaders are also allowed to attend KCT meetings as ‘observers’ (C-KS-2; 3). The private investor representatives to the trust have also remained the same persons over time, while the AWF representative has been changing over time due to turnover of AWF staff (A-4).

In the five-member board of trustees, AWF holds the position of the chairperson; the private partner holds the position of the treasurer, while the community holds the position of the secretary. This arrangement was conceived for strategic purposes: AWF’s position as chair of the board of trustees was meant to assist in moderating the decisions since AWF joined the partnership as the ‘neutral’ or ‘broker’ partner (A-4). On the other hand, the private investor’s position as the treasurer was settled on since all the daily operations of the lodge, as well as bookings and marketing, were to be handled by the private investor.

The trust deed governs operations at the trust and accords trustees power to decide on behalf of the partners which means that the trustees ‘hold the Starbeds in trust’ for the partners. The trust is also mandated with the tasks of managing the Koija community trust fund or income from the partnership, distribution of income among the partners, providing management oversight over the private investor partner and procuring services required to maintain and improve the lodge (Deed of Discharge and Appointment 2000).

**The Koija group ranch**

Decision-making at the group ranch is mainly by the nine-member group ranch committee which is mandated to oversee all the activities of the group ranch on behalf of the group ranch members (Koija Group Ranch Constitution 2000; Land (Group
Representatives) Act Cap 287). In addition to the group ranch committee, each cluster has an elder who represents them to the community council of elders. The elders assist the group ranch committee in conflict resolution at both the group ranch and family levels in addition to ensuring that the community code of ethics and traditions are maintained (C-KS-1).

**Loisaba Community Conservation Trust (LCCT)**

The Loisaba Community Conservation Trust (LCCT) is a charitable trust of the Loisaba Wilderness (the private investors’ ranch) engaged in education, health and conservation issues in adjacent communities.

### 5.3 Governance of the partnership

#### 5.3.1 Participation

Decisions made at the trust include but not limited to the division of money among the stipulated uses such as lodge maintenance and repairs as well as other issues affecting the partnership such as challenges and future plans for the community and the partnership (Deed of Discharge and Appointment 2000). The trust board is engaged in decision-making on the benefit-sharing procedures (C-KS-1; 2; -3; 4; P-KS-2).

With regard to implementation of decisions arrived at the trust, the private investor trustee is more engaged than the community and AWF trustees. In most cases for example, the private investor brings in quotations for lodge maintenance and repair work to KCT board meetings, which are always approved without much scrutiny(C-KS-1; 2; 3; 4). There exists some ‘assumed trust’ and confidence by both the community and AWF on the work of the private investor (C-KS-1; P-KS-2; A-4). Some community leaders are
however of the opinion that the community is not given a chance to take part in decisions regarding repairs, maintenance and renovations. One leader points out that: “The investor decides what is to be renovated, there is no committee that decides what is to be done…making it a one-man’s show…..We have left everything for the investor to decide…we feel sidelined” (C-KS-1). Another community respondent argued that the community plays the role of ‘witnesses’ at the trust where “everyone goes on with their business as usual until after 3 months to come and witness the sharing of the Starbeds money” (C-KS-4).

The group ranch leaders often make requests for projects that they would wish to be funded by the trust. The viability of the community requests are then deliberated on at the trust board meetings after which they are either funded or dismissed. Those requests that have been turned down by the trust have elicited diverse reactions from some community leaders who feel like they do not have a voice regarding decisions at the trust. Some community leaders argue that only the private investor’s ideas and views are taken into account at KCT-KS with the support of AWF: “The private investor’s ideas are followed; he decides what is to be done because he controls the money, all the money is in his account, he writes and signs the cheques, therefore when he speaks, everyone agrees to what he says” (C-KS-2).

In support of their arguments, the community leaders make reference to the community request to purchase of a car and extra land (C-KS-2; 3). In response, AWF and the private investor pointed out that all requests to the trust board must be in line to the mission and must also be viable, sustainable and provide benefit to all community members. The request for the purchase of the car and land therefore, did not meet the criteria and was turned down (P-KS-2; A-4).
Through a Management Agreement, signed between KCT-KS and Oryx Limited, the investor implements decisions that relate to day-to-day lodge management, marketing and guests’ satisfaction (Koija Starbeds Management Agreement 2000). Moreover, as a result of the witnessed poor record keeping and accountability of bursary funds by community leaders, since 2010 the private investor also implements decisions regarding the bursaries, through Electronic Funds Transfer (EFT) of the bursaries to the school accounts. Lodge inspections for repairs and maintenance is the responsibility of the KCT board of trustees, but has been ‘silently and unofficially ‘delegated’ to the private investor (C-KS-1; KS-FGD-1).

The group ranch leadership is also charged with the responsibility of implementing decisions, especially relating to group ranch management and projects as well as the maintenance of the conservation area (Deed of Discharge and Appointment 2000). This responsibility has however not been fulfilled well, as incidences of grazing in the conservation area as well as poaching by some community members have been witnessed (C-KS-2; P-KS-2).

The group ranch leaders have also not been able to restrict farming along the riverbank, a land-use activity which is not compatible with conservation (P-KS-2; 4). The trust deed is however not explicit about who should enforce decisions at the trust platform, which has led to implementation challenges.

The private investor’s key role in the trust, coupled with his knowledge and skills, has given him a central role. The community partner’s rather peripheral roles at KCT-KS have also contributed to their laxity and limited commitment in fulfilling their responsibilities. There is also lack of incentives or remuneration for community representatives to trusts and other leadership positions leading to limited commitment (A-2).
At the group ranch platform, management and decision-making is vested on the group ranch committee which is elected every year and only males above eighteen years and widows are eligible to be registered group ranch members (Koija Group Ranch Constitution 2000; C-KS-4). The Maasai culture also limits the participation of women in as well as participation in public discussions, though there is one woman representative in the committee (C-KS-1). The elected group ranch leaders, assisted by the council of elders, are involved in enforcing the decisions made (C-KS-1).

In case of non-performance, the only avenue to remove non-performing group ranch officials is by voting them out in the next AGM. These discussions of non-performance often become political conquests, thus curtailing objective enforcement. The elected group ranch leaders dominate decision-making, implementation and enforcement. The group ranch members play a peripheral role which is limited to annually electing leaders as stipulated in the Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287 Laws of Kenya.

At the cultural manyatta, major decisions include selection of their representative to the group ranch committee, the sharing of the money from the cultural manyatta entry fees, repairs and maintenance of the manyatta, and modalities of selling the beads (C-KS-1; 10). These decisions are made during meetings convened by the elected women leaders. When the attendance is low, decisions are made by women leaders (C-KS-10).

The Morans group is a well-knit group where the inside information is hard to access since it is an age group, a warrior group that lasts until the next generation joins Moranism (C-KS-1). In the past, it was the group that went to war on behalf of the community, but with time it has been transformed into a group for young unmarried males who showcase the community culture to visitors at the cultural manyatta. The
group elects their representatives, especially the signatories to their account as well as for contact and communication regarding dance performances (C-KS-1).

The Loisaba Community Conservation Trust, a charitable organization set up by the Loisaba Wilderness aims to help the Koija community in addition to other communities on health and education matters (P-KS-2). The Koija community as well as the group ranch leaders are not aware of the existence of LCCT and are of the opinion that the Loisaba Wilderness management uses their community to fundraise (C-KS-2; 3; 4). LCCT through the private investor consults the relevant people such as group ranch leaders, the head of school or head of the health center before implementing any assistance (C-KS-8; 9; P-KS-2). Several group ranch leaders however feel that there should be some consultation and involvement of the community before the assistance: “They just come and tell us that they have money to build a class or pay a nurse” (C-KS-4).

Some community leaders further argue that the LCCT comes with a fixed idea of the project it wants to implement. Though the community leaders appreciate the assistance given by the LCCT, they feel unrepresented and uninvolved in the philanthropic activities, especially with regard to fundraising (C-KS-2; 3; 4). The private investor however feels that those claiming not to be involved would wish to be the ones implementing the projects and thus misappropriate the money (P-KS-2).

This view seems to be fueled by mistrust towards certain community leaders who have mis-appropriated group ranch money in the past: “We have a foundation that has nothing to do with Koija…they are completely wrong about that…most of the money comes from the owner of Loisaba who sponsors projects and scholarships….may be the things have been done without the consensus of some individuals because they wanted to have the budget and make deals etc” (P-KS-2).
Some stakeholders are of the opinion that for the philanthropy to be successful, some level of involvement and consultation is required. For example, the teachers would like to be consulted on the text books they would require according to the school syllabus instead of just being provided with any books (C-KS-12).

5.3.2 Transparency

At the trust, the private investor is the central actor providing information regarding the amount due to the community as well as details of repair and maintenance to the KCT board (KS-FGD-1). The community however felt that the information provided was not enough and expected more information regarding the lodge performance (C-KS-4). In 2011 therefore, the private investor provided the trust board with a breakdown of how the money received from guests is spent in relation to the KCT share (KS-FGD-1). Though this disclosure was appreciated by the community, the leaders felt that they need to know and be consulted much more; for example why and when the investor closes the lodge as well as how it is decided that a guest stays at Kiboko Starbeds and not Koija Starbeds (C-KS-1; 2; 3).

The general feeling within the community leadership was that the gesture of revealing how the money was spent helped address the fears they had that the investor was benefiting more from their lodge (C-KS-1; 2; 3; 4). Despite this information disclosure, the lack of clear understanding within the community of how hotel bookings are done has further fueled community mistrust (C-KS-3; 4). The community also felt that the investor was marketing his Starbed more than the community Starbeds, hence the low occupancy (C-KS-3; 4). Moreover, the information provided by the investor to the KCT board is still rather complicated for some group ranch leaders -who have low
education levels - and the majority of the ordinary group ranch members (C-KS-1), hence affecting transparency.

Through the trust, transparency at the partnership has been enhanced through the information provided by the investor to the other actors regarding the operations of the lodge (P-KS-2; A-4). However information trickling down to the group ranch members is usually distorted and misinterpreted due to limited education levels (P-KS-2; C-KS-1; A-4). In addition, information is mainly shared by word of mouth and community meetings leading to misinterpretation or affected by a general disinterest among members (C-KS-1). Moreover, community meetings in most cases take place once a year or once every two years at the Annual General Meetings (AGM), which are usually marred by politics and campaigns by elections of new incoming leaders (C-KS-2). The majority of the community members also do not attend these meetings and therefore the larger segments of the community are not reached (C-KS-1).

At the group ranch platform, communication or information transfer takes place through several mediums. The first medium is the notice board at the group ranch office. Information posted at the group ranch notice board includes but is not limited to security information and lists of students receiving bursaries among others (C-KS-1). However, very few group ranch members visit the notice board. Moreover, the majority of the community members' limited education tests their understanding (C-KS-1; 2). Word of mouth is widely used but is prone to information misrepresentation and misinterpretation (C-KS-2). At the cultural manyatta and Moran groups, communication is through meetings and word of mouth and focuses on the amount of money collected and the modes of sharing (C-KS-1; 10).

At LCCT, the community leaders do not have information regarding the nature and existence of LCCT (C-KS-4). Some community leaders’ question why the private
investor would start up their own trust while they already set up one with the community which has not achieved its objectives, especially with regard to fundraising for community projects (C-KS-2; 3; 4). The community leaders further argue that LCCT does not share information about the amount of money raised and the sources of the money which they term it as a ‘lack of transparency’. LCCT however posts all their activities on their website (http://www.loisabaccf.org/about/). This means of information about LCCT is inaccessible to majority of the leaders and community members.

5.3.3 Accountability

Similar to the Sanctuary at Oi Lentille case, at the initial stages of the partnership set-up, all the actors at KCT-KS had roles and responsibilities to play. The community roles included provision of raw materials and labour for construction (C-KS-4; 6). The role of AWF included community mobilization and capacity building among others (A-4). The private investor roles included provision of day-to-day lodge management and other logistical aspects for start-up. Moreover, decision-making at the initial stages involved a lot of consultation and all the representatives of the partners felt included and informed about the process (C-KS-4; 6).

In the on-going partnership, the Trust Deed details the responsibilities of each of the actors at KCT-KS. The private investor is charged with the responsibilities day-to-day lodge operations, marketing and general lodge management. The community partner is charged with the responsibility of management and maintenance of the conservation area. AWF’s responsibilities include its role as a ‘neutral’ partner and community mobilization and capacity building. The board of trustees’ responsibilities includes management oversight on the lodge, inspection of repairs and maintenance and sharing of lodge income. In relation to actor responsibilities at KCT, the private partner has
performed his duties in a satisfactory way according to community and AWF actors, though the occupancy rates remain below the break-even percentage (C- KS-4; A-4; Sumba et al. 2007).

The community partner roles have not been performed as stipulated, especially with regard to grazing and poaching in the exclusive conservation area (P-KS-2; KS-FGD-1; A-4). This can be partly attributed to the nature of the resource as 'common property' and limited commitment of the group ranch leadership to conservation (C-KS-2; P-KS-2). AWF has also not managed to undertake continuous capacity building and facilitation and their presence is not as strongly felt as it was in the initial stages of the partnership (C-KS-4).

The Trust Deed, which stipulates all KCT rules and regulations, lacks explicit checks and balances as well as sanctions regarding actor responsibilities which are critical for accountability. The capability of the actors to monitor the checks and balances for actor responsibilities is also limited. For example, the KCT-KS board of trustees is supposed to monitor the activities of the private investor in the partnership. The trust board members, especially the local community trustees, do not have the capacity to investigate and monitor the activities of the private investor due to lack of knowledge of operations (C-KS-1). One avenue stipulated for ensuring accountability are yearly audits which have not been carried out since 2008 (C-KS-2) as seen in the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille case. In the event that audits are carried out, there are no stipulated sanctions of what steps can be taken for non-compliance.

The community leaders who have misappropriated funds in the past have been subjected to community punishment (C-KS-1; A-FGD-1). These punishments include public shaming as opposed to sanctions related to Kenya’s dominant legal system. This has not been supported by the private investor and AWF partners who subscribe to the
application of the legal system (P-KS-1; A-FGD-1). Moreover, the different and multiple roles or ‘hats’ of the private investor poses challenges for accountability. For example, the private investor is the representative of Oryx Limited to KCT-KS and therefore the treasurer to the board of trustees. The same board of trustees is required to monitor the activities of the same private investor; a situation which is not contributing to accountability.

The responsibilities of the group ranch members are stipulated in the Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287 Laws of Kenya: to form the group and register, elect representatives and remove them from office. Moreover the group ranch members are required to keep track of the actions of the elected group ranch leaders. This latter responsibility has not been successful due to minimal education levels of the majority of the community (C-KS-1). Although the elected group ranch leaders in principle can exert a lot of power, in practice the committee has limited financial resources and managerial skills posing a challenge for compliance with requirements hence a challenge for accountability.

The available checks and balances for accountability; that is the group ranch constitution and the stipulations of the Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287, have not been effective. Moreover, the Act gives more responsibilities, hence more power to the group ranch committee including determination of when the AGM and elections should take place, a situation which affects accountability.

At LCCT, the trustees post reports on the use of funds and other trust activities on their website. This medium of information is not accessible to the community. Just like at the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille case, there are also no documented agreements between the community and the trust as well as checks and balances for the operations of the projects.
5.3.4 Equity

All the guests staying overnight at the Koija Starbeds are charged both bed-night and conservation fees (see table 5.1) which is the money that is shared quarterly at KCT-KS board meetings. Information regarding how the figure was arrived at is unclear with the community leaders (C-KS-2). The private investor and AWF are of the opinion that the figure was set higher than the existing community based ventures at the time, though they do not divulge the details of how the figure was arrived at (A-4; P-KS-2). The money is deposited to Koija Community Trust Fund account which is managed by the KCT-KS board.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category of Guests</th>
<th>Bed night fee</th>
<th>Conservation fee</th>
<th>Totals</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non-resident adults</td>
<td>US$ 50</td>
<td>US$ 35</td>
<td>US$ 85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-resident children</td>
<td>US$ 25</td>
<td>US$ 15</td>
<td>US$ 40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident adults</td>
<td>US$ 30</td>
<td>US$ 18</td>
<td>US$ 48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resident children</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source (C-KS-1; KS-FGD-1)

Every three months, the amount due to KCT-KS is consolidated by the private investor and brought to the KCT-KS board meetings which allocate the money as follows: 25% is used for a capital fund to finance the purchase of lodge assets and maintenance, 20% of the remaining 75% is provided to the group ranch to assist in group ranch management and related logistics. The remaining amount, 80% of 75%, is allocated to the Koija Bursary Fund which pays for school fees for secondary school, college and university education for members’ children (C-KS-1; P-KS-2; KS-FGD-1).

The money set aside for bursaries is shared equally by all those at secondary school where each secondary school student receives US$ 125 per year as bursary while those at tertiary institutions and at the university receive payments to cover the full...
fees (C-KS-1). There is however dissatisfaction among the community members who do not have children in secondary school, college or university (C-KS-3).

The majority of the community leaders are not sure whether the benefit-sharing among the actors is equitable, since they cannot tell how much the private investor gets (C-KS-2; 3; 4). However, they are of the opinion that the community is benefiting a lot given the nature of their contribution in terms of responsibilities, the amount of land set aside for conservation and the amount of initial investment they put into the project (C-KS-2; 3; 4).

The main cost the community incurs in relation to the partnership is the setting aside of 200 hectares of their land for conservation (P-KS-2; C-KS-1). The community also has to bear other costs associated with living with wildlife such as human-wildlife conflicts such as the destruction of their crops along the river bank by elephants and sharing of water holes with wildlife (C-KS-2; 4). The Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS) has also not been able to engage the community well on issues to do with wildlife management and compensation (O-1).

There is a general agreement among partners that the community receives more benefits from the Starbeds compared to the land they have put under conservation (C-KS-1; A-4; P-KS-2; Sumba et al. 2007). The community benefits could however be enhanced if the community is able to adhere to the stipulated rules of keeping livestock out of the conservation area (P-KS-2; A-4). This is because the presence of livestock in the conservation area which hosts the lodge makes it unattractive to guests, which partly explains the low occupancy (P-KS-2).

The community leaders however attribute the grazing in the conservation area and some members’ engagement in poaching to the nature of the group ranch as a
‘common property’, as well as to the fact that wildlife is a state property, whereby the community lacks ownership rights (C-KS-2; 4).

The costs to the investor include daily operations, marketing, providing game drives and other activities. The private investor is however able to leverage the costs as a result of the economies of scale due to the joint management and marketing with the other tourism facilities in the Loisaba Wilderness ranch (P-KS-2).

At the group ranch platform, the main income generating activities of the group ranch include the share of the group ranch money from KCT-KS as well as leasehold money from another tourism facility, the Lemartis Camp (C-KS-1; 2). This money is spent on group ranch management, such as salaries for guards and other employees (C-KS-4; 7). Other group ranch expenses include paying hospital bills for hospitalized group ranch members as well as repairs for water pumps and pipes among other expenses. As opposed to the Kijabe group ranch which has a Community Investment Plan (CIP), there are no guidelines, rules and regulations regarding how the group ranch committee should use the finances which makes it prone to abuse and misappropriation.

Moreover, the group ranch management has inadequate management skills, poor organization and record-keeping coupled with low education levels of the committee members (C-KS-1). The group ranch management also relies on the council of elders which is a traditional management system to regulate behaviour and adherence to customs as well as conservation ethics (C-KS-1). This traditional system is not only contradicting with the modern, legal management system, but also can be said to be more lenient. The interaction of the community with other communities as well as with the modern ways of life has, especially by the youth, diluted the respect for the traditional management system leading to illegal grazing in the conservation area and poaching thus reduced contribution to livelihoods and conservation.
The majority of the projects initiated by the LCCT are public projects intended for general community benefits such as those focusing on health, education, water and conservation. The amount of money that goes to the Koija community from LCCT philanthropy is equivalent (US$ 20,000-30,000 per year) to the amount made by the Starbeds for KCT-KS (P-KS-2) and all the group ranch members have an equal chance to access the benefits. At the cultural manyatta, all the members get an equal share of the income from the gate entrance fees. The only difference is the income received from the sale of beads, which depends on individual creativity and efforts. The Morans also get equal shares of the income from their dances thus a sense of equity.

5.4 **Conclusion**

This chapter analyzed governance of the Koija Starbeds partnership based on the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability and equity. Similar to the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille case, three platforms of governance were identified; the trust, group ranch and the projects platforms. The analysis clearly reveals the complexity of partnerships as governance institutions.

Compared to the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille case, the local composition of the board of trustees in the Koija Starbeds partnership made governance less politicized. Despite the provision of information by the investor to other actors, issues of mistrust still persisted which influenced the community’s perception of transparency and accountability. This shows the importance of trust in governing partnerships. The results further reveal several other issues having implications for governance of the partnership: the dominant role of group ranch leaders, minimal women representation, and lack of accountability by the community members in meeting their obligations such as not grazing livestock in the conservation area.
Chapter 6: Contribution to livelihoods and conservation

6.1 Introduction

In this chapter, I present results of the contributions of the partnership enterprises to community livelihoods and biodiversity conservation. Chapters 4 and 5 analyzed governance of the partnerships in terms of participation, transparency, accountability and equity. This chapter therefore analyzes governance in the partnerships in terms of the effectiveness concept. The chapter further attempts to analyze the effectiveness in relation to participation, transparency, accountability and equity.

As argued in chapter 1, the partnership enterprises are part of a broader conservation-development discourse whose aim is to simultaneously address livelihoods and biodiversity loss challenges. As market-based strategies the partnerships are meant to create livelihoods benefits that incentivize conservation. For the studied partnerships, the main motivating goal for their establishment also was to provide alternative livelihoods that would incentivize communities to conserve nature and at the end reduce the biodiversity threats in the area. This chapter therefore describes and analyzes the implications of the partnership enterprises to livelihoods based on the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework and to the biodiversity conservation threats and conservation area. The chapter begins with a presentation on the contribution to livelihoods, followed by one on conservation and ends with a conclusion.

6 A revised version of this chapter has been re-submitted after reviews to the journal Development Southern Africa as: Nthiga, R.W., Van der Duim, V.R., Visseren-Hamakers, I.J. and Lamers, M. ‘Tourism-conservation enterprises for community livelihoods and biodiversity conservation in Kenya’.

135
6.2 Contributions to livelihoods

To analyze the contribution of the partnership enterprises to livelihoods, I borrow from the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework discussed in chapter 2. Therefore, the contributions of the enterprise partnerships to the five capital assets and implications for livelihood strategies, outcomes and vulnerability are analyzed. The contributions are further divided into direct and expected outcomes from the enterprises and other livelihood enterprises that emerged as a result, and the indirect, unexpected outcomes, mainly from philanthropy, donations and grants. In the discussion both the positive and negative effects are taken into account.

6.2.1 Physical capital

Buildings: Most importantly, and an essential characteristic of AWF tourism-based conservation enterprises, is that lodge buildings and immovable assets for both enterprises belong to the communities (P-KS-2; P-SOL-3). Moreover, AWF facilitated the construction of offices for the three group ranches (i.e. Kijabe, Nkiloriti and Koija) and the installation of communication-related infrastructure such as solar panels and radio communication equipment for health emergencies and security communications in the region. The Kijabe group ranch office, which also hosts the micro-finance institution, is for example worth US$ 35,500 (AWF 2008).

Women at the Kijabe and Nkiloriti group ranches have bought iron sheets for some members to construct more modern houses with income from the spin-off enterprises; others have bought beehives for their beekeeping projects (C-SOL-5). The women initiatives have however, been confronted with challenges related to poor management of income, general management, and record keeping, due to low literacy levels (C-SOL-5). The benefits are also limited since the cultural manyatta visits and
bead sales depend on the guests to the Sanctuary (C-SOL-6), which operates on an average of less than 30% occupancy (P-SOL-2). The contributions are thus affected by occupancy challenges (Goodwin & Santilli 2009).

**Urbanization:** Indirectly, the enterprise partnerships have led to an expansion of trading centers in the area such as Koija, Munishoi, and Kimanjo (C-SOL-9; P-KS-2). One respondent who has witnessed the area transform argues: “if you looked at Koija ten years ago, there was no town, there was only one shop, and there were two buildings in that whole village” (P-KS-2). Currently, the Koija group ranch hosts multiple shops, offices, a primary school and a health centre as well as two other eco-lodges. This growth in urbanization-related infrastructure - in as much as it is a positive outcome towards development - has a negative side. The growth of urban centres has attracted settlements, which has contributed to an increase in population. This increase in population poses increased threats for conservation due to pressure on the environment.

**Water:** The area is arid land where water is scarce and the partnership enterprises have made a contribution to the installation of water-related infrastructure. At Kijabe and Nkiloriti, there has been drilling of boreholes, laying of water pipes, and maintenance and construction of dams, mainly funded through philanthropy of the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya and lodge guest donations (P-SOL-3; C-SOL-2). The trust has also provided water tanks for schools, the group ranch office and a dispensary for rainwater harvesting (P-SOL-3). At Koija, the money received by the Koija group ranch management from the trust is partly spent for maintenance of water pipes, and fueling and repair of the power generator which supplies water for the school and community (C-KS-4).
**Health:** The Ol Lentille Trust Kenya (OLTK) has constructed a 24-bed sub-district hospital with an x-ray room, a maternity unit, a youth centre and doctors’ quarters at the Kimanjo trading centre, and handed it over to the Government of Kenya in September 2013. Prior to the hospital construction, the trust supported the Kimanjo health centre with hospital equipment, bicycles and a motorbike for community health workers (C-SOL-14). At Koija, the private investor, through the Loisaba Community Conservation Trust, donated equipment for the health centre such as the refrigerator, among other facilities (C-KS-1).

**Education:** The OLTK has constructed buildings, provided desks, chairs, books, laptops, and printers in over six primary schools and one secondary school in the different group ranches in the area (C-SOL-1; P-SOL-3). The secondary school has been constructed by the OLTK and the infrastructure by January 2013 included four classrooms, a kitchen, a store, and two latrine blocks, and plans were underway to construct an administration wing, science laboratory, teachers’ housing and a library. At Koija, the main beneficiary has been the Ewaso primary school, where the Loisaba Community Conservation Trust (LCCT) has constructed classrooms, a dining hall and dormitories and provided books and reading materials (P-KS-2; C-KS-1).

Community optimization of these benefits has however been hindered by several issues: children engaging in livestock herding has limited the number of children attending school; instances of minimal consultation and participation of beneficiaries by the trusts and the group ranch leadership have minimized benefits; and donors have just donated books without considering whether they are useful for the school curriculum.
6.2.2 Social capital

The partnership enterprises can be credited for contributing positively to the communities’ pride, belonging and identity. At the initial stages, AWF facilitated the acquisition of land title deeds. Both areas had been designated as group ranches in the 1970s but did not have the legal documents to prove ownership (A-4; C-KS-1). As one leader at Koija pointed out: “we can credit the existence of Koija as a group ranch to the Starbeds…now we can say that we own the land, we have the title deed… before we just used to live here and maybe someone could have come to claim ownership… thanks to the Starbeds we are the real legal owners of the land” (C-KS-4).

The private investor at the Sanctuary supports the local football club as well as a sport exchange program for primary school pupils, which supports social cohesion and growth (C-SOL-2). The lodge also provides transport to school for pupils to attend functions such as music festivals and other extra-curricular activities (C-SOL-2; 9). Both Koija and Kijabe/Nkiloriti communities have also been able to organize themselves into committees, women and Moran groups, also leading to social cohesion (C-KS-3). At Koija, LCCT, through the community youth group, also purchased a television set, video machine and a power generator for youth education on social issues such as guidance and counseling on HIV/AIDS (C-KS-1), aimed at improving the community’s social fabric. Moreover, the roles and respect for women in the community are also gradually improving as a result of linkages with other communities, as well as from their improved financial status (C-KS-4).

Negative social impacts have also been identified. Internal conflicts and power struggles have been increased by the influx of money into the communities from the tourism-conservation enterprises. In Kijabe for example, before the lodge, there was harmonious co-existence with the neighbouring Nkiloriti (C-SOL-12). The construction of
the lodge and consequent benefits has created some tension between the two group ranches, which have now been temporarily and formally settled by a MoU.

Internal conflicts and power struggles have also been witnessed at Kijabe group ranch between those living within and those living outside the group ranch (C-SOL-1). These conflicts are associated with leadership and associated benefits from control of income from the lodge. In addition, interactions with other communities as a result of increased commercial activities have contributed to cultural changes and reduced adherence to traditions, especially by the young generation (C-KS-5). As instances of political struggles crippling investments have been reported elsewhere in Kenya, for example in the Kimana group ranch in the Amboseli area (Southgate 2006), these occurrences of political struggles should not be ignored.

6.2.3 Human capital

Educational support: The Sanctuary provides meals, bursaries and payment of teachers’ salaries. AWF as an actor in the partnership also offers so-called ‘Charlotte fellow scholarships’ for secondary, college and university education (AWF 2008) which benefits communities in all the heartlands they work in. At Kijabe, 40% of the income from the partnership to the group ranch goes to finance education, bursaries, and teachers’ salaries as stipulated in the Community Investment Plan (CIP). However, the distribution of this amount is hampered by un-updated group ranch membership register with two-thirds of the members living elsewhere. The money is also shared among all children in secondary school, colleges and university making members receive a small amount each.
The decision-making power of the elected leaders also makes it difficult for the community members to demand accountability and transparency (C-SOL-3). At the group ranch level, especially at Kijabe, the benefits could be larger if issues of transparency and accountability are addressed. AWF for example notes that “transparency and accountability is a big challenge for Kijabe; out of the US$ 6,785 that went to the community, it is hard to give exact amounts that went directly to the community members or community-supported projects” (AWF 2008: 32).

In addition, according to statistics from the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya in 2011, RL, through their bursary programme, paid school fees for twelve teacher training college students, 5 university students and 12 secondary school students (P-SOL-2), and by 2010, over 380 children had received bursaries through the partnership (P-SOL-1).

At Koija, the largest percentage of income to the Koija Conservation trust is used for bursaries for secondary school, professional college and university education. An evaluation carried out in 2007 revealed that a total of US$ 42,096 had been given to the community for bursaries from the partnership (Sumba et al. 2007). Other available statistics indicate that in the second term of 2010, a total of US$ 5,775 was used to pay bursaries for 58 high school students and two university students (there are three terms in a year). In 2011, a total of US$ 10,462 was spent on bursaries for 43 high school students, one in a professional college and two at the university (C-KS-1). At Koija the transparent, accountable and participatory nature of bursary awards - usually done at KCT-KS - made it more effective in comparison to the Kijabe. The Loisaba Community Conservation Trust (LCCT) also provided books, meals, bursaries and payment of teachers’ salaries. As of November 2011, LCCT had educated about five students from Koija through secondary school up to university (P-KS-2).
While there are no available data to quantify the extent to which the benefits to education have influenced the illiteracy rates, one group ranch leader at Koija argued that the existence of the Starbeds has contributed to a reduction in illiteracy levels and changed the community attitude towards education: “the quality of education has improved, we now have around 5 graduates, many with diplomas and many in secondary school, people are now taking children to school since the lodge was opened” (C-KS-4). However, the majority of the children at the group ranches were not in school due to reasons such as: livestock rearing, joining the Morans group who perform dances at the cultural manyatta, and early marriages and pregnancies (C-KS-1).

**Health support:** At Kijabe, the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya is engaged in the provision of a food programme for HIV/AIDS patients on Anti-Retrovirals (C-SOL-14; OLTK Trustees Annual Report 2011). The trust also paid salaries for 34 community health workers, whose duties include support for the community health program at the grassroots level. The Trust also provides mobile clinic services to the community and an average of ten mobile sessions reaching on average 400 patients were conducted in 2011 (OLTK Trustees Annual Report 2011). At Koija, the private investor supports the family planning programme at the health centre, which has received a set-back due to minimal acceptance caused by culture and traditions (P-KS-2). The investor also provides transport for the sick in case of emergencies (C-KS-1).

At Kijabe, a portion of the income from the partnership is used to pay hospital bills for those admitted to hospitals (C-SOL-1). However, there is an absence of proper guidelines, rules and accountability mechanisms for the use of the money creating a loophole for misappropriation (C-SOL-1). Despite the development of health-care facilities, health problems are still severe as community members continue to rely on
traditional forms of medicine. Illiteracy further restricts the follow-up of medical staff instructions in addition to poor nutrition, as a result of poverty and drought (C-SOL-14).

**Skills development:** At the initial stages of the partnerships, the women groups were enrolled in a capacity building programme aimed at improving their skills in bead-making, and savings and money management (C-SOL-5; A-4). AWF sponsored community leaders for familiarization tours to other regions to learn about conservation enterprises (A-4). At Kijabe, AWF also sponsored the participation of over thirty community members in a familiarization tour to learn about micro-finance and credit institutions and personal financial management (C-SOL-6). The communities have also developed an entrepreneurial culture. For example, a Koija community member is constructing a lodge, the Lewaso Cottages, in the group ranch. The conservation area scouts have also on various occasions received para-military training and instructions such as wildlife patrols.

### 6.2.4 Financial capital

In the following paragraphs, I present the financial capital contributions of the two enterprise partnerships by examining employment, as well as other individual and collective income streams. The two eco-lodges have had considerable financial impacts on the communities involved. AWF claims that the total community income from the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille (lease fee, conservation and bed night fees and wage benefits from direct employment) in the period 2006-2012 has exceeded $ 330, 000. For Koija, AWF estimated half of this amount (A-11)

**Employment:** The employment opportunities created directly and indirectly are summarized in Table 7.4. The Sanctuary employs a total of 21 permanent employees out of which 8 are from the Kijabe group ranch (C-SOL-13). In addition, RL, through the Ol
Lentille Trust Kenya, pays salaries for 34 community health workers, 1 nurse, 22 schoolteachers and 29 community scouts. The Financial Service Organization (FSO), a spin-off enterprise, also provides employment for 2 persons. The money received by the group ranch from the Kijabe Conservation Trust also contributes to employment. Part of the group ranch income is used to pay 3 primary school teachers, 2 nursery school teachers, and 8 scouts (C-SOL-11). The lodge also purchases goat meat from community members which amount to over US$ 125 per month, milk for US$ 94 per month, and eggs for US$ 38 per month from the Kijabe group ranch members (P-SOL-2).

The Koija Starbeds has 5 employees who include 1 chef, 2 waiters, and 2 room stewards (C-KS-2). Other employment opportunities created include 1 nurse and 2 teachers paid by Loisaba Wilderness; 1 cultural manyatta supervisor, paid by the cultural manyatta; and 3 scouts, 1 radio operator and 1 educational secretary, 1 cleaner for the health centre, and 1 watchman, paid by the group ranch with funds from the Koija Conservation Trust (C-KS-4). In addition, out of an estimated 170 employees of the Loisaba Wilderness around 40 are from the Koija group ranch (P-KS-2).

**Other income:** At Koija, women and Morans earn income from the cultural manyatta. From the dances, Morans can earn an estimated amount of US$ 250 per year while women from the sale of handcrafts can buy 10 goats or one cow per year. Around 160 women are members of the cultural manyatta, and due to this large number, each takes home around US$ 25 per year from gate collection fees. These low levels of income from the cultural manyatta can also be attributed to the limited number of guests, since they depend on guests visiting the Starbeds and other Loisaba Wilderness facilities (C-KS-1).
At Kijabe/Nkiloriti, the manyatta provides income for close to 300 members, from manyatta entry fees, sale of communal and individual beads. The guest entry charge to the cultural manyatta is US$ 38, which is shared among the Morans and the women (C-SOL-5). Numerous challenges face the management of the cultural manyatta: illiteracy, since only a few members are educated; limited visitor numbers (sometimes as few as two a month); uncertain markets for their products; and poor record-keeping (C-SOL-5).

At Nkiloriti, AWF had assisted the women group to start a chicken-rearing project in 2008. The project however experienced marketing challenges due to the remoteness of the place, which were not addressed initially (AWF 2010).

**Other financial benefits:** At Koija, the private investor has improved the community’s financial capital by providing pasture and possibilities for interbreeding for the community livestock during periods of drought, when the community takes their livestock to Loisaba ranch at a fee of US$ 4 monthly for every cow (P-KS-2). This arrangement has however been critiqued by the community for lacking proper organization and information (C-KS-3).

The Financial Service Organization (FSO), initiated as a women project in 2008, became fully operational in April 2011 through the assistance of AWF (C-SOL-6). It has a membership of over 1,000 shareholders from the different group ranches in the region (C-SOL-6) and operates as a bank and a micro-finance organization. Services include saving opportunities, with charges for withdrawals amounting US$ 0.12 and loans and credit services, with interest rates from 1.5% to 3% per annum (C-SOL-5). From an initial capital of US$ 575 in 2008, it has grown to US$ 112,500 as of August 2012. By that time, it had disbursed over US$ 93,023 in loans to shareholders who are eligible to get a loan of four times the amount of shares and earnings each year.
In February 2012, AWF gave a grant to the FSO of US$ 10,625 to support savings and loans (C-SOL-6). The FSO however faces several challenges, some of which are associated with illiteracy among its shareholders. The fact that only about 10% of the shareholders are educated inhibits most shareholders from embracing financial opportunities as well as understanding the financial details (C-SOL-6). Bank accounts have also not been widely embraced by the communities (AWF 2010). There are also plans to transform the FSO from a Community-Based Organization (CBO) to a Savings and Co-operative Credit Organisation (SACCO) with a banking hall at Kimanjo shopping centre (AWF 2013).

Summarizing the livelihood benefits of the partnership enterprises, one community leader stated that: “illiteracy levels have gone down, people have added livestock, women can now make beads and sell, warriors used to engage in livestock theft but have now stopped, we have identity and peace and treatment is now available” (C-KS-3).

6.3 Contributions to natural capital and biodiversity conservation

The existence of the conservation enterprises has had both positive and negative impacts on natural capital and biodiversity conservation. In this thesis, I mainly focus on the contribution of the enterprise partnerships to the reduction of threats to biodiversity and to the area brought under conservation. Before the establishment of the tourism-conservation enterprises, unplanned and uncontrolled land-use and land degradation were identified as major threats to biodiversity in the region. AWF therefore assisted in the zonation of the group ranches into conservation, settlement and grazing zones, and initiated soil erosion control initiatives such as the construction of barriers (A-2).
The intention was to have a well planned, organized and sustainable land-use system and in the process reduce land degradation and soil erosion. Though the Koija and the Kijabe group ranches have been zoned into conservation, settlement and grazing areas, some community members still do not adhere to the zonation rules and the support for soil erosion initiatives by the group ranch members has not been consistent (A-10). There are also incidences of non-commitment by the communities in terms of sustaining the soil initiated erosion strategies and disrespecting the land zoning rules, such as not keeping livestock out of the conservation areas (P-SOL-2; P-KS-2; A-10) which has impacted the realization of the reduction of the threats.

For exclusive conservation land, the Koija group ranch has set aside only the initial 200 hectares (A-2). Kijabe group ranch set aside an initial 2,000 hectares for conservation, with Nkiloriti group ranch adding 600 hectares to the conservation area to share in the benefits, as a result of a boundary dispute. Over time, neighbouring Tiamamut group ranch and Narupa conservancy added each 2,225 hectares (P-SOL-2) to make up the Ol Lentille conservancy. By the end of 2011, the land under exclusive conservation at the Ol Lentille conservancy was over 7,050 hectares (P-SOL-2).

These exclusive conservation areas have served as important wildlife habitats and vegetation recovery has been reported, which has helped address the threat of land-use (A-10). Additionally, as a result of the existence of the exclusive conservation areas, there has been an increase in numbers and diversity of large and small mammals such as elephants, Grevy’s zebra and wild dogs and the existence of resident wildlife in the group ranches which was not there before the exclusive conservation areas (A-10). Despite the impressive contribution, several fundamental ecological questions remain, such as the size of the conservation areas and their durability as conservation initiatives.
in light of future increases in human population and the corresponding increases in livestock populations.

The partnership enterprises were also set up to help address the threats of human wildlife conflicts arising from aspects such as predation of livestock among others. Figures by AWF (2008) indicate that 300 wild dogs were identified in the heartland in the year 2007, and 308 heads of livestock lost to predators in 2007 but no retaliatory attack on wild dogs were reported by the communities. This is credited to among others conservation scouts monitoring and other predator mitigation measures which has reduced livestock predation and promoted co-existence of people and wildlife.

In terms of human-wildlife conflicts, the communities have also become more tolerant to wildlife (C-KS-1; P-KS-2; A-2) as evidenced by the lack of retaliatory attacks on wildlife by the communities after loss of their livestock to wild dogs and other predators (AWF 2008).

The enterprise partnerships also sought to contribute to the reduction of incidences of poaching. Though minimal, incidences of poaching animals such as giraffes and Grevy’s zebra by some community members have been reported (P-KS-2). This can be attributed to the ‘commons’ nature of the group ranch land and the weakly enforced group ranch and conservation area rules. The communities’ dispute resolution mechanisms and sanctions tend to be weakly enforced by the Maasai communities who often do not want to bring a community member to the police or to legal courts (see also Lamers et al. 2013). The presence of AWF and the private investors has changed this situation considerably as these actors do favour the involvement of modern enforcement institutions. In addition, lack of property rights over wildlife on their land also serves as a disincentive to protect wildlife, particularly since communities receive minimal assistance
and recognition as critical players in wildlife management in national policies and legislations (Van Wijk et al. 2014).

The presence of conservation scouts and other security measures has also lead to increased security in the area which has in turn reduced threats to wildlife. Other benefits to biodiversity, as argued by one stakeholder on the Koija group ranch include that: “there is a sense of security for the dispersal of wildlife to community land...they have a more positive attitude towards wildlife...and also the caring for that environment...they do not cut trees...they do not burn charcoal...the biggest disappointment is that they have not been able to expand the conservation area” (P-KS-2).

On the other hand, increased income from the enterprises has had negative impacts on biodiversity and natural capital. For example income from the sale of beads and manyatta entry fees has been used for buying more livestock, which has increased the threats of overgrazing and land degradation (A-10). Other community members have used the income to buy seeds for subsistence farming on the river bank at Koija group ranch (AWF 2012; C-KS-5) increasing the threats of land-use changes and human-wildlife conflicts.
6.4 Conclusion

This chapter has discussed the contributions of both partnership enterprises to livelihood and conservation, in other words the effectiveness concept. The analysis was based on the Sustainable Livelihood Framework, with a focus on the livelihood capital assets and impacts on biodiversity threats and contributions in terms of the land set aside for exclusive conservation. Results indicate that the experimentation with tourism-conservation enterprises have had important, but also mixed impacts on livelihoods and conservation.

Both partnership enterprises have contributed significantly to livelihoods and to conservation. Through the partnerships contributions to the five capital assets, some community members’ well-being has been improved and their vulnerability to drought reduced as a result of aspects such as income from employment. The findings however, reveal that the majority of the livelihood benefits are not direct from the enterprises, but are indirect effects, resulting from philanthropy, grants and donations, among others, and from the guests staying at the eco-lodges. Moreover, the direct benefits, though substantial, are highly influenced by among others the low occupancy rates. This raises the question of the viability of tourism as a consistent and durable strategy for livelihood enhancement and conservation.

In terms of conservation, the main contribution of the partnership enterprises has been the setting aside of exclusive conservation areas by the communities. However, the conservation of biodiversity is pressured by illegal grazing in the conservation areas, increased crop farming, and growing livestock populations which arise out of the ‘commons’ nature of the land. Future increases in human populations also raise questions of the durability of the interventions for biodiversity conservation.
Chapter 7: Conclusions and discussion

7.1 Introduction

In Eastern Africa the partnership model has been widely adopted as a preferred mode of governance addressing the joint objectives of conservation and development. From the late 1990s, the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) started to experiment with tourism conservation enterprises by acting as a third party, moderating partnerships between private investors and communities. This thesis analyzes and explains the governance of two of these AWF facilitated tourism-based conservation enterprises in Kenya: the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and Koija Starbeds partnerships.

Both partnership enterprises are eco-lodges located in Laikipia County, Kenya. They involve three partners: AWF, communities and a private investor. For the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille, the partners are AWF, the Kijabe group ranch and Nkiloriti group ranch, and Regenesis Limited (RL). At Koija Starbeds, the partners are AWF, the Koija group ranch and Oryx Limited (OL). In both partnerships, the communities have set aside a part of their land exclusively for conservation where the eco-lodges have been constructed. In return, the communities receive benefits from the eco-lodges, which are operated by the private investors.

This thesis studies the governance of the two partnerships making use of the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness. Although these concepts are also known as normative and prescriptive ‘good governance’ principles, this thesis departs from this normative view of ‘good governance’ and applies the concepts in an analytical way to study and understand the nature of governance of the partnerships. Moreover, it also examines the inter-relationships
between participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness, power-relations among the actors involved and the local, national and international contexts in which the partnerships operate.

The thesis therefore aims to answer the following research question:

What is the nature of governance of the partnerships in terms of participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness, and how can this be explained?

In this final chapter, I bring together the findings from the empirical chapters and discuss crosscutting issues, the theoretical and policy implications, and suggest ways forward.

7.2 Overview of main concepts

This thesis examines governance of the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and the Koija Starbeds partnerships. The contemporary meaning of governance entails societal steering through an assemblage of actors beyond the state (Arts & Van Tatenhove 2004; Rhodes 1997; Offe 2009; Rosenau & Czempiel 1992; Van Kersbergen & Van Waarden 2004), with these actors often collaborating through partnerships (Van Huijstee et al 2007; Brinkerhoff 2002). In the thesis, the governance of the two partnerships is analyzed in terms of participation, transparency, accountability, equity and effectiveness.

In the analysis of governance in both partnerships, three places for decision-making, or ‘governing platforms’ are identified: the trust, the group ranch, and the project platforms. The trust platforms refer to the ‘Kijabe Trust’ for the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership and the ‘Koija Trust’ for the Koija Starbeds partnership. Both trusts are charitable entities designed as decision-making bodies for maintaining and managing the
respective conservation areas, the eco-lodges and the community benefits. Their mandate was also to attract donor and investment funding for the communities, a role they have not managed to execute since inception due to the absence of proper structures, such as staff and fundraising policies and procedures.

The Kijabe Trust is governed by an eight-member board of trustees, comprising of three members from the private investor, three from the Kijabe group ranch (including a former speaker of the National Assembly) and one from AWF (a high profile official). On the other hand, the Koija Trust is governed by a more locally constituted five-member board of trustees, comprising of two members from the private investor, two from Koija group ranch and one from AWF. The high profile representation at the Kijabe Trust arose after the community chose an influential politician to represent them. As a consequence, AWF chose to be represented by an equally influential official.

Both partnerships also involve community groups who own and utilize land together. These institutional arrangements are known as group ranches. For both partnerships, the group ranch decision-making platforms are managed by committee members, elected annually by the adult male members of the respective communities.

Lastly, there are the ‘projects’ platforms. In both partnerships, the private investors have set up charities that support and initiate various projects in the region. These charities are formally not part of the conservation enterprise partnerships, but separate entities. For the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille, there is the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya, which manages the Ol Lentille Conservancy (all the land set aside for conservation by the various community groups in the area), and attracts donor funds and philanthropy for projects providing community and conservation benefits. For the Koija Starbeds, there is the Loisaba Community Conservation Trust (LCCT), a charitable trust concerned with education, health and conservation issues in the region.
The conceptualization and analysis of governance in this thesis is based on insights from literature on governance, environmental regimes, partnerships, and development (see Chapter 2). Participation is conceptualized in terms of actors’ involvement in making, implementing, and enforcing decisions in the partnerships. Moreover, participation is differentiated as ‘consultative’ if ideas, decision-making and implementation are mainly performed by a central actor (for example the private investor); ‘functional’ if decisions are made by a central actor and other actors are involved in implementation; ‘collaborative’ if there is consensus in decision-making, exchange of knowledge and information, and sharing of finances and resources among the actors. Finally, it is ‘transformative’ if there is community control, exchange of knowledge and information, and use of local finances and resources.

Transparency is conceptualized as the availability and content of information, and its accessibility for different actors. Accountability is conceptualized in terms of actors’ obligations for and ability to take on responsibilities, availability of checks and balances for responsibilities, and presence of sanctions for non-compliance. Equity is analyzed in terms of economic equity, including the allocation of costs and benefits amongst the actors.

Borrowing from environmental regime literature, effectiveness is operationalized as the extent to which the partnerships have achieved what they set out to accomplish. Effectiveness is therefore analyzed in terms of the contributions to community livelihoods and to biodiversity conservation.

To analyze the contribution to livelihoods, the thesis draws on the ‘Sustainable Livelihoods Framework’ (see chapter 2). The tourism conservation enterprises studied in this thesis have been established to diversify the communities’ livelihood strategies, by expanding the way the communities make a living (mainly through pastoralism),
improving the communities’ well-being and reducing poverty (as main livelihood outcomes), and decreasing vulnerability to external factors (e.g. climate change and drought) by reinforcing human, social, natural, physical and financial livelihood assets. This thesis therefore analyzes the partnerships’ contributions to these assets. To assess the contribution of the partnerships to natural assets and biodiversity conservation, this thesis mainly focuses on the contributions of the partnerships to reducing threats to biodiversity and the set aside conservation area.

To explain the nature of governance in the partnerships, actor power relations and context are identified. Just like governance, power is a contested concept with no universal definition. There are many conceptualizations of power (Bachrach & Baratz 1962; Clegg 1989; Dahl 1957; Digeser 1992). However, for this thesis, I conceptualize power based on Barnett & Duvall (2005) four faces of power. The first is compulsory power, which is about the direct control of one actor over the conditions of existence and/or the actions of another, either intentionally or unintentionally, through the deployment of resources. In practice compulsory power is identified through establishing the actors’ control over resources and the actors who win in decision-making.

The second is institutional power, which entails an actor’s control over others, through ‘biased’ rules and laws. The third is structural power, which is the direct and mutual constitution of actors’ subject positions in a structural relationship within a certain social system, producing subjective interests, differential privileges and relations of subordination. Finally we have the productive power, which entails the production of subjects and identities through scientific and societal discourses.

The context (as discussed in Chapter 3) is conceptualized in terms of the international, national, local and the AWF’s conservation enterprise strategy. At the international level context, three discourses, i.e. the sustainable development; the
governance, good governance & partnerships and the neoliberal conservation discourses are identified to have influenced and continue to influence the development of the conservation enterprise partnerships. At the national level, the history of wildlife conservation in Kenya and the policy and institutional framework are identified. At the local level, aspects related to culture and traditions, socio-economic status and the ecological status are considered.

7.3 Summary of the main findings

The two partnerships studied in this thesis are important experiments using tourism-based enterprises to address the joint objectives of conservation and development (see also Van der Duim et al. 2014). They present an opportunity for community involvement and devolution of authority and benefits in the management and conservation of wildlife in Kenya. The partnerships also offer the potential of pooling strengths and resources of different actors in the achievement of conservation and development objectives, in addition to their potential for solving complex sustainability challenges (Mol 2007) due to the inclusion of actors from different societal spheres.

This research showed that the two partnerships made important contributions to livelihoods and conservation in the group ranches involved. However, the results also reveal governance challenges witnessed elsewhere in Eastern and Southern Africa as well (see Van der Duim et al. 2014). The main challenges for governance of the partnerships resulted from power relations between the private investors and the communities on the one hand, and between group ranch leaders and the community members on the other. Other aspects, such as culture and traditions, policy voids regarding conservation on community land and the existence of legal plurism, as exemplified in the different rules and procedures in the governance platforms, and the
different world views of the various actors involved, also played a role. Below, I will summarize my main findings in more detail. First, I briefly introduce the governance challenges per platform and then the findings in terms of the governance concepts.

**Governance challenges per platform**

At the trusts, the main issues identified include: (i) the absence of Kijabe Trust Board meetings for some time as a result a disagreement between the influential community trustee and the private investor trustee. There are claims that the community trustee wanted to gain political mileage from the partnership activities which led to disagreement with the private investor trustee. This shows that that the partnerships as modes of governance are prone to politics; (ii) the dominant role of the private investor trustees, especially in the implementation of the decisions in both trusts. Contrary to the communities, the investors possessed both business and management knowledge, which influenced the power relationship between the private investors and community actors; (iii) absence of checks and balances and sanctions for actor responsibilities at the trusts, which partly influenced accountability and contributed to mistrust of the community towards the private investors. The mistrust arose as a result of the community perceptions that the investors were not disclosing all the information, especially with regard to the operations of the eco-lodges.

Other major issues identified were the different world views and expectations among the actors. For example the community view of what accountability is and the most appropriate way to hold wrong doers accountable was different from the private investor and AWF views on the same. For the community, public shaming and fines in form of goats or cows to the elders depending on the severity of the crime serves the
purpose. This is opposed to the private investor and AWF options of involving police and courts of law.

At the group ranches, issues identified relate to: (i) minimal involvement or participation of women in group ranch affairs; (ii) infrequent and ineffective communication modes between the community leaders and the members; mainly by Annual General Meetings (AGMs), notice boards and word of mouth; (iii) the dominant roles of the group ranch leaders. The member roles were mainly restricted to voting in the annual elections of group ranch committee members; (iv) absence of checks and balances and sanctions for the follow up of leaders’ actions and decisions by the members. This had implications for accountability at the group ranch platforms; (v) unenforced sanctions in the Land (Group Representatives) Act Cap 287 for unaccountable group ranch leaders especially due to the lax government enforcement structures (vi) unclear membership, especially for the Kijabe group ranch. This resulted to benefits being shared among a large number of beneficiaries, thus affecting the effectiveness in terms of contributions to livelihoods.

At the ‘projects’ platforms, most of the projects were mainly financed through philanthropy and major decisions were made at the level of the respective private investor affiliated charitable trusts. The findings indicated that there were no rules or agreements for collaboration between the trusts and the communities. Therefore, the main governance challenges identified at the projects platforms for both partnerships include: (i) limited community involvement, especially during fundraising. Their lack of involvement influenced their perceptions of lack of transparency, accountability and equity in the projects; (ii) limited community trust in the private investors, with a majority of community leaders interviewed having the opinion that the investor used the community to raise funds without being honest about the amounts raised; (iii) non-
compatible information disclosure mechanisms by the charitable trusts, since the main reporting mechanism of the trusts was through the internet; and (iv) non-existent collaborative agreements and checks and balances for the trusts by the community actors which had implications for the communities’ perception of lack of accountability.

Main findings per governance concept

Participation

Global discourses on partnerships and sustainable development typically stress the need for participation by all relevant actors in a partnership. The reality on the ground is that participation is often confronted with various challenges. At the Kijabe Trust, the private investor partner, Regenesis Limited, as executive trustee made, implemented and enforced decisions with minimal involvement of AWF and the community partners. Participation at the Kijabe Trust was thus mainly consultative. The main explanation for this situation is the disagreement between the investor and a community trustee, due to which no trust meetings have taken place since May 2010 to the time of the field study. The private investor occupies a powerful position compared to other actors as a result of the key responsibilities at the trust.

Participation at the Koija Trust was more collaborative, since all the trustees were to some extent involved in decision-making. However, the private investor clearly took the lead in activities such as supervising eco-lodge maintenance. The private investor’s possession of management knowledge and the occupation of a key position in the trust place him in a position of influence over the other actors.

In both group ranches, participation was mainly consultative, as the elected group ranch leaders (the chairman, secretary and treasurer) were the main actors in making,
implementing and enforcing decisions. The decision-making structures at the group ranches [governed by the Land (Group Representatives) Act cap 287], typically manifest gender inequalities; women are not registered members and therefore have minimal participation in elections and decision-making. At Kijabe, there was no woman representative in the committee, while at Koija there was one female member of the committee, who however did not hold any of the three key leadership positions.

Other reasons for the limited women participation include their low literacy levels and the paternalistic culture, which subjects women to a different and peripheral identity than men. In addition, the Act provides for limited involvement of the group ranch members, which confined their participation to annual elections and attendance of meetings. This limited involvement has also implications for accountability.

Finally, for the projects, the private investors, making use of their (donor) networks and access to capital, made major decisions, mainly with regard to fundraising and implementation, making participation to be functional in nature. The networks and access to capital gave the investors a powerful position in relation to the communities, by acting as donors and making communities ‘recipients of aid’. The dominant role of the private investors is also enabling, as we look at the huge financial streams that are generated though donors and philanthropy.

**Transparency**

At the Kijabe Trust the private investor, as the executive trustee, provides quarterly reports on the number of guests and use of funds to other partners. The community partners however, want more information regarding the lodge operations, which is beyond the provisions of the management agreement signed at the initial stages of the partnership. This perceived lack of disclosure of the lodge accounts by the private
investor is considered by the community and its leaders as a lack of transparency and accountability. So even though transparency at the trust meets the set rules, there is still dissatisfaction among the community actors, which also influences their opinions on accountability, since information disclosure plays a critical role in accountability.

At the Kojja Trust, the private investor provided the required information, including a breakdown of how money paid by guests was used. Despite this disclosure, the community still has doubts about the information provided, which can be seen as an indication of a low level of trust among the partners. Similar to the Kijabe Trust, this perceived lack of information also had an effect on the community’s perceptions on accountability.

At the group ranches, information is provided to the community through public meetings and notice boards, and also often passed through ‘word of mouth’. The content of the information is however not fully understood by the majority of community members due to the existing low literacy levels in the region. Transparency at the group ranch platforms can therefore be said to be low due to the nature and media of information to the members, as well as due to the limitations of the members to process the information provided.

At the projects, information is mainly availed to the community partners by the investors during the implementation phase of projects. The activities are mainly presented on the respective trust websites, which are not accessible to the majority of the community leaders and members, resulting in low transparency at the project platforms.
**Accountability**

At the Kijabe trust, the private investor had the responsibilities of managing the conservation area, supervising and equipping conservation scouts, and managing the eco-lodge, among other trust roles. At the Koija trust, the private investor responsibilities included managing and maintenance of the eco-lodge, among other duties. AWF played mediation and community mobilization roles, and also attracted donor funding. The main responsibility of the communities in both partnerships was to keep the conservation area free from livestock grazing.

These different roles were stipulated in the Trust Deed, which provided guidelines for responsibilities of the actors and their authority to act. The deed at the Kijabe Trust for example gave the executive trustee, the private investor, power to execute the stipulations of the trust deed, and to make executive or management-related decisions. There were also minimal documented checks and balances and sanctions for the responsibilities of the private investor trustees in both the Kijabe and Koija Trusts. Although the trust deeds for both trusts included stipulations that the trust could withhold money from the group ranch if the community would let its livestock graze in the conservation area, there were unclear guidelines on avenues in place for the community and AWF in case of dissatisfaction with the reports availed by the private investor trustees. The trust deeds thus provided unbalanced rules for checks and balances and sanctions for different actors with implications for accountability. Accountability at the trust platforms can therefore be termed as minimal. Although there are differentiated actor roles and responsibilities depending on their capabilities, there are minimal checks and balances and sanctions in case of offences.

At the group ranch platforms for both partnerships, major responsibilities were vested on the group ranch leaders (the chairman, secretary and treasurer), typically
reflecting the traditional governance structure at group ranches in Kenya. The existing checks and balances for the responsibilities of the leaders, mainly stipulated in the Land (Group Representatives) Act cap 287, were weakly enforced in the group ranch platforms. At the Kijabe group ranch, the group ranch committee was responsible for distributing community benefits. However, the local institutional mechanisms for accountability, such as the Community Investment Plan (CIP), which details how group ranch income is to be distributed, did not provide comprehensive guidelines to ensure accountability. This could create avenues for mis-appropriation and inequality, a scenario that links accountability and equity aspects.

At the Koija partnership, on the other hand, all income from the eco-lodge was divided through the Koija Trust, including the Electronic Fund Transfer (EFT) of bursaries from the trust account directly to school, college and university accounts. The involvement of representatives from all of the partners and a reduction of the number of handlers has contributed to improved transparency on the use of funds and enhanced accountability.

At the projects, major responsibilities included fundraising for development and conservation projects and implementing these projects. The private investors and/or their representatives performed the responsibilities of fundraising.

**Equity**

At both the Kijabe and Koija Trusts, it was difficult to trace the decision-making processes on the amounts and the sharing of the conservation and bed-night fees. At the Sanctuary, the bed-night and conservation fee paid by each guest was US$ 80, of which US$ 20 remained with Regenesis Limited; US$ 30 was allocated to the Kijabe Conservation Trust (KCT-SOL), US$ 24 to the Kijabe group ranch, and US$ 6 to the
Nkiloriti group ranch. At Koija Starbeds, each non-resident guest paid US$ 85 as bed-night and conservation fee, all which went to KCT-KS. Out of this, 25% of it was used for a capital fund to finance the purchase of lodge assets and maintenance, 20% of the remaining 75% was provided to the group ranch to assist in group ranch management and related logistics. The remaining amount, 80% of 75%, was allocated to the Koija Bursary Fund, which paid partial school fees for secondary school, college and university education (see Table 7.1).

Table 7.1: Utilization of Bed-night and Conservation fee at Koija Trust

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Allocation</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
<th>Responsibility for funds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Capital fund (capital development and lodge maintenance)</td>
<td>25% of total income</td>
<td>Koija Conservation Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Group ranch management</td>
<td>20% of the remaining 75%</td>
<td>Group ranch committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Koija Bursary Fund (payment of school fees)</td>
<td>80% of the remaining 75%</td>
<td>Koija Conservation Trust</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the Kijabe group ranch, benefits were shared equally between those living within the ranch and those residing outside (two-thirds of the members). There were mixed feelings about this arrangement; with some community respondents arguing that those residing outside should benefit less since they encountered less human-wildlife conflicts (such as loss of livestock to predators and competition for water with wildlife). Others were of the opinion that those who resided outside reduced pressure from grazing and hence should benefit equally. Individual benefits for both partnerships mainly entailed school bursaries for those in secondary, college and universities. However, in both group ranches members without children of school-going age felt left out of the benefits and therefore considered the benefit sharing unfair. At the projects, all community members had equal access to the benefits, as the majority of the activities were community projects.
Overview of participation, transparency, accountability and equity in the partnerships

From the above discussion and the summary in Table 7.2, there are both similarities and differences in both partnerships in terms of participation, transparency, accountability and equity. In both partnerships, AWF as third partner, has played a major role of moderating the arrangements and attracting donor funds for the set-up of the enterprises. In both partnerships, there were also three platforms of decision-making, which have evolved over time, with different actors, actor roles and rules of engagement, which have had implications for governance.

A third notable similarity is the mistrust of the communities towards the private investors, despite the fact that both partnerships have been in existence for some time. This mistrust contributed to the community opinions of perceived lack of transparency, accountability and equity in the partnerships.

Several differences in the partnerships were also identified. The first major difference is in terms of the representation and member composition at the trusts. For example at Kijabe trust, as a result of the high profile representation, meetings did not take place, political misunderstandings were abundant and the community did not feel adequately represented. This is opposed to the Koija Trust, which had local representation, where meetings took place as scheduled and consultation of the actors took place.

The second main difference is on the platform responsible for funds and benefit sharing. The responsibility for majority of funds from the conservation enterprise at Koija was at the Koija Conservation Trust board. The implication here is that, the inclusion of representatives from the different actors enhanced openness. At the same time, the direct transfer of funds to school accounts reduced the number of handlers which as a
consequence, reduced the chances of the money being diverted to other uses. This is opposed to the Sanctuary where the responsibility for funds and benefit sharing is at the group ranch level.

The third difference reflects the presence of intra-community and inter-community political struggles. As a result of some members living outside, at Kijabe, intra-community political struggles were identified this influenced representation to the group ranch committees by persons with infrequent contact with the operations of the group ranch. At the same time, inter-community political struggles as a result of a boundary dispute with the neighbouring Nkiloriti group ranch were identified as also influencing governance.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Sanctuary at Oi Lentille</th>
<th>Koija Starbeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participation</td>
<td>Kijabe Trust</td>
<td>Kijabe Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘Consultative’: private investor actor more engaged in making, implementing and enforcing decisions.</td>
<td>• ‘Collaborative’: all actors engaged in making decisions; private investor actor more engaged in implementing and enforcing decisions.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• High-level actor representation.</td>
<td>• Local actor representation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kijabe group ranch</td>
<td>Koija group ranch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘Consultative’: committee members more engaged in making, implementing and enforcing decisions compared group ranch members.</td>
<td>• ‘Consultative’: committee members more engaged in making, implementing and enforcing decisions compared to group ranch members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Koija group ranch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘Collaborative’: all actors engaged in implementing decisions not in decision-making and enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ol Lentille Trust</td>
<td>LCCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• ‘Functional’: community involved in implementing decisions, not in decision-making and enforcement</td>
<td>• ‘Functional’: community involved in implementing decisions not in decision-making and enforcement.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transparency</td>
<td>Kijabe Trust</td>
<td>Koija Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Transparency meets the set rules, but community dissatisfied and mistrusts the private investor.</td>
<td>• Transparency meets the set rules, but community dissatisfied and mistrusts the private investor.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kijabe group ranch</td>
<td>Koija group ranch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low due to limited access to information by members.</td>
<td>• Low due to limited access to information by members.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Koija group ranch</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low due to limited access to information by community.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Kijabe Trust:</td>
<td>Koija Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited due to private investor holding most responsibilities, minimal checks and balances and sanctions for non-conformance.</td>
<td>• Limited due to private investor holding most responsibilities, minimal checks and balances and sanctions for non-conformance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kijabe group ranch</td>
<td>Koija group ranch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited due to the committee holding most responsibilities, minimal checks and balances and sanctions for non-conformance.</td>
<td>• Limited due to the committee holding most responsibilities, minimal checks and balances and sanctions for non-conformance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Accountability of funds better than at Kijabe, due to the Koija Trust’s responsibilities for bursary allocation.</td>
<td>• Accountability of funds better than at Kijabe, due to the Koija Trust’s responsibilities for bursary allocation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ol Lentille Trust</td>
<td>LCCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited due to the investor holding most responsibilities, minimal checks and balances and sanctions for non-conformance.</td>
<td>• Limited due to the investor holding most responsibilities, minimal checks and balances and sanctions for non-conformance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Equity</td>
<td>Kijabe Trust</td>
<td>Koija Trust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community considers it low due to lack of information regarding benefit sharing amongst the actors</td>
<td>• Community considers it low due to lack of information regarding benefit sharing amongst the actors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kijabe group ranch</td>
<td>Koija group ranch</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Limited due to lack of clear membership, guidelines for allocation, checks and balances and sanctions for misappropriation.</td>
<td>• Limited by lack of clear membership, guidelines for allocation, checks and balances and sanctions for misappropriation.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Access of benefits by all members but viewed as inequitable by those without school-going children.</td>
<td>• Access of benefits by all members but viewed as inequitable by those without school-going children.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ol Lentille Trust</td>
<td>LCCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Community level benefits. High equity since all members have equal access to benefits.</td>
<td>• Community level benefits. High equity since all members have equal access to benefits.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Effectiveness

The main issues identified in relation to the partnerships contributions to conservation and livelihoods include: (i) the dependency of the partnerships’ contributions on philanthropy. The majority of the livelihood contributions, especially at the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille, were from donations from the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya with less direct benefits from the partnership enterprise; (ii) the absence of comprehensive and clear guidelines for the distribution of benefits, especially the benefits shared at the group ranch platform in the Kijabe group ranch. This could lead to misappropriation and corruption which has clear implications for governance; (iii) the use of income from employment and other livelihood activities to purchase more livestock, increasing the threats of overgrazing and land degradation. This contradicts the hypothesis that the set-up of conservation enterprises will lead to conservation benefits; (iv) neighbouring communities and some group ranch members letting their livestock graze in the exclusive conservation areas. This had implications for the realization of conservation outcomes of the partnerships.

In terms of the five capital assets of the Sustainable Livelihoods Framework (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4; Table 7.3 summarizes the contribution to the capital assets while Table 7.4 summarizes the employment opportunities which are part of the contributions to financial assets), both partnerships had made important contributions to the livelihoods of the group ranch members. Livelihood strategies were diversified through the creation of jobs, sale of crafts, and performing traditional dances for the guests of the eco-lodges. These contributions were both direct from the eco-lodges and related undertakings such as the cultural manyattas (houses where the dances were performed and crafts were sold by women), and indirect benefits from philanthropy of the respective private investor philanthropic activities (through the OLTK and LCCT).
The indirect benefits, from philanthropy, in both partnerships were significant. At Koija, the benefits from philanthropy were slightly larger than the direct benefits from the enterprise, and at the Sanctuary, the indirect benefits from philanthropy even far outweighed the benefits from the eco-lodge and cultural manyatta (see Tables 7.3 and 7.4). Below, the main (direct and indirect) contributions of the partnerships to the five livelihood assets (physical, social, human, financial and natural) are highlighted.

An essential characteristic of AWF conservation tourism enterprises, in terms of physical livelihood assets, is that the eco-lodge buildings and immovable assets belong to the community. AWF also facilitated the construction of the group ranch offices and installation of communication-related infrastructure such as solar panels and radio communication equipment for health emergencies and security communications. Through the income of the cultural manyattas, some women have bought iron sheets for the construction of more modern houses, and others have bought beehives. The women initiatives have however been confronted with challenges related to management and record keeping, due to the low literacy levels. The benefits are also limited, since the cultural manyattas depend on the eco-lodge guests which operate on an annual average of less than 30% occupancy.

Main indirect contributions to physical capital, mainly funded through the philanthropy of the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya and guest donations, include the drilling of boreholes for the provision of water, laying of water pipes, and maintenance and construction of dams, and the provision of water tanks for rainwater harvesting. The Ol Lentille Trust Kenya has also constructed a 24-bed sub-district hospital. Prior to this, the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya supported the Kimanjo health centre by providing hospital equipment, bicycles and a motorbike for community health workers. It has also been engaged in the construction of buildings and the provision of furniture and supplies in
over six primary schools and one secondary school in the region. At Koija, LCCT also contributed to the purchase of the Koija health centre refrigerator among other health centre equipment.

Both enterprises also contributed to the community’s pride, sense of belonging and identity. The trusts for example, support local football clubs and sport exchange programs for primary school pupils, activities that strengthen social cohesion. A negative effect has been the rise of internal conflicts and power struggles at Kijabe due to the influx of money into the community from the enterprise. Internal conflicts and power struggles have also emerged between members living in the group ranch and those living elsewhere. These conflicts are related to leadership, and associated benefits of controlling the income from the partnership. External tensions with other communities have also been witnessed. For example, before the arrival of the lodge, there was harmonious co-existence with the neighboring Nkiloriti group ranch. The lodge and consequent benefits has however created tensions between the two group ranches, which have temporarily been settled by a MoU.

In terms of human capital, the partnerships and the projects provide, among others, payment of teachers’ salaries, financing of education, bursaries, food programs for HIV/AIDS patients, and salaries for community health workers providing mobile clinic services.

For financial capital, AWF estimates the total community income from the lodge at the Sanctuary (lease fee, conservation and bed night fees, and wages from direct employment) in the period 2006-2012 as more than US$ 330,000 (A-11). For Koija, AWF estimated half of this amount (A-11). These figures exclude the income from employment of teachers, conservation scouts and health workers, among others.
In terms of contributions to natural capital and biodiversity conservation, both partnerships have set aside land for conservation, protecting these habitats from grazing by livestock. For the Sanctuary, a larger conservation area of 2,000 hectares was initially set aside compared to the 200 hectares set aside at Koija. The private investor at the Sanctuary expanded the conservation area to an area exceeding 7,050 hectares by engaging neighbouring group ranches (to set aside conservation areas in exchange for livelihood benefits by the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya. The conservation areas are meant to reduce the threats to biodiversity caused by land-use changes and land degradation as a result of overgrazing.

These exclusive conservation areas have served as important wildlife habitats, and vegetation recovery has been reported. Additionally, there is an increase in numbers and diversity of large and small mammals such as elephants, Grevy’s zebra and wild dogs. The exclusive conservation areas have also contributed to reduced land degradation as a result of vegetation recovery. There are however, incidences of non-commitment by the communities in terms of not sustaining soil erosion strategies such as grass rehabilitation and reforestation of degraded areas, and not respecting the land zoning rules by not keeping livestock out of the conservation area.

Moreover, some incidences of poaching especially of giraffes and Grevy’s zebra by a few community members have also been reported. This can be attributed to the ‘commons’ nature of the group ranch land and the weakly enforced group ranch rules and weak traditional dispute resolution and sanctioning mechanisms. The community has also received minimal assistance in and recognition for their role in wildlife management in national policies and legislations, which have served as disincentives for commitment to conservation. The community has, however, become more tolerant to
wildlife, as evidenced by the lack of retaliatory attacks on wildlife by the communities after loss of their livestock to wild dogs and other predators.

On the other hand, increased income from the enterprise has had negative impacts on biodiversity and natural capital. For example, income from the cultural manyatta has been used for buying livestock, which has increased overgrazing levels, contributing to land degradation. The conservation of biodiversity is thus pressured by illegal grazing in the conservation areas, increased crop farming, and growing livestock populations which arise out of the ‘commons’ nature of the land since every member attempts to get maximum benefits from the land and related resources. Moreover, several fundamental ecological questions remain, including whether the conservation areas are large enough to support the different wildlife populations, and whether the areas are connected well enough to other conservation areas by corridors.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Aspect</th>
<th>Sanctuary at Ol Lentille</th>
<th>Kolja Starbeds</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Physical capital</td>
<td>Community ownership of lodge buildings and immovable assets.</td>
<td>Community ownership of lodge and immovable assets.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Physical assets such as beehives, sub-district hospital and purchase of iron sheets for modern houses.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Construction of group ranch offices.</td>
<td>Construction of group ranch offices.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social capital</td>
<td>Enhanced community pride, belonging and identity through ownership of land and belonging to a group.</td>
<td>Enhanced community pride, belonging and identity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Organization into committees.</td>
<td>Organization into committees.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Financial capital</td>
<td>Average annual community income of US$ 20,000-30,000 (bed-night, conservation and lease fees).</td>
<td>Average annual community income of US$ 20,000-30,000 (bed-night and conservation fees).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Employment (see Table 7.3).</td>
<td>Employment (see Table 7.3).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Purchase of goat meat, milk and eggs by the lodge.</td>
<td>Women and Morans income from Cultural manyatta (more than 300 members).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human capital</td>
<td>Education bursaries for secondary, college and universities e.g. by 2010 over 380 students had received bursaries from the partnership</td>
<td>Education bursaries for secondary, college and universities e.g. over 50 students in 2010 and 53 students in 2011.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Business skills for women.</td>
<td>Business skills for women.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Feeding programme for HIV patients.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Salaries for teachers and community Health Workers (see Table 7.4).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Natural capital and Biodiversity Conservation</td>
<td>2,000 hectares + 600 hectares from Nkilorit group ranch conservation area. Extended to &gt;7,050 hectares from neighbouring group ranches.</td>
<td>200 hectares conservation area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Reduction in poaching and improved community tolerance to wildlife.</td>
<td>Reduction in poaching and improved community tolerance.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Income used to buy more livestock leading to Degradation</td>
<td>Income used to buy more livestock leading to degradation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 7.4: Employment Opportunities

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of employment</th>
<th>Sanctuary at Ol Lentille</th>
<th>Responsibility for salary payment</th>
<th>Koija Starbeds</th>
<th>Responsibility for salary payment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Eco-lodge</td>
<td>21 staff members (8 from Kijabe group ranch)</td>
<td>Regenesis Limited</td>
<td>5 staff members (All from Koija)</td>
<td>Oryx Limited</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Health centre</td>
<td>35 (34 Community Health Workers and 1 nurse)</td>
<td>Ol Lentille Trust</td>
<td>2 staff members (1 nurse, 1 assistant)</td>
<td>LCCT</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Schools</td>
<td>27 (both primary and nursery school teachers)</td>
<td>Kijabe group ranch (5 staff members)</td>
<td>3 teachers</td>
<td>LCCT (2 staff members) Koija group ranch (1 staff member)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security + Administration</td>
<td>37 Security scouts for the conservation area</td>
<td>Kijabe group ranch (6) Kijabe Trust (29)</td>
<td>5 staff members Koija group ranch (part of the income is from Koija Trust)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FSO (Village Bank) (changed to a Savings and Credit Co-operative)</td>
<td>2 staff members</td>
<td>AWF (until December 2012)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>&gt;40 staff members Koija community members employed at Loisaba Wilderness</td>
<td>staff members Loisaba Wilderness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

7.4 Discussion and ways forward

The tourism conservation enterprise partnerships studied in this thesis are examples of experimentation with strategies for conservation and development using tourism as an instrument. The results have not only shown their value for and contributions to both conservation and livelihoods, but also revealed diverse governance challenges. The findings thus present valuable lessons to the wider policy and theoretical debates about the roles of partnerships and tourism in the conservation-development nexus.

This section therefore discusses some of the wider implications of this study, and gives suggestions for ways forward. To begin with, I discuss the theoretical and methodological reflections of this thesis and suggestions for future research. The findings of this thesis are then discussed in relation to lessons to three main debates: (i) the role of partnerships in the conservation-development nexus and related governance
challenges, (ii) the role of tourism in conservation and development, and (iii) role of governments in regulating these kinds of partnerships.

7.4.1 Theoretical and methodological reflection and suggestions for future research

In this thesis, I aimed to contribute to the theoretical debates on governance and partnerships for conservation and development. I analyzed governance of the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and the Koija Starbeds partnerships using the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, equity and effectiveness. The thesis however departed from the normative view of the concepts as ‘good governance’ and incorporated the inter-relationships between the concepts, power-relations and the local, national and international contexts in which the partnerships operate.

The thesis has shown that this application of the concepts is a viable way of studying and understanding governance of partnerships. The analytical perspective allows a rich analysis of how partnerships are governed in practice, and provides a detailed understanding of why partnerships are governed the way they are. From the analytical approach, and the study of the various concepts of governance together, I was able to establish that in governance, there are reinforcements and trade-offs among the concepts (see Agrawal 2001; Graham et al. 2003; Cornwall 2004). This is opposed to when the concepts are studied in isolation.

The results also confirmed the limits that exist for the governance concepts in practice. For example the limits to accountability and transparency arising from aspects such as revelation of sensitive information, and violation of privacy among others (see Park & Blenkinsopp 2011). The incorporation of power in the analysis helped confirm that power issues are always present in any collaborative arrangement (Lister 2000). I
therefore recommend the application of a similar approach to other partnerships, as well as other collaborative modes of governance.

Methodologically, a case study design was employed. Through the two-case studies, I was able to perform an in-depth analysis of the governance of the partnerships. The selected case studies included partnerships between a community, a private investor and an NGO. Future research could however be conducted on the governance of tourism related partnerships without the involvement of a third party (for example those involving only community and private investor partners) or involving actors from other societal spheres, such as those involving the state as a partner. In this case, comparative research could contribute to our understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of these kind of arrangements in which tourism is used to address conservation and development issues.

In terms of the partnership literature, the thesis has confirmed that partnerships do not automatically solve governance challenges and are prone to politics and changes and modifications over time. Future research should therefore include a follow-up of the changes in terms of governance and the contributions of the partnerships over time.

7.4.2 Role of partnerships in the conservation-development nexus

This thesis examined governance in the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and the Koija Starbeds partnerships and is part of a broader debate about the role of partnerships in the conservation-development nexus, and the way they are governed. Theoretically, partnerships are positioned as having an important potential for enhancing governance, as they are argued – almost per definition by engaging multiple types of partners—to improve, among others, inclusiveness, transparency, and equity, and re-distribute power.
Results however indicate several governance challenges in the partnerships (see Section 7.3). The challenges identified reveal that partnerships, as portrayed in partnership and sustainable development discourses, do not automatically address governance challenges. This is in line with critical partnerships literature that argues that partnerships, as emerging constellations of multiple actors for societal steering, do not automatically solve governance challenges related to accountability, unequal power-relations, transparency and ineffective institutions (Bramwell 2004; Bovaird 2004; Edgar et al. 2006).

Similar governance challenges experienced in the partnerships have been witnessed elsewhere, especially in relation to internal political struggles and lack of trust by the community partners related to the private investor partners (Ahebwa et al. 2012; Pellis 2011; Southgate 2006; Van der Duim et al. 2014), even resulting in court cases and closing down of conservation enterprises. Therefore, there is need for the actors in the partnerships to critically reflect on the opportunities and limitations presented by their approaches to making, implementing and enforcing decisions.

For durability of tourism-based partnerships as strategies for conservation, there is need to consider possible interventions for wildlife conservation in case of a fall-out or disagreements among the partners. For example, the Kimana Sanctuary in Kenya experienced neglect and degradation of the community-owned conservation area as a result of the community fall-out with the private investor. Therefore, partners in related partnerships need to have a set exit strategy, which takes care of the conservation area.

Results also show that just as in other related studies (Ahebwa et al. 2012; Southgate 2006; Van Wijk et al. 2014); partnerships are not ‘simple’ or ‘single’ governance arrangements. Rather, partnerships are ‘complex’ institutions of governance comprising of ‘nested institutions’ that all influence governance in their own manner.
While the community adheres to the group ranch laws and rules, NGO- and donor-related rules influence the actions of AWF. The existence of nested institutions is also exemplified by legal pluralism, stemming from the mingling of traditional, group ranch, trust and governmental rules, laws, and regulations, which further complicates governance in the partnerships. This pluralism, combined with the different world views of the communities, private investors and AWF, has complicated the governance process of the partnerships.

Moreover, the existence of various platforms of decision-making, with differentiated understandings of, rules for, and approaches to the different aspects of governance, further complicated governance. The identified platforms were also comprised of different actors. Some actors, such as the private investors, participated in the different platforms with different roles and rules of engagement per platform. For example, the private investor partner at the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership was the executive trustee of the Kijabe Trust, a director of the Regenesis Company, and a trustee at the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya. These differences in roles and rules of engagement led to confusion in the relationships among the partners and hence perceptions of lacking accountability and transparency. This calls for clear articulation actor roles and rules of engagement in partnerships that involve actors from different societal spheres.

Results further show that partnerships are not static, but dynamic initiatives that evolve over time. This evolution is manifested in the entry and exit of partners, engagement with other actors through MoUs, and some actors in the partnerships engaging in new partnerships with other actors. With this, the partnership becomes part of a network of partnerships, complicating not only governance in the partnership, but also governance of conservation and development in the region as a whole.
Moreover, partnerships are also influenced by changes in the context in which they operate. Partnerships are for example carriers of politics and have to face political shifts in group ranch committees or representation in the partnership arrangements, along with the subsequent politicization of the partnership by local leaders who wish to increase their share of the benefits or their political power. This is in addition to political disagreements between communities which often emerge when landownership and boundaries are not clear, as in this case for example between Kijabe group ranch and Nkiloriti group ranch.

These changes in the context of partnerships were not captured in the initial agreement contracts among the partners. The long-term (15-25 years) contracts between the private investors and the community at the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille make sense from a business perspective, because the private investors need to ensure a return on their investments. However, these long-term agreements pose a challenge from a partnership perspective due to among others the changes that occur in the context the partnerships operate in. There is therefore need for existing and future partnerships in conservation and development to consider agreements that are short term, for example 5-year contracts in order to be adaptive to the changes and the dynamism in both the context and within the partnership arrangements.

But at the same time, experience with partnerships over time indicates that they require a long-term involvement of all the partners. The enterprise partnerships are basically ‘trial and error’ interventions and require a not-for-profit engagement. However, it remains to be seen if and how organizations such as AWF would be capable to meet this requirement, since their involvement is sponsored by international donors who predominantly work with time-bound projects.
In response, AWF has started to claim financial compensation for the mediation services provided and to create more risk in the partnership arrangement by relying more on loans and social venture capital, through the African Wildlife Capital (AWC), which aims to shift funding for conservation enterprises from grants to a consolidated fund. This fund uses commercial debt and provides an element of risk. This move is likely to address the challenge of dependence on donor funding and the accompanying restrictions in terms of restrictions in the geographical coverage, focus issues and time-frame that money has to be spent, which usually curtail their creativity and long-term engagement with communities.

These developments clearly reflect a stronger neoliberal discourse exercised by AWF, through the belief that the inclusion of risk will create a greater sense of ownership by all partners, and the requirement for more rigorous business viability assessment will allow for a limited mediation role by a third party such as an NGO. However, the question that arises is whether the communities, with their current institutions, social-economic status and the ‘commons’ nature of their natural resources are able to handle such financial risks and associated business deals.

The above also illustrates that partnerships incorporate actors from different societal spheres with different world views, also in terms of the meaning and relevance of governance elements such as participation and accountability. For example in modern societies, women participation and gender equality are considered human rights and the private investors and AWF recognize them as such. The majority in the communities however, view women marginalization as ‘normal’ and as respect for tradition and culture. This contrasting world view has implications for women involvement and participation and ultimately on the governance in the partnerships. The results therefore reveal the difficulties of individual voluntary instruments, like the studied partnerships, to
contribute to fundamental societal reform such as the enhancement of women’s rights, which reflects findings in other partnership studies (Visseren-Hamakers 2013).

The partnerships are also part of a wider strategy, that of integrated conservation and development. The Integrated Conservation and Development (ICDP) strategy has however been critiqued for among others attempting to link two opposing or competing policy objectives, that is conservation and development (Butcher 2011). One major assumption of ICDPs which has been viewed as ‘erroneous’, is that raising the living standards of local communities will automatically lead to conservation (Newmark & Hough 2000). Results in this study underpin these criticisms where communities have used the income from the partnerships and spin-off activities to engage in farming or purchase of more livestock. These activities have contributed to increased human-wildlife conflicts and overstocking resulting in increased environmental degradation. From this scenario, it is important for interventions that aim to link conservation and development using economic incentives to consider trade-offs between the two opposing policy objectives and from the initial stages make the trade-offs clear to all parties.

Finally, the partnerships studied in this thesis are part of the Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) discourse where community inclusion in management of natural resources and benefit sharing is considered critically important. A challenge common in CBNRM initiatives (Southgate 2006) and partnerships is that the ‘community’ has been treated as homogenous by the partners and an entity free of individual agency and interests or internal divisions with no considerations of the differences that exist within that community such as gender, education levels, age, area of residence and poverty levels amongst others. This is opposed to the findings, also in this thesis, that communities are heterogeneous, stratified and characterized by a
multiplicity of actor power-relations. This research clearly revealed the difficulties related to participation and representation of different factions within the communities.

### 7.4.3 Role of tourism in the conservation-development nexus

As noted earlier, the studied enterprise partnerships are part of the CBNRM and the sustainable development discourses, and use tourism as a strategy for conservation and development. They are therefore similar to other experiments in sub-Saharan Africa, like the conservancies in Namibia, and community-based organizations in Botswana which also utilize tourism as a main economic mechanism to incentivize conservation (Van der Duim 2010).

Previous studies have indicated that the use of tourism-based interventions for conservation and development is particularly prone to challenges such as low occupancy and reinforcing dependency (Goodwin & Santilli 2009; Manyara & Jones 2007; Spenceley 2008). From the findings both conservation enterprises were found to be operating at less than 30% annual occupancy, thus minimizing the potential benefits to the community livelihoods and to conservation. The majority of the community benefits especially for the Sanctuary therefore arose from philanthropy.

This reliance on philanthropy combined with the low occupancy rates, increased competition within sub-Saharan Africa, a potential saturation of the market in countries like Kenya and the vulnerability of tourism to occurrences such as increased insecurity, terrorism and economic crisis among other catastrophes, raises concerns on the durability of tourism as a strategy for conservation and development. For example what happens to conservation and local benefits when there are no more donations? Other issues that need consideration include having a critical evaluation of means of
countering the low occupancy rates of the enterprises by focusing on new markets, including domestic tourism.

These interventions however require concerted efforts which are beyond the capacity of the actors in the partnership and therefore should include national government marketing agencies like the Kenya Tourist Board (KTB), national governmental agencies as well as the international community.

On the other hand, if tourism becomes ‘too successful’, and thus large-scale, the benefits may flourish in the short term, but the long-term contribution to conservation will most likely suffer from the environmental damage caused by tourists and subsequent developments. While this may not be the case in the studied partnerships, whose set-up is small-scale and are located in rather rural areas, this threat is clearly present in other areas, where tourism is more popular, for example around Kenya’s Amboseli National Park.

Another concern is that of the durability of community-based tourism interventions into the future, given the current increases in human population and the corresponding increases in livestock populations. This therefore calls for among others integrating tourism with other land uses. A mechanism that the private investor and AWF have been considering is the incorporation of ‘holistic’ grazing, or allowing periodic and organized grazing of community livestock in the exclusive conservation area which could lead to the durability of livelihood interventions. The challenge however may lie in the weakly enforced local community institutions in the management of the ‘commons’ nature of the resource which is prone to ‘free-rider’ challenges.

Finally, through tourism, the area has been linked to a larger network of demand and supply. This linkage in essence creates opportunities for communities to engage in. However results indicate that contextual aspects such as education levels and social-
economic status hinder the chances of communities to position themselves to take advantage of the opportunities brought about by tourism as a market-based strategy for conservation.

Tourism, coupled with the perceived participation process of CBNRM, also creates high expectations to communities (Gibson & Marks 1995; Newmark & Hough 2000) which if not met are catalysts for dissatisfaction. For example the communities had high expectations of ‘milking the elephant’ (gaining income through wildlife-based tourism). With majority of the benefits from tourism being communal benefits, this has brought about dissatisfaction among some members. The communal nature of tourism benefits is being countered by organizations investing in agricultural-based projects since the benefits are usually individual level benefits and therefore likely to be more appreciated by communities.

7.4.4 Role of the government in the regulation of partnerships

The partnerships studied in this thesis are part of a wider institutional environment in which tourism-based conservation enterprises are placed. The partnerships can be considered part of a neoliberal trend of projects and interventions in the tourism-conservation-development nexus, with no government involvement in Eastern and Southern Africa. Nationally (in Kenya) but also regionally (in Laikipia), a proliferation of similar neoliberal projects can be identified, driven by different organizations, different models, and different configurations of actors, resources and regulatory arrangements, such as private conservancies (e.g. Ol Pejeta Conservancy, Loisaba Wilderness, Lewa Downs), community-based tourism enterprises (e.g. Il Ngwesi), and the community enterprise projects arranged by other organizations (e.g. Northern Rangelands Trust-NRT).
The above mentioned conservation interventions which are located outside protected areas in Kenya, came into existence at a time when there was a gap in the Kenyan land-use policy which did not cover community involvement and wildlife user rights. This policy void (Van Wijk et al. 2014) on the one hand created room for experimentation, leading to a variety of arrangements developed by different organizations (AWF 2011; Elliott & Sumba 2010; Lamers et al. 2014; Van Wijk et al. 2014). However, each organization developed its own products and processes standards creating a variety of community-based enterprises, which has created the need for coordination and congruence of the interventions, and necessitating the creation of an effective regulatory and monitoring strategy (Van Wijk et al. 2014).

In the recent past, we have witnessed a dynamic process in which the regulatory environment of tourism-based conservation enterprises is taking shape, such as the establishment of the Federation of Community-Based Tourism Organizations (FECTO) and the Kenya Wildlife Conservancies Association (KWCA), two lobby-membership organizations by various community-based organizations in the field of conservation tourism in Kenya. In addition, AWF actively cooperates with these and other regional actors, such as the Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF) and the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT).

Moreover, there have been calls for standardization of community-based conservation interventions. The Kenyan government through the Kenya Wildlife Service (KWS), is in the process of creating mechanisms to regulate and standardize community conservancies and related partnerships in Kenya. This new regulatory environment will most certainly have consequences for the future of tourism-based conservation enterprises and other community-based conservation initiatives in Kenya.
In governance literature, scholars have suggested that the challenges of coordination, congruence and regulation in self-governance can be partially addressed through meta-governance (Jessop 2003; 2004; Sørensen 2006; Sørensen & Torving 2009; Visseren-Hamakers 2013). Meta-governance, defined as the ‘regulation of self-regulation’ (Sørensen, 2006), ‘governance of governance’ (Jessop 2003) or ‘strategic steering in the governance system’ (Visseren-Hamakers 2013: 147), is a relatively new concept. Public authorities (in our case KWS) are typically seen as the most legitimate and suitable actors for providing oversight, steering and coordination of non-state governance arrangements (e.g. Sørensen 2006; Sørensen & Torving 2009; Entwistle et al. 2007).

However, Glasbergen (2011) and Visseren-Hamakers et al. (2011) have argued that this oversight role is, and can be, performed by NGOs or multi-actor partnerships as well. In our case, organizations such as the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) or local bodies such as the Northern Rangelands Trust (NRT) or the Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF) for the case of Laikipia or the membership organizations such as the Federation of Community-Based Tourism Organizations (FECTO) and the recently founded Kenya Wildlife Conservancies Association (KWCA), potentially can play a role in the coordination and regulation of tourism-based conservation enterprises and other community-based tourism conservation initiatives in Kenya.

There may not be a clear answer regarding the most appropriate meta-governor. The thesis therefore recommends the need for consultation of all major stakeholders in the search for a more coordinated community-based conservation environment. However, the government, in its role in guiding, supporting, and directing institutional change processes (Van Wijk et al. 2014), mainly through KWS, would be the best placed convener of such a forum that consults and engages all stakeholders on the best way to
coordinate mechanisms for conservation and development outside protected areas in Kenya.

Although the concept of meta-governance has mainly been used to refer to managing the relationships among multiple initiatives and policies (see e.g. Visseren-Hamakers 2013), this thesis would like to expand the concept to also denote strategic steering within single initiatives (Lamers et al. 2014).

This thesis has studied governance of the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and the Koija Starbeds partnerships in Kenya. The results reveal significant contributions of the partnership enterprises to conservation and livelihoods. The results have however shown that the partnerships face diverse governance challenges. The thesis has therefore provided valuable lessons for the conservation-development interventions. The thesis has for example shown the potentials and challenges of partnerships as governance institutions in conservation and development. Another lesson is on the need for coordination of the diverse interventions for conservation and development, in other words the need for meta-governance. The thesis therefore concludes that that in order to fully realize their potential, partnerships must be more consciously governed, both at the level of the individual partnership – by the partners, and as a governance instrument more generally – by various societal actors.
Summary

Governance of Tourism Conservation Partnerships: Lessons from Kenya

Since the 19th-century nature conservation in Eastern Africa has evolved in different stages. Initial interventions emerged as a result of the decline and potential extinction of species for sport hunting. Colonial administrations thus started by formulating hunting regulations and licenses. More structured efforts began after the Second World War with the setting aside of nature parks and reserves referred to as the 'preservationist' approach to conservation. To address some of the weaknesses of this approach, a community paradigm, that sought to integrate the objectives of biodiversity conservation with objectives of socio-economic development, emerged in the 1980s. Interventions to conservation were based on the idea that conservation should contribute to local needs and development.

With the shift from 'government to governance', a variety of actors, including governments, NGOs and donor organizations, began to support market-based initiatives, including tourism-based ones, aimed at achieving conservation goals while at the same time addressing development challenges. In these programmes the partnership model has been increasingly adopted as a preferred mode of governance for addressing the objectives of conservation and development.

From the late 1990s, the conservation NGO African Wildlife Foundation (AWF) started to experiment with tourism-based conservation enterprises by acting as a 'neutral broker', moderating partnerships between private investors and communities. This thesis analyses and explains the governance of two of these AWF facilitated tourism-based conservation enterprises in Kenya: the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and Koija Starbeds partnerships.
Both partnership enterprises are eco-lodges located in Laikipia County, Kenya and involve three partners: AWF, communities and a private investor. For the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille, the partners are AWF, the Kijabe group ranch, the Kijabe group ranch and Regenesis Limited (RL). At Koija Starbeds, the partners are AWF, the Koija group ranch and Oryx Limited (OL). In both partnerships, the communities have set aside a part of their land exclusively for conservation where the eco-lodges have been constructed. In return, the communities receive benefits from the eco-lodges, operated by the private investors.

Both cases were chosen for the study since both partnership enterprises were started through the African Wildlife Foundation (AWF), an NGO considered an ‘institutional entrepreneur’ in applying tourism through a tripartite partnership model. They provide valuable lessons in terms of governance of tourism-conservation-development partnerships.

This thesis studied the governance of the two partnerships making use of the concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness. Although these concepts are also known as prescriptive ‘good governance’ principles, this thesis departed from this normative view of ‘good governance’ and applies the concepts in an analytical way to study and understand the nature of governance in the partnerships. Moreover, it also examined the inter-relationships between participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness, power-relations among the actors involved, as well as the local, national and international contexts in which the partnerships operate. The thesis therefore aimed to answer the following research question: What is the nature of governance of the partnerships in terms of participation, transparency, accountability, equity, and effectiveness, and how can this be explained?
As explained in chapter 1, to answer the research question, the thesis employed a ‘two-case’ holistic case study design. Data collection involved the use of semi-structured interviews, document analysis and literature review, observations and informal discussions and focus group discussions. In chapters 3 to 6, I presented the results of the study. Chapter 3 introduced the local, national and international developments that have led to the foundation of the two tourism conservation enterprises and influenced the nature of governance of the two partnerships. Chapter 4 described and analyzed governance at the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille and chapter 5 governance at the Koija Starbeds partnership.

In the analysis, I discerned three main places for decision-making or ‘governing platforms’. First, each partnership is governed by a trust, charitable entities designed as decision-making bodies for maintaining and managing the respective conservation areas, the eco-lodges and the community benefits. The Kijabe trust has an eight member board which consists of high-level representation. On the other hand, the Koija trust has a more locally constituted five-member board. At both trusts governance was influenced by the dominant roles of the private investor trustees and the absence of checks and balances and sanctions. Compared to the Sanctuary at Ol Lentille partnership, the Koija partnership experienced less politics at the trust platform.

Second, at the group ranch platforms, governance issues related to: minimal involvement or participation of women in group ranch affairs; infrequent and ineffective communication modes between the community leaders and the members; the dominant roles of the group ranch leaders and the absence of checks and balances and sanctions for the follow up of leaders’ actions and decisions.

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7 A group ranch is land that has been demarcated and legally allocated to a group such as a tribe, clan, section, family or other group of persons under the Land Adjudication Act cap 284 Laws of Kenya.
Third, there are the ‘projects’ platforms. In both partnerships, the private investors have set up charities that support and initiate various projects in the region. At these projects platforms for both partnerships, the main issues for governance included: limited community involvement, especially during fundraising; limited community trust in the private investors and non-compatible information disclosure mechanisms by the charitable trusts.

In terms of the governance concepts used in the thesis, participation at the Kijabe Trust was mainly consultative, and at the Koija Trust more collaborative, since in the latter case all the trustees were to some extent involved in decision-making. In both group ranches, participation was mainly consultative, as the elected group ranch leaders (the chairman, secretary and treasurer) were the main actors in making, implementing and enforcing decisions. For the projects, the private investors, making use of their (donor) networks and access to capital, made major decisions, mainly with regard to fundraising and implementation, making participation to be functional in nature.

At the Koija Trust as well as the Kijabe Trust, a perceived lack of information by the community had an effect on the community’s perceptions on transparency as well as accountability. At the group ranches, information was provided to the community through public meetings and notice boards, and also often passed through ‘word of mouth’. The content of the information was however not fully understood by the majority of community members due to the existing low literacy levels in the region. At the projects, information was mainly availed to the community partners by the investors during the implementation phase of projects. The activities were mainly presented on the respective trust websites, which were not accessible to the majority of the community leaders and members, resulting in low transparency at the project platforms.
Results showed that accountability at the trust platforms has been minimal. Although there were differentiated actor roles and responsibilities depending on their capabilities, there were minimal checks and balances and sanctions in case of offences.

At the group ranch platforms for both partnerships, major responsibilities were vested on the group ranch leaders, typically reflecting the traditional governance structure at group ranches in Kenya. Local institutional mechanisms for accountability did not provide comprehensive guidelines to ensure accountability. This could create avenues for mis-appropriation and inequality, a scenario that links accountability and equity aspects.

At the projects, major responsibilities included fundraising for development and conservation projects and implementing these projects. The private investors and/or their representatives performed the responsibilities of fundraising. In the implementation of the projects, the trustees only reported to the community leaders and project staff such as school head-teachers and health centre staff.

In terms of equity, at both the Kijabe and Koija Trusts, it was difficult to trace the decision-making processes on the amounts and the sharing of the conservation and bed-night fees paid by tourists staying at the lodges. At the Kijabe group ranch, benefits were shared equally between those living within the ranch and those residing outside (two-thirds of the members).

More generally speaking there are both similarities and differences in the two partnerships in terms of participation, transparency, accountability and equity. In both partnerships AWF, as third partner, has played a major role of moderating the arrangements and attracting donor funds for the set-up of the enterprises. Despite this brokering, there still is mistrust of the communities towards the private investors, even now that both partnerships have been in existence for some time. This mistrust
contributed to the community opinions of perceived lack of transparency, accountability and equity in the partnerships.

Several differences in the partnerships were also identified. First there was a difference in terms of the representation and member composition at the trusts. For example at Kijabe trust, as a result of the high profile representation, meetings did not take place, political misunderstandings were abundant and the community did not feel adequately represented. This is opposed to the Koija Trust, which had local representation, where meetings took place as scheduled and consultation of the actors took place.

The second main difference is on the platform responsible for funds and benefit sharing. The responsibility for majority of funds from the conservation enterprise at Koija was at the Koija Conservation Trust board. This is opposed to the Sanctuary where the responsibility for funds and benefit sharing is at the group ranch level. The third difference reflects the presence of intra-community and inter-community political struggles. As a result of some members living outside the group ranch, at Kijabe, intra-community political struggles were identified. At the same time, inter-community political struggles as a result of a boundary dispute with the neighbouring Nkiloriti group ranch were identified as also influencing governance.

These main challenges for governance of the partnerships resulted from power relations between the private investors and the communities on the one hand, and between group ranch leaders and the community members on the other. Other contextual aspects, such as culture and traditions, policy voids regarding conservation on community land and the existence of legal plurism, as exemplified in the different rules and procedures in the governance platforms, and the different world views of the various actors involved, also played a role.
Chapter 6 presented the results of both partnerships in terms of the concept of effectiveness. Effectiveness in the thesis was conceptualized in terms of the contribution of the enterprises to the reduction in biodiversity threats and to the community livelihoods (capital assets). Research results clearly showed that, despite the governance challenges, both partnerships made important contributions to livelihoods and conservation in the group ranches. Livelihood strategies were diversified through the creation of jobs, sale of crafts, and performing traditional dances for the guests of the lodges. These contributions were both direct from the eco-lodges and related undertakings such as the cultural manyattas (houses where the dances were performed and crafts were sold by women), and indirect benefits from philanthropy of the respective private investor philanthropic activities. The indirect benefits, from philanthropy, in both partnerships were significant. At Koija, the benefits from philanthropy were slightly larger than the direct benefits from the enterprise, and at the Sanctuary, the indirect benefits from philanthropy even far outweighed the benefits from the eco-lodge and cultural manyatta. Tables 7.3 and 7.4 in chapter 7 give a more detailed overview of the contributions of the two partnerships to the livelihood capital assets.

In terms of contributions to natural capital and biodiversity conservation, both partnerships have set aside land for conservation, protecting these habitats from grazing by livestock. For the Sanctuary, a larger conservation area of 2,000 hectares was initially set aside compared to the 200 hectares set aside at Koija. The private investor at the Sanctuary expanded the conservation area to an area exceeding 7,050 hectares by engaging neighbouring group ranches (to set aside conservation areas in exchange for livelihood benefits by the Ol Lentille Trust Kenya). The conservation areas were meant to reduce the threats to biodiversity caused by land-use changes and land degradation as a result of overgrazing.
These exclusive conservation areas have served as important wildlife habitats, and vegetation recovery has been reported. Additionally, there has been an increase in numbers and diversity of large and small mammals such as elephants, Grevy’s zebra and wild dogs. The exclusive conservation areas have also contributed to reduced land degradation as a result of vegetation recovery. There were however, incidences of non-commitment by the communities in terms of not sustaining soil erosion strategies such as grass rehabilitation and reforestation of degraded areas, and not respecting the land zoning rules by not keeping livestock out of the conservation area.

In Chapter 7, I summarized the research findings and discussed the wider implications of this project. In terms of theory, the findings of this research demonstrated the viability of governance concepts of participation, transparency, accountability, equity and effectiveness in studying partnerships and developing a better understanding of tourism conservation partnerships as instruments for governance. The analytical perspective allows a rich analysis of how partnerships are governed in practice, and provides a detailed understanding of why partnerships are governed the way they are.

In chapter 7, I also highlighted in which way this thesis specifically provides lessons to three main debates: (i) the role of partnerships in the conservation-development nexus and related governance challenges, (ii) the role of tourism in conservation and development, and (iii) role of governments in regulating these kinds of partnerships.

Related to the first debate, research results showed that partnerships are complex and consist of ‘nested’ institutions. Partnerships are also part of a network of partnerships, complicating not only governance in the partnerships, but also governance of conservation and development in the entire region.
Second, partnerships as part of the Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) discourse are similar to other initiatives utilizing tourism as a strategy for development and conservation in Africa. They are therefore prone to challenges such as low occupancy which minimizes their potential. Moreover, their reliance on philanthropy combined with the challenges raises concerns of the durability of tourism as a strategy for conservation and development.

Finally, the partnerships studied in this thesis are just one particular of many other interventions addressing the tourism-conservation-development nexus. As a result, the different organizations have developed each their own products and processes standards creating a variety of community-based enterprises. This has created the need for coordination and congruence among the interventions, necessitating the creation of effective regulations and monitoring. Governance scholars have suggested that the challenges of coordination, congruence and regulation in governance can be partially addressed through meta-governance.

With this, the thesis has provided a detailed analysis of the nature of governance of two tourism-conservation partnerships, and has contributed to the broader discussions on the role of partnerships and tourism in conservation and development. The thesis has shown that despite multiple governance challenges, partnerships can contribute to conservation and development. However, in order to fully realize their potential, partnerships must be more consciously governed, both at the level of the individual partnership – by the partners, and as a governance instrument more generally – by various societal actors.
Samenvatting

Bestuur van partnerschappen in toerisme en natuurbescherming: Lessen uit Kenia


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8 Een groep ranch is een afgebakend stuk land dat officieel aan een groep, zoals een stam, clan, familie of andere groep is toegewezen onder de Land Adjudication Act cap 284 Laws of Kenya.
natuurbescherming. De eco-lodges worden gerund door de private investeerder en als tegenprestatie vloeit een deel van de baten ervan terug naar de lokale bevolking.

In dit proefschrift bestudeer ik het bestuur van deze twee partnerschappen en maak daarbij gebruik van de concepten participatie, transparantie, wijze van verantwoording, rechtvaardigheid en effectiviteit. Hoewel deze termen vooral bekend staan als principes van ‘goed bestuur’ (‘good governance’), worden de termen in dit proefschrift op een meer analytische wijze gebruikt om de aard van bestuur van de partnerschappen te bestuderen en te begrijpen. Bovendien onderzoek ik de relaties tussen participatie, transparantie, wijze van verantwoording, rechtvaardigheid en effectiviteit, evenals machtsrelaties tussen actoren en de lokale, nationale en internationale context waarin de partnerschappen tot ontwikkeling komen. In het proefschrift beantwoord ik daarom de volgende onderzoeksvraag: *Wat is de aard van bestuur in de partnerschappen in termen van participatie, transparantie, wijze van verantwoording, rechtvaardigheid en effectiviteit, en hoe kan dat worden verklaard?*

Voor het verzamelen van data is gebruik gemaakt van semigestructureerde interviews, de analyse van documenten, literatuuronderzoek, observaties, informele discussies en focusgroep discussies. In de hoofdstukken 3 tot 6 presenteer ik de resultaten van mijn onderzoek. Hoofdstuk 3 beschrijft lokale, nationale en internationale ontwikkelingen die tot de oprichting van de twee toerisme-natuurbeschermingsondernemingen hebben geleid en de aard van bestuur hebben beïnvloed. Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft en analyseert het bestuur van The Sanctuary at Ol Lentille en hoofdstuk 5 doet datzelfde voor The Koija Starbeds.

In de analyse onderscheid ik drie niveaus van besluitvorming, ofwel ‘bestuurplatforms’. Om te beginnen wordt elke partnerschap bestuurd door een stichting. De Kijabe stichting bestaat uit acht bestuursleden, vooral invloedrijke politici,
soms werkend op nationale schaal; de Koija stichting bestaat uit vijf – vooral lokale – bestuursleden. Het bestuur van beide stichtingen wordt gekenmerkt door de dominante rol die de door de private investeerder afgevaardigde leden uitoefenden. In vergelijking met The Sanctuary at Ol Lentille heeft Koija Starbeds minder last gehad van politieke strubbelingen op het niveau van de stichting.

Het tweede niveau is dat van de groep ranch. Daar zijn bestuursproblemen vooral gerelateerd aan de minimale betrokkenheid en participatie van vrouwen in groep ranch gerelateerde zaken. Maar ook onregelmatige en ineffectieve communicatie tussen leiders en de lokale bevolking, de dominante rol van de leiders van groep ranches en het ontbreken van een goede machtsbalans en sanctiemechanismen voor de uitvoer van acties en beslissingen van de leiders zijn hier punten van aandacht.

Het derde niveau is dat van individuele projecten. In beide partnerschappen hebben de private investeerders liefdadigheidsprojecten opgezet. Op dit niveau valt de lage betrokkenheid van de lokale gemeenschap op – voornamelijk tijdens fondsenwerving – en het gebrek aan vertrouwen van de gemeenschap in de private investeerders.

In termen van het eerdergenoemde concepten van bestuur is de participatie van de Kijabe stichting voornamelijk raadgevend en die van de Koija stichting meer coöperatief van aard, waarbij bij de laatstgenoemde min of meer alle bestuursleden betrokken zijn in besluitvorming. In beide groep ranches is participatie voornamelijk raadgevend, omdat de (democratisch) gekozen leiders van groep ranches (voorzitter, secretaris en penningmeester) de hoofdrolspelers zijn in het maken, implementeren en naleven van besluiten. Op het niveau van projecten zijn het de private investeerders die – mede door gebruik te maken van hun (donor)netwerken en toegang tot kapitaal –
belangrijke besluiten nemen, met name wat betreft fondsenwerving en implementatie. Participatie is daarom functioneel van aard.

In het geval van zowel de Koija als de Kijabe stichting vindt de lokale bevolking dat zij gebrek aan informatie hebben, en daarmee overheerst het gevoel van onvoldoende transparantie en een gebrekkige wijze van verantwoording. Op het niveau van groep ranches is informatie voor iedereen toegankelijk door middel van openbare vergaderingen en mededelingenborden. Informatie gaat overigens ook vaak van mond tot mond. Door analfabetisme wordt de inhoud van de informatie door de meerderheid echter niet altijd volledig begrepen. Op projectniveau wordt informatie door de investeerders voornamelijk verspreid tijdens de implementatiefase via websites, die lang niet voor iedereen toegankelijk zijn.

Resultaten suggereren dat op het niveau van de stichtingen de wijze van verantwoording minimaal is. Op het niveau van de groep ranches rusten voor beide partnerschappen de grootste verantwoordelijkheden op de schouders van de leiders van groepranches, zoals traditioneel gezien overal in Kenia het geval is. Fondsenwerving voor ontwikkelings- en natuurbeschermingsprojecten is de voornaamste verantwoordelijkheid op projectniveau, evenals het implementeren ervan. Het zijn de private investeerders en/of hun vertegenwoordigers die deze verantwoordelijkheden dragen. Bij het implementeren van projecten wordt er slechts gerapporteerd aan leiders en projectstaf, zoals schoolhoofden en zorgverleners.

Voor beide partnerschappen was het lastig een goed beeld te krijgen van de besluitvormingsprocessen over de hoogte van de vergoeding van de lodge aan de lokale gemeenschap en de rechtvaardige verdeling daarvan. Bij de Kijabe groep ranch worden de baten gelijkmatig uitgekeerd aan zowel de leden binnen de ranch, als ook aan leden die nu buiten de ranch wonen (twee-derde van alle ranchleden).
Over het algemeen heb ik in termen van participatie, transparantie, wijze van verantwoording, rechtvaardigheid en effectiviteit zowel overeenkomsten als verschillen tussen de twee partnerschappen gevonden. In beide partnerschappen is AWF de derde partij en handelt het als tussenpersoon bij onderhandelingen en fondsenwerving voor het opstarten van de ondernemingen. Deze neutrale positie kan echter niet voorkomen dat de lokale gemeenschap weinig vertrouwen heeft in de private investeerder, ook al bestaan beide partnerschappen nu al enige tijd. Dit wantrouwen leidt vervolgens tot argwaan over gevolgde procedures onder de lokale bevolking.

Er zijn ook duidelijke verschillen tussen de partnerschappen. Ten eerste is er het verschil in samenstelling van het bestuur van de stichting. In de Kijabe stichting gaan vergaderingen vaak niet door, zijn er veel politieke strubbelingen en voelt de gemeenschap zich niet voldoende vertegenwoordigd. In Koija is de situatie heel anders. Hier zijn de vertegenwoordigers lokale figuren, vinden vergaderingen meestal plaats zoals gepland en worden andere actoren geraadpleegd.

Een tweede groot verschil is de wijze van verdeling van fondsen en baten. Bij Koija Starbeds ligt de verantwoordelijk hiervoor bij de stichting, in het geval van The Sanctuary at Ol Lentille ligt die verantwoordelijkheid op het niveau van de groep ranch.

Het derde verschil heeft te maken met strubbelingen binnen de groep ranch en tussen de groep ranches. Omdat een aanzienlijk aantal leden van de Kijabe groep ranch buiten de groep ranch woont, doen zich allerlei conflicten voor. Tegelijkertijd was er ook een conflict over de landsgrenzen met de naburige Nkiloriti groep ranch, dat via een overeenkomst opgelost is. Beide zaken hebben het bestuur van het partnerschap duidelijk beïnvloed.

Al deze bestuurlijke uitdagingen zijn het resultaat van machtsverhoudingen tussen de private investeerder en gemeenschap enerzijds, en tussen leiders en leden van de
groep ranch anderzijds. Ook spelen andere, contextuele aspecten, zoals cultuur en tradities, gebrek aan natuurbeschermingsbeleid voor gebieden buiten nationale parken, het bestaan van verschillende regels en procedures en uiteenlopende wereldvisies van de betrokken partijen, een rol.

In hoofdstuk 6 bespreek ik de effectiviteit van beide partnerschappen in termen van hun bijdrage aan natuurbescherming en economische ontwikkeling. Mijn onderzoek wijst uit dat, ondanks de bestuurlijke uitdagingen, beide partnerschappen een belangrijke bijdrage leveren aan het levensonderhoud en natuurbescherming binnen de groep ranches. Het creëren van banen, toegenomen handel, inkomen uit handwerk en het opvoeren van traditionele dansen voor toeristen dragen allen bij aan het levensonderhoud van de lokale bevolking. Deze bijdragen komen zowel direct via de eco-lodges en gerelateerde nevenactiviteiten zoals culturele manyattas (traditionele dorpjes waar de dansen worden opgevoerd en handwerk wordt verkocht), als ook indirect door filantropie van de betrokken private investeerders en de overwegend rijke toeristen die de lodges bezoeken. In Koija zijn de baten uit filantropie enigszins hoger dan de directe baten van de lodge en bij The Sanctuary zijn ze zelfs fors hoger dan de baten van de eco-lodge en de culturele manyatta. De tabellen 7.3 en 7.4 in hoofdstuk 7 laten een meer gedetailleerd overzicht zien van de impact van de partnerschappen op het levensonderhoud van de lokale gemeenschap.

Wat betreft de bijdrage aan de bescherming van biodiversiteit hebben beide partnerschappen land opzijgezet voor natuurbescherming. Dat komt er in de praktijk op neer dat een deel van land beschermd gebied is om overbegrazing door vee tegen te gaan. In het geval van The Sanctuary at Ol Lentille was dit een gebied van 2.000 hectare, tegenover 200 hectare in Koija. De private investeerder bij The Sanctuary heeft het beschermd gebied nog eens uitgebreid tot 7.050 hectare door naburige groep ranches bij
het project te betrekken in ruil voor economische baten. De beschermende gebieden zijn bedoeld om de afname van biodiversiteit door veranderingen in landgebruik en landdegradatie als gevolg van overbegrazing te verminderen. En met succes. Er is sprake van een toename van het aantal grote en kleine zoogdieren zoals olifanten, zebra’s en wilde honden. Er zijn echter ook incidenten geweest waarbij de lokale bevolking zich niet heeft gehouden aan gemaakte afspraken, met onder andere als gevolg bodemerosie en overbegrazing.

In hoofdstuk 7 vat ik de onderzoeksbevindingen samen en bediscussieer ik de bredere implicaties van dit project. Het onderzoek toont aan dat de bestuurlijke concepten participatie, transparantie, wijze van verantwoording, rechtvaardigheid en effectiviteit goed bruikbaar zijn voor het bestuderen van partnerschappen. Het in dit proefschrift gehanteerde conceptueel raamwerk laat goed zien hoe partnerschappen in de praktijk worden bestuurd, en waarom ze zo worden bestuurd.

De resultaten van mijn onderzoek dragen ook bij aan de volgende drie wetenschappelijke discussies: (i) de rol van partnerschappen op het gebied van natuurbescherming en ontwikkeling en de bijkomende bestuurlijke uitdagingen, (ii) de rol van toerisme in natuurbescherming en ontwikkeling, en (iii) de rol van overheden in het reguleren van dit soort partnerschappen.

Mijn onderzoek toont aan dat partnerschappen zeer complex zijn en deel uitmaken van netwerken van partnerschappen, hetgeen niet alleen het bestuur van de partnerschappen, maar ook het bestuur op het gebied van natuurbescherming en ontwikkeling in de hele regio compliceert.

Verder vertonen deze partnerschappen die deel uitmaken van de bredere discussie over Community-Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) gelijkenissen met andere initiatieven in Afrika waar toerisme wordt ingezet als
ontwikkelings- en natuurbeschermingsstrategie. Ze kenmerken zich door lage bezettingsgraden van de lodges en delen ook andere uitdagingen die hun voortbestaan bedreigen. Bovendien roept hun grote afhankelijkheid van filantropie vragen op over de duurzaamheid van toerisme als ontwikkelings- en natuurbeschermingsstrategie.

Refererend naar de derde discussie, ten slotte, zijn de partnerschappen in dit proefschrift slechts twee voorbeelden van de vele interventies op het snijvlak van toerisme-natuurbescherming-ontwikkeling. Zodoende hebben verschillende organisaties allemaal hun eigen producten en processen ontwikkeld. Dit leidt tot de noodzaak van coördinatie van en congruentie tussen interventies en effectieve regulering en toezicht en dus vraagstukken op het gebied van meta-sturing ('meta-governance').

Al met al biedt dit proefschrift een gedetailleerde analyse van de aard van het bestuur van twee toerisme-natuurbeschermingsprojecten en draagt het bij aan de bredere discussies over de rol van partnerschappen en toerisme in debatten over economische ontwikkeling en natuurbescherming. Het laat zien dat, ondanks vele bestuurlijke uitdagingen, partnerschappen substantieel kunnen bijdragen aan natuurbescherming en ontwikkeling. Echter, om hun potentieel volledig te kunnen benutten moeten partnerschappen goed worden bestuurd, zowel op het niveau van de individuele partnerschappen zelf, als op het regionale of nationale niveau waarin meerdere maatschappelijke actoren een rol spelen.
References


Government of Kenya (GoK) unpublished data (2009)


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About the Author

Rita Wairimu Nthiga was born in Embu, Kenya, on 15\textsuperscript{th} February 1978. She completed the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education in 1995 at Nguviu Girls High School in Embu, Kenya. In 1997, she joined Moi University, Kenya and graduated with a Bachelor of Science Degree in Tourism Management in 2001. In the period May 2001-April 2004, she worked in the Hospitality Industry on various management capacities. In May 2004, she joined Moi University as a Graduate Assistant in the Department of Hotel and Hospitality Management. In 2005, she started her Masters’ degree at Kenyatta University, Kenya and graduated with a Master of Science Degree in Hospitality and Tourism Management in 2008. In February 2010, Rita joined the Cultural Geography Group, Wageningen University for her PhD studies. Currently, Rita is a Lecturer at the Department of Hotel and Hospitality Management, School of Tourism, Hospitality and Events Management, Moi University, Kenya. Rita’s research interests are on tourism as a tool for poverty reduction; tourism partnerships in biodiversity governance, biodiversity conservation and livelihoods.