Introduction

Risk and uncertainty dominate life in the semi-arid tropics where most of the world’s pastoralists live. Due to erratic rainfall, fluctuating markets for basic food and livestock and political turmoil, most people have to face insecurity with respect to the basic necessities of life and consequently with respect to their physical and mental well-being. In fact so-called ‘pastoral adaptations’ can be conceptualised as technological, social and cultural means of dealing with risk and uncertainty (de Bruijn & van Dijk 1995). The strategies by which people deal with risk and uncertainty are based on their ‘cultural understandings’ of these insecurities, giving rise to specific cultural and social complexes, which show a high degree of dynamism.

These cultural complexes as well as modes of resource use have been described extensively by anthropologists and geographers. However, the relations between these dynamic cultural complexes, individual behaviour and individual perceptions of insecurity have remained rather obscure. Among other things this obscurity hinges upon our own understandings of how individuals deal with risks in making decisions with respect to the management of natural and social resources. Scientific approaches to risk in semi-arid zones have been dominated by agro-ecology and agro-economics. Within these paradigms risk is treated as a stochastic occurrence, and decision-making strategies are analysed with the help of simulation models. These models are based on assumptions from rational choice decision-making theory, and presume that people are either geared towards profit maximisation or towards risk minimisation. As I will try to show this approach is too narrow, because people operate not only in an ecological and economic environment, but also in social and cultural environments. Within social science little effort has been devoted to how all kinds of variability in rainfall – amount, dry spells, onset of the rains – and other risks affect small farmers (Vincent 1981:69).

It will be argued that we may further our understanding of individual behaviour and cultural dynamics in high risk environments by treating risk and uncertainty as total events, i.e., that we learn more by tracing the consequences of single events across space and time, and the tracks that people follow to deal with calamities (see Scoones 1995). Every drought and pest has its own dynamics in timing, duration, severity and consequences, and consequently demands a different response of the people affected.

First, I will discuss the ways in which risk has been dealt with within agro-ecological and agro-economic approaches. Next I will discuss a framework for the understanding of the role of risk and uncertainty in decision making by pastoralists and the cultural dynamics of their societies. Then I will discuss a case study of decision making by pastoralists and their cultivating neighbours to illustrate this framework.

Decision making in agricultural science

Within agricultural ecology and agricultural economy most research views decision making with respect to agricultural risks against objective indicators. Farmers and herdsmen are supposed to strive at an optimal allocation of the resources they have available for their specific production purposes, which may range from maximization of profit, production or productivity, to risk avoidance or long-term continuity and stable levels of production. To study decision making a specific theoretical and methodological apparatus has been developed, which has evolved from the simple appraisal of different agricultural technologies to the assessment of the performance of agricultural systems, and the interaction between their subsystems and finally to the development of all kinds of simulation models to generate prescriptive and predictive statements about the most efficient operation of these agricultural systems and their planning. In this development a systems approach has become the dominant theoretical and methodological tool of agricultural science. This systems approach is characterised by a stress on quantitative data and a number of assumptions about the nature of the agricultural system and farmer behaviour in response to ecological and other conditions. The analysis of decision making is based on a measurement of the inputs and the outputs. It is supposed then that the outputs are a result of the decision maker and his decisions to combine a specific bundle of inputs.

Within this approach risk and uncertainty are laid down in probabilities, and land use strategies are appraised for their capacity to prevent hazard and to avoid risk. Huge amounts of quantitative data about inputs, the resource base and outputs of the agro-ecosystem are collected, mostly over one agricultural season, and analysed with the help of statistics, within the framework of a model specifying the most basic cause-effect relations in the farming system. Subsequently causal relations are quantified, so that predictive statements can be made about, for example, the relations between soil fertility, rainfall, labour input, crop varieties and productivity of the farming system. A similar procedure is followed for livestock production systems. So, risk and uncertainty are reduced to stochastic occurrences and statistical means, as if the data belong to a knowable and predictable set of phenomena. Based on rainfall data and simulation models of biomass production under semi-arid conditions, predictions are made of useful production for human and animal consumption, and hence how many animals and humans a specific ecosystem may support (see e.g., Breman & de Ridder 1991, Kessler 1994). The result is a prognosis, which may be fairly accurate at regional or national level. However, the amount of error increases with decreasing geographical scale.
A recurrent problem in modelling crop and pasture production is the difference between real life production figures as collected on the farm and/or the test site and calculated production figures. Toulmin (1992:109-111) found very few real-life millet production figures falling within the range ± 25 per cent of her calculated production figures. Similar results have been achieved for models of pasture production (de Leeuw et al. 1993). So, the predictions derived from the model can hardly be taken as the correct estimate for the value of a specific site or an actor. A difference of ± 25 per cent will have an enormous impact on an individual decision maker.

To solve this problem differences in socio-economic variables are identified as important explanations of variability in crop and livestock production, and natural resource management in general. One of the basic tenets of the systems approach is that no significant differences in systems output are expected given the same agro-ecological and socio-economic conditions (de Steenhuisen Piter 1995: 11). Unfortunately, all kinds of unexpected problems wreck this solution. A research project designed to pin down this variety in stratification along socio-economic dimensions of fields belonging to the same agro-ecological type revealed that the composition of diversity was not the same in each stratum, and that constraints on sorghum production were different for each cropping system and field type, and that the impact of different socio-economic and agro-ecological variables contributing to crop production varied wildly from one year to another (de Steenhuisen Piter 1995). Toulmin (1992:121) found considerable differences in estimated marginal value products of each production factor at the mean from one year to another despite the fact that rainfall and crop production did not differ much. In other words the ways in which production factors contributed to final crop production varied from one year to another.

Still, it may theoretically be possible to solve these practical problems of quantification by adding variables, data, computer power etc., but this solution demands enormous investment. It may be more practical to develop a different approach (Scoones 1995). There are also a number of theoretical arguments to change our focus in research. The first problem is that of bounded rationality. A model of a given crop or livestock production system is insensitive to changes in relations between its variables and those of other production systems such as trade and livestock production. It regards the composition of the variables and the boundaries of the system as well as the social unit which is operating the system as given. However, the decision maker is not insensitive to the impact of these factors. When livestock production fails he/she will operate the crop or livestock production system in a different manner. But he might also draw other conclusions and leave the area to seek refuge in town. Key variables may change in the course of the operation of the cropping or herding system. For example Berti cultivators in Sudan always sow more land than they can possibly cultivate. If the rains are good and last for a longer period they are able to weed more land. If the rains are bad they weed much less land (Holy 1988). What is a field in this case? The area worked, sown or har-
librium and the calibration of risks. This seems to suggest that given the same agro-ecological conditions there is one optimal combination of inputs so as to produce the maximal output with a minimal amount of risk (see e.g., van Noordwijk et al. 1994). The only problem is that in no two years conditions are alike in (semi-) arid zones and that consequently farmers and herdsmen do not know the risks, and do not know for which risk to prepare.

Agro-ecological approaches to agricultural decision making have in common that they suppose that the decision makers stand in a direct functional relation with their agro-ecological environment and production system. Outside motivational factors such as embedded in social organisation, culture, religion, land tenure arrangements, social security, prices and government policies are assumed to be objectively given and constant for the (groups of) decision makers. However, dynamic economic, political and social systems and the positions individuals and groups occupy in these systems are important intervening variables. They co-determine to a large extent the impact of (and response to) hazard on individual farmers and herdsmen (see Henderson 1987: 256). Consequently, as is consistently shown by case studies of real-life decision making key decisions are taken as sequential adjustments as all kind of relevant events evolve in the course of the agricultural season without prior knowledge of climatic and market conditions (Watts 1983). While taking these decisions people develop new tracks to deal with high-risk environments. Individuals take these decisions on the basis of a wide range of experiences, rather than on a vision of the future, while these recollections of the past depend to a great extent on their intellectual concerns in the present (Ortiz 1980:188).

An alternative view

Pastoralism is a major subsistence activity in high risk environments such as the semi-arid tropics. Pure pastoralism may be defined as a mode of existence based on the exploitation of successive generations of domestic animals. The accumulation of animals and herd mobility are the main elements of the pastoral pursuit in order to deal with the environmental instability. For the accumulation of livestock the herd managers, generally a herdsman with his family, has to protect the livestock from all kinds of hazards, such as predators, animal diseases and lack of pasture and water. The latter two may even wipe out (large parts of) the herds in a short span of time. The accumulation of animals is therefore not an irrational strategy geared towards prestige, but an insurance strategy (Horowitz 1986). [The] reason for accumulating livestock not lies in the desire to increase yield beyond a fixed domestic target, but in the need to provide [the] his household with some security against environmental fluctuations' (Ingold 1986:134). Such a strategy may be labelled 'opportunistic' (see Sandford 1983) rather than profit oriented.

This strategy seems to be oriented towards the reduction of risks. Yet, the protection of herds introduces a new element of instability into the pastoral enterprise.

In comparison with natural conditions in which natural hazards such as animal diseases and predators dampen the random herbivore-pasture oscillations – i.e., the disparities between pasture production and livestock population – livestock numbers may be pushed beyond the limits of natural pasture production. Due to the fact that more animals stay alive because of the protective measures effected by the pastoralist, there is an increasing chance that pasture production will fall short of the minimum amount of feed needed to keep the animals alive, or that (new) epidemics of animal diseases claim a lot of victims among the livestock population. The 'corrective disasters' may lead to wild oscillations in animal numbers (Ingold 1986:148). So, the pastoral enterprise is not only inherently unstable, the risks are even enhanced by the very management decisions that enable humans to exploit the animals. In this perspective the dictum that 'disaster always looms over the pastoral enterprise' (Ingold 1986:80) must be understood.

Another source of risk for the pastoralist is the necessity of obtaining calories of vegetable origin by cultivating, gathering, exchange or force. Either the pastoralist has to produce these himself, or he/she has to engage in social relations with people who produce cereals. This has important consequences for the cherished mobility of pastoralists, because cereal production or exchange is tied to specific localities (fields and markets), which hamper the free movement of the pastoralist and his animals.

However, risk is also an intrinsic element of cultivation. Just as the pastoralist introduces an element of hazard into his own undertaking by protecting his animals against predation and the vagaries of the environment, the cultivator enhances the chances for disaster by removing the natural vegetation, and replacing it with the desired crop. This agro-ecosystem also needs to be protected against the invasion of weeds, birds, rodents and other pests. If not, the crop will not survive. Moreover, whereas the pastoralist may move his herd from one place to another to deal with erratic rainfall, the cultivator cannot move his field and has to wait for better times.

Lastly the cultivator has to prevent the continuous deterioration of the productive capacities of his field because of the extraction of nutrients from the soil by the crop. This is particularly a problem in the semi-arid tropics as owing to the combination of long dry periods, high temperatures, and low humidity the level of organic matter is very low. This is often aggravated by the low natural fertility of the soils. An obvious solution to this problem would be to replace the fields, when the soil is exhausted, to have soil fertility recover by a fallow period. In this way soil fertility can never be pushed beyond the limits of natural fertility. To do this the cultivator may also bring in nutrients from outside in the form of manure of animal animals and/or mulching material.

Surprisingly little attention has been given to the dynamics of the combination of pastoralism and the cropping of cereals. This 'agro-pastoral strategy' is extremely important in dry-land Africa. Contrary to what is suggested by the myth of the wandering pastoralist, most pastoral populations in West Africa do not
see in the next sections this view is closer to the empirical reality of agro-pastoral decision making because it allows for a greater variety of conditions to be taken into consideration in decision making than the formal agro-economic models.

Agricultural decision making by herdsmen and farmers in Central Mali

The research area

This section is based on a field study in an agro-pastoral community in the centre of the Niger Bend, 30 kilometres south of the mountains which connect the Bandiagara plateau with Mount Hombori in the cercle Douentza, region of Mopti, Central Mali. Three agro-ecosystems may be distinguished in the research area: the mountains; the flatlands surrounding the mountains, where a thick bush vegetation (tiger bush, brousse tigrée) can be found alternating with bands devoid of any vegetation on clay soils; and an area of fixed aeolic dunes with a very sparse tree cover and a herbal layer of annual grasses. In the area separating the tiger bush from the dunes a number of agro-pastoral settlements of Fulbe herdsmen and Rii may be found, some of which were established in the nineteenth century and before. Others were until recently (1950–1970) only inhabited during the rainy season, because of the lack of a dry season water supply. Long-term average rainfall in the area is about 400 mm per annum, and falls predominantly (over 80 per cent) in the months from July to September. However, observations by ILCA in the 1980s somewhat to the east indicate that total rainfall is probably less (Hernaux et al. 1990). In particular rainfall in the month August has declined (Heske & Thera 1987). Variance in rainfall is more than 20 per cent with sometimes an extreme observation of ± 50 per cent from the mean.

These rainfall variations lead to enormous fluctuations in resource availability and food production. In the cercle Koro south of the research area, millet production varied between 19,000 and 51,000 tons during the 1980s (Harts-Broekhuis & de Jong 1993: 194), and between 13,000 and 42,000 tons in the cercle Douentza over the period 1975 to 1986 (Heske & Thera 1987: 38). The most telling indicator of the consequences of natural hazards is the amount of fiscal revenue in the Mopti region, which fell from 2 billion Francs CFA in 1985 to only 13 per cent of that amount in 1986 (Moorehead 1991: 241).

The community where the data were gathered, Serma, consists of a permanent sedentary hamlet of Rii may be cultivators surrounded by eight temporary settlements of Fulbe herdsmen. Approximately 500 people (400 Fulbe and 100 Rii may be) inhabit the area, but the number of people varies over the seasons and over the years following dry and wet periods. Both population groups combined livestock keeping and crop production in various mixes, with the Fulbe emphasizing transhumant livestock production and the Rii may be stressing the production of millet. Both Fulbe and Rii may be belong to Fulbe society, though there are
marked differences between these population groups. Before the colonial period the Fulbe pastoralists formed the noble stratum of society together with the political and religious elite. The Rimmaye are the descendants of the former slaves in Fulbe society. At present they have become free and independent cultivators, whereas the Fulbe have lost their political influence and have become impoverished agro-pastoralists. Despite this development, up to now the Fulbe have avoided certain types of work as much as possible such as the cultivation of cereals, the gathering of bush products, construction work, and other types of manual labour, which are considered unworthy for nobles. They leave all this work to the Rimmaye. At present the Fulbe cannot avoid cultivation of cereals, because their herds are too small to provide for a subsistence.

The livestock is herded in the surroundings of the settlements. To the south there are vast pastures of predominantly annual grasses on the sandy soils of fixed dunes. Here the cattle are grazed. To the north the soils are clayey and trees dominate the vegetation. This area is used predominantly for the grazing of sheep and camels. When the fields are harvested very little labour is invested in herding. The cattle are only collected for milking.

When the herding family falls short of cereals or when pastures in the surroundings of Serma are bad, people go on transhumance to cultivators’ villages to the south and west either to look for pastures and water for their animals or for possibilities to barter/market their milk for cereals.

The inhabitants of Serma were cultivating several types of fields with different soil and management properties: (1) the fields on the sand dunes (Tıle), with sandy soils and little manure; (2) some fields around the Rimmaye hamlet, Debere, located in a depression with heavier soils and relatively well fertilised with dung and village waste; (3) fields around the well called Yarara, sandy soils, but regularly fertilised; and (4) deserted campsites (Winde) which were heavily fertilised, but only occasionally cultivated. Fields of type 1 were used by Fulbe herdsmen and Rimmaye cultivators, of type 2 by Rimmaye only. Type 3 and 4 were exclusively in use by Fulbe herdsmen.

The situation in which the research was conducted was difficult. In 1989 the complete harvest was destroyed by local grasshoppers. The rains of 1990 were bad and only somewhat better in 1991, so that a near-famine situation existed during most of the fieldwork. According to the population this had been a permanent characteristic of the past decade (1981-1991), with only one good harvest in 1988. So we may consider this situation as a good example for a discussion of decision making under conditions of insecurity, and of how people manage risk.

**The data base**

In the following subsections I will attempt to analyse the dynamics of livestock and cereal production. However, this description hides much of the state of chaos and the anxiety of the people about the course events and the decisions they had to take. At times we talked with people who were very insecure, almost desperate about what to do in their situation. Moreover, the information given in this paper concerns the relatively wealthy. The near-famine situation affected the process of the gathering of data, and made it especially difficult to gather consistent sets of quantitative data. We did not want to push people, because of the extra drain on their time and energy, and for fear of getting distorted information because of window-dressing. Poverty is considered as shameful in Fulbe society (de Brujin 1994).

In general, people were very reluctant to talk about the ‘wealth’ they possessed. A favourable remark by the interviewer or his assistant about, for example, the number of cattle or children (labour power) would cause the person being interviewed to close up like an oyster. The normal explanation of the ‘fear-of-the-tax-collector syndrome’ does not hold in this case. People evidently experience shame (yaage) loaded with fear and suspicion that someone may destroy their wealth out of jealousy (haasidaare). When people owned only few cattle, the discussion of animal ownership was much less of a problem. Attempts to count animals in the camps and to record all kinds of data met with suspicion. Men who were willing to provide information on these subjects did so in barely audible voices. So we had to resort to wealth ranking exercises to acquire data on livestock ownership, which is not a very sensitive and error-proof method, but was probably the most reliable in this case.

Most people were less hesitant to discuss crop production. Nevertheless many problems were also encountered in this domain. In the first place many fields were abandoned in 1990, and to a lesser extent in 1991, so that no data could be gathered for two consecutive years for most fields. Information about the fields that had failed was hard to obtain, because the workers did not see any point in going to a field that had not produced anything. For them it was not relevant. Secondly, field size was hard to determine. A lot of fields were only partly covered with seedlings or weeded. Should the area measured reflect the intentions of the worker or the actual outcome? Sometimes he did not know either. A similar problem was encountered at harvest time. Crop production had to be estimated by the number of loads of spikes carried home, which was the easiest to ask. We could not possibly monitor sixty households, or even ten, and weigh all the millet brought home. However, the variation in loads was tremendous depending on the length of the stalks used for binding, and the quality of the spikes. Moreover a lot of millet was carried home in baskets without being bound, because of its bad quality or because it needed additional drying.

Data on labour input proved a menace. The labour devoted to cereal cropping over both seasons was not equal in character. In 1990 most labour was spent on sowing and chasing birds, and very little on weeding. At times people seemed almost apathetic because of the bad rains. Their answers to questions with respect to labour hours were based on social desirability or the intentions of the person interviewed, rather than actual working hours spent on the field. In 1991 the people were more hungry, and thus less effective while working. However, the rains were better and they spent much more time on their fields.
The same sort of problems applied to the management of soil fertility. Most people applied manure to their fields with their own livestock by contracting a herdsman or by carrying household refuse to the field. The question was how to establish the amount of manure applied. How many and for how long were the animals corralled on the field? Were they taken to graze at night and for how many hours? What was the composition of the herd? How did they spread the manure over the field? How to compare goats dung with cow dung? To get some idea one needs to be present everywhere all the time.

The aggregation of data at the level of the family or the production unit also proved to be difficult. There was a clear difference in the organisation of production between the Fulbe and the Rimiaybe. The Fulbe have all kinds of arrangements to undertake millet production. All the men of a \textit{wuro}, the basic unit for organising agricultural production, normally work on the family’s fields. Mostly the sons work. The women never work on the fields, because their task is the processing and marketing of milk because of ideological reasons. When older men work, they normally have separate fields. Production may be stored in a common granary, but also in individual granaries, even when the producers belong to the same \textit{wuro}. Rimiaybe work a number of fields with their family, men, women, children and old people alike. At the same time individuals, mostly women, but also men, work personal fields with the help of their children. The harvest of these personal fields is put into private granaries.

Both Fulbe and Rimiaybe possessed livestock on an individual basis. Among the Fulbe herd management was organised at the level of the household \textit{(wuro)} by its male head. Among the Rimiaybe various forms of management could be observed. Some families managed their own livestock. Others had their cattle herded by Fulbe herdsman. Small ruminants were in general taken care of by the family, sometimes at the level of the household, sometimes at the individual level mainly by women, who invested the revenues of petty trade in goats. As we shall see these different management regimes have consequences for the maintenance of soil fertility.

Besides these structural differences the organisation of the production units themselves proved to be very dynamic in the sense that a number of families, Fulbe as well as Rimiaybe, changed their organisation over the course of the two seasons that were observed. In one case, a Fulbe family, split into five sub-units. In the second year the head of one of the sub-units refused to provide us with data on production, so that the data over the two years were not comparable.

So there are numerous sources of error in quantitative data, which only become clear after prolonged observations over more than one season. Moreover, what is observed this year cannot necessarily be observed next year. Data which are normally considered as constant over time may vary or change at a much faster rate than assumed. Examples of these are the productivity of an hour of extra labour, the composition of production units, the number of livestock available to maintain soil fertility, the tree cover, and the time devoted to specific agricultural activities.

\begin{center}
\textbf{Livestock production}
\end{center}

Over the past decades livestock numbers fluctuated heavily in accordance with the occurrence of droughts. In a neighbouring village the Fulbe lost 62 per cent of their cattle and 55 per cent of their small ruminants during the droughts of 1972-1973 (Diallo 1977). In this instance the herds recovered at a fast rate, for by 1977 the number of cattle had increased by 43 per cent in just four years. There is no reason to think that things were different in Serma. According to the Fulbe herdsman they again lost most of their cattle in the drought of 1983-1985, this time 3 out of 4, which is close to official estimates (ca. 65 per cent, RIM 1987: 54). Recovery from this last disaster has been much slower because rainfall did not pick up until 1994. So, a total number of 1,000 head of cattle at the time of the fieldwork owned by 62 families (Fulbe and Rimiaybe) seems a reasonable estimate (see Table 1).

The total village herd may produce at most 600 litres of milk a day for human consumption during the rainy season, and almost nothing during the dry season. During the post-harvest season (October-December) of 1990 and the cold dry season (January-February) of 1991 on average 8 women marketed their milk each day, while their average turnover was sufficient for 2 kilos of millet. This means that the women’s economy has suffered enormously from the fluctuations in cattle numbers (De Bruijn 1997). Consequently the selling of animals, which is a male prerogative, has taken over the role of supplier of cereals during the dry season, putting women and children at even more risk. The Rimiaybe women never marketed their milk. It was all used for home consumption, or the livestock was herded by Fulbe herdsman who consumed the milk.

In general the Fulbe own more livestock, especially cattle, than the Rimiaybe. However, one has to keep in mind that these cattle are very unevenly distributed over the community. This leaves 37 Fulbe families and 10 out of 12 Rimiaybe families with less than 5 head of cattle (most of them without any) (see Table 1) at

\begin{center}
\begin{tabular}{|c|c|c|c|}
\hline
\textbf{No. of cattle} & \textbf{No. of} & \textbf{Total cattle} & \textbf{\% of} \\
\textbf{per family} & \textbf{families} & \textbf{per category} & \textbf{total} \\
\hline
ca. 200 & 2 & 400 & 40 \\
ca. 50 & 1 & 50 & 5 \\
25-30 & 6 & 165 & 17 \\
15-24 & 9 & 180 & 18 \\
5-14 & 7 & 70 & 7 \\
1-4 & 25 & 75 & 8 \\
- & 12 & 0 & 0 \\
missed & 60 & 6 \\
\hline
\textbf{total} & \textbf{62} & \textbf{1,000} & \textbf{100\%} \\
\hline
\end{tabular}
\end{center}
the time of the field research. The ownership of cattle is, however, not translated into political influence for the two wealthy (Fulbe) families. Political domination is instead based on closeness to the Fulbe chief who resides in Booni 27 kilometres north of Serma, family and lineage size, or the occupation of positions such as tax-collector or lineage head which were created by the colonial administration and subsequently perpetuated by the Malian government.

If we compare the fluctuations in livestock numbers with the instability in pasture production, it is clear that at least as far as the last drought is concerned a major dip in pasture production in 1983 and 1984 preceded the massive dying (75 per cent) of cattle in the dry season of 1985 (see Table 2). The variance in forage production for specific components of the vegetation is even higher (see De Bruijn & Van Dijk 1995: 284). It also appears, when comparing the production figures for 1984 and 1987 that total rainfall is not the only important factor, but it is also the timing and spacing of showers, which was much better in 1987 than in 1984. The high cattle mortality related to the drought of 1985 was further due to the massive influx of livestock from northern regions and the administrative decisions concerning access to water points and pasture areas, which led to catastrophic overstocking (Van Dijk & De Bruijn 1995).

In addition food and livestock markets collapsed. Cereals doubled in price because of short supply and speculation – though eventually the rise of cereal prices was stopped by the massive distribution of food aid. Official market prices for livestock dropped to approximately 20-25 per cent of pre-drought levels, while the proportion of all animals offered at the market which were sold dropped from 50 per cent to 30 per cent, and the number of animals offered increased by 600 per cent (Hesse 1987). Locally, animals fetched much lower prices, and were even given away by herdsmen just to get rid of the burden, hoping that the new owner would manage to keep them alive.

During the fieldwork period (1990-1991) herd growth stagnated because of tick-borne diseases. Official livestock prices were structurally depressed because of subsidised beef exports by the European Union to the coastal countries of West Africa (Ruben et al. 1994), and official cereal prices were very high due to bad harvests (see Table 3). As a result the amount of millet obtained for a head of cattle was low, which meant an extra drain on the growth of the herd. When a good harvest was obtained in 1991, cereal prices dropped and livestock prices rose immediately.

So, in this case herdsmen had to face the hazards caused by three factors. First of all, climatic risk, which caused a dramatic fluctuation in pasture (and cereal) production. A second source of risk was the cereal and livestock market, which responded inversely to the drop in agricultural production. The third source of risk was political in nature, i.e., the political decisions which led to the admission of too much livestock on the pastures of Serma. These factors led to the ‘corrective disaster’ as predicted by our framework.

### Table 2: Primary production (PP) and carrying capacity (CC) of pastures in the research area for various years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>P in mm</th>
<th>PP in kg</th>
<th>CC in TLU.ha⁻¹</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>196</td>
<td>347</td>
<td>0.048</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>n.d.</td>
<td>1,276</td>
<td>0.175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>1,171</td>
<td>0.135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>0.098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>284</td>
<td>1,660</td>
<td>0.227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>1,350</td>
<td>0.185</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>212</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>0.145</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| \( s_p \) (%) | 20 | 41 | 41 |

**Note:** one TLU is a standard animal of 250 kg, 1 camel is 1 TLU; one head of cattle is 0.7 TLU; one goat or one sheep is 0.1 TLU

**Sources:** Diarra & Hienaux 1987, Hienaux et al. 1984, 1988, 1989, 1990

### Table 3: Prices of millet, bulls and kilos of millet per bull in the research area over various seasons

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Season</th>
<th>Millet Price in FCFA per 100 kg</th>
<th>Price of a Bull</th>
<th>Kilos of Millet per Bull</th>
<th>( s_n )</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>rainy</td>
<td>8,893</td>
<td>50,071</td>
<td>541</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>dry hot</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>68,653</td>
<td>549</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>rainy</td>
<td>12,500</td>
<td>59,833</td>
<td>479</td>
<td>95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>post-harvest</td>
<td>6,438</td>
<td>60,750</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean</td>
<td></td>
<td>11,000</td>
<td>61,348</td>
<td>577</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cereal production

A similar picture can be sketched for cereal production. Both the Fulbe and the Raimaybe cultivate millet to compensate for the gaps left by the livestock production system. Some Raimaybe occasionally sow sorghum and beans. Surprisingly, the Fulbe herdsmen work more land per worker than the Raimaybe (see Table 4). This is due to the fact that Fulbe women never take part in cultivation work. On a per capita basis the Fulbe cultivate on average less land than the Raimaybe, but given the range of variation (\( x \pm s_n = 0.28-0.40 \) for the Fulbe and 0.29-0.61 for the Raimaybe) the differences are not worth mentioning.
Table 4: Area cultivated per worker and per capita for various population groups in Serma, Central Mali

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>group</th>
<th>Mean area cultivated (ha)</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>per worker</td>
<td>$s_n$ %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulbe</td>
<td>1.70</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riiimaye</td>
<td>0.95</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Much more important are the differences in production per worker and per capita, the coefficient of variance of these figures and the differences between the two years that observations were made (see Table 5). In 1990 the average Fulbe worker produced less grains with twice as much land as an average Riiimaye worker. On a per capita basis this difference is even more impressive. The difference in per capita production remains large in 1991 but the relative gap becomes less, due to a spectacular increase in production per Fulbe worker surpassing the Riiimaye workers by almost 300 kilos. However, we must be cautious here because of the small data base. The difference between Riiimaye and Fulbe in inter-annual variation is particularly large.

If we then take the inter-annual variation for all the fields monitored in 1990 and 1991 it seems clear that average productivity of fields was higher in 1991, especially when one considers that the figures for 1990 are inflated because a number of fields failed and were not monitored for that reason. Moreover, the coefficient of variance in 1990 is much higher than in 1991. If we split the data into field type (Table 6), no clear pattern emerges, only that the heavily fertilised fields of the Wndae (a deserted campsite) do particularly well in a year of good rainfall and that the cultivation of the sandy soils on the Dunes (Tiiile) is extremely risky in a year of bad rainfall given the enormous variance. Productivity of the heavier soils around the Riiimaye village (Debere) and the sandy soils around the pastoral well (Yaraama) is relatively stable.

**Table 5: Crop production per worker and per capita for various population groups and various years in Serma, Central Mali.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>group</th>
<th>Mean crop production (kg)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>per worker</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fulbe</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riiimaye</td>
<td>261</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|       | 1991                      |
|       | per worker | $s_n$ % | per capita | $s_n$ % | N |
| Fulbe | 676        | 33      | 127        | 30      | 6 |
| Riiimaye | 393   | *       | 180        | *       | 2 |
| Total | 606        | 38%     | 140        | 55%     | 8 |

| Total | 386        | 63%     | 118        | 55%     | 20|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>location</th>
<th>year</th>
<th>mean field size (ha)</th>
<th>per ha $p^1$</th>
<th>$s_n$ %</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tiiile</td>
<td>1990</td>
<td>1.52*</td>
<td>281</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.99*</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Debere</td>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>1.25</td>
<td>341</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaraama</td>
<td>1990/91</td>
<td>0.89</td>
<td>377</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wndae</td>
<td>1991</td>
<td>0.38</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>year</th>
<th>location</th>
<th>mean field size (ha)</th>
<th>per ha $p^1$</th>
<th>$s_n$ %</th>
<th>N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>1.85*</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>all</td>
<td>0.89*</td>
<td>452</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>total</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.34</td>
<td>382</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note. * The differences in mean field size between 1990 and 1991 have to be attributed to the fact that just before the growing season of 1991 a family of five brothers and their nuclear families decided to split their fields. The fields on tiiile (plural of wndae) are always very small.

Farm management
So it seems that there are two main production strategies. The first is mainly pursued by the Riiimaye. They cultivate the heavier soils around the Riiimaye hamlet, sometimes in combination with fields on the dunes. This strategy results in relatively stable cereal production figures. The second strategy is mainly followed by the Fulbe, who cultivate the sandy soils on the dunes and around the well at Yaraama, and sometimes heavily fertilised campsites. Given the soil characteris-
tics in combination with the quantities of manure applied to these fields this second strategy is much more risky than that of the Riumbye, which is made clear by the high coefficients of variance (Tables 5 and 6).

Within the cropping system itself there is no ready made explanation for the differences between these two groups. Riumbye may own and/or operate the same resources in nature and quantity as the Fulbe. Moreover, as is made clear by the data, the differences within each group are just as big. So, variations in cereal and livestock production cannot be brought down to a simple socio-economic indicator. We will have to look at particular mixes of crop and livestock production at ‘farm level’, and the way in which soil fertility is managed, this is the most important link between the two production systems.

This becomes clear if we compare two relatively rich families, one Fulbe and one Riumbye, of equal size, and a poor Fulbe family. In 1990 the wealthy Fulbe family harvested far too little for the subsistence of the family (see Table 7). This was quite understandable since they cultivated only fields on the dunes. In order to compensate for the gap, the family went on transhumance to barter their milk for cereals in a village of sedentary cultivators. But during the dry season the cows ran dry because of the bad quality of the forage and the inhabitants of the village where they had camped were unwilling to sell millet and buy milk, since they had also had a bad harvest. The only option left was to sell cattle. In this case, five head of cattle were converted into 1,300 kg of millet (260 kg of millet per head of cattle) and other necessities such as clothes, cola nuts and tobacco. The prices which this herdsman obtained for his cattle were lower than the official prices (see Table 3).

The following year (1991) the rains were much more abundant, and the family took a deserted campsite into production, which produced very well (500 kg.ha\(^{-1}\)). The other fields more than doubled in production (from 99 to 238 kg.ha\(^{-1}\)). The disappointing returns per hectare from these fields indicated that soil fertility was low. This is due to the fact that owing to cereal deficits the family was obliged to look for cereals elsewhere, leaving no time to manure their own fields. In 1991 they harvested much more (though still not sufficient) and decided to stay in the village to apply manure to their own fields.

The Riumbye family was the only one who harvested sufficient millet for the whole of 1990 from their family fields (424 kg.ha\(^{-1}\) on the heavier soils, 22 kg.ha\(^{-1}\) on the dunes). In addition, the wives of the household head harvested several hundred kilos from their own personal fields. In 1991, however, they harvested little more. As Riumbye they did not consider going on transhumance. Instead, they corralled their own livestock on their fields, and invited other people to do the same. One son of the family was sent away to Bamako, the capital of Mali, to earn money for the head taxes. He was not very successful, as he did not even earn enough money for his return journey.

Table 7: Budget of a relatively well off Fulbe family in 1990.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consumption</th>
<th>kg millet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millet harvest (1990)</td>
<td>335</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>market transaction 13 sacks of 100 kilo</td>
<td>1,300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bartered for milk</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>support by son-in-law</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gift of cultivator</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subtotal</td>
<td>2,095</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>needed 7 kg per day*</td>
<td>2,555</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>-460</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Cash income                      | FCFA      |
| Bull (8 years)                   | 36,000    |
| Bull (one year)                  | 16,000    |
| cow (12 years)                   | 36,000    |
| heifer (3 years)                 | 30,000    |
| bull (3 years)                   | 33,000    |
| Total budget                     | 151,000   |

Note: * This figure is corrected for the fact that they had a number of milk cows and derived part of their subsistence from the self-consumption of milk.

Table 8: Budget of a poor Fulbe family in 1991.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Consumption</th>
<th>kg millet</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Millet harvest (1991)</td>
<td>833</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bought in small quantities for FCFA 24,500</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bartered for milk</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>borrowed from Riumbye</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>subtotal</td>
<td>1,218</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>needed 5 kg per day*</td>
<td>1,825</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deficit</td>
<td>-607</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Spending                          | FCFA      |
| donkey                            | 7,500     |
| 2 goats                           | 5,350     |
| one she-goat plus kid             | 2,800     |
| one goat                          | 1,500     |
| one bull                          | 1,500     |
| wage labour for Riumbye           | 5,000     |
| Total budget                      | 23,650    |

Note: * This figure is corrected for the fact that this family relied almost totally on cereals for their subsistence as they possessed very few livestock.
However, these were the well off. Differences within each group, Fulbe and Riimaybe, are greater, greater than between these two families. The poorest have to rely on quite different strategies to cope with cereal deficits. They cannot count on their own harvest or the sale of cattle, as the rich do. Instead they have to muddle through on a day-to-day basis. In Table 8 a budget of such a poor family is summarised for 1991, a relatively good year. This family spent the dry season wandering from village to village, bartering the (little) milk of their goats, and doing work on an occasional basis for the sedentary cultivators. They were lucky that year, because they harvested a lot of cereals. Despite the fact that they had no livestock to apply dung, nor the means to contract a herdsman to corral his livestock on their field, it had received a lot of village waste by way of manure, because it was located close to the Riimaybe hamlet. However, the year before their crop had ‘burned’, due to water stress. As the result of the high amount of manure in the soil, the water requirements of the crop were too high to survive a dry spell in the middle of the rainy season.

Natural resource management

It is clear that there is a large element of risk and uncertainty involved in farming and herding, given the high variability in crop production figures each year, and the cyclical oscillations in livestock numbers. Actors, whether individuals or groups have to deal in a comprehensive manner with each event, in order to survive each calamity, while not eroding the basis of their existence. Nevertheless, they do so within their own particular framework, ideologies and their membership of a particular herding or farming community. The Riimaybe have always been defined as low status people. Culturally they are not allowed to behave like the Fulbe and follow their herds on transhumance. Herd following as a way of earning a subsistence is just not done. It is not part of their identity. Instead, they entrust their animals to the Fulbe or keep them near their homesteads. Nonetheless, the Riimaybe conform very well to the picture of skilful survivors. They cultivate, keep animals, gather, engage in wage labour and petty trade etc.

The Fulbe on the other hand have strong prejudices against the gathering of tree fruits and wild grains as this is the work of the ‘poor’, and in fact only cultivate cereals because they have to. Wage labour is a last resort. They prefer to move through the pastures in a rather haphazard way, sometimes going to places where the forage is bad and food is lacking, instead of employing fine-tuned grazing strategies to accumulate cattle as rational pastoralists are supposed to do. Even worse, if they cultivate, they farm the most drought-prone soils in their home area, after applying tons of manure, so that their crops constantly ‘burn’ and fail. They leave the wild grains in the bush, and their women buy their spices and other necessities from Riimaybe women, instead of engaging in petty trade by themselves.

Nevertheless, it would be quite premature to conclude that they behave in an irrational fashion. Applying a lot of manure to light sandy soils in a semi-arid region may seem illogical, because it enhances the risk of crop failure. However, because of the labour in cultivating light soils, a herding family is able to manage a herd at the same time, to liberate the women from agricultural labour in order to process and market milk, and to harvest a bumper crop once every five years. It adds in another way to the variety in subsistence, because this composite strategy permits the Fulbe to stay mobile and to shift from herding to farming and vice versa.

However, specific strategies work only under specific conditions. People lack the technical means to develop fine-tuned strategies to tame the environment and can only react to extremely variable conditions. For both Riimaybe and Fulbe there have been no two years over the last decades in which the growing conditions, and hence the productive capacity of the ecosystem, were the same. This year’s loser may be tomorrow’s winner and vice versa. Given the differences in strategies between the Riimaybe and Fulbe, the Riimaybe opt for lower risks in the form of more reliable outputs of cereals, whereas the Fulbe choose a high risk strategy, where both the gains and losses are higher.

At the level of Fulbe society as a whole there are even more complicated patterns of interaction. The differences in strategies between the Riimaybe and Fulbe can be understood as opposites in a dialectical relation. The presence of the Riimaybe as a sedentary core in Fulbe society, and the fact that they perform all kinds of services for the Fulbe herdsman, enables the Fulbe to maintain the flexibility and mobility to move around with their prime resource cattle. If the Fulbe took part in gathering, petty trade, repairing wells and water reservoirs and the plastering of granaries etc., they would not be able to exploit the variety of pastures and cereal markets in far away cultivators’ villages as they do now.

The Riimaybe profit from this situation in two ways. Firstly, by allying themselves to the Fulbe they have better employment and trading opportunities. The second manner in which they profit is the fact that they are able to exploit a larger area for mature production with the help of the livestock and the herding capacities of the Fulbe. When they contract a herdsman for fertilising their fields or herding their cattle they gain access to much larger pasture resources than if they operate on their own.

To further investigate these interactions we would have to include property and tenure relations, and the regulation of access to grazing and gathering to see how they enable people to occupy specific ‘risk positions’ (see Beck, 1992), and move or negotiate themselves from one position to another. As can be concluded from the budgets of rich and poor families, people do not start from the same position when confronted with hazard, and consequently do not have the same options for responses to risk, and may have to deal with hazard in a sub-optimal manner.

Conclusion

Given the large variety of factors involved in agricultural decision making in high-risk environments, the dynamics can only be understood in a larger framework, which comprises ecological, economic, legal political and cultural factors. As has
been shown in this paper one cannot understand the role of risk and uncertainty in
decision making with reference to agricultural input and output data alone, for
they suppose linear feedback relations between the factors involved. On the con-
trary decisions in one domain may have far-reaching consequences for other
domains. This means that decision makers will often choose to operate specific
domains in a sub-optimal manner, so that negative consequences in other domains
can be prevented.

The feedback processes in these domains seem to evolve in a non-linear man-
ner due to their complex character, and the compounded effects of numerous deci-
sions and environmental factors, which leads to changes in system characteristics
and key variables. This results in a number of emergent properties of the land use
system, which cannot be reduced to the decisions of individuals. Given the num-
erosity differences between the decision makers and the large variety of conditions
in which they operate it seems that there is not just one optimal strategy. Rather
there are a number of possible tracks for herdsman as well as cultivators in each
and every situation, with each their own risks and having possibilities for gains.

A last word on risk and uncertainty itself. The dynamics of risk and uncertainty
are very important to our understanding of agricultural decision making in semi-
arid environments and high risk environments in general. It has been shown that
these dynamics have a multi-dimensional character and cannot be brought down
to individualised decision making. Firstly, individuals occupy a variety of risk
positions. This means that they are vulnerable to the impact of risk in a different
manner. Secondly, individuals coordinate their decisions with, and adjust them-
 themselves to, the decisions of other people, such that the compounded effect of large
numbers of individual decisions are transformed into all kinds of emergent prop-
eties in higher order social entities, such as camps, villages, ethnic groups, land
 tenure arrangements and even the land use system as a whole. This implies that we
will have only a partial, if not one-sided, understanding of risk-coping behaviour,
if we focus on individual decision making alone. To do full justice to these larger
dynamics of risk and uncertainty we need to develop logical chain models which
include these motivational, cultural and institutional factors.

Notes

1. Risk in this perspective is an aspect of any unforeseeable event that impos-
ing directly or indirectly on the productivity of natural resources and the production,
consumption, and distribution of agricultural products. Hazards are a possible consequence of risk.

2. The fieldwork in this community took place between July 1990 and February 1992,
with a pause of three months during the dry season in 1991. Funding for this research
project was granted by the Netherlands Foundation for the Advancement of Tropical
Science (WOTRO: grant W 52-494). Data were gathered by two researchers, Mirjam
de Brujin and myself. The initial purpose of the study was to assess the consequences
of political change and drought for local-level strategies of natural resource manage-
ment, and social security arrangements. For the study on land use, to which we will
limit the discussion here, data were gathered by means of participant observation, open
and semi-structured interviews, field observations, archival research and oral history.
Most of the data were qualitative. Some quantitative data were gathered to get some
idea about the economics of cereal and livestock production.

3. The big difference between the two fields cannot be explained with reference to soil
type alone. It is probable that there was no labour invested in the field on the dunes
when it became clear that the rainy season would not be good and that the harvest was
bound to fail on that field, and that it would be wise to devote all attention to the field
with the heavier soils.

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Résumé

Les modèles conventionnels pour analyser l’impact des risques et pour saisir la prise de décision considèrent principalement des facteurs écologiques et économiques. Dans cet article, la thèse est avancée que le risque et l’incertitude doivent être analysés comme des facteurs tels que nous pourrions développer une meilleure compréhension de démarches pour améliorer les risques. Par conséquent, ces conditions d’un fait singulier dans l’espace et dans le temps. Basé sur cette

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conception de risque un cadre d'analyse est présenté pour saisir le rôle des risques et l’instabilité qui en résulte pour les décideurs et les dynamiques culturelles et institutionnelles de leurs sociétés. Ce cadre est discuté par l'analyse de l'impact de la variabilité des pluies sur la prise de décisions par des éleveurs peuls au Mali central et leurs voisins sédentaires. La thèse est avancée que les décideurs souvent optent pour des stratégies de façon non-optimale et que les processus de rétroaction évoluent de façon non-linéaire. Pour une compréhension plus approfondie de la prise de décision dans un environnement de hauts risques il est nécessaire de développer des modèles qui englobent des facteurs culturels et intentionnels ainsi que les motivations des décideurs.

**Resumen**

Modelos convencionales para la evaluación de riesgos y procesos de toma de decisiones solamente tienen en cuenta factores ecológicos y económicos. Uno de los argumentos centrales de la contribución es, que riesgo e incertidumbre deberían ser tratados como eventos totales que obtendremos una mejor comprensión del comportamiento frente a riesgos si estudiamos el impacto de un evento en el espacio y a lo largo del tiempo. A partir de este argumento se desarrolla un marco de análisis de riesgos y de la inestabilidad resultante tanto para los que tienen que tomar decisiones como para la dinámica cultural e institucional de sus sociedades. Este marco es aplicado al análisis del impacto de la variabilidad de precipitaciones en las decisiones de pastores Fulbe en Mali Central y de sus vecinos agricultores. Se concluye que los actores muchas veces optan por estrategias sub-óptimas y que procesos retroactivos se desarrollan de una manera no lineal. Para un entendimiento más profundo de la toma de decisiones en entornos de alto riesgo se tendrían que desarrollar modelos que incluyan factores motivacionales, culturales e institucionales.

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**TRANSHUMANCE – A PASTORAL RESPONSE TO RISK AND UNCERTAINTY IN THE HIMALAYAS**

*Minoti Chakravarty-Kaul*

It will be sufficient to speak of original property in land, for among pastoral peoples property in such natural products of the earth as, e.g., sheep is at the same time property in pastures they pass through. In general, property in land includes property in its organic products.

Karl Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Formations*: 89

Nomadism in the Indian Himalayas, as organised by Gaddi shepherds, is an institutional arrangement to reap economies of pastoral value from the limited and uncertain pastures of the Himalayan country side. Their transhumance is a method of scaling down risks by spreading pastoral activity over time and space. During the process transaction costs are reduced. Such traditional practices have, however, been disrupted by a combination of structural and institutional changes; consequently the Gaddis today are commonly perceived as shiftless nomads who deforest and degrade the Himalayan environment.

In the first section I will describe the characteristics of risk and uncertainty specific to this region and the measures shepherds have taken to tackle these. My major source of information has been historical documents relating to the entire region of Greater Punjab, i.e., Punjab prior to the end of colonial rule and the partition of the Indian subcontinent in 1947 into the states of India and Pakistan. These suggest that in the first instance, transhumance was not an isolated phenomenon, but was much more integrated into the mainstream structure of rural life than is today; what remains now are only fragments of long-haul trails which ran across the entire ‘land of the five rivers’. Secondly, it appears that such transhumance was part of an overall land use pattern obtaining among various communities with arable and pastoral occupations where long and short fallows were alternated to suit the wide regional variation of soil, elevation, temperature and precipitation over the year. Thirdly, it is perceived that such a complex land use pattern was governed by institutions of collective reciprocity, in turn facilitated by a ‘property rights’ structure which combined individual and ‘primula’ (private for some parts of the year and communal the rest of the time) holdings in the arable, and communal control in the pastoral. Only then could arable and pastoral strategies be accommodated in the different seasons. Fourthly, such institutional arrangements reflected the ability of both the cultivators and the pastoralists to self-govern resource use (for details on all these aspects see Chakravarty-Kaul 1996).

In the second part of this paper I examine the impact of legal and administrative intervention by the State and of technology which changed the structure of land use and institutions of property rights, altering the context in which pastoralism was related to agriculture. Canals in the doabs (land lying between two rivers)