Staff Publications

Staff Publications

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    'Staff publications' is the digital repository of Wageningen University & Research

    'Staff publications' contains references to publications authored by Wageningen University staff from 1976 onward.

    Publications authored by the staff of the Research Institutes are available from 1995 onwards.

    Full text documents are added when available. The database is updated daily and currently holds about 240,000 items, of which 72,000 in open access.

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Record number 387243
Title Cartel stability under an optimal sharing rule
Author(s) Weikard, H.P.
Source The Manchester School 77 (2009)5. - ISSN 1463-6786 - p. 575 - 593.
DOI https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02111.x
Department(s) Environmental Economics and Natural Resources
MGS
Publication type Refereed Article in a scientific journal
Publication year 2009
Keyword(s) international environmental agreements - stable coalition structures - climate agreements - externalities - membership
Abstract In this paper I analyse the stability of cartels in games with heterogeneous players and externalities. I introduce a class of sharing rules for coalition pay-offs, called 'optimal sharing rules', that stabilize all cartels that are possibly stable under some arbitrary sharing rule. To illustrate the impact of optimal sharing with heterogeneous players and positive externalities I analyse a public goods game. In contrast to games with identical players that are common in the study of international environmental agreements, my results show that large coalitions may well be stable when optimal sharing is applied.
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