Staff Publications

Staff Publications

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    'Staff publications' is the digital repository of Wageningen University & Research

    'Staff publications' contains references to publications authored by Wageningen University staff from 1976 onward.

    Publications authored by the staff of the Research Institutes are available from 1995 onwards.

    Full text documents are added when available. The database is updated daily and currently holds about 240,000 items, of which 72,000 in open access.

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Record number 388643
Title Renegotiations in the Greenhouse
Author(s) Weikard, H.P.; Dellink, R.B.; Ierland, E.C. van
Source Environmental and Resource Economics 45 (2010)4. - ISSN 0924-6460 - p. 573 - 596.
Department(s) Environmental Economics and Natural Resources
Publication type Refereed Article in a scientific journal
Publication year 2010
Keyword(s) klimaatverandering - internationale verdragen - milieubeleid - climatic change - international agreements - environmental policy - international environmental agreements - climate agreements - stock pollutant - stability - cooperation - uncertainty - game - information - equilibria - coalition
Categories Climatic Change
Abstract International climate policies are being shaped in a process of ongoing negotiations. This paper develops a sequential game framework to explore the stability of international climate agreements allowing for multiple renegotiations. We analyse how the incentives to reach an international climate agreement in the first period will be impacted by the prospect of further negotiations in later periods and by the punishment options related to renegotiations. For this purpose we introduce a dynamic model of coalition formation with twelve world regions that captures the key features of the climate-economy impacts of greenhouse gas emissions. For a model with one round of renegotiations we find that a coalition of China and the United States is the unique renegotiation proof equilibrium. In a game with more frequent renegotiations we find that the possibility to punish defecting players helps to stabilise larger coalitions in early stages of the game. Consequently, several renegotiation proof equilibria emerge that outperform the coalition of China and USA in terms of abatement levels and global payoff. The Grand Coalition, however, is unstable
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