|Title||Positive framing does not solve the tragedy of the commons|
|Author(s)||Isaksen, Elisabeth Thuestad; Brekke, Kjell Arne; Richter, Andries|
|Source||Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 95 (2019). - ISSN 0095-0696 - p. 45 - 56.|
Environmental Economics and Natural Resources
|Publication type||Refereed Article in a scientific journal|
|Availibility||Full text available from 2021-05-01|
|Keyword(s)||Common pool experiment - Externality - Framing - Public goods experiment - Rivalry - Strategic complements - Strategic substitutes|
We investigate whether positive framing increases cooperation in three social dilemmas with slightly different properties: a linear public goods (PG) game, a non-linear PG game, and a common pool resource (CPR) game. Results from our laboratory experiments show that contributions to a linear PG are higher if the externality is framed positively, rather than negatively, corroborating earlier findings by Andreoni (1995). By contrast, we find no such framing effects in the non-linear PG game or the CPR game. In these games, the best response in the material payoffs is to contribute less if others contribute more, counteracting effects of pro-social preferences. Positive framing therefore does not help to solve the tragedy of the commons.