Staff Publications

Staff Publications

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    'Staff publications' is the digital repository of Wageningen University & Research

    'Staff publications' contains references to publications authored by Wageningen University staff from 1976 onward.

    Publications authored by the staff of the Research Institutes are available from 1995 onwards.

    Full text documents are added when available. The database is updated daily and currently holds about 240,000 items, of which 72,000 in open access.

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Record number 553363
Title Overcapitalization and social norms of cooperation in a small-scale fishery
Author(s) Schaap, Robbert; Richter, Andries
Source Ecological Economics 166 (2019). - ISSN 0921-8009
DOI https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2019.106438
Department(s) Environmental Economics and Natural Resources
WASS
Publication type Refereed Article in a scientific journal
Publication year 2019
Availibility Full text available from 2021-12-01
Keyword(s) Cooperation - Evolutionary game theory - Fisheries - Investment - Overcapacity - Social norms - Social-ecological systems - Technological efficiency
Abstract

The increasing technological efficiency of harvesting equipment has been identified as one of the main causes of overcapacity and overexploitation of natural resources. In this paper, a formal model is developed which studies the effects of technological efficiency as an endogenous variable within a bioeconomic system. We model capital investments in a fishery, where investment decisions are made less frequently than the allocation of variable inputs. We study how the possibility to invest in capital affects open access dynamics, and also the evolution of cooperative harvesting norms. We find that the possibility to make large capital investments can destabilize cooperation, especially if enforcement capacity is low. Further, we find that communities can preserve cooperation by agreeing on a resource level that is lower than socially-optimal. This reduces the incentive to deviate from the cooperative strategy and invest in capital.

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