|Title||The two-stage game approach to coalition formation: Where we stand and ways to go|
|Author(s)||Hagen, Achim; Mouche, Pierre von; Weikard, Hans Peter|
|Source||Games 11 (2020)1. - ISSN 2073-4336|
Environmental Economics and Natural Resources
|Publication type||Refereed Article in a scientific journal|
|Keyword(s)||Binary action game - Cartel game - Coalition formation - Cournot-like game - Equilibrium coalition structure - Potential game - Symmetric game - Two-stage game|
Coalition formation is often analysed in an almost non-cooperative way, as a two-stage game that consists of a first stage comprising membership actions and a second stage with physical actions, such as the provision of a public good. We formalised this widely used approach for the case where actions are simultaneous in each stage. Herein, we give special attention to the case of a symmetric physical game. Various theoretical results, in particular, for cartel games, are provided. As they are crucial, recent results on the uniqueness of coalitional equilibria of Cournot-like physical games are reconsidered. Various concrete examples are included. Finally, we discuss research strategies to obtain results about equilibrium coalition structures with abstract physical games in terms of qualitative properties of their primitives.