Staff Publications

Staff Publications

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    'Staff publications' is the digital repository of Wageningen University & Research

    'Staff publications' contains references to publications authored by Wageningen University staff from 1976 onward.

    Publications authored by the staff of the Research Institutes are available from 1995 onwards.

    Full text documents are added when available. The database is updated daily and currently holds about 240,000 items, of which 72,000 in open access.

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    Costs, benefits and interlinkages between adaptation and mitigation
    Hof, Andries ; Bruin, Kelly De; Dellink, Rob ; Elzen, Michel Den; Vuuren, Detlef Van - \ 2014
    In: Global Climate Governance beyond 2012 Cambridge University Press - ISBN 9780521190114 - p. 235 - 254.

    The thirteenth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in 2007 decided that developing countries should be compensated for adaptation costs to climate change through the Adaptation Fund (first draft decision of the third session of the conference of the parties serving as the meeting of the parties to the Kyoto Protocol). This shows that adaptation to climate change has become important in international climate negotiations. Today, adaptation is widely recognized as an equally important and complementary response to climate change mitigation (for example, Commission of the European Communities 2007; IPCC 2007a; Agrawala and Fankhauser 2008). Still, relatively little information is available to support more integrated climate policies that focus on both mitigation and adaptation (Klein et al. 2005). In particular, in integrated assessment models that aim at supporting climate policy by analysing their economic and environmental consequences and formulating efficient responses, explicit consideration of adaptation is still in its infancy (Tol 2005; Wilbanks 2005; Agrawala et al. 2008). This chapter tries to fill the gap in integrated assessment models by integrating adaptation and residual damage functions from AD-RICE (de Bruin et al. 2009) with the FAIR model (den Elzen and van Vuuren 2007; Hof et al. 2008). This version of the FAIR model (from now on called AD-FAIR) enables an analysis of the interactions between mitigation, emissions trading, adaptation and residual damages (that is, damages not avoided by adaptation measures) on a global as well as regional scale. Furthermore, adaptation is modelled explicitly as a policy variable, providing insights in the economic consequences of adaptation. This information is vital for effective adaptation governance.

    Sticks and carrots for the design of international climate agreements with renegotiations
    Weikard, H.P. ; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2014
    Annals of Operations Research 220 (2014). - ISSN 0254-5330 - p. 49 - 68.
    klimaatverandering - internationale verdragen - milieubeleid - climatic change - international agreements - environmental policy - environmental agreements - stability - cooperation - schemes
    This paper examines renegotiations of international climate agreements for carbon abatement. We explore coalition stability under ‘optimal transfers’ that have been suggested to stabilise international environmental agreements (e.g. McGinty in Oxford Economic Papers 59, 45–62, 2007). Such transfer schemes need to be refined when agreements are renegotiated. We determine the requirements that transfers between signatories of an international climate agreement must satisfy in order to stabilise the sequence of agreements that performs best in terms of provision of the public good ‘carbon abatement’. If these requirements are met, no country wants to change its membership status at any stage. In order to demonstrate the applicability of our result we use the STACO model, a 12-regions global model, to assess the impact of well-designed transfer rules on the stability of an international climate agreement. Although there are strong free-rider incentives, we find a stable grand coalition in the first commitment period in a game with one round of renegotiations if renegotations take place sufficiently early.
    The Fatter the Tail, the Fatter the Climate Agreement. Simulating the Influence of Fat Tails in Climate Change Damages on the Success of International Climate Negotiations
    Dellink, R.B. ; Dekker, T. ; Ketterer, J. - \ 2013
    Environmental and Resource Economics 56 (2013)2. - ISSN 0924-6460 - p. 277 - 305.
    international environmental agreements - stability likelihood - uncertainty - coalitions - strategies
    International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the ‘fat tail’, on the formation of an international mitigation agreement. We systematically vary the shape and location of the distribution of climate change damages using the stochastic version of the applied game-theoretical STACO model. Our aim is to identify how changes to the distributional form affect the stability of coalitions and their performance. We find that fatter upper tails increase the likelihood that more ambitious coalitions are stable as well as the performance of these stable coalitions. Fatter tails thus imply more successful, or ‘fatter’, international climate agreements
    The Fatter the Tail, the Fatter the Climate Agreement : Simulating the Influence of Fat Tails in Climate Change Damages on the Success of International Climate Negotiations
    Dekker, T. ; Dellink, R.B. ; Ketterer, J. - \ 2012
    Munich : Center for Economic Studies & Ifo Institute (CESifo Working Paper 4059) - 40 p.
    International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the ‘fat tail’, on the formation of an international mitigation agreement. We systematically vary the shape and location of the distribution of climate change damages using the stochastic version of the applied game-theoretical STACO model. Our aim is to identify how changes to the distributional form affect the stability of coalitions and their performance. We find that fatter upper tails increase the likelihood that more ambitious coalitions are stable as well as the performance of these stable coalitions. Fatter tails thus imply more successful, or ‘fatter’, international climate agreements.
    Uncertainty and climate treaties: Does ignorance pay?
    Dellink, R.B. ; Finus, M. - \ 2012
    Resource and Energy Economics 34 (2012)4. - ISSN 0928-7655 - p. 565 - 584.
    international environmental agreements - stability likelihood - irreversibility - strategies - coalitions - emissions - model
    Uncertainty and learning play an important role in the management of many environmental and resource problems and in particular in climate change. In stylized game-theoretic models of international environmental treaty formation, which capture the strategic interactions between nations, learning usually has a negative impact on the success of cooperation. We use a richer climate model that captures the large heterogeneity between different world regions and considers uncertainty about the benefits and costs from climate mitigation. By explicitly exploiting differences between regions and allowing transfers to mitigate free-rider incentives, we derive much more positive conclusions about the role of learning.
    International climate agreements under induced technological change
    Nagashima, M.N. ; Weikard, H.P. ; Bruin, K.C. de; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2011
    Metroeconomica : international review of economics 62 (2011)4. - ISSN 0026-1386 - p. 612 - 634.
    klimaatverandering - internationale verdragen - technology assessment - climatic change - international agreements - technology assessment - development spillovers - technical change - environmental agreements - co2 abatement - coalitions - stability - economics - future - models - policy
    We examine the impact of technological change on the stability of climate coalitions and explore how international cooperation on abatement affects the incentives of signatories to invest in R&D to reduce emissions. We compare the case of no technological change with exogenous technological change and induced technological change. In the latter case R&D investments are endogenous. We find that the highest equilibrium pay-offs are achieved in the case of induced technological change. Furthermore, the formation of a climate coalition boosts R&D investments in carbon abatement technologies in signatory countries
    Drivers of stability of climate coalitions in the STACO model
    Dellink, R.B. - \ 2011
    Climate Change Economics 2 (2011)2. - ISSN 2010-0078 - p. 105 - 128.
    This paper investigates which drivers affect the formation and stability of international climate agreements (ICAs). The applied model STACO is used to project costs and benefits of an international agreement on climate change mitigation activities. The simulation results show that an incentive-based permit allocation scheme is an essential driver in stabilizing larger coalitions. Regional damage shares turn out to be another driver of coalition formation but global damages do not seem to be, thus illustrating that international coalition formation is a matter of relative costs and benefits across regions. No allocation scheme can, however, assure the stability of a global agreement due to huge free-rider incentives. This requires alternative rules, such as a condition that some players are essential in a coalition, or accepting a small loss from cooperation
    The Role of Proactive Adaptation in International Climate Change Mitigation Agreements
    Bruin, K.C. de; Weikard, H.P. ; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2011
    Umea, Sweden : CERE
    klimaatverandering - klimaatadaptatie - internationale verdragen - speltheorie - climatic change - climate adaptation - international agreements - game theory
    This paper investigates the role of proactive adaptation in international mitigation coalition formation. Adaptation is introduced into a three stage cartel game of coalition formation. We analytically derive the optimal level of mitigation and proactive adaptation for the singletons and coalition members. We introduce the AD-STACO model which is constructed based on the STACO model, which is an applied three-stage cartel formation model with 12 heterogenous regions.
    AGE assessment of interactions between climate change policy instruments and pre-existing taxes: the case of Ireland
    Wissema, W.W. ; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2010
    International Journal of Global Environmental Issues 10 (2010)1/2. - ISSN 1466-6650 - p. 46 - 62.
    We introduce a computable general equilibrium model for Ireland to investigate the impact of climate policy on the Irish economy, taking special notice of interactions with the existing tax structure. To this end, we extend the model with a detailed representation of the tax system using separate tax data on all transactions, both intermediate and final demand. We simulate the implementation of auctioned CO2 emissions trading and specific CO2 taxation in Ireland and compare different methods to recycle the revenues. The extended tax specification facilitates a thorough second-best analysis.
    Incentives for international cooperation on adaptation and mitigation
    Dellink, R.B. ; Bruin, K.C. de; Ierland, E.C. van - \ 2010
    In: The Social and Behavioural Aspects of Climate Change. Linking Vulnerability, Adaptation and Mitigation Sheffield UK : Greenleaf Publishing - ISBN 9781906093426 - p. 252 - 274.
    International Cooperation on Climate Change Adaptation from an Economic Perspective
    Bruin, K.C. de; Dellink, R.B. ; Tol, R.S.J. - \ 2010
    Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Sustainable development series 63.2010) - 35
    Renegotiations in the Greenhouse
    Weikard, H.P. ; Dellink, R.B. ; Ierland, E.C. van - \ 2010
    Environmental and Resource Economics 45 (2010)4. - ISSN 0924-6460 - p. 573 - 596.
    klimaatverandering - internationale verdragen - milieubeleid - climatic change - international agreements - environmental policy - international environmental agreements - climate agreements - stock pollutant - stability - cooperation - uncertainty - game - information - equilibria - coalition
    International climate policies are being shaped in a process of ongoing negotiations. This paper develops a sequential game framework to explore the stability of international climate agreements allowing for multiple renegotiations. We analyse how the incentives to reach an international climate agreement in the first period will be impacted by the prospect of further negotiations in later periods and by the punishment options related to renegotiations. For this purpose we introduce a dynamic model of coalition formation with twelve world regions that captures the key features of the climate-economy impacts of greenhouse gas emissions. For a model with one round of renegotiations we find that a coalition of China and the United States is the unique renegotiation proof equilibrium. In a game with more frequent renegotiations we find that the possibility to punish defecting players helps to stabilise larger coalitions in early stages of the game. Consequently, several renegotiation proof equilibria emerge that outperform the coalition of China and USA in terms of abatement levels and global payoff. The Grand Coalition, however, is unstable
    International Cooperation on Climate Change Adaptation from an Economic Perspective
    Bruin, K.C. de; Dellink, R.B. ; Tol, R.S.J. - \ 2009
    Dublin, Ireland : ESRI (Working paper / ESRI no. 323) - 52
    How Harmful are Adaptation Restrictions
    Bruin, K.C. de; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2009
    Milano : FEEM (Nota di lavoro 58.2009) - 41
    The dominant assumption in economic models of climate policy remains that adaptation will be implemented in an optimal manner. There are, however, several reasons why optimal levels of adaptation may not be attainable. This paper investigates the effects of suboptimal levels of adaptation, i.e. adaptation restrictions, on the composition and level of climate change costs and on welfare. Several adaptation restrictions are identified and then simulated in a revised DICE model, extended with adaptation (AD-DICE). We find that especially substantial over-investment in adaptation can be very harmful due to sharply increasing marginal adaptation costs. Furthermore the potential of mitigation to offset suboptimal adaptation is investigated. When adaptation is not possible at extreme levels of climate change, it is cost-effective to use more stringent mitigation policies in order to keep climate change limited, thereby making adaptation possible. Furthermore not adjusting the optimal level of mitigation to these adaptation restrictions may double the costs of adaptation restrictions, and thus in general it is very harmful to ignore existing restrictions on adaptation when devising (efficient) climate policies
    Economic aspects of adaptation to climate change: integrated assessment modelling of adaptation costs and benefits
    Bruin, K.C. de; Dellink, R.B. ; Agrawala, S. - \ 2009
    Paris : OECD (OECD environment working papers no. 6) - 48
    Environmental cost-benefit analysis of alternative timing strategies in greenhouse gas abatement: A data envelopment analysis approach
    Kuosmanen, T.K. ; Bijsterbosch, N. ; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2009
    Ecological Economics 68 (2009)6. - ISSN 0921-8009 - p. 1633 - 1642.
    eco-efficiency - shadow prices - model
    Assessing the benefits of climate policies is complicated due to ancillary benefits: abatement of greenhouse gases also reduces local air pollution. The timing of the abatement measures influences both the economic costs and ancillary benefits. This paper conducts efficiency analysis of ten alternative timing strategies, taking into account the ancillary benefits. We apply the approach by Kuosmanen and Kortelainen [Valuing Environmental Factors in Cost-Benefit Analysis Using Data Envelopment Analysis, Ecological Economics 62 (2007), 56–65], which does not require prior valuation of the environmental impacts. The assessment is based on synthetic data from a dynamic applied general equilibrium model calibrated to The Netherlands. Our assessment shows that if one is only interested in GHG abatement at the lowest economic cost, then equal reduction of GHGs over time is preferred. If society is willing to pay a premium for higher ancillary benefits, an early mid-intensive reduction strategy is optimal.
    AD-DICE: an implementation of adaptation in the DICE model
    Bruin, K.C. de; Dellink, R.B. ; Tol, R.S.J. - \ 2009
    Climatic Change 95 (2009)1-2. - ISSN 0165-0009 - p. 63 - 81.
    climate-change - exchange-rates - trade
    Integrated Assessment Models (IAMS) have helped us over the past decade to understand the interactions between the environment and the economy in the context of climate change. Although it has also long been recognized that adaptation is a powerful and necessary tool to combat the adverse effects of climate change, most IAMS have not explicitly included the option of adaptation in combating climate change. This paper adds to the IAM and climate change literature by explicitly including adaptation in an IAM, thereby making the trade-offs between adaptation and mitigation visible. Specifically, a theoretical framework is created and used to implement adaptation as a decision variable into the DICE model. We use our new AD-DICE model to derive the adaptation cost functions implicit in the DICE model. In our set-up, adaptation and mitigation decisions are separable and AD-DICE can mimic DICE when adaptation is optimal. We find that our specification of the adaptation costs is robust with respect to the mitigation policy scenarios and parameter values. Our numerical results show that adaptation is a powerful option to combat climate change, as it reduces most of the potential costs of climate change in earlier periods, while mitigation does so in later periods
    The effect of different mitigation strategies on international financing of adaptation
    Hof, A.F. ; Bruin, K.C. de; Dellink, R.B. ; Elzen, M.G.J. den; Vuuren, D.P. van - \ 2009
    Environmental Science & Policy 12 (2009)7. - ISSN 1462-9011 - p. 832 - 843.
    climate-change - greenhouse gases - damage costs - trade-offs - model - policy - projections - economics - targets - regimes
    Recent proposals at the UNFCCC meeting in Bali in December 2007 suggest that a 2% levy on the CDM could finance adaptation costs in developing regions. Other proposals include extending the scope of the levy to emissions trading. This study applies an Integrated Assessment Model to gain insight in the interactions between adaptation costs, residual damages and mitigation costs and to analyse the effectiveness of a 2% levy on both the CDM and emissions trading from developing countries. We show that adaptation is especially important in lower income regions where damages are higher. The revenues of a 2% levy strongly depend on both the climate mitigation target and the burden-sharing regime. A more stringent climate mitigation target results in more emissions trade and, in the longer run, less need for adaptation. Both factors increase the share of adaptation costs that can be funded. The burden-sharing regime strongly affects the revenues of a 2% levy as well: relatively more stringent targets for developed countries increase the revenues of a 2% levy. However, in the next two decades the share of adaptation that can be financed remains well below 20% in most cases. Additional funding mechanisms are therefore necessary to substantially finance adaptation costs in developing countries.
    Coalition formation in Integrated Assessment Models. Exploration of international climate agreements in FAIR and MERGE
    Dellink, R.B. ; Weikard, H.P. - \ 2009
    Amsterdam : Institute for Environmental Studies (Report / Institute for Environmental Studies R-09/03) - 33 p.
    Adapting to climate change in The Netherlands: an inventory of climate adaptation options and ranking of alternatives
    Bruin, K. de; Dellink, R.B. ; Ruijs, A.J.W. ; Bolwidt, L. ; Buuren, A. van; Graveland, J. ; Groot, R.S. de; Kuikman, P.J. ; Reinhard, A.J. ; Rötter, R.P. ; Tassone, V.C. ; Verhagen, A. ; Ierland, E.C. van - \ 2009
    Climatic Change 95 (2009)1-2. - ISSN 0165-0009 - p. 23 - 45.
    klimaatverandering - klimaatadaptatie - inventarisaties - kosten-batenanalyse - climatic change - climate adaptation - inventories - cost benefit analysis - policies
    In many countries around the world impacts of climate change are assessed and adaptation options identified. We describe an approach for a qualitative and quantitative assessment of adaptation options to respond to climate change in the Netherlands. The study introduces an inventory and ranking of adaptation options based on stakeholder analysis and expert judgement, and presents some estimates of incremental costs and benefits. The qualitative assessment focuses on ranking and prioritisation of adaptation options. Options are selected and identified and discussed by stakeholders on the basis of a sectoral approach, and assessed with respect to their importance, urgency and other characteristics by experts. The preliminary quantitative assessment identifies incremental costs and benefits of adaptation options. Priority ranking based on a weighted sum of criteria reveals that in the Netherlands integrated nature and water management and risk based policies rank high, followed by policies aiming at ‘climate proof’ housing and infrastructure.
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