Staff Publications

Staff Publications

  • external user (warningwarning)
  • Log in as
  • language uk
  • About

    'Staff publications' is the digital repository of Wageningen University & Research

    'Staff publications' contains references to publications authored by Wageningen University staff from 1976 onward.

    Publications authored by the staff of the Research Institutes are available from 1995 onwards.

    Full text documents are added when available. The database is updated daily and currently holds about 240,000 items, of which 72,000 in open access.

    We have a manual that explains all the features 

    Records 1 - 17 / 17

    • help
    • print

      Print search results

    • export

      Export search results

    Check title to add to marked list
    On Uniqueness of coalitional equilibria
    Finus, M. ; Mouche, P.H.M. van; Rundshagen, B. - \ 2014
    In: Contributions to Game Theory and Management volume 7 - Collected papers presented on the Seventh International Conference Game Theory and Management / / Petrosyan, L.A., Zenkevich, N.A., - p. 51 - 60.
    For the so-called "new approach" of coalitio formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to existene and to semi-uniqueness, i.e.\that there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide smi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new equilibrum semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional strategy sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.
    Uncertainty and climate treaties: Does ignorance pay?
    Dellink, R.B. ; Finus, M. - \ 2012
    Resource and Energy Economics 34 (2012)4. - ISSN 0928-7655 - p. 565 - 584.
    international environmental agreements - stability likelihood - irreversibility - strategies - coalitions - emissions - model
    Uncertainty and learning play an important role in the management of many environmental and resource problems and in particular in climate change. In stylized game-theoretic models of international environmental treaty formation, which capture the strategic interactions between nations, learning usually has a negative impact on the success of cooperation. We use a richer climate model that captures the large heterogeneity between different world regions and considers uncertainty about the benefits and costs from climate mitigation. By explicitly exploiting differences between regions and allowing transfers to mitigate free-rider incentives, we derive much more positive conclusions about the role of learning.
    An empirical test of new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements
    Finus, M. ; Sáiz Pérez, M.E. ; Hendrix, E.M.T. - \ 2009
    Environment and Development Economics 14 (2009). - ISSN 1355-770X - p. 117 - 137.
    climate agreements - externalities - cooperation - membership - stability - success - equity - costs
    We consider new developments in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements (IEAs). Applying an empirical model on climate change that comprises benefit and cost estimates from abatement for 12 world regions, we analyze how the design of an agreement affects the success of self-enforcing IEAs. We analyze single versus multiple coalitions, open versus exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting, and no transfers versus transfers with four different transfer schemes.
    The stability likelihood of an international climate agreement
    Dellink, R.B. ; Finus, M. ; Olieman, N.J. - \ 2008
    Environmental and Resource Economics 39 (2008)4. - ISSN 0924-6460 - p. 357 - 377.
    environmental agreements - damage costs - uncertainty - emissions - game
    Results derived from empirical analyses on the stability of climate coalitions are usually very sensitive to the large uncertainties associated with the benefits and costs of climate policies. This paper provides the methodology of Stability Likelihood (SL) that links uncertainties about benefits and costs of climate change to the stability of coalitions. We show that the concept of SL improves upon the robustness and interpretation of stability analyses. Moreover, our numerical application qualifies conclusions from a recent strand of literature based on stylised models with ex-ante symmetric players that learning has a negative impact on the success of coalition formation in context of uncertainty
    Do abatement quotas lead to more successful climate coalitions?
    Altamirano-Cabrera, J.C. ; Finus, M. ; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2008
    The Manchester School 76 (2008)1. - ISSN 1463-6786 - p. 104 - 129.
    global emission game - international-cooperation - pollution-control - stability - agreements - protocol
    In this paper we study the effect of different treaty designs on the success of international environmental agreements (IEAs). We analyze the standard assumption of an efficient abatement scheme and three uniform abatement quota schemes. Apart from analytical results, the analysis is supported by simulations based on the STACO (stability of coalitions) model. It turns out that quota agreements where the members decide by majority or unanimity voting are successful in overcoming free-rider incentives within an IEA. Finally, our results provide a rationale for the application of uniform abatement quotas in IEAs
    Stability of climate coalitions in a cartel formation game
    Finus, M. ; Ierland, E.C. van; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2006
    Economics of Governance 7 (2006)3. - ISSN 1435-6104 - p. 271 - 291.
    This paper analyses the formation and stability of coalitions to form international environmental agreements. We present and apply the Stability of coalitions model to assess the internal and external stability of all possible coalition structures in a cartel formation game; first under the assumption that no transfers take place and second for a transfer scheme. One important novelty of this paper is the analysis of the incentive structure of twelve regions for all possible combinations of (cartel) coalitions in an empirical setting with asymmetric regions. We show that stable coalitions can emerge only if benefits from global abatement are sufficiently high or if an appropriate transfer scheme is introduced.
    Permit trading and stability of international climate agreements
    Altamirano-Cabrera, J.C. ; Finus, M. - \ 2006
    Journal of Applied Economics 9 (2006)1. - ISSN 1514-0326 - p. 19 - 47.
    emission permits
    We analyze the implication of different allocation schemes of CO2-emission permits for stability and the success of international climate agreements. Our model combines a game theoretical with an empirical module that comprises 12 world regions and captures important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We consider seven different permit allocation schemes. Two ¿pragmatic schemes¿ allocate permits according to a uniform emission reductio quota, five ¿equitable schemes¿ allocate permits based on some normative criteria frequently discussed in the literature permit trading can raise participation and the success of climate agreements, but pragmatic schemes are superior to equitable ones.
    The impact of surplus sharing on the stability of international climate agreements
    Weikard, H.P. ; Finus, M. ; Altamirano-Cabrera, J.C. - \ 2006
    Oxford Economic Papers 58 (2006)2. - ISSN 0030-7653 - p. 209 - 232.
    environmental agreements - emission permits
    This paper analyses stability of coalitions for greenhouse gas abatement under different sharing rules applied to the gains from cooperation. We use a 12-region model to examine internal and external stability of coalitions. We determine and compare stable coalitions under different surplus sharing rules; for example, grandfathering (sharing proportional to current emissions) and a number of equitable rules, i.e. sharing according to historical responsibilities for past emissions. Due to strong free-rider incentives we find only small stable coalitions for all sharing rules examined. We observe that stable coalitions consist of regions with low marginal abatement costs that are attractive partners in any coalition and regions receiving the highest shares of the surplus from cooperation under a particular sharing rule. We find that equitable rules may not be conducive to success: in fact, a grandfathering scheme leads to the most successful coalition in terms of global abatement and global welfare
    The effect of membership rules and voting schemes on the success of international climate agreements
    Finus, M. ; Altamirano-Cabrera, J.C. ; Ierland, E.C. van - \ 2005
    Public Choice 125 (2005)1-2. - ISSN 0048-5829 - p. 95 - 127.
    environmental agreements - economy - choice
    We empirically test the role of membership rules and voting schemes for climate change coalitions with the STAbility of COalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures long-run effects of greenhouse gas accumulation. We apply three stability concepts that capture the notion of open membership and exclusive membership with majority and unanimity voting. We show that exclusive membership leads to superior outcomes than open membership and that unanimity voting is preferable to majority voting in welfare and environmental terms. Our results suggest restricting membership in future international environmental agreements and they provide a rationale for unanimity voting as applied in many international organizations
    Uniqueness of Coalitional Equilibria
    Finus, M. ; Mouche, P.H.M. van; Rundshagen, B. - \ 2005
    Milaan : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Nota di Lavoro 23) - 4 p.
    Environmental Economics: How to Reach Agreement?
    Ierland, E.C. van; Finus, M. ; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2005
    In: 44. Jahrestagung der Gesellschaft für Wirtschafts- und Sozialwissenschaften des Landbaues e. V., 27-29 September 2004, Berlin. - Münster-Hiltrup : Landwirtschaftsverlag GmbH - p. 27 - 47.
    Coalition Formation under Uncertainty: The Stability Likelihood of an International Climate Agreement
    Dellink, R.B. ; Finus, M. ; Olieman, N.J. - \ 2005
    Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Nota di Lavoro 98.2005) - 23 p.
    An empirical test of new development in coalition theory for the design of international environmental agreements
    Finus, M. ; Sáiz Pérez, M.E. ; Hendrix, E.M.T. - \ 2004
    Wageningen : Mansholt Graduate School (Discussion paper / Mansholt Graduate School pf Social Sciences 14) - 31 p.
    The Impact of Surplus Sharing on the Stability of International Climate Agreements
    Weikard, H.P. ; Finus, M. ; Altamirano-Cabrera, J.C. - \ 2004
    Milaan : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Nota di Lavoro 99.2004) - 18 p.
    The Effect of Membership Rules and Voting Schemes on the Success of International Climate Agreements
    Finus, M. ; Altamirano-Cabrera, J.C. ; Ierland, E.C. van - \ 2003
    Hagen : Fern Universität (Diskussionsbeitrag 344) - 32 p.
    Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
    Finus, M. ; Ierland, E.C. van; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2003
    Hagen : Fern Universität (Diskussionsbeitrag 343) - 27 p.
    Stability of Climate Coalitions in a Cartel Formation Game
    Finus, M. ; Ierland, E.C. van; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2003
    Milaan : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Nota di Lavoro 61.2003) - 28 p.
    Check title to add to marked list

    Show 20 50 100 records per page

     
    Please log in to use this service. Login as Wageningen University & Research user or guest user in upper right hand corner of this page.