International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter
Alvarado-Quesada, Irene ; Weikard, Hans Peter - \ 2017
Spatial Economic Analysis 12 (2017)1. - ISSN 1742-1772 - p. 27 - 49.
biodiversity conservation - coalition formation - international environmental agreements - spatial structure of cooperation
International cooperation on biodiversity conservation when spatial structures matter. Spatial Economic Analysis. This paper considers the stability of international environmental agreements (IEAs) for biodiversity conservation with an explicit spatial structure. It studies the impact of distance between countries on coalition stability. It analyses a circular spatial structure with different spatial patterns. Robust results are obtained for a wide range of cost-and-benefit parameters: stable coalitions have a maximum size of two members. The best global payoff is obtained when coalitions are composed of neighbouring countries with the smallest possible distance. A ‘remoteness effect’ is observed, i.e., some coalitions of two members are unstable when one of the signatory countries is far away from the other coalition member and from the singletons.
The Fatter the Tail, the Fatter the Climate Agreement. Simulating the Influence of Fat Tails in Climate Change Damages on the Success of International Climate Negotiations
Dellink, R.B. ; Dekker, T. ; Ketterer, J. - \ 2013
Environmental and Resource Economics 56 (2013)2. - ISSN 0924-6460 - p. 277 - 305.
international environmental agreements - stability likelihood - uncertainty - coalitions - strategies
International climate negotiations take place in a setting where uncertainties regarding the impacts of climate change are very large. In this paper, we examine the influence of increasing the probability and impact of large climate change damages, also known as the ‘fat tail’, on the formation of an international mitigation agreement. We systematically vary the shape and location of the distribution of climate change damages using the stochastic version of the applied game-theoretical STACO model. Our aim is to identify how changes to the distributional form affect the stability of coalitions and their performance. We find that fatter upper tails increase the likelihood that more ambitious coalitions are stable as well as the performance of these stable coalitions. Fatter tails thus imply more successful, or ‘fatter’, international climate agreements
Uncertainty and climate treaties: Does ignorance pay?
Dellink, R.B. ; Finus, M. - \ 2012
Resource and Energy Economics 34 (2012)4. - ISSN 0928-7655 - p. 565 - 584.
international environmental agreements - stability likelihood - irreversibility - strategies - coalitions - emissions - model
Uncertainty and learning play an important role in the management of many environmental and resource problems and in particular in climate change. In stylized game-theoretic models of international environmental treaty formation, which capture the strategic interactions between nations, learning usually has a negative impact on the success of cooperation. We use a richer climate model that captures the large heterogeneity between different world regions and considers uncertainty about the benefits and costs from climate mitigation. By explicitly exploiting differences between regions and allowing transfers to mitigate free-rider incentives, we derive much more positive conclusions about the role of learning.
Renegotiations in the Greenhouse
Weikard, H.P. ; Dellink, R.B. ; Ierland, E.C. van - \ 2010
Environmental and Resource Economics 45 (2010)4. - ISSN 0924-6460 - p. 573 - 596.
klimaatverandering - internationale verdragen - milieubeleid - climatic change - international agreements - environmental policy - international environmental agreements - climate agreements - stock pollutant - stability - cooperation - uncertainty - game - information - equilibria - coalition
International climate policies are being shaped in a process of ongoing negotiations. This paper develops a sequential game framework to explore the stability of international climate agreements allowing for multiple renegotiations. We analyse how the incentives to reach an international climate agreement in the first period will be impacted by the prospect of further negotiations in later periods and by the punishment options related to renegotiations. For this purpose we introduce a dynamic model of coalition formation with twelve world regions that captures the key features of the climate-economy impacts of greenhouse gas emissions. For a model with one round of renegotiations we find that a coalition of China and the United States is the unique renegotiation proof equilibrium. In a game with more frequent renegotiations we find that the possibility to punish defecting players helps to stabilise larger coalitions in early stages of the game. Consequently, several renegotiation proof equilibria emerge that outperform the coalition of China and USA in terms of abatement levels and global payoff. The Grand Coalition, however, is unstable
Cartel stability under an optimal sharing rule
Weikard, H.P. - \ 2009
The Manchester School 77 (2009)5. - ISSN 1463-6786 - p. 575 - 593.
international environmental agreements - stable coalition structures - climate agreements - externalities - membership
In this paper I analyse the stability of cartels in games with heterogeneous players and externalities. I introduce a class of sharing rules for coalition pay-offs, called 'optimal sharing rules', that stabilize all cartels that are possibly stable under some arbitrary sharing rule. To illustrate the impact of optimal sharing with heterogeneous players and positive externalities I analyse a public goods game. In contrast to games with identical players that are common in the study of international environmental agreements, my results show that large coalitions may well be stable when optimal sharing is applied.