Staff Publications

Staff Publications

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    'Staff publications' is the digital repository of Wageningen University & Research

    'Staff publications' contains references to publications authored by Wageningen University staff from 1976 onward.

    Publications authored by the staff of the Research Institutes are available from 1995 onwards.

    Full text documents are added when available. The database is updated daily and currently holds about 240,000 items, of which 72,000 in open access.

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    Green deals : van ruimte maken naar richting geven
    Ganzevles, Jurgen ; Oorschot, Mark van; Potting, J.M.B. ; Henkens, R.J.H.G. - \ 2017
    Tijdschrift Milieu : Vereniging van milieuprofessionals (2017)juni. - p. 35 - 39.
    overheidsbeleid - milieubeleid - overeenkomsten - emissiereductie - samenwerking - evaluatie - duurzame ontwikkeling - government policy - environmental policy - agreements - emission reduction - cooperation - evaluation - sustainable development
    Green Deals zijn vrijwillige afspraken tussen de Rijksoverheid en maatschappelijke partijen om innovatie en verduurzaming te bevorderen. Met deze aanpak geeft de overheid ruimte aan vernieuwing vanuit de maatschappij. Maar wat leveren Green Deals nu eigenlijk op? Partijen blijken warm te lopen voor samenwerking en vernieuwing. Maar wat mist is het vooraf goed doordenken van de ver wachte milieuwinst en het moni- toren er van tijdens de uitvoering van deals. Door meer richting te geven, zowel aan het begin als aan het einde van individuele deals, kan de Rijksoverheid bevorderen dat de Green Deals verder bijdragen aan maatschappelijke doelen.
    Economic essays on marine invasive species and international fisheries agreements
    Walker, A.N. - \ 2016
    Wageningen University. Promotor(en): Ekko van Ierland, co-promotor(en): Rolf Groeneveld; Hans-Peter Weikard. - Wageningen : Wageningen University - ISBN 9789462576308 - 165
    fisheries - fisheries ecology - agreements - biodiversity - invasive species - europe - marine fisheries - marine fishes - visserij - visserij-ecologie - overeenkomsten - biodiversiteit - invasieve soorten - europa - zeevisserij - zeevissen

    This thesis is divided into two parts, as explained in Chapter 1, which focus on different aspects of marine ecological change. Part A considers marine Invasive Alien Species (IAS), which are taxa introduced outside of their native range. The detrimental consequences of invasions for human welfare necessitate management of IAS. There are two types of IAS management. These are (i) management of the risks that an invasion will become established, termed “prevention”, and (ii) management of already established invasions, termed “control”. Chapter 2 considers prevention of invasive species with Ballast Water Management (BWM). Vessels transport invasive species in their ballast water. BWM involves treating ballast water to reduce the risk of successful invasion establishment. Chapter 2 studies the determinants of optimal ballast water treatment standards from a theoretical perspective. Chapter 3 considers control of already established invasions from a spatial and dynamic perspective. We model a non-native habitat divided into patches, where each patch may contain a population of the invasive species, and where spread of the invasion between patches is a stochastic process. In this context, we derive optimal management policies.

    The second part of this thesis: Part B, considers International Fisheries Agreements (IFAs). IFAs facilitate cooperation in the management of fish stocks. Cooperation is necessary to ensure sustainable management. Part B focuses on two issues which may affect the stability of cooperation within IFAs. These are; in Chapter 4, changes in stock location, which may occur due to climate change, and in Chapter 5, the risk of stock collapse, which may exist due to overfishing. Part B uses game theory to analyse the effects of these two issues on the stability of the Grand Coalition, which is the state of affairs where all parties cooperate to maximize their joint benefit from the fish stock.

    The methods and findings of the thesis are summarized as follows: in Chapter 2 (Part A), we construct a model to study optimal BWM standards. The model is built around the assumption that invasions arriving via ballast water are irreversible, i.e. once an invasion has arrived, it is not possible to reduce the size of the invasive population to zero. The hazard rate of invasion establishment can be reduced by setting a BWM standard. The hazard rate is also affected by the Minimum Viable Population (MVPs) of the species and the possibility of an Allee effect. An MVP exists if there is some population size below which there is an insufficient number of invasive individuals to sustain a population. An Allee effect exists if the probability that a population survives increases at an increasing rate in the size of the population. Our analysis focuses on the conditions under which a BWM standard which aims to reduce invasive populations in ballast water to below their MVPs (as is aimed for by the BWM convention) can be optimal. We find that the current aim of the BWM convention can only be optimal in the case that the hazard function (which determines the hazard rate) is not continuously differentiable around the MVP. We find that Allee effects are a requirement for a continuously differentiable hazard function. Therefore, we find that whether or not an Allee effect exists fundamentally affects whether it is optimal to aim to reduce an invasive population in ballast water to marginally below its MVP.

    In Chapter 3 (Part A), we combine aspects of previous modelling approaches to provide new generalized management insights for controlling established invasions. We employ a metapopulation network consisting of patches which are arranged one-dimensionally (i.e. in a line), which is relevant, among other cases, for invasive species spreading along coastlines. We allow for the population size of the invasion within patches to be reduced, which we term “removal”, and we allow for the probability of spread between patches to be reduced without affecting the population sizes directly, which we term “containment”. We employ numerical stochastic dynamic programming to explore how these two interventions (removal and containment) can be optimally applied to minimize the sum of damages from the invasion and the costs of removing and containing the invasion. We find that allowing for varying stock sizes within patches facilitates optimal timing of the application of containment. We also identify two novel optimal policies: the combination of containment and removal to stop spread between patches and the application of up to four distinct policies for a single patch depending on the size of the invasion in that patch.

    Chapter 4 (Part B) considers how Grand Coalitions can be stabilized in the face of changing stock location. To do so, we employ the Gordon-Schaefer fisheries model. We consider farsightedness as a mechanism by which stability of the Grand Coalition can be increased in the face of changing stock location. Farsightedness allows players to respond to deviations of other players by deviating themselves. This reduces the incentives to leave the Grand Coalition. This is in contrast to shortsightedness, whereby players cannot decide to leave the Grand Coalition in response to such a choice by another player. We begin by modifying the farsightedness concept such that it can be used in games with asymmetric players and transfer payments. We proceed to analyse the modified farsightedness concept in the case where players are symmetric (stock location does not change) in order to identify the properties of the concept in the base case. We find that farsightedness increases Grand Coalition stability with respect to shortsightedness. We proceed to analyse the extent to which farsightedness increases Grand Coalition stability, relative to shortsightedness, as fish stock location changes, using sensitivity analysis. We find that farsightedness increases the stability of the Grand Coalition, but also increases the sensitivity of stability to changes in fish stock location. Thus, for any fish stock location, a Grand Coalition is more likely to be stable if players are farsighted, but shifts between a stable and an unstable Grand Coalition will occur more frequently if players are farsighted.

    In Chapter 5 (Part B), we analyse how the stability of Grand Coalitions is affected by an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse. We do so using the Levhari and Mirman (LM) fisheries model, which is adapted such that there is a risk of stock collapse which increases as the fish stock size decreases. We numerically solve the model and calculate the stability of the Grand Coalition. We find that the effect of an endogenously determined risk of stock collapse depends heavily on the assumptions made regarding how payoffs are determined. A common assumption in the literature is that payoffs are determined at the steady state fish stock. Under this assumption, endogenous risk means that for specific discount and growth rates, a Grand Coalition is stable for any number of players. This is a very different result from the original LM model whereby Grand Coalitions can never be sustained. This is because players can essentially follow two strategies in response to the risk. Firstly, they can attempt to maintain the fish stock by fishing less. In doing so they are running the risk of collapse. Secondly, they can avoid the risk by pre-emptively depleting the fish stock, i.e. harvesting the stock to zero immediately to avoid the risk. Grand Coalitions of any number of players are stable for parameterizations for which a Grand Coalition attempts to maintain a non-zero fish stock and if a deviation from the Grand Coalition would result in pre-emptive depletion. We proceed by relaxing the assumption that payoffs are determined in the steady state by allowing for deviators to obtain payoffs in the transition between steady states. In this case, only Grand Coalitions of two players are stable, and then only for certain parameterizations. The reason is that players can now gain payoffs in the process of pre-emptively depleting the stock, i.e. payoffs are received from the process of fishing the stock down to zero. This increases the benefit of deviating from the Grand Coalition. In this case, Grand Coalitions are only stable for two players for specific parameterizations.

    Chapter 6 summarises the research questions formulated in Chapter 1 and evaluates the work of the thesis. Regarding Chapter 2, we justify our theoretical approach with the following two points. Firstly, BWM management is a global and complex problem, which means that the information required to formally calculate an optimal standard is prohibitively burdensome. Secondly, we argue that the complexity of BWM necessitates a sound theoretical understanding of the problem in order to evaluate the current BWM standard, and also to aid in future policy formulation. Similarly, in Chapter 3, we focus on deriving generalized management insights which are applicable to a variety of real-world cases, as opposed to deriving an optimal management strategy for a specific case. In addition to the data requirements necessary to derive such a management strategy, the complexity of such applied cases leads to potentially excessive computational burden. Chapter 3 analyses systems of two and three patches, which are likely to be too simple to analyse specific real world cases, but are sufficient to derive generalized management insights.

    The game theoretic methodologies in Part B are evaluated principally in terms of the assumptions about changes in stock location in Chapter 4 and the numerical method in Chapter 5. In Chapter 4, the fish stock is conceptualised as existing at a single point in space. The location of this point is determined in relation to fishing nations, which are also conceptualised as single points in space. Changes in stock location result from rises in ocean temperatures due to climate change. Such rises in temperature are likely to lead to other changes in the fish stock such as the size of the area where the fish stock can be found and increases in the maximum fish stock size which the ecosystem can support. These other aspects of changing stock location need to be considered in evaluating Chapter 4, as well as in formulating more applied models. In Chapter 5, a numerical method is adopted to analyse the effects of an endogenous risk of stock collapse. To do so, the utility function in the LM model is adapted such that it can be used in a numerical model. In order to isolate the effect of endogenous risk from changes in the utility function, a validation procedure is carried out by comparing analytically derived results in the deterministic case (without endogenous risk of stock collapse) to numerically derived results in the deterministic case. This reveals that changes to the utility function have a negligible effect and thus the results, in terms of the stability of Grand Coalitions can be attributed solely to endogenous risk of stock collapse.

    Overall, Part A of this thesis presents new insights into the determinants of optimal BWM standards. These insights demonstrate the conditions under which the current BWM standard, which aims to eliminate the risk of invasion establishment, may or may not be optimal. Part A therefore provides a novel theoretical framework which aids in the evaluation of current, and the determination of future standards. Part A also provides new insights into the control of established invasions, by extending existing spatially explicit optimal control models. Specifically, dividing space into patches and allowing for varying invasive population sizes within patches facilitates the optimal timing of management interventions and, in general, more detailed, and thus more efficient, management strategies. Part B provides a novel analysis of the effects of changing stock location on Grand Coalitions by explicitly introducing fish stock location in the analysis, and shows how farsightedness can stabilize Grand Coalitions in the face of such changes. Part B also shows how the effects of an endogenous risk of stock collapse on the stability of Grand Coalitions depends vitally on whether transition payoffs are included. These results can form the basis for more interdisciplinary analyses, analyses of different types of marine ecological change, and analyses of these changes in different settings, such as non-European countries.

    Van internationaal naar provinciaal natuurbeleid : de doorwerking van internationale afspraken over behoud en herstel biodiversiteit naar de provincies
    Schmidt, A.M. ; Knegt, B. de - \ 2014
    Wageningen : Alterra, Wageningen-UR (Alterra-rapport 2566) - 25
    biodiversiteit - richtlijnen (directives) - eu regelingen - overeenkomsten - indicatoren - natuurbeleid - provincies - natuurbescherming - noord-holland - biodiversity - directives - eu regulations - agreements - indicators - nature conservation policy - provinces - nature conservation - noord-holland
    Dit rapport is in opdracht van de provincie Noord-Holland opgesteld. Het gaat in op de betekenis en het belang van biodiversiteit. Het gaat in op wat er op internationall niveau is afgesproken over het behoud en herstel van biodiversiteit, dit in het kader van wetten en verdragen. Vervolgens wordt ingegaan op hoe deze afspraken vertaald zijn in nationaal beleid en uiteindelijk doorwerken op provinciaal niveau. Het heeft als doel de provincie Noord Holland handvatten te bieden voor het formuleren van provinciale beleidsdoelen en indicatoren voor de evaluatie van desbetreffende doelen.
    Report of the Workshop on the identification of clupeoid, flatfish, gadoids and other fish larvae (WKIDFL)
    Imares, - \ 2011
    IJmuiden : IMARES (ICES WKIDFL report 2011)
    conferenties - larven - vis - dieridentificatiesystemen - dieridentificatie - identificatie - overeenkomsten - pleuronectiformes - conferences - larvae - fish - animal identification systems - animal identification - identification - agreements - pleuronectiformes
    The Workshop on the Identification of clupeoid, flatfish, gadoid and other fish larvae (WKIDFL) met from 5 to 9 September 2011 in IJmuiden, The Netherlands, to calibrate fish larvae identification. The meeting was chaired by Cindy van Damme, The Neth-erlands, and Matthias Kloppmann, Germany. In total 17 persons representing 10 in-stitutes from 8 countries participated in the workshop. The majority of the time at the workshop was spent identifying fish larvae. The re-sults promoted discussion and highlighted specific problem areas. These discussions led to the further development of standard keys and larval identification characteris-tic tables.
    Coalitie voor duurzame groenten en fruit
    Heijne, B. ; Wenneker, M. ; Vermeulen, R. - \ 2008
    De Fruitteelt 98 (2008)31. - ISSN 0016-2302 - p. 14 - 15.
    tuinbouw - groenteteelt - biologische landbouw - fruitteelt - duurzaamheid (sustainability) - spuitapparaten - spuiten - projecten - milieubescherming - beslissingsondersteunende systemen - overeenkomsten - horticulture - vegetable growing - organic farming - fruit growing - sustainability - sprayers - spraying - projects - environmental protection - decision support systems - agreements
    Eind 2005 heeft Laurus een convenant gesloten met Stichting Natuur en Milieu en Novib/Oxfam om milieuvriendelijk geteelde groenten en fruit in winkels van Super de Boer te krijgen. Twee jaar heeft een groep appel- en perentelers gewerkt aan een milieuvriendelijke teelt. In het project wordt ernaar gestreefd de belasting van het milieu te verminderen
    Technology Spillovers and Stability of International Climate Coalitions
    Nagashima, M.N. ; Dellink, R.B. - \ 2007
    Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Note di lavora della Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei = Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Working Paper Series 157) - 27
    klimaat - klimaatverandering - internationale verdragen - internationale samenwerking - kooldioxide - koolstofvastlegging - milieubescherming - stimulansen - overeenkomsten - climate - climatic change - international agreements - international cooperation - carbon dioxide - carbon sequestration - environmental protection - incentives - agreements
    Cooperation in international environmental agreements appears difficult to attain because of strong free-riding incentives. This paper explores how different technology spillover mechanisms among regions can influence the incentive structures to join and stabilise an international agreement. We use an applied modelling framework (STACO) that enables us to investigate stability of partial climate coalitions. Technology spillovers to coalition members increase their incentives to stay in the coalition and reduce abatement costs, which leads to larger global payoffs and a lower global CO2 stock. Several theories on the impact of technology spillovers are evaluated by simulating a range of alternative specifcations. We find that while spillovers are a good instrument to improve stability of bilateral agreements, they cannot overcome the strong free rider incentives that are present in larger coalitions. This conclusion is robust against the specification of technology spillovers.
    Climate Change and the Stability of Water Allocation Agreements
    Ansink, E.J.H. ; Ruijs, A.J.W. - \ 2007
    Milano : Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (Note di lavoro della Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei = Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei working paper series 16.2007) - 34
    watertoewijzing - waterbeheer - watergebruik - contracten - watervoorziening - rivieren - rivierwater - overeenkomsten - water allocation - water management - water use - contracts - water supply - rivers - river water - agreements
    We analyse agreements on river water allocation between riparian countries. Besides being efficient, water allocation agreements need to be stable in order to be effective in increasing the efficiency of water use. In this paper, we assess the stability of water allocation agreements, using a game theoretic model. We consider the effects of climate change and the choice of a sharing rule on stability. Our results show that both a decrease in mean riverflow and an increase in the variance of riverflow decrease the stability of an agreement. An agreement where the downstream country is allocated a fixed amount of water has the lowest stability compared to other sharing rules.
    De rapportageverplichtingen van de Directie Natuur van het Ministerie van Landbouw, Natuur en Voedselkwaliteit in het kader van wetten en verdragen : een analyse van informatievragen en informatieaanbod als basis voor het WOT programma Informatievoorziening Natuur (WOT IN)
    Schmidt, A.M. ; Kistenkas, F.H. ; Vogel, R.L. ; Broekmeyer, M.E.A. - \ 2007
    Wageningen : Alterra (WOT IN serie nr. 1) - 90
    landbouwministeries - natuurbescherming - rapporten - recht - wetgeving - nederland - overeenkomsten - ministries of agriculture - nature conservation - reports - law - legislation - netherlands - agreements
    In het huidige rapport wordt verslag gedaan over een inventarisatie van alle rapportageverplichtingen voortvloeiend uit wetten en verdragen waar het Ministerie van LNV, Directie Natuur (mede-)verantwoordelijk voor is
    Op zoek naar ruimte voor landbouw en natuur: community of Practice
    Baltussen, W.H.M. ; Peet, G.F.V. van der - \ 2007
    Den Haag : LEI (Rapport / LEI 4.07.03) - ISBN 9789086151608 - 26
    intensieve veehouderij - landgebruiksplanning - gedragscode - besluitvorming - natuurbescherming - landgebruik - boeren - nederland - onderzoek - overeenkomsten - reconstructie - noord-brabant - intensive livestock farming - land use planning - code of practice - decision making - nature conservation - land use - farmers - netherlands - research - agreements - reconstruction - noord-brabant
    In dit rapport is de methodiek van de Community of Practice (CoP) beschreven. Dit is geïllustreerd aan de hand van een praktijkvoorbeeld in het reconstructiegebied Beerze Reusel. Een CoP is onder andere geschikt om complexe problemen aan te pakken waar meerdere partijen bij betrokken zijn en waarbij niemand tot een geschikte oplossing kan komen. Daarnaast zijn praktische handvatten vermeld voor organisaties die in de toekomst met een CoP aan de slag willen. In this report the method Community of Practice (CoP) is described. The different steps of the method are illustrated by a practical example in the region Beerze Reusel in the Netherlands. A CoP is suitable for a complex problem where many organisations are involved and none of them can find a suitable solution. Practical do's and don'ts are presented for the different steps to help organisations which want to use the CoP method in the future.
    On the political economy of international climate agreements
    Altamirano-Cabrera, J.C. - \ 2007
    Wageningen University. Promotor(en): Ekko van Ierland, co-promotor(en): M. Finus; R.B. Dellink; Hans-Peter Weikard. - [S.l.] : S.n. - ISBN 9789085045984 - 226
    klimaat - klimaatverandering - internationale verdragen - internationale samenwerking - politiek - economie - overeenkomsten - politieke economie - milieueconomie - climate - climatic change - international agreements - international cooperation - politics - economics - agreements - political economy - environmental economics
    Global cooperation is crucial to tackle climate change. However, cooperation on such a scale has proven to be difficult given the public good nature of the problem. Abatement of greenhouse gases (GHGs) results in benefits at a global scale. This translates into strong free-rider incentives that threaten the success of an international agreement. However, even if current policy approaches are successful and they achieve a meaningful reduction of GHGs, the effects of past emissions on the atmosphere will still be noticeable for hundreds of years from now. Although these effects are both negative and positive, on a global scale, it is likely that the positive effects (e.g. increase in crop yields as a result of higher temperatures and more precipitation, fewer cold related deaths, less energy demand for heating and an increase in amenity and recreational values) have a lower impact than the negative effects (e.g. rise in sea levels, retreat of glaciers, increase in heat stress, vector-borne diseases and loss of lives due to an increase in extreme weather events such as floods and storms).

    It is recognized that climate change is a global challenge. Countries are sovereign and most of the time act following self-interest. An agreement to tackle climate change, then, should shape the incentives of countries in such a way that cooperation is fostered. The success (i.e. the level of reduction of GHG emissions) of an international climate agreement (ICA) depends to large extent on its design. ICAs' design faces two problems: enforceability and political feasibility. First, an agreement has to be self-enforcing because there is no supranational authority that can enforce and sanction anICA. Second, an agreement has to be politically feasible and recognize that the position of the government at the international negotiations tables is influenced by the national political actors - e.g. ministries, lobbies and the general electorate.

    The objective of this thesis is to analyze the impact of design characteristics and national political actors on the potential stability and success of ICAs. In this thesis, the cost-benefit, game theoretical and political economy strands of the literature are combined to attain this objective. For this purpose, I use the STAbility of COalitions (STACO) model, which combines a game theoretical module with an empirical module. STACO analyzes ICAs in a 'cartel formation' setting (i.e. only one agreement can be signed at a time). The game theoretical module considers coalition formation. The empirical module considers that governments base their membership decision on a net benefit function. This function comprises benefits of abatement in the form of reduced damages (focusing on emissions of CO 2 ).

    Impact of design characteristics

    Chapter 4 focuses on the effects of considering ICAs as exclusive membership agreements. I assume that coalition members decide on the accession of new members following two rules: unanimity and simple majority voting. I find that in an exclusive membership agreement, global cooperation is difficult to attain. The grand coalition is not stable regardless of the membership rule and the voting rule used for accession. I find that partial cooperation is stable but only under exclusive membership. However, stable coalitions are rather small and do not improve significantly upon the situation without an agreement.

    From the stable coalitions, the most successful in terms of gains of cooperation (i.e. the difference in global payoff between full and no cooperation) is a coalition between the energy exporting countries (EEX) andChina. This coalition achieves 11.7% of the possible gains of cooperation (i.e. the difference in payoff between the situation with no cooperation and the grand coalition) and it is stable under unanimity voting. The results suggest that it is worthwhile to consider the possibility of having anICAbased on exclusive membership rules. Furthermore, these results give a rationale for the frequent application of unanimity voting in international policy-making and suggest that when countries have a veto power this would not be a major obstacle to achieve larger participation in a stableICA.

    Emission permits are considered crucial instruments for addressing many environmental problems. However, there is no clear consensus about the most successful way of allocating emissions permits. Often, it is argued that a distribution of permits following equity considerations may be desirable. In Chapter 5, I test seven different permit trading schemes. Each one reflects a different initial allocation of emission permits. I classify the schemes in two categories: pragmatic and equitable. The pragmatic schemes are close to the current status quo and allocate permits according to a uniform emission reduction from a reference emission level. The equitable schemes are motivated by different notions of fairness cited in literature.

    I find that, without permit trading, the gains of partial and full cooperation are unevenly distributed among coalition members. This is caused by the heterogeneity among regions. Depending on the permit scheme this inequality might be reduced - to some extent. I find that the pragmatic schemes help to reduce the uneven distribution of gains of cooperation. In contrast, equitable schemes only aggravate it. I find stable coalitions only under the pragmatic schemes. The coalition between the European Union (EU-15) andChinais the most successful in terms of abatement and it is stable under the allocation of permits proportionally to BAU-emissions. This coalition achieves almost 25 % of the gains of full cooperation. These results, thus, do not support the conjecture that equity may enhance the success and participation of anICA. A pragmatic scheme, though apparently less fair, may be more successful in attracting more countries to cooperate.

    Most of the studies on ICAs assume that abatement decisions of members and non-members are efficiently chosen. However, this contrasts with the evidence on international environmental agreements. Many of these agreements specify a uniform quota for all participants. In Chapter 6, I study the effect that a uniform abatement quota has on the participation and effectiveness of ICAs. I analyze four agreement designs, representing different forms of choosing the level of abatement of coalition members. Firstly, the 'Reference Design' that implies a cost-effective allocation of abatement within the coalition and a coalitional optimal aggregate abatement level. Secondly, the 'Joint Quota' design assumes that countries maximize their coalitional payoff but with a restriction. The restriction is that all coalition members have to reduce emissions by a quota from their level of emissions when no agreement is signed. The last two agreement designs assume a bargaining process where each coalition member maximizes its own payoff considering that each member has to make a quota proposal for the coalition. Thus, thirdly, the 'median quota proposal' design assumes that members agree on the median proposal. Fourthly, the 'lowest quota proposal' design assumes that members agree on the lowest proposal. Additionally, I consider the possibility of trading quotas among coalition members.

    The results of Chapter 6 show that the quota agreement designs help to improve participation in stable agreements. I find that each of the three quota designs result in one stable coalition at least. Quotas foster participation because they represent a less uneven distribution of abatement burdens. From the three quota designs the most successful (in terms of global net benefits) is the 'Lowest quota proposal' design. In this setting, I find that the coalition of EU-15,China,Indiaand rest of the World (ROW) is stable. This coalition reaps 19% of the gains from cooperation. Furthermore, I find that when quotas may be traded among coalition members the design that results in the most successful coalition is the 'Median quota proposal'. In this case, a coalition amongUSA, EU-15,ChinaandIndiais stable. This coalition reaps 40% of the gains from cooperation. These results suggest that the inefficiency of quotas might be compensated through an increase in participation and the success of anICA.

    Impact on national political actors

    In Chapter 7, I study the effect of lobby groups on the size and stability of ICAs. Thus, I depart from the standard assumption on coalition formation analysis about the behavior of governments. I consider that governments are not simply welfare maximizers but that they consider the political pressure of their national lobbies. Thus, a government bases its decision about participation and level of abatement considering both the net benefits from abatement and the lobby contributions. I assume that there are only two lobbies: industry and environmentalist. I consider two types of environmentalist lobbies, supergreen and green. A supergreen lobby is interested in the global effects of the abatement policies. A green lobby is only interested in the regional effects of abatement policies. As for the industry lobby, I assume that the industry is always harmed by their government abatement decisions given the associated abatement costs.

    I find that, in the absence of an agreement, supergreen lobby contributions may help to foster an increase in abatement efforts, but only when supergreen and industry lobby contributions are considered. Furthermore, I find that full cooperation is not stable and, although partial cooperation is stable, it does not help much to tackle climate change. I find that the success of stable coalitions, in terms of global abatement and payoff, depends on whether there is a supergreen or a green lobby. There is a stable coalition betweenJapanand EU-15 with supergreen and industry lobby contributions. This stable coalition achieves little in terms of gains of cooperation - it shows an improvement of only 2 %. However, when there are green and industry contributions the stable coalition falls short of achieving the abatement of the case without contributions. Finally, I find that contrary to intuition, industry contributions are compatible with participation in anICA. For instance, EU-15 receives industry contributions in the stable coalition.

    It has been argued that there may be another reason for unsuccessful IEAs, namely that voters support candidates whose environmental preferences differ from their own. Voters choose a 'less green' government - i.e. strategically delegate their decision power - because it gives them a better bargaining position at the negotiations- i.e. lower abatement targets and associated costs and the possibility of receiving a larger compensation if transfers would be available. In Chapter 8, I study the effect of this strategic delegation behavior on the effectiveness and stability of anICA. I assume that there are different types of politicians, corresponding to the different attitudes towards the environmental problem of the voters. Furthermore, I assume that voters can elect the type of politician that will represent them at the international negotiations. I study a model of two asymmetric countries, for a pure public good and analyze stability. I find that when countries act as singletons leakage effects (i.e. the fact that the increase in abatement of one country is offset by a decrease in abatement of the other country) are the main cause of strategic voting. Moreover, I find that when countries sign an IEA, voters always have an incentive to elect strategically their government but that the resulting agreement improves in environmental terms (i.e. abatement levels) upon the case without cooperation. Finally, I find that strategic voting undermines the success of an IEA but not because voters elect a 'less green' government but because strategic voting makes IEAs unstable.

    From the analysis that I present in this thesis it is clear that anICAneeds to be designed to attain a meaningful participation (i.e. that members actually reduce GHGs emissions). Thus, an agreement would better tackle climate change if it is deep (i.e. that attains a significant reduction of GHGs) rather than wide (i.e. that is signed by a large number of countries). The design of an agreement (considering, for instance, membership issues and instruments such as tradable permits and quotas) is a crucial point on this respect. Furthermore, it is important to have a better understanding of the underlying political process of the negotiation of ICAs. The political economy aspects of these agreements are essential to understand the underlying incentives of countries to participate. I highlight the relevance of national political actors in the outcomes of the negotiations. Lobby groups and voters certainly have an influence, direct and indirect, on the terms and success of anICA. Moreover, the analysis of the decision-making process in ICAs and IEAs needs to consider that their success is related to the extent to which the government can be influenced. At the international level, lobby groups have a clear influence on the outcome of the negotiation, whereas voters have only an influence at national or local level. Policy-makers may perceive this and act accordingly not only to maximize the overall welfare of the nation but also to maximize their private benefit (reflected not only in monetary terms but in the many forms of political support).

    De kleine vraagbaak van het Kyoto Protocol : vragen en antwoorden over ontstaan, inwerkingtreding en uitvoering van het Kyoto Protocol
    Berk, M. ; Bollen, J. ; Dorland, R. van; Eickhout, B. ; Gaast, W. van der; Gijsen, A. ; Heij, B.J. ; Jansen, B. ; Meer, M. van der - \ 2005
    Bilthoven [etc.] : RIVM [etc.] - 24
    klimaat - klimaatverandering - internationale samenwerking - eu regelingen - nederland - overeenkomsten - climate - climatic change - international cooperation - eu regulations - netherlands - agreements
    Bij gelegenheid van de officiële inwerkingtreding van het Kyoto-protocol hebben Wageningen UR, KNMI, RIVM, NWO, VU en ECN een handzaam boekje uitgegeven met antwoorden op alle vragen die u maar over de zin en onzin van Kyoto kunt bedenken. Het boekje legt uit wat het protocol inhoudt en wat het betekent voor milieu, economie en samenleving. Ook het jargon dat door klimaatonderzoekers en in het internationale onderhandelingscircuit wordt gebruikt, wordt in begrijpelijke bewoordingen
    Evaluatie van Mestafzetovereenkomsten en Dierrechten; Studie in het kader van Evaluatie Meststoffenwet 2004.
    Hoop, D.W. de; Hubeek, F.B. ; Schans, J.W. van der - \ 2004
    onbekend : LEI (Rapport / LEI : Domein 3, Natuurlijke hulpbronnen en milieu ) - ISBN 9789052428932 - 108
    agrarische economie - milieubescherming - natuurlijke hulpbronnen - recht - evaluatie - mest - nederland - mestoverschotten - productiebeperkingen - overeenkomsten - agricultural economics - environmental protection - natural resources - law - evaluation - manures - netherlands - manure surpluses - production restrictions - agreements
    In opdracht van de stuurgroep EMW 2004 worden in dit rapport de resultaten weergegeven van de ex ante evaluatie uitgevoerd door het LEI naar een toekomstig MAO- dan wel Rechtenstelsel ter ondersteuning van een stelsel van Gebruiksnormen
    'Telen met toekomst' zoekt oplossing voor stikstofuitspoeling
    Pronk, A.A. ; Reuler, H. van - \ 2002
    De Boomkwekerij 15 (2002)35. - ISSN 0923-2443 - p. 18 - 19.
    houtachtige planten als sierplanten - plantenvoeding - mineralen - boekhouding - uitspoelen - nitraten - stikstof - landbouwbeleid - eu regelingen - zandgronden - overeenkomsten - ornamental woody plants - plant nutrition - sandy soils - minerals - accounting - leaching - nitrates - nitrogen - agricultural policy - eu regulations - agreements
    In het project 'Telen met toekomst'werken kwekers samen met onderzoek en voorlichting aan duurzame bedrijfssystemen voor de boomteelt. Deelnemers aan het project proberen te werken binnen de aangescherpte MINAS-normen. Het onderzoek in de boomkwekerij onderzoekt in hoeverre de boomkwekerij kan voldoen aan de EU- en de VROM-nitraatrichtlijn. Gegevens in bijgaande tabellen: 1) Aanvoer, afvoer (kluit en snoeisel) en overschot van stikstof (N kg/ha) in een tweejarige teelt; 2) Hoeveelheid stikstof in het najaar (N kg/ha) op het geïntegreerd bedrijfssysteem op zandgrond, PPO in Horst
    Blauwe diensten
    Bommel, K.H.M. van; Hoekstra, J.R. ; Stuyt, L.C.P.M. ; Reinhard, A.J. ; Boland, D.J.K. ; Gerritsen, A.L. - \ 2002
    Den Haag : LEI (Rapport / LEI : Domein 3, Natuurlijke hulpbronnen en milieu ) - ISBN 9789052427683 - 128
    agrarische economie - waterbeheer - dienstensector - contracten - aanbesteding - grondwaterspiegel - veengronden - natuurbescherming - wateropslag - retentie - nederland - overeenkomsten - bufferzones - waterstand - agricultural economics - water management - services - contracts - tendering - water table - peat soils - nature conservation - water storage - retention - netherlands - agreements - buffer zones - water level
    Dit rapport geeft een beschrijving van de mogelijkheden van 'blauwe diensten'. Een blauwe dienst is een aan de waterbeheerstaak gerelateerde, op zakelijke grondslag voor anderen verrichte activiteit. Naast de analyse van een aantal mogelijke diensten ligt de nadruk op hoe deze overeenkomsten tot stand kunnen komen. In dit rapport is het concept blauwe diensten uitgewerkt voor drie situaties: peilverhoging in het veenweidegebied, bufferzone rond de EHS en piekberging. Het rapport concludeert dat blauwe diensten haalbaar zijn en doet aanbevelingen voor verdere uitwerking en implementatie.
    Beheersovereenkomsten op grasland van melkveebedrijven - Economie en gevolgen voor de P-huishouding
    Haan, M.H.A. de; Vellinga, Th.V. ; Mandersloot, F. - \ 1995
    Lelystad : Proefstation voor de Rundveehouderij, Schapenhouderij enPaardenhouderij (Rapport / Proefstation voor de Rundveehouderij, Schapenhouderij en Paardenhouderij P.R. 159) - 80
    landschapsbescherming - fauna - natuurbescherming - landbouwgronden - veehouderij - overeenkomsten - landscape conservation - fauna - nature conservation - agricultural soils - livestock farming - agreements
    De laatste vijftig jaar is er sprake van een achteruitgang van floristische, faunistische en landschappelijke waarden in Nederland. Agrarische activiteiten zijn daar in sterke mate debet aan. Om de meest waardevolle en kwetsbare delen van het cultuurlandschap te beschermen, zijn in de "Nota betreffende de relatie landbouw en natuur- en landschapsbehoud" (Relatienota, 1975) twee instrumenten aangereikt. Deze betreffen het werven van gronden voor reservaatsvorming en het sluiten van beheersovereenkomsten voor landbouwgronden. De mate waarin deze beheersovereenkomsten inpasbaar zijn, is evenwel aan grenzen gebonden. Over de inpasbaarheid was echter nog onvoldoende bekend. LBL betaalt een zogenoemde beheersvergoeding. Deze vergoeding is in het verleden vastgesteld door de opbrengstderving per hectare in guldens om te rekenen (DBL, 1992). Tot nog toe is deze vergoeding nog niet in bedrijfsverband geevalueerd. Verder hebben beheersovereenkomsten gevolgen voor bemesting en voeding. Vooral fosfor is hierbij een punt van aandacht. De problematiek van kwantificering van inpasbaarheid, bedrijfseconomische evaluatie en de gevolgen voor de P-huishouding zijn aanleiding geweest tot onderzoek door het Proefstation voor de Rundveehouderij, Schapenhouderij en Paardenhouderij (PR). De studie is gesplitst in twee delen, namelijk de inpasbaarheid enerzijds en de gevolgen voor economie en de P-huishouding anderzijds. Het vaststellen van de inpasbaarheid op beweidingstechnische en voedertechnische gronden, is beschreven door Vellinga en Verburg (PR-rapport 158). Dit rapport (PR-rapport 159) beschrijft de bedrijfseconomische gevolgen van beheersovereenkomsten op grasland en de gevolgen voor de P-huishouding. Voedervoorziening De beheersovereenkomsten met sterke beperkingen van de voorjaarswerkzaamheden en het uitstellen van de eerste maaisnede tot in juni (het zogenaamd zwaar beheer)
    Decision making of low - labour income farmers
    Anonymous, - \ 1975
    Wageningen : [s.n.] (Literatuurlijst / Centrum voor landbouwpublikaties en landbouwdocumentatie no. 3682)
    kleine landbouwbedrijven - agrarische bedrijfsvoering - zelfvoorzieningslandbouw - besluitvorming - laag inkomen - bibliografieën - landbouw - overeenkomsten - personen - small farms - farm management - subsistence farming - decision making - low income - bibliographies - agriculture - agreements - persons
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