Aid Distribution and Cooperation in Unequal Communities
Exelle, B. D'; Berg, M.M. van den - \ 2014
Review of Income and Wealth 60 (2014)1. - ISSN 0034-6586 - p. 114 - 132.
public-goods - voluntary contributions - driven development - fairness - risk - reciprocity - competition - punishment - provision - wealth
We experimentally study aid distribution and cooperation in a field lab in rural Nicaragua. In the first stage of the experimental game, participants contribute to a collective effort that determines the amount of aid given to the group, which is distributed among the players in a second stage. We find that in a treatment where a group representative, selected as the highest contributor, distributes aid, contributions are higher compared to a treatment where aid is equally distributed. The higher amounts of aid attracted, however, benefit representatives only. At the same time, representatives do care about fairness. They give higher aid shares to players with low endowments and lower shares to low contributors. Moreover, representatives with lower relative wealth or who contribute relatively more, keep higher aid shares. With our experimental game simulating community-based development (CBD) schemes, we discuss the implications of our results for elite capture in such schemes.
Contagious cooperation, temptation and ecosystem collapse
Richter, A.P. ; Soest, D. van; Grasman, J. - \ 2013
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 66 (2013)1. - ISSN 0095-0696 - p. 141 - 158.
resource use - punishment - management - dynamics - evolution - economics - model - extinction - fisheries - systems
Real world observations suggest that social norms of cooperation can be effective in overcoming social dilemmas such as the joint management of a common pool resource—but also that they can be subject to slow erosion and sudden collapse. We show that these patterns of erosion and collapse emerge endogenously in a model of a closed community harvesting a renewable natural resource in which individual agents face the temptation to overexploit the resource, while a cooperative harvesting norm spreads through the community via interpersonal relations. We analyze under what circumstances small changes in key parameters (including the size of the community, and the rate of technological progress) trigger catastrophic transitions from relatively high levels of cooperation to widespread norm violation—causing the social–ecological system to collapse.
The transmission of sustainable harvesting norms when agents are conditionally cooperative
Richter, Andries ; Grasman, J. - \ 2013
Ecological Economics 93 (2013). - ISSN 0921-8009 - p. 202 - 209.
social-ecological systems - public-goods - voluntary contributions - collective action - rational choice - behavior - punishment - survival - commons - governance
Experimental and observational studies have highlighted the importance of agents being conditionally cooperative when facing a social dilemma. We formalize this mechanism in a theoretical model that portrays a small community having joint access to a common pool resource. The diffusion of norms of cooperation takes place via interpersonal relations, while individual agents face the temptation of higher profits by overexploiting the resource. Agents remain conditionally cooperative, unless other individuals are misbehaving already. We can observe a bubble of conditional cooperators slowly building up followed by a sudden burst, which means that a transition from a cooperative social norm to non-cooperation occurs. Interestingly, in some parameter regions alternative stable states and limit cycles arise. The latter implies that the same community goes through such a transition repeatedly over long time spans — history thus repeats itself in the form of the creation and erosion of social capital.
Perceiving Pure Evil: The Influence of Cognitive Load and Prototypical Evilness on Demonizing
Prooijen, J.W. van; Veer, E. van de - \ 2010
Social Justice Research 23 (2010)4. - ISSN 0885-7466 - p. 259 - 271.
social categorizations - punishment - judgment - justice
The present research sought to investigate the psychological dynamics underlying demonizing, that is, the tendency to see others as personifications of pure evilness. Building on an integrative theoretical framework, it is hypothesized that the extent to which a perpetrator matches prototypical expectations of evilness shapes demonizing responses to offenders particularly when cognitive resources are impaired. In two experiments, participants were asked to memorize either a difficult or an easy telephone number (cognitive load vs. control), and were then asked to evaluate a perpetrator who murdered a young woman (Experiment 1) or who kidnapped a child (Experiment 2). Results revealed that the extent to which the description of the perpetrator was consistent with a prototypical evilness scheme influenced demonizing particularly under conditions of cognitive load. It is concluded that impairment of cognitive resources increases the influence of prototypical evilness on demonizing
Explaining Ethnic Inequality in the Juvenile Justice System, an analysis of the outcomes of Dutch Prosecutorial Decision Making
Weenink, D. - \ 2009
British Journal of Criminology 49 (2009)2. - ISSN 0007-0955 - p. 220 - 242.
racial disparities - race - punishment - offenders - gender - courts
Most studies of the treatment of minorities in criminal justice systems show that ethnic minorities are punished more harshly. This paper aims to explain ethnic inequality in prosecutorial decision making in the Dutch juvenile justice system. Based on statistical analyses of 409 case files, it emerged that ethnic minorities are more often summoned to juvenile court. The prevailing source of the ethnic unequal treatment lies in the reporting of troublesome encounters between judicial officials and suspects from ethnic minority descent. A qualitative analysis of 97 descriptions of such troublesome encounters showed that native Dutch suspects were more often regarded as defiant, while ethnic minorities were more often perceived as equivocating. Future research might focus on the ways in which judicial officials interpret the observed and reported behaviour of suspects, and the extent to which these stem from broader cultural stereotypes, ideologies and anxieties regarding ethnic minorities.
Tussenevaluatie co-management en motorvermogen : controle en sanctionering
Hoefnagel, E.W.J. ; Mil, E.M. van - \ 2008
Den Haag : LEI (Rapport / LEI : Domein 6, Beleid ) - ISBN 9789086152100 - 81
landbouwbeleid - vis vangen - vissersschepen - kracht - schepen - motoren - capaciteit - noordzee - nederland - rechtshandhaving - straf - publiek-private samenwerking - agricultural policy - fishing - fishing vessels - power - ships - engines - capacity - north sea - netherlands - law enforcement - punishment - public-private cooperation
Dit onderzoeksverslag betreft een evaluatie van de uitbreiding van het co-managementsysteem op het vlak van het motorvermogen. Deze tweede evaluatie concentreert zich vooral op de uitvoering van de controle en sanctionering door de beheergroepen en de AID, en de meningen van gecontroleerde vissers over deze activiteiten.