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**Chobe Enclave, Botswana
Lessons learnt from a CBNRM Project 1993-2002**

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IUCN/SNV CBNRM Support Programme

The Community Based Natural Resource Management Support Programme is a joint initiative by SNV Botswana and IUCN Botswana. It is built on SNV's experience in CBNRM pilot projects at the grassroots level and on IUCN's expertise in information sharing, documentation of project approaches, and establishing dialogue between Non-Governmental Organisations, Government and private sector on a national, regional and international level. The three main objectives of the programme are: 1) to establish a focal point for CBNRM in Botswana through support to the Botswana Community Based Organisation Network (BOCOBONET). 2) To make an inventory of and further develop CBNRM project approaches and best practices, and disseminate knowledge regarding implementation of CBNRM activities through the provision of information and technical advice to CBNRM actors. 3) To improve dialogue and co-ordination between CBOs, NGOs, private sector and Government. For more information, visit the Internet on <http://www.cbnrm.bw>

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Foreword

The implementation of what we call Community-based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Botswana started in the Chobe Enclave in the northern part of the country. The Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT) was the first trust to enter into a joint venture agreement with a private safari company and as such the first community organisation to earn large amounts of money from natural resource utilisation.

Ten years have passed and over these years both community and the relevant extension staff gained substantial experience. Internal and external evaluations of the project took place in this period and files full of information were collected. We assume that the lessons drawn from this first CBNRM project in Botswana over time have helped in refining the concept and its implementation in the project area and in other communities. Is this the case?

What has definitely not happened is to make the experiences gained in the Chobe Enclave available to the large audience of CBNRM practitioners in Botswana and beyond. We are therefore truly grateful to Brian Jones, who is an independent consultant from Namibia, for his efforts to consolidate the CBNRM lessons learnt in the Chobe Enclave and to make this information easily accessible in the paper that follows below. Brian Jones has extensive knowledge of CBNRM in Botswana and the Southern African region as a whole and through this paper we benefit greatly from his experience¹.

This document is the seventh in the Occasional Paper Series of the IUCN/SNV CBNRM Support Programme. The Papers intend to promote CBNRM in Botswana by documenting experiences and lessons learnt during the implementation of the concept by the practitioners in this field. Stakeholders such as Government agencies, NGOs, the private sector and CBOs, which are involved in CBNRM, are often too busy implementing to find the time to share experiences on success and failure with others. The CBNRM Series hopes to fill this information gap.

Relevant CBNRM related information would assist in bringing together all stakeholders who have an interest in what the concept stands for: social and economic empowerment of rural communities, and natural resources conservation. Fully informed stakeholders can understand each other's specific opportunities, problems, roles and responsibilities, and can dispel feelings of mistrust arising from the misinterpretations of regulations and procedures or unrealistic expectations. The Series is aimed therefore at all practitioners who work with CBNRM in Botswana, and is intended to provide information that assists in successfully applying the concept.

The publications in the Occasional Paper Series of the CBNRM Support Programme are distributed free of charge to all institutions involved in CBNRM in Botswana and to a selected readership in Southern Africa. All documents are also freely available for downloading on the web site of the CBNRM Support Programme: www.cbnrm.bw

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List of acronyms

BOCOBONET	Botswana Community Based Organisation Network
BP	Botswana Pula
CBNRM	Community Based Natural Resources Management
CAP	Community Action Plan
CBO	Community Based Organisation
CECT	Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust
CEG	Community Escort Guide
CHA	Controlled Hunting Area
CWT	Chobe Wildlife Trust
DLUPU	District Land Use Planning Unit
DWNP	Department of Wildlife and National Parks
EPC	Enclave Project Committee
GOB	Government of Botswana
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
KCS	Kalahari Conservation Society
MFDP	Ministry of Finance and Development Planning
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NRMP	Natural Resources Management Project
PACT/IRCE	Pact/Institutional Reinforcement for Community Empowerment
RC	Review Committee
RHS	Rann Hunting Safaris
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SIAPAC	Social Impact Assessment and Policy Analysis Corporation (Pty) Ltd.
SNV	Netherlands Development Organisation
TAC	Technical Advisory Committee
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VDC	Village Development Committee
VTC	Village Trust Committee
WWF US	World Wildlife Fund (United States)

Background

Modern-day community-based natural resource management (CBNRM) activities in Botswana have been developed and promoted for more than a decade. Over this period, there has been considerable progress and achievement. A number of policies and laws have been put in place that promote and enable rural communities to gain increased rights over natural resources. More than 40 community trusts have been established, or are being formed, by rural people wishing to manage their natural resources in a way that can provide financial and other benefits for present generations while enabling future generations to also benefit from the same resources. The trusts have been established on elective representative democratic principles, with elected boards representing the interests of trust members. Many trusts are earning significant revenue from sub-leasing hunting and tourism rights to the private sector. While the activities of many trusts are focused on hunting and tourism, several are also exploring the management of other natural resources such as veld products. An umbrella organisation, the Botswana Community Based Organisation Network (BOCOBONET) has been formed to represent the interests of the trusts at national level. A number of government and non-government agencies provide various support services to the trusts.

At the same time, CBNRM in Botswana faces problems and challenges. The trusts and BOCOBNET face issues of financial sustainability, the support organisations themselves have limited resources and capacity to provide services to the trusts, there are still policy gaps and questions over the commitment of government to key CBNRM principles. Many trusts have money sitting in the bank unused, while their members are wondering when they will receive some benefits. The capacity of many trust committees to manage trust affairs and handle new requirements stemming from contracts with the private sector remains weak. There are question marks over the level of representation of some trust committees and the level of participation of trust members in decision-making².

These problems and challenges need not be insurmountable if the Botswana CBNRM programme is able to learn from its own experience and adapt and change in the light of that experience. The Chobe Enclave was the first site where modern-day CBNRM activities were promoted and developed in Botswana, and implementation experience extends back to the late 1980s. The experiences of community members and various support agencies and personnel in the Chobe Enclave provide a rich source of material from which to draw some lessons that can assist the programme in its ongoing development.

This paper aims to use the Chobe Enclave experience to analyse seven key issues relevant to CBNRM in Botswana (as well as the rest of the SADC region). These are:

- a) Devolution of management authority
- b) Accountability and transparency in decision-making within community based organisations (CBOs)
- c) The receipt and use of income from hunting and tourism by CBOs
- d) Capacity building for CBOs and community members
- e) The role of external support agencies
- f) The role of CBOs and their members in natural resource management
- g) The role of women and marginalised groups in CBNRM

In an analysis of this nature, attention is inevitably drawn towards problems and challenges and can often leave an overwhelmingly negative impression on readers unfamiliar with the subject of the case study. While I have tried to do justice to the positive aspects of CBNRM in the enclave, for a more detailed treatment of strengths of CBNRM activities, readers are referred to the report by Alexander

² It is worth noting that all of these issues are relevant to CBNRM programmes in neighbouring countries to varying degrees and are not unique to Botswana

et al. (1999). This report was produced as part of the final evaluation of the USAID-funded Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP) support to the enclave.

This analysis of lessons learned from the Chobe Enclave CBNRM activities is based on a number of reports and studies of these activities over the past decade and the experiences of personnel involved in supporting the development of the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT). I have also drawn on interviews with individuals involved in CBNRM and field visits to the Chobe Enclave carried out as part of various consultancies in Botswana over the past four years. Much of the material is drawn from a study carried out for USAID looking at governance issues in CBNRM in Namibia and Botswana (Jones and Butterfield 2001).

CBNRM context

CBNRM in the modern era

CBNRM is not new, it is simply what rural communities have been doing for centuries. Through local institutions such as traditional leadership, religious beliefs and cultural norms people manage their natural resources. Rules have evolved for regulating the use of common property natural resources, and community pressure and the use of sanctions by chiefs and headmen help to enforce those rules. In many cases, however, these institutions, norms and rules have become weakened by factors such as past colonial rule, centralisation of authority in government, weakening of traditional authorities, population increase, war etc. As a result many common property natural resources have become *de facto* “open access” resources for which there are no management rules, or there is no institution with sufficient authority to enforce the rules. What is new about modern CBNRM activities is that they reaffirm the importance of community management of natural resources and attempt to create or recreate the conditions under which such management can successfully take place. Thus modern CBNRM approaches focus on the establishment of community level institutions that can take management decisions over natural resources.

CBNRM in the SADC region

CBNRM activities in Botswana take place within a broader CBNRM context within the SADC region. Generally in southern Africa the term CBNRM has been used to describe the programmes in the wildlife sector that have received funding support from USAID (of which Botswana is one). These programmes have been characterised by attempts to transfer rights over wildlife and tourism from central government to local communities and the provision of considerable external support to these communities. Generally, communities have used their new rights to enter into contracts with established hunting and tourism operators and receive income from these activities. Some attempts have been made within the region to diversify into the use of other resources (notably Botswana), but the CBNRM “movement” in southern Africa still remains largely identified with wildlife and tourism. It should be noted, however, that many other activities within the region that involve community management of natural resources (e.g. forestry and fisheries) certainly should be recognised as falling under the umbrella of CBNRM.

CBNRM in Botswana

According to Rozemeijer and van der Jagt (2000), a major feature of CBNRM in Botswana is the combination of rural development and natural resources conservation. Further, CBNRM is based on the recognition that local people must have the power to decide over their natural resources in order to encourage sustainable development. According to Botswana’s draft CBNRM policy, CBNRM “aims to alleviate rural poverty and advance conservation by strengthening rural economies and empowering communities to manage resources for their long-term social, economic and ecological benefits” (GOB 1998). Rozemeijer and van der Jagt emphasise that the devolution of power is the “key notion” in CBNRM in Botswana. They identify three assumptions on which CBNRM in Botswana is based:

- Management responsibility over the local natural resources that is devolved to community level will encourage communities to use these resources sustainably;
- The “community” represents the interests of all its members; and
- Communities are keen to accept management responsibility because they see the (long-term) economic benefits of sustainable utilisation, and they are willing to invest time and resources in natural resource management.

The importance of localised decision-making is also emphasised in a document on the Botswana CBNRM Programme compiled by the Botswana NRMP (undated). The document states that: “Decisions (such as how to manage natural resources and how to distribute benefits) are made primarily by community members; central and local governments play important facilitating roles”. This statement also begins to define the expected role of government within the Botswana CBNRM

context. The same document emphasises that part of the CBNRM 'vision' in Botswana is that communities will generate jobs, income, and additional spin off enterprises from the use of natural resources and will reinvest some of the their benefits in monitoring the status of their resources, regulating sustainable use and undertaking conservation measures.

CBNRM in Botswana therefore places a heavy emphasis on the devolution of power, the generation of jobs and income through enterprise development, the active management of natural resources by local communities, and capacity building and other forms of support to local communities by external agencies including government.

The CBNRM policy and legal context in Botswana

Over the past decade, the Government of Botswana has created a positive enabling policy and legal framework within which community-based approaches to natural resource management can be implemented. Overall policy on rural development as set out in the Community Based Strategy for Rural Development (MFDP 1997a) emphasises participatory and needs-based approaches. The National Development Plan 8 (MFDP 1997b) for the period 1997–2003 emphasises the role that tourism and wildlife can play in diversifying rural economies. Together, the policies, legislation, and policy directives of the wildlife and tourism sectors provide the framework for allowing rural communities to gain user rights over wildlife and tourism on their land and to benefit from the commercial exploitation of these resources within the bounds of sustainability. Communities in controlled hunting areas (CHAs) designated for community use may be granted resource leases over wildlife and tourism on their land for a period of up to 15 years from the Tribal Land Board, if they have formed a representative, accountable and legal entity, such as a community trust. The Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) will also award the community a wildlife quota for hunting purposes if the community meets the same condition.

The main policy document setting out the approach to community management of wildlife and tourism is a government directive on "Community tourism and hunting development activities" (GOB 1995). It is a joint directive from the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (which houses the DWNP) and the Ministry of Local Government, Lands and Housing. It sets out the minimum conditions that communities need to meet before they can be awarded a community wildlife off-take quota from the DWNP or a resource use lease for any tourism or hunting development activity from a Land Board. If the community forms a legal, representative and accountable entity with a constitution, it can gain the quota or lease itself. If it has not formed such an entity, the community may request that the quota or lease be given to an approved commercial partner after going through a tender process. Land Boards may grant leases to communities for up to 15 years.

The leases are for the resources on the land but not for the land itself. They were originally designed to cover wildlife and tourism, but more recently have been designed to allow the commercial harvesting of some plant resources. Communities will have the right to exclude outsiders from commercial harvesting of these resources (Cassidy 2000).

The Chobe Enclave

Environmental setting

The Chobe Enclave is surrounded by protected areas on three sides. The Chobe National Park is on the western and eastern side, and the Chobe Forest Reserve forms the southern boundary. On the northern boundary is the Chobe River, which forms the border with Namibia. Much of the Enclave consists of floodplains of the Chobe River backed by forested higher ground and a low escarpment. With more than 650 mm per annum, the Enclave receives the highest rainfall in Botswana and is within the area most suitable for rain-fed cropping, particularly maize.

Politico-geographic context

The Chobe Enclave is situated within the second most important wildlife and tourism area in Botswana after the Okavango Delta. The small town of Kasane, about 50 km from the northern tip of the Enclave, is the hub of the tourism industry in northern Botswana, and the riverfront in the Chobe National Park is a magnet for foreign tourists. One of the main routes from northern Chobe to the south of the park runs through the Enclave.

However, the residents of the Enclave have in the past been mostly isolated from the economic opportunities in the wildlife and tourism industries enjoyed by residents of Kasane. Even today, with better roads and communications, there is a sense of isolation about the Enclave. There are no major shops or services such as filling stations, and residents have to travel the 50 km through the national park to Kasane for major requirements.

The sense of isolation is heightened by the effects of the protected areas that border the Enclave. Resource use is restricted in these areas; residents suffer from elephants and other herbivores that damage crops, predators that kill livestock, and from a shortage of land. Much of the northern section of Chobe National Park used to be part of the tribal lands of the Basubiya, whose territory spread over northern Botswana, into neighbouring Caprivi in Namibia and across into Zambia. The declaration of protected areas has severely reduced the land available to the people of the Enclave. The Chobe National Park is more than 10,000 km² in size, and the Enclave is 1,690 km², much of which floods in years of high rainfall.

The Enclave consists of five main villages, Kachikau, Kavimba, Mabele, Satau and Parakarungu. It consists of two controlled hunting areas, CH1 and CH2, which covers the Forestry Reserve.

Socio-economic setting

Several socio-economic studies have been done in the Enclave: 1988 (Jansen et al. 1990), 1991 (SIAPAC 1992), and 1995 (Ecosurv 1996). The data presented here are based on the most recent study as summarised in a project monitoring and evaluation document (Painter 1997).

There is an estimated population of 7,500 people in the Enclave. Of these, about 70% reside in the Enclave and the rest work outside the area. There are three major ethnic groups present: 70% of households are Basubiya, 27% are Batawana, and 1% are !Xo (one of Botswana's San groups). The average household size is 7.2 members, with 5.2 members residing in the enclave. Female-headed households make up one quarter of all households.

Regardless of ethnic origin, households have a mixed economy based on three main activities: crop production, livestock production, and wage employment. These are supplemented by small-scale businesses such as beer making and natural resources (selling baskets, thatching grass, game meat). Wealth is unevenly distributed, with 10% of households controlling 60% of total homestead assets in the area.

Crop production is undertaken by 86% of the households; average area under crops is 4.3 ha. Subsidies have allowed people to hire tractors for ploughing, thus reducing men's traditional role in that task. Women still carry out most of the agricultural activities of weeding, harvesting, and threshing.

Livestock is owned by 75% of households. However, 10% of households owned 55% of the cattle. Male-headed households owned more cattle than those headed by females (cattle herding is traditionally a man's job). About 40% of households hired labour to care for their cattle. Livestock is sold only when cash is needed and is not raised commercially. Livestock is threatened not only by lions, but also by diseases carried by wildlife. Foot and mouth disease, carried by buffalo, has occasionally devastated livestock herds and restricts the ability of residents to sell meat outside of the Enclave.

Less than half of all households had a wage earner and female-headed households were the least likely to have a wage earner. Most of those with employment resided outside the Enclave. In 1996 54% of households had subsidised employment through drought relief; the majority of them were women. Of those with formal employment, 80% were employed by the government and 20% by the private sector.

Natural resources are used by all households for subsistence purposes (firewood, thatching grass, reeds, and poles). There is some ethnic division of labour owing to geographic proximity to certain resources. For instance, Basubiya sell reeds and thatching grass while the Batawana do not as their village is not near the flood plains. Male heads of household are more likely to be involved in the commercial selling of natural resources than their female counterparts.

Socio-economic changes in the Enclave (from 1988 to 1995) were summarised by Painter (1997). There was a decrease in wage employment since 1992, mostly in fewer jobs outside the Enclave. The poorest 20% of the population were worse off than they were in 1992. The number of households engaged in agriculture was constant, as was the overall livestock number. However, cattle were concentrated in fewer households. Crop and livestock damage by wildlife remained high, and people felt the threat was not decreasing. In short, "the skewed distribution of wealth and control of resources observed in the 1995 study was observed in both the 1992 and 1988 studies, but appeared to be increasing" (Painter 1997:41).

CBNRM activities in the Chobe Enclave

The development of CBNRM in the Chobe Enclave can be traced back to a series of meetings in 1989 to discuss the potential of wildlife utilisation with local residents. NGOs such as the Kalahari Conservation Society (KCS), the Chobe Wildlife Trust (CWT) and the United States branch of World Wildlife Fund (WWF), were promoting the idea of wildlife utilisation, which was also recognised as a development option in the North West District Development Plan 4. The plan specifically requested the Department of Wildlife and National Parks (DWNP) to assist in the formulation of a wildlife utilisation project (Hazam 1999). The indications from the meetings were that residents recognised the potential of wildlife and tourism and were interested in becoming involved in utilising these resources (Machana 1999).

A number of follow-up meetings were held in 1990 by the DWNP, CWT and WWF. In February 1991, the DWNP presented the District Land Use Planning Unit (DLUPU) with a draft document on the Chobe Enclave Community Wildlife Utilisation Project, proposing that a wildlife quota be given to a properly constituted 'Chobe Enclave Wildlife Management Committee'. The proposal suggested that the committee could manage the quota as it saw fit with technical advice from DLUPU and the DWNP. The proposal also suggested that there was a need for technical expertise in community mobilisation and wildlife utilisation, which could be supplied by NGOs and with external funding (Hazam 1999).

During 1991, a team of external advisors from the Natural Resources Management Project (NRMP), funded by USAID, began working in the DWNP to assist government in the implementation of CBNRM activities. The DWNP asked the advisors and their counterparts in DWNP to visit the Chobe Enclave to review progress and provide advice. The DWNP/NRMP team then began a series of meetings, first at district level, then with chiefs and headmen, village development committees (VDCs) and then the general public. The team gained proposals from villagers on development options based on natural resource use and began working with local people on the development of a natural resource profile (Hazam 1999).

During 1992 discussions continued with the five villages of the enclave around the allocation of a hunting quota. In early 1992, WWF and CWT began jointly drafting a proposal for support to the communities in the Enclave, including limited funding, technical assistance, and capacity building. Villagers were particularly suspicious of CWT and expressed concerns about who would control the project and who would benefit. As a result of continued suspicions about CWT, and a lack of consensus in the NGO on what it should support, on advice from the DWNP/NRMP extension team, the DWNP director asked CWT in early 1993 to suspend its interest until invited back by the community (Hazam 1999).

The DWNP/NRMP extension team had based its plans for extension support on the understanding that NGOs would be able to carry out facilitation and capacity building. Given the lack of a suitable alternative to CWT, the team was left to continue with intensive support to the CBNRM activities in the enclave. This was not an easy task as the team was based in Gaborone, more than a day's drive away (1000 kilometres).

During 1992, the five main villages of the enclave, Kachikau, Kavimba, Mabele, Satau and Parakarungu formed village project committees. In early 1993 the village committees elected an Enclave Project Committee (EPC) and decided they wanted to form the Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust (CECT). In March 1993, the EPC was informed by DWNP that it could manage the hunting quota for 1993 and decided to put the quota out to tender by the private sector. By 1994, the EPC had been replaced by the formally constituted CECT. The village project committees were now called Village Trust Committee (VTCs) which elected representatives to the CECT board.

The CECT now manages the annually issued wildlife quotas that it receives from the DWNP. The Trust has a "head lease" from the Tribal Land Board for carrying out wildlife and tourism activities within the area of land covered by the Trust. The Trust then subleases the wildlife and tourism

utilisation rights to private operators. The mechanism used in the Chobe Enclave for devolving rights to communities and the institutional arrangements pioneered there have formed the model for implementing CBNRM elsewhere in Botswana.

The authority vested in the CECT by the five villages was formalised in a Deed of Trust in 1994 (Ecosurv 1996). The main objectives are summarised below:

- To use the natural resources of the Chobe Enclave sustainably for the benefit and development of the communities of the Enclave;
- To protect and conserve the natural resources of the Chobe Enclave against extinction, misuse, or other irreversible damage;
- To integrate natural resources-based conservation and development planning at the village level in the Chobe Enclave;
- To monitor the condition of the natural resources of the Chobe Enclave in order to protect and to use them in a sustainable manner;
- To equitably share the benefits of the sustainable use of the resources of the Chobe Enclave without discrimination (tribal, racial, political, religious, or ethnic); and
- To educate the residents of the Chobe Enclave as to the importance of and in the wise management of their natural resources.

Key CBNRM issues in the Chobe Enclave

Devolution of management authority

Devolution of authority to manage resources is one of the key principles underlying the Botswana CBNRM programme (Rozemeijer and van der Jagt 2000) and similar programmes in the SADC region. Underlying this principle is the importance of tenure and property rights or “proprietorship” for sustainable natural resource management.

The term tenure includes the concept of proprietorship, which Murphree (1994:405) defines as “sanctioned use rights, including the right to determine the mode and extent of management and use, rights of access and inclusion, and the right to benefit fully from use and management.” The term tenure also includes a temporal dimension and relates to the period of proprietorship. Often in discussions about tenure, the notion of “secure” tenure is emphasised. In other words in order to invest time and effort into managing resources sustainably, resource users need to know that their rights of proprietorship are secure over time and secure in terms of the ease or difficulty by which their rights might be removed. Resource users will also perceive their tenure over resources to be secure if these rights are upheld by the state, as well as internally legitimised within the community of resource users.

Another important principle that affects decision-making concerning natural resources is the linking of responsibility with authority. If those expected to manage the resource (i.e. those assigned responsibility) do not have authority (i.e. the right to take management decisions) then there is little incentive for management to take place. Murphree (2001:6) suggests that when authority and responsibility are assigned to different institutional actors both are eroded: “Authority without responsibility becomes meaningless or obstructive: responsibility without authority lacks the necessary components for its efficient exercise.”

One of the accepted preconditions therefore for successful CBNRM is an enabling policy and legislative framework that gives communities secure rights over resources and/or land, enables them to make decisions over the management of the resource (i.e. authority), and allows them to retain income derived from its use.

It is therefore important to understand the extent to which a CBO such as the CECT has received devolved authority and secure tenure over resources such as wildlife through the existing policy and legislation.

Botswana does not have a single policy or law that gives local communities secure rights over wildlife and tourism as resources, or rights over the land on which these resources are found. What exists, however, is a number of different policy documents and laws that, together, provide opportunities for government to allow communities to gain rights over wildlife and tourism. The Botswana approach combines rights to obtain quotas and hunting licences from the Department of Wildlife and National Parks with rights to obtain leases over land for commercial natural resource utilisation purposes from Land Boards. Policy directives ensure that communities’ interests are promoted.

Rights depend on designation of an area as a community CHA. Otherwise the lease is negotiated between the Land Board and the private sector directly. The Joint Venture Guidelines make it clear that “Wildlife remains the property of the State, and although wildlife management is to be decentralised, wildlife utilisation and any form of off-take will be subject to the DWNP’s decisions regarding the quota for each area. Close liaison with the DWNP is therefore important” (DWNP undated:26).

In the case of CECT, the community is able to gain a wildlife quota and a natural resource user lease because it resides within a community-designated CHA. But as made clear above, the trust does not have ownership over the land or the wildlife. The Trust’s options for management decisions concerning wildlife are actually limited. It can decide how to use the quota, and whether it will tender the quota and the tourism concession lease to the private sector. Because of its lack of capacity to run hunting and tourism safaris, there is really no option for CECT if it wants to

maximise its income from wildlife and tourism. The Trust can also decide how to use its income from wildlife and tourism. Beyond these aspects, CECT has very little other management authority, particularly as the DWNP sets the hunting quota fairly arbitrarily (see section on natural resource management below). Management actions such as wildlife monitoring and problem-animal control are largely carried out by the DWNP (although citizens have the right by law to kill problem animals themselves). Any other "management" aspects are carried out by the safari company to which CECT awarded the tender, Rann Hunting Safaris (RHS). The company sets out in its bid a basic management plan for the area. While it might be argued that the company is carrying out the management on behalf of CECT, there is little real involvement or monitoring by CECT of the management activities carried out by the company.

It is the Land Board that is responsible for land allocation and land use decisions in the Enclave, and not CECT. Currently, the planning environment in the district generally favours wildlife and tourism as appropriate forms of land use, but if the policy were to change, the Land Board could approve conflicting forms of land use in the Enclave. The lease that the CECT received from the Land Board is for 15 years only but can be renewed.

The ability of the trust to exert authority over tourism rights is also compromised. Although the head lease from the Land Board gives CECT exclusive tourism rights in CH1, there are two tourist operations inside the Enclave that predate the establishment of the CECT. Each has a 50-year lease from the Land Board that cannot be changed unless the lease conditions are not met. Muchenje is a tourist lodge, and Buffalo Ridge is a private campsite. Both employ local staff - 25 and 3 people, respectively. However, in early 2001 the Muchenje lodge was trying to block plans by RHS to build on a site next door. The existence of the lodge and campsite undermine CECT's ability to control the tourism market within its boundaries. There has been some discussion of trying to get the leases transferred to the CECT, but nothing has come of this.

Further, CECT applied to the Land Board for a lodge site in the enclave, but allocation was suspended because the Department of National Museums believes the site has archaeological value.

Decision-making and accountability

The way in which decisions are taken and who takes those decisions are important issues for CBNRM activities in the Chobe Enclave. The extent to which the VTCs and the CECT committee are accountable and transparent in their decision making will determine the extent to which these entities become legitimate community institutions, supported by residents. Accountable and transparent decision making will also help to promote equity in terms of distribution of benefits from the CECT activities. As Painter (1997:45) points out: "The key to CBNRM success lies in the extent to which it creates checks and balances that (1) distribute decision-making powers among all stakeholders, (2) prevent individuals or groups from appropriating resources without negotiating with the people who stand to lose, and (3) distribute benefits among stakeholders in a way that motivates their continuing support for productive activities based on conservation and sustainable use of natural resources. Thus, CBNRM seeks to create new opportunities within a framework of accountability to the community of resources users."

In the Chobe Enclave, all adult citizens (over 18 years of age) who reside in the Chobe Enclave are general members of the CECT. The overall membership is estimated at 4,000 people. Each of the five major villages within the Enclave has a Village Trust Committee (VTC). The 10 VTC committee members are elected at the village level. Each VTC then elects two members to serve on the executive committee of the CECT. Elections are every two years, and there are no limits on the number of terms that a person can serve. In the first three years of the operation of CECT there was considerable change in membership of the Executive Committee and the VTCs. At first the older elites were voted in, and later younger representatives began to be elected although they rarely spoke up in front of their elders (Hazam, *pers. comm.*). More recently representatives do not change much from term to term and most of them are older community members, since the younger members are often living outside the Enclave. The executive committee of the CECT has evolved into the Board of Trustees for the CECT.

A 1995 study (Ecosurv 1996) found that less than half of households knew about the CECT and less than one quarter knew of the VTCs. Wealthier households were more likely to know about the Trust than poorer ones. By 1999 (Alexander *et al*), this situation had improved, when a majority of respondents in a household survey had heard about CECT.

Alexander *et al* (1999) reported the following problems facing VTCs:

- Attendance at VTC meetings by members and residents was poor, slowing down decision making and delaying implementation of activities;
- Some VTC members were not conversant with the VTC constitutions and were not aware of their role in the quota tendering process;
- Power struggles between some VTCs and Village Development Committees (VDCs) as well as some community leaders were contributing to the lack of progress. There were conflicts over whether VDCs should be given money by the VTCs from the sale of the hunting quota;
- The criteria used for the selection of VTC (and CECT) staff seemed to lack transparency; and
- There was weak communication to residents by the VTCs/CECT regarding decisions on investing money from the sale of the wildlife quota.

The CECT holds an annual general meeting in which the chairperson reports on Trust activities over the last year and the treasurer gives the financial report. This is repeated for each Village Trust. The annual revenue for each village is announced, and accounts are audited annually by a certified accounting firm. The annual general meeting is advertised via posters in each village, over the radio, and through advertisements in the local newspaper. The CECT arranges transport and says that about 700 people attend meetings.

Elections are supposed to take place every two years. The first elections were held in 1993 for the CECT Board. The next round of elections began in 1995, but was not completed until early 1996 because of delays in the VTC elections. The next elections were held in 1999 (Hazam 1999).

Decisions within CECT are made mainly within the various committees, although some issues, such as the choice of a joint venture partner, are taken by the general members (in the joint venture case, this is one of the DWNP guidelines). However, little information reaches the general members from the committees. Hazam (1999: 17) concluded that, "Once elected, committee members expect to merely inform their constituents infrequently, and constituents don't demand frequent and regular dialogue. Developing a regular feedback cycle between general members, VTC members and Board members is one key to strengthening the CECT."

Some CECT staff members are also on the Board of Trustees, which presents problems for supervision or accountability for staff. Alexander *et al* (1999) reported that the CECT Board was experiencing problems with members not attending meetings. This had delayed decision-making and hindered the effective management of CECT.

Although the system of Village Trusts, elections, and village-level meetings appears to invite broad participation and potential accountability, the reality is that few people participate in the village-level events (such as *kgotla* meetings). A limited number of wealthier households are participating and making decisions. This has implications for who benefits from Trust activities and the impact on gender and marginalised people.

Transparency and accountability are considerations in the process of choosing a joint venture partner. In the past in Botswana, a number of incidents of alleged irregularities have taken place in the tender process for community CHAs. Key gatekeepers in the tender process are the District Technical Advisory Committee (TAC) and the Review Committee (RC) established by the community trust to evaluate the tenders. They are expected to present the shortlisted tenders to the community for voting. A review of the 1998 CECT tender process by a District official reported that the TAC and the RC had failed to ensure that the community was fully informed of the commitments of the tendering companies, and failed to make any recommendation or present the results of the technical evaluation of the tenders. The official concluded that this failure created an environment in which companies could try to influence villagers through holding parties and buying votes.

Community benefits

Income generation from hunting and tourism

The CECT is viewed as a successful example of CBNRM because of its performance in revenue generation. This is due to two factors. First, throughout Botswana, the tender process for joint ventures has markedly increased the market prices for those goods and services (Jones 2000).³ Second, owing to its location (surrounded on three sides by Chobe National Park), the Enclave has a very high elephant quota that significantly increases the value of its trophy hunting contract and its attractiveness for photographic safaris.

The Trust has done extremely well in increasing both the value and terms of its joint venture contract. In seven years (1993–2000), the Trust has increased total annual revenues by nearly 4,000% (Table 1).

Table 1. Revenue gained through Joint Venture Contract - Chobe Enclave Conservation Trust 1993–2003 (Nchunga 1999).

YEAR	HUNTING (US\$)	PHOTOGRAPHIC	ELEPHANTS	TOTAL ANNUAL REVENUES (US\$) ⁴
1993	4,800	Included in hunting	—	4,800
1994	13,000	Included	—	13,000
1995	40,000	Included	—	40,000
1996	40,000	Included	4,400/each x 6 (\$26,400)	66,400
1997	40,000	Included	4,400/each x 12 (\$52,800)	92,800
1998	40,000	Included	\$52,800	92,800
1999	42,000	24,000	10,000/each x 12 (\$120,000)	186,000
2000	44,000	25,000	120,000	189,000
2001	46,250	26,400	120,000	192,650
2002	48,620	27,683	120,000	196,303
2003	51,051	29,173	120,000	200,224

Note: Hunting contracts were for one year in 1993, 1994, and 1995. There was a three-year lease (1996–1998). Elephants were added to the hunting quota in 1996 (6 animals), and the elephant quota was increased to 12 animals the following year. All revenues are paid in Pula except the elephant fee, which is paid in dollars. Revenues for 2001–2003 are estimates assuming the hunting quota is unchanged. (Source: Jones and Butterfield 2001)

Benefit distribution

Benefit distribution has been less successful. CECT has struggled to decide how to distribute benefits. Alexander *et al* (1999) reported that the majority of participants in their focus group discussions, especially women and young people, were concerned that they had not seen any direct benefits from projects started with wildlife and tourism income and felt that some of the potential benefits would benefit more affluent residents rather than the entire community,

Decisions have tended to focus on the need to invest funds so they would continue to generate income for the communities. CECT decided on a basic formula for dividing revenues: 85% of revenues are divided evenly among the five VTC and 15% remains with the CECT for operating costs. Each VTC is grappling with decisions on how to spend its share of the revenues, again focusing on

³ The overall income from community multipurpose concessions in Botswana, for example, has increased from below BP 100 000 in 1992 to BP 6 400 000 in 2001.

⁴ Figures converted to US \$ at 5 Pula = US \$1.

investments that provide community services or employment. Ideas for VTC investments have included:

- Filling station;
- General store;
- Hardware store;
- Campground;
- Brick-making operation; and
- Grinding mill.

None of the investment options has been analysed from a financial point of view, including those already implemented. None of the government representatives serving as technical advisors for the CECT board nor the Village Community Action Plan (CAP) co-ordinators have any training to provide financial or economic analysis of investment options. The business investments remain the property of the VTC; management oversight and ability is weak. Three investments in place are discussed below (Jones and Butterfield 2001).

a) The village of Kavimba established a campground on the main road into the Chobe Enclave. Although it was advised that it was not an attractive site for campers owing to its location next to a dusty thoroughfare, the VTC constructed it anyway. The campground offers tent sites, flush toilets and showers, and a small grocery store. It originally employed six people but now employs only four. A visit in early 2001 revealed an absence of maintenance and cleaning. The water pump reportedly broke down the day after the campground opened and has never been fixed, so the toilets and showers are inoperable (and no alternative sanitary options have been created). During last year 2000 peak season (September to December), the campground received a total of three tourists for two nights. The small store reportedly earns a small profit. At best, the operation might break even, but most likely it is a drain on VTC funds if the four employed staff are paid. Kavimba VTC would now like to move the campground to a ridge above the road, a better site with views over the floodplain.

b) Mabele VTC built and opened a general store in June 2000. There were already two other stores in town, but the rationale for a third was to offer goods at lower prices. The VTC owns and manages the store, which has two full-time employees and a night watchman. The VTC vice-chairman goes to Kasane once a month to buy supplies to restock the store. No data could be collected to ascertain whether the store made any profits, broke even, or was selling goods at lower prices.

c) The Kachikau VTC wanted to invest in a filling station so that car owners do not have to go all the way to Kasane to fill up. The VTC also thought the occasional traveller would want to use the service station (this VTC is off the main highway). No suppliers have yet signed up to provide petrol to the station as they do not think it is financially feasible. Meanwhile, the filling station site was being used for making cement/sand bricks. Eight people/day were hired for a half-day to make bricks. A total of 17 people were employed, on a rotational basis; demand exceeds supply. Many houses in Kachikau are converting from mud to cement brick wall, which makes them less prone to elephant damage. Originally the brick-maker purchased cartloads of sand from local workers, but realised the brick-making operation was losing money. The CECT then decided to lend its car to the supervisor (a CECT board member) who used it to haul sand to the site and to purchase cement in Kasane rather than locally. The bricks were thus being subsidised by the CECT and sold below cost. The question is how many people in the community can take advantage of this subsidy for home improvement? Some employment is being generated, but more could be generated if the CECT did not subsidise the cost of materials.

A detailed study would be needed to determine if more affluent members of communities are those most likely to benefit from "investment projects". The CECT is contemplating two larger investment projects. One is a CECT built, owned, and operated safari lodge in the forest reserve to which all the VTCs would have to contribute some capital. The other is a resurrection of an older development idea to salvage dead timber in the forest reserve for a furniture factory which would employ an estimated 300 people.

CECT-generated employment is an important benefit. Community Escort Guides (CEGs) are hired by the CECT, on a rotational basis from the five villages, to accompany a hunting trip. The CECT also employs a CAP and a radio operator in each village. The safari operator employs a minimum of 50 seasonal and temporary workers for the hunting camps. More could be done to service the hunting camps, such as provision of local produce. Excess game meat from the safaris is sold by CECT to member villagers.

Capacity building

Capacity building has been recognised as an important aspect of CBNRM, particularly where communities become engaged in new activities for which they lack appropriate skills and knowledge. Examples include the receipt and handling of large sums of income, negotiations with government and the private sector and the tendering of hunting quotas and tourism concessions.

CECT and VTC personnel have received considerable training and capacity building support through an international NGO, PACT/IRCE, funded by USAID and other from sources such as consultants also funded by grants from USAID. The PACT/IRCE training was aimed at VTCs, the CECT committee, CAP co-ordinators, the CECT programme officer and some community members. It focused on financial management, business management skills, governance, leadership skills, meeting skills, understanding joint ventures and the CBNRM concept.

Despite the training that has taken place, insufficient capacity remains a problem within CECT. The CAP co-ordinators are tasked with helping the VTCs with project planning and annual budgets. The co-ordinators received training in leadership skills, budgeting, and business planning. The community identifies investment project ideas; the co-ordinator is expected to prepare the business plan and present it to the community. The CAP co-ordinator for Kachikau had been there for one year in early 2001, but had not yet prepared any business plans despite the start-up of the brick-moulding operation.

Alexander *et al* (1999) reported that VTC members said they were not skilled in identification, selection and planning of community investments. This lack of capacity caused difficulties in guiding communities to select viable investments. They concluded that the VTCs needed training on how to work as effective committees. Further the CAP co-ordinators also said they did not have adequate or relevant skills to assist the VTCs. The main function of the CAP co-ordinators was to help the village to implement its own Community Action Plan (CAP). Most of these plans were based on establishing infrastructure such as boreholes, fences, and roads, or solving problems such as damage by problem animals and water supply. Hazam (1999) reported that apart from monthly visits by CECT and the DWNP/NRMP team to check monthly activity sheets, no other support was provided to the co-ordinators and they made little progress.

VTC members and others who underwent training say the level of the training was sometimes too high for participants to understand and language was sometimes a problem. In some cases the abilities and the literacy levels of trainees were not appropriate. Another issue is that residents who obtain skills through training programmes often get attracted into government and the private sector.

Hazam (1999) reported that the financial management training provided by PACT/IRCE was ineffective because it was theoretical and not based on actual transactions and there was no follow up. CECT committee members say they cannot act on much of the financial advice they have received because the membership is suspicious of complicated financial transactions (such as becoming shareholders in a corporation).

The implementation of hunting meant that CECT needed to monitor the activities of the hunting operator and its clients. The DWNP has worked with the CECT's Community Escort Guides (CEGs) in drafting CEG duties, designing record forms for monitoring and providing annual training.

The role of external support

The main source of external support for the CECT has come from the DWNP/Extension team and PACT/IRCE. The DWNP/NRMP extension team spent a considerable amount of time in community sensitisation and mobilisation before CBNRM activities could be fully implemented. The community decided to form the Trust only after at least two years of discussions and negotiations with the DWNP and NRMP personnel, who had to work hard at first to break down the hostility and suspicion of the community. This hostility and suspicion came from the problems people suffered from wildlife, particularly lions and elephants from the Chobe National Park, and a poor relationship with park staff.

PACT/IRCE have focused on specific skills development as noted in the section above on capacity building.

For two years from mid 1996 an external Community Development Advisor was employed by CECT with USAID funding. CECT committee members agree that he left very little capacity with themselves or other residents.

The district Technical Advisory Committee is expected to provide support to CECT, but Alexander *et al* (1999) reported that the TAC staff were not clear about their roles, which were not well defined apart from in the tender process. Furthermore, their own skills and capacity are weak in the main areas where CECT needs support such as in identifying business activities for investment of their wildlife and tourism income.

The main role that the TAC has played in supporting CECT has been in advice on choosing a safari operator through the tender process. This process has been designed to ensure that the final decision concerning choice of a joint venture partner is left with the community through a secret ballot to vote on the three best proposals. A community Review Committee is involved in the selection of the proposals that are submitted to the community for voting and is supposed to be advised by the District TAC.

However, a number of problems in this system have been identified. The Community Review Committees are usually fairly passive in the tender assessment stage. TAC members interviewed in Kasane (Jones 2000) reported that the evaluation of proposals for CECT is essentially carried out by the TAC, which then recommends a shortlist of three companies to the CECT Review Committee. The Review Committee members rarely read the proposals because of the lengthy and detailed nature of these documents and often because they have neither good literacy nor English language skills.

One of the problems is that TAC members, who are mostly well-educated young professionals, are highly sceptical of the ability of community representatives to understand, analyse, and evaluate the technical proposals submitted for tender. However, the response of CECT committee members is that the TAC is of little help because the TAC members are too young and inexperienced. "They are people fresh from university who we will have to teach" said one committee member." The committee believes that with the help of a legal advisor it could carry out the tender assessment itself, now that it has gone through the process a couple of times. The government could still play a role to ensure transparency.

During interviews in February 2000 committee members emphasised that CECT still needed considerable support, particularly training in business and project management as well as the services of a good facilitator. However they were critical about some of the external support they had already received. They said it was not good to receive support from one donor only, as the donor tried to control you. It was more difficult for donors to control you if you received support from several at the same time. The committee members felt that the support from PACT/IRCE had been problematic. Some of the consultants sent by PACT/IRCE to assist CECT had divided the community by their actions and CECT had not been involved in writing the Terms of Reference for the consultants. Further the committee had not really had control over the grant it had received from PACT. For example they said PACT/IRCE had insisted that the committee buy a lap top computer, but it couldn't be used by CECT.

Natural resource management

CECT has not developed a management plan for the Chobe Enclave nor is there any incentive to develop one. Although the CECT is allowed to comment on the wildlife quotas set by DWNP, they no longer do so since the department does not take their comments into account. Annual quotas are set by the research unit and Management and Utilisation Division Staff in Gaborone and assigned to CHAs. Quotas were based on annual aerial surveys and population models for various species. For the 2002 season the department took lions off quotas nationally and severely increased the cost of hunting licences without consulting either the hunting industry or CBOs with private sector hunting partners such as CECT. Off-take quotas are generally conservative and do not necessarily reflect actual wildlife densities in any particular CHA. Table 2 shows the 2002 wildlife quota for CECT.

Neither the CECT nor VTC do any meaningful monitoring of wildlife. The Community Escort Guides (CEGs) employed by the Trust do record wildlife sightings while accompanying a hunt, but, because those data are not systematically or consistently collected, they are not useful for monitoring purposes or for estimating wildlife densities. There has been an attempt to develop methodologies for CBOs to collect data that may be entered into a DWNP data base and then used with DWNP data to help set quotas. However, this system has not yet been implemented.

Table 2 Chobe Enclave Wildlife Quota for 2002

Baboon	10	Kudu	10
Buffalo	12	Lechwe	2
Crocodile	3	Leopard	2
Duiker	15	Steenbok	15
Eland	1	Tsessebe	2
Elephant	12	Wart Hog	2
Hyena	3	Wildebeest	1
Impala	16	Zebra	4

A 1995 survey indicated that wildlife problems had *not* decreased since 1988. Now livestock herds are larger and problem animals are reported more frequently. Seventy-one percent of households reported livestock damage, mostly hyenas and lions, and 42% of households reported crop damage (mostly elephant and buffalo) (Painter 1997). The Botswana government does pay compensation for loss of livestock and crops, though many claims are never submitted. Government officials think people are more careless with livestock - letting them roam the forest at night - which exacerbates the predator problem. The CECT, on the other hand, claims that problem animals have become more aggressive and kill an average of two people annually.

Increased human/animal conflict has also led to increased killing of problem animals. The Chobe National Park Problem Animal Control Unit does collaborate with the CECT on problem animals by trying to trap them or discourage them from entering fields. Nevertheless, problem animals continue to be killed, and the question arises whether these animals should be subtracted from the Enclave quota or be added to the quota. Certainly, CECT would argue for the latter, whereas some government officials feel that if the former were the case, people would take more measures to avoid confrontations.

Although problem animals may be the curse of Chobe Enclave residents, the abundant wildlife has enabled the Enclave to receive a generous hunting quota, especially in elephants, which provides a significant source of income to CECT and the Village Trusts. Elephant populations have increased in northern Botswana, through migration and reproduction, from an estimated 78,000 in 1995 to 120,000 in 2000 (R. Bell, *pers. comm.* 2000).

The CECT does not try to manage any other natural resources. They would like to have a permit for salvage logging in the forest reserve. Reeds sold commercially are unregulated, and women basket weavers are also managing their material supply without any CECT input.

Under the new five-year agreement, RHS has exclusive right to safari hunting within Chobe Enclave (hunting blocks CH1 and CH2) and has rights to photographic safaris. The CECT reserves rights to

conduct photographic safaris in CH1. Each hunting client will have two CEGs nominated by CECT. CECT pays for the CEGs to monitor killing and wounding of game animals. These reports are forwarded to the professional hunter and law authority. CECT reserves five buffalo from their quota for Independence Day celebrations or can sell them back to RHS at BP 3,000 each.

The CECT has mentioned that the CEG role is not clearly defined. There are problems with their not filling out monitoring forms or submitting them to CECT. In any case, it is not clear what CECT can do with the information, as it cannot use it for management decisions. This is partly because of a lack of technical capacity and skills, but also because government retains the authority over the main management issues. DWNP cannot use the information collected by the CEGs because it has not been collected consistently and in an appropriate form. Relationships with some professional hunters have not always been good. It might be difficult for the CECT to assert authority over a rotating group of people who are only occasionally employed as CEGs (the positions change with each hunt, rotated among residents of the five villages).

Although initially relations between the community and the Chobe Park officials were not good, the development of CECT and change in government policy have produced a good working relationship. The Park Problem Animal Control Unit regularly helps with live trapping of problem lions or keeping problem animals off farmer's fields.

The CECT and its joint venture partner, Rann Hunting Safaris (RHS), meet yearly to review the safari hunting operations and to improve the working relationship. Community Escort Guides (CEGs) have complained of small rations, whereas the safari owner has complained of guides coming to work drunk. The CECT has been proactive in trying to find solutions for both sides.

Role of women and marginalised groups

There is a real danger in CECT that the more active, wealthier members of society will dominate decision making, particularly concerning benefit flows and how money from hunting and tourism is re-invested. Women and groups like the minority !Xo San are particularly vulnerable.

The low participation rate at VTC and Kgotla meetings, especially by women and more marginal members of community, means that community projects to use the VTC funds are unlikely to meet their needs and concerns. Alexander *et al* (1999) reported that women said they had little knowledge or understanding of CECT and therefore did not participate in meetings, particularly in the selection of community investments. Cultural and traditional barriers appeared to be another factor in limiting the participation of women. They are also the principal farmers in the area (men tend the livestock). Whereas the men have more opportunities to leave the Enclave for employment opportunities, women tend to stay. However, many of the "investment" projects undertaken by the VTCs involve more employment opportunities for men than women. Women are more involved than men in natural resource harvesting such as reeds for baskets, collecting firewood, and thatching grass and their proposals for investing the wildlife and tourism income reflect this involvement. These include traditional food kiosks for tourists, basketry and crafts production, traditional dancing and horticulture.

The !Xo San group are traditional hunters, and have always depended upon hunting. During the household survey conducted by Alexander *et al* (1999) respondents reported that poorer households that depended heavily on hunting for a living strongly protested at the decision by CECT to sell practically the entire hunting quota to the Safari Company, thus leaving fewer animals for local hunting. It is not clear whether these poorer households had previously had access to Special Game Licences for hunting as Hazam (*pers. comm*) reports that the !Xo were not receiving such licences in the years immediately prior to the formation of CECT. Clearly, however, there is a perception among some residents that they have been severely disadvantaged by the sale of the quota. And their hunting opportunities have been reduced. Groups like the !Xo usually do not have the cash to purchase meat from CECT. They are also the group least involved in the decision-making structures. A special effort would be needed to draw in these people and their views.

Lessons learnt and conclusions

Empowerment and community based management of resources

Questions concerning “ownership” of land and resources such as wildlife are increasingly being asked by various stakeholders in CBNRM in Botswana. CBOs and NGOs are seeking clarification from government about the nature of the rights that policy and legislation gives to local communities (National CBNRM Forum 2001). The Chobe Enclave case study helps to highlight some of the key issues in this regard. Firstly, the rights that the CECT has received appear to be considerably limited. Most of the management authority for wildlife still resides with the government. Attempts to involve CECT (and Trusts elsewhere in Botswana) in monitoring of wildlife for quota setting purposes have not been successful. Although CECT has been successful in pushing up the tender price for hunting quotas, it does not have exclusive rights to tourism in the enclave and therefore is not able to maximise its income from wildlife. The resource use lease from the Land Board for wildlife and tourism is not a long-term lease, and there must be question marks in the minds of residents over whether the lease will in fact be renewed.

CBNRM in Botswana has done much to improve the situation of rural communities within existing legislation over the past decade. However, it will be difficult to maintain the momentum that has been achieved within the current policy and legislative framework. There is a need to move from the situation where communities are simply passive recipients of income from trophy hunting and tourism to one where they are true managers, i.e. decision-makers, over their land and resources. Hazam (1999) notes that a wildlife CBNRM activity was relatively simple to implement through the joint venture partner and could bring income quickly. However, it did not develop a sense of participation by residents or membership because it was a “windfall”. No participation was required to produce benefits other than electing a committee and selecting a joint venture partner. Even then, those who do not participate in voting for the partner still receive the same benefits as those who do.

Real authority over resources such as wildlife needs to be devolved to CBOs so that authority and responsibility are combined in the same decision-making unit. Perhaps the best way in which CBNRM could be advanced in Botswana would be for Land Boards to lease the land to CBOs rather than simply resource rights. The land lease could incorporate resource rights and would ensure that the CBO has exclusive control over activities such as tourism⁵. If the lease also provided for a reasonable period of tenure (certainly longer than 15 years), the CBO would also be in a much better position to design long-term development plans for its area and implement these plans.

The lack of legal and regulatory measures that define veld resources as common property rather than “open access” has also been identified as a gap in the enabling framework for natural resource management (Cassidy 2000). If Land Boards were to give community trusts long-term leases over land, this would go a long way toward creating a local-level common property resource management regime, which could include veld products, timber forest resources etc.

The devolution of strong rights of proprietorship with secure tenure could also provide communities with a stronger incentive to find useful ways to use their wildlife income. There are many explanations advanced as to why many CBOs are leaving their income in the bank. One possible reason is that the future is uncertain, including even the extent to which they will still be able to earn money from wildlife in the future. If government makes arbitrary decisions concerning quotas and species that can be hunted, if government issues edicts that income must be held by district councils, if Land Boards can take decisions that undermine CBOs’ ability to earn income, and CBOs only have a lease for 15 years, is there a guarantee that investments now (of time and effort as well as money) are worth it? Such risks might be attractive to a city-based entrepreneur, but not necessarily to rural people whose land, natural resources, and livestock are their capital.

⁵ A land lease could open the way for national wildlife legislation to extend to community trusts the same rights given to freehold farmers (called *landholders privileges*).

If stronger proprietorship and authority over wildlife were devolved to a CBO such as CECT, this might also promote the development of more active partnerships between the CBO and the private sector. CBOs would have more incentive to become active partners in management and to monitor the activities of their joint venture partner.

If CBNRM is to be more than simply generating income from wildlife, it has to focus on the appropriate incentives for promoting collective management of natural resources. There also has to be a clear understanding that “management” cannot take place unless there is the authority to decide on how the resource will be used and what form of management will be adopted.

Strong and secure proprietorship over land and resources is clearly a major foundation for successful CBNRM, and is one element of community “empowerment”. However, attention needs to be given not only to the devolution of authority to take decisions, but to how those decisions are taken and by whom. Experience in the Chobe Enclave shows that there is a need to strengthen transparency and accountability in decision making so that all sections of society can be involved. Again, however, the issue of participation and involvement is multi-faceted. There could be many reasons why individuals might not participate in decision-making. It could be due to the well-documented shortcomings in the *kgotla* system where the wealthy tend to dominate, or it could be because no tangible benefits have accrued to individuals at household level. Leaving the money in the bank and using it for community projects without it passing through the hands of individuals does not promote much sense of “ownership” of that income. If the money is not really going to affect you, why bother going to a meeting, when you could use your time for other purposes?

Start box

Key lessons

- Trusts such as CECT need to move from being passive recipients of income from trophy hunting and tourism to being true managers i.e. decision-makers;
- Trusts such as CECT are being given *responsibility* for natural resource management but little real *authority*;
- Policy and legislation need to provide CBOs with stronger rights and more secure tenure over land and resources so that the authority and incentives are provided for trusts to become decision-makers;
- Experience in CECT shows there is a need to strengthen internal transparency and accountability in decision-making so that all sections of local society can be involved; and
- In order to ensure greater participation and interest in CECT affairs, residents need to perceive that they are gaining benefits.

End box

External support and capacity building

Providing external support to CECT has not been an easy task. The NRMP/DWNP extension team had to take on the bulk of the work in the early years because of a lack of a suitable NGO (CECT had refused the assistance of the Chobe Wildlife Trust and there was no alternative organisation available). This meant that support had to be provided by personnel based in Gaborone. Yet, as Hazam (1999:14) points out, “Although visits were made on a monthly basis for 1-2 weeks at a time, it was not sufficient and is not a model to be repeated.....long processes (such as the constitution and capacity building proposals) became even longer processes as the Gaborone based team could rarely commit such large blocks of time away from their base station.”

PACT/IRCE lifted the burden on the NRMP/DWNP extension team to some extent, although its support was more in terms of skills training than the community mobilisation and facilitation carried out by the extension team. However, there appears to be a consensus that much of the training provided by PACT/IRCE has not had a significant impact for a number of reasons. These reasons include a lack of follow-up and, according to CECT committee members, inappropriate delivery methods. One of the problems of the type of training provided by NGOs is that they end up

being packaged, simply because of the need to develop modules that can be used in more than one situation. However, there is a need to sometimes listen to those receiving the training and adapt the package and method of delivery to local circumstances and needs.

There is perhaps a general lesson from CECT that those providing external support should not underestimate the capacity of those they are supporting. When interviewed in February 2000, CECT committee members had a clear idea of the type of support they needed. At the same time they felt they had a body of experience and skills that could enable them to carry out certain activities (e.g. tender assessment) themselves. The different responses of CECT and the government members of the TAC in Kasane regarding CECT's capacity and the experience of the TAC members is significant with each side believing it has to teach the other. There is a need for external support agencies to recognise their own limitations and not to assume that a lack of education equals a lack of capacity. There is also a tendency by support agencies, particularly government, to want to establish problem free systems from the start. Yet the ability of CBOs to make mistakes and learn from them surely also has to be part of "capacity building". With regard to the tender process, the CECT joint venture Review Committee should become more active in the evaluation of tenders, and the TAC should facilitate decision-making by the Review Committee rather than making decisions itself. The Review Committee should give full and open presentations to the community on the short-listed tenders and should make recommendations based on its technical evaluation with the TAC.

The external support to CECT has focused mainly on community mobilisation, the acquisition of a joint venture partner and organisational development such as financial management training. A start was made with the longer term process of the institutional development of CECT. Institutional development concerns the establishment of decision-making authority, and the rules, obligations and relationships concerned with decision-making such as between Board and VTCs, or between VTCs and village members. An institution needs to be legitimised by its members and by other institutions. This process of legitimation can only take place over time, thus institutions develop and are not created.

The process of institutional development began in the enclave with the main steps in CBO formation such as the election of a Board, the establishment of the VTCs and drafting of the CECT constitution. But the process does not end with these initial steps. The degree of accountability of the board to members, the level of communication, information and feedback between the board and members, the transparency of decision-making, the holding of regular elections, keeping to the constitution, the process of decision-making on benefit distribution/use etc. will all determine whether a community-based organisation, develops into a strong and long-enduring community institution. These are all areas in which external support, through sensitive facilitation, could assist CECT.

Start box

Key lessons

- Community mobilisation and capacity building are *processes* that require a regular and consistent presence in the community – follow up to initial visits or training events is crucial;
- Training packages and methods of delivery need to be adapted to local needs;
- Agencies providing external support should not underestimate the capacity of those they are supporting – a lack of education does not necessarily mean a lack of capacity;
- Providing space for CBOs to learn from their own mistakes should also be part of capacity building;
- External support to CBOs such as CECT needs to go beyond community mobilisation, the acquisition of a joint venture partner and organisational development (financial management, running a committee, job descriptions etc) – it needs to also focus on *institutional* development i.e. governance, decision-making, accountability; and
- Institutions need to be given legitimacy by their own members and by other institutions – they therefore develop and cannot be created. CECT is still evolving as an institution and needs sensitive facilitation support to help it in its evolution.

End box

Benefit distribution

Weak participation in VTC and CECT decision-making, especially for benefit distribution or “investment,” is a problem that can undermine the Trust’s legitimacy if efforts are not made to include more groups in benefit distribution. The CECT and VTC need to take a more proactive role in soliciting input and participation by villagers and to discuss whether some benefits should be earmarked for certain groups (women, hunters) who suffer the most from wildlife conflicts/policies. More attention should be given to whether funds should be available for other non-investment projects (community infrastructure, scholarships, micro-credit, etc.).

Outside facilitation support should focus less on defining investment opportunities and more on assisting residents of the enclave to develop decision-making processes that will lead to benefit distribution that meets the needs of the wider membership. Space needs to be provided for the residents of the enclave to define the benefits they can get from their wildlife income, instead of these benefits being defined by donors and other outsiders. Donors and NGOs supporting CBNRM need to reassess and clarify expectations that trusts such as CECT should develop enterprises. A reorientation toward the “trust as opportunity provider” concept may bring expectations in line with trust skills and development while providing a flexible means to maximise benefits to members. Once CBNRM program supporters are clear on the concept, support is needed to help VTCs to develop their own specialised vision of “opportunity provider.”

Start box

Key lessons

- Weak participation by residents in decisions concerning decision-making can undermine CECT’s and the VTC’s internal legitimacy;
- CECT needs to be more pro-active in gaining participation by villagers to discuss whether benefits should also target more marginalised groups such as women, the San and/or those who suffer most from wildlife damage;
- Less attention should be given to investment in enterprises and more to non-investment benefits such as community infrastructure, scholarships, micro-credit etc.;
- CECT could become an “opportunity provider” from which individuals and households can benefit;
- Space needs to be provided for residents to define the benefits they can get from their wildlife income, instead of these benefits being defined by donors and other outsiders; and
- Facilitation support should focus on decision-making processes that will lead to benefit distribution that meets the needs of the wider CECT membership.

End box

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